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A Note on Terms
The title ’Australian Labor Party’ was adopted for use at the 
1908 federal conference of the state parties, but, up until the First 
World War years, was not commonly employed. State Labor parties retained 
their names adopted upon foundation in the late-nineteenth, early- 
twentieth centuries. These were as follows:
NSW
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania
Political Labor League.
Political Labor Council 
Queensland Labour Party.
United Labor Party.
Australian Labor Federation. 
Tasmanian Workers’ Political League.
At the 1917 state conference of the PLL in Sydney it was decided to call 
for adoption of a common party name: Victorian and South Australian
state parties complied at their own subsequent state conferences that 
year, but it was not until a decision was made at the 1918 federal 
conference in Perth that all agreed to adopt the same style. Hereafter 
they were titled ALP, followed by the name of the state branch.
Other differences in nomenclature persisted; Labor state 
executives were known either by that name, or as central executives, 
executive committees, etc. Similarly, state conferences were also 
called conventions or congresses and organised union bodies were either 
Trades and Labor Councils, Trades Hall Councils or Industrial Councils. 
For the sake of consistency I have employed the term ALP to refer to the 
national embodiment of all six state branches, the Federal Parliamentary 
Labor Party, the federal conference, federal executive and federal 
platform. State Labor parties have been specifically identified as such 
and as a convenience terms like state conference and state executive 
have been generally adopted for ordinary use; for the same reason I have 
preferred to use the one spelling of Labor throughout.
A number of antonyms require further definition. Conservative 
and radical are used to refer to political attitudes and policies of 
protagonists to the issues; militant and moderate refer to the type of
viii
action pursued, while revolutionary and reformist concern attitudes 
to the social system as a whole. All are relative terms: it is hoped
that the intended meanings are apparent from their context. Finally, 
the Labor movement is taken to broadly involve all Labor organisations 
and groups combined, including the parliamentary-political wing, trade 
union-industrialist wing and other formally or informally affiliated 
bodies of sympathetic conviction.
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PREFACE
This is a study in the formation of policy in the Australian 
Labor Party on the closely connected subjects of defence and foreign 
relations from prior to the first World War until 1930. Broadly, the 
era selected divides into three sections. In 1908 the basic principles 
of Labor defence policy were established to ensure the protection of 
the nation as a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire and were 
implemented up until the war by Labor governments and non-Labor 
governments, with whom there was very little difference in approach. 
Secondly there was a period in which key alterations were made as a 
result of experience during the war followed by their assimilation by 
the party in the following decade and eventual reconciliation with the 
needs of government. Party policy is taken to be represented primarily 
in a constantly evolving document, the ALP federal platform binding all 
members as the democratically expressed wishes of the majority. In 
addition to the platform two other dimensions can be taken into account - 
electoral undertakings and public pronouncements by party leaders and 
the performance of the federal party when in office.“*- The last is 
especially important but applies only during 1908-9, 1910-13 and 1914-16 
or a period of six years out of the two decades selected, but encompassing 
the first great disastrous clash between the federal Labor leadership and 
substantial sections of the movement over platform issues. The Great War 
then dominates the study.
Historically, defence and foreign policies have been recurrent
and often intractable issues in the ALP and were more persistent causes
2of disagreement than practically any others. They were never more so
than during the first World War which divided the nation as never before 3or since. While the conscription crisis has attracted a wide attention,
J. Jupp, Australian Party Politics. Second edition, Melbourne, 1968.
pp. 100-101.
K. E. Beazley for example includes them with banking and finance as 
the most controversial pre-occupations encountered for his own study 
Caucus as an Instrument for Determining the Policy and Tactics of the 
FPLP in the Commonwealth Parliament, 1901-1960. M .A . t lie s1s , A .N .U . 
1967.
E. Scott, Australia During the War. Second edition, Sydney, 1937;
L. L. Robson, The First A.I.F. ; A Study of its Recruitment, 1914-18. 
Melbourne, 1970; on the ALP particularly - I. Turner, Industrial 
Labour and Politics. Canberra, 1965.
Xinevitably concentrating much upon the Labor parties, it was a highly 
complicated phenomenon in each separate party in the individual states and 
at the federal level.^ As a confederal organisation examination must 
concentrate then upon each party in its own terms, its political environ­
ment, socio-economic base, electoral position, ideological climate and 
leadership in order to explain changes to the federal platform. Defence 
and foreign policies occupied attention at every federal conference during 
this period, especially during the war, but even after the post-1918 
return to normalcy there were significant changes either made or attempted
at successive conferences up until 1930; the subject was then one of a
2persistently recurring nature over the whole period. This study is an 
attempt to place these later developments within the context both of the 
prewar and wartime periods.
3In organisation the ALP is a confederal structure composed of
4six largely autonomous state branches and a federal party. Normatively, 
federal policy is decided by a conference of equal delegations from the 
state parties and embodied in a federal platform binding all members, 
including Federal Parliamentary Labor Party members, who retain allegiance 
to their respective states. From 1915 a further body was formed based 
also upon federal representation, the federal executive, designed to 
administer national party affairs, interpret policy planks when they 
existed and to give direction between federal conferences where none was 
apparent. In practice this formal structure is subject to a number of 
formal qualifications to its theoretically democratic operation. 
Principally there is the problem identified in the critique of Michels 
in 1915 that political parties as organisations are inherently
Nevertheless only two detailed studies have been published on the 
subject, namely J.R. Robertson, ’The Conscription Issue and the 
National Movement in Western Australia: June, 1916 to December, 1917.’ 
University Studies in Western Australian History 3, 3 October, 1959 
pp. 5-57 and P.M. Gibson, 'The Conscription Issue in South Australia, 
1916-1917.' University Studies in History 4,2 1963-4 pp. 47-80.
See particularly P.M.C. Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939- 
1941. Canberra, 1952; L. Ross, 'Some Factors in the Development of 
Labor's Foreign Policy.' A.Q. 3,1, March, 1949 pp. 32-46; K.E. Beazley, 
'Labour and Foreign Policy.' A.Q. 20,2 1966 pp. 125-134; J. Spigelman, 
'Isolationism and Internationalism in ALP Foreign Policy.' A.Q. 37,4 
December, 1965 pp. 65-77; J.M. McCarthy, 'The ALP and the Armed Services. 
Theory and Practice.' L,H. 25 November, 1973 pp . 58-67.
R. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism.A Study in the Great Depression,
Canberra, 1971 p. xi .
L . F . Crisp , The Australian Federal Labour Party, 190.1. — 1 951 . Melbourne, 
1955 pp. 12-13.
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oligarchical because of the limitations of human nature and structural
necessity, ultimately leading to a par ty run by and for the leadership.1
This generalisation can be assimilated by its acceptance as a relative
characteristic with leadership control and rank and file interests
having a varying relationship, the former being capable of being
balanced out in the long term by the latter. At the federal level
especially the ALP structure has placed federal politicians at several
removes from the rank and file of the state branches and during this
period there was first a challenge then reassertion of freedom from
close state executive control on matters of general importance not
covered by the platform of the ALP. This conservative bent at the
federal level was encouraged rather than inhibited by the performance
2of the federal executive. Secondly, because the Australian Labor 
parties have always needed to appeal to broader constituencies than the 
unions and branches making up the membership in order to win office
there has been a built-in conflict between sectional and national
3responsibilities.
If the FPLP was well favored by a broad licence through 
organisational causes it was especially capable of a wide initiative 
in imposing its own will on defence and foreign policies. From the 
start the federal Labor platform was abbreviated and highly general and 
as it developed in both length and comprehensiveness proved highly 
susceptible to the urging of FPLP leadership suggestions in these areas, 
where the federal politicians possessed inherent advantages of expertise, 
authority and experience. In government this independence was greatly
increased by cabinet responsibility for implementation and administration
4of party policies and the inherent nature of decision making by 
governments in defence and foreign affairs, which involve small elites 
and permit of n one but the most general party political policies 
exercising an influence. The attempt by a political party to establish 
fairly explicit constraints upon its leaders and the success obtained 
will be another of the themes pursued here.
R. Michels, Political Parties. New York, 1959.
D.W. Rawson, 'Federalism and the Party System.’ Typescript deposited 
at the Menzies Library, ANU. 1954.
V. Gordon Childe, How Labour Governs. London, 1923; second edition 
with foreword by F.B. Smith Melbourne, 1964. Chapter V.
Crisp, The Australian Federal Labor Party, pp. 127-9.4
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Having stressed that even in a party such as the ALP, with a 
strong tradition of rank and file control, the amount of influence by 
the party over the leadership is usually minimal and restricted to very 
general areas, the party structure did nevertheless provide machinery by 
which the federal leaders could be challenged. Formal channels for the 
exertion of pressures were available, although dependent upon the 
determination and confidence of the subordinate groups using them for 
their effectiveness. Foreign and defence policy making, while normally 
remote and abstract to all but a small group of practitioners can also 
be the subject of intense public interest and concern and is amenable 
to the same processes of public response and pressure group activity as 
purely domestic issues.^" To the extent that such policies have domestic 
repercussions leading to pressures for change - as, for example, in 
adoption of a comprehensive peacetime military training scheme, an 
escalating commitment to a foreign war or threatened involvement in 
international disputes - the federal Labor platform-making procedure 
facilitated the formulation and expression of such demands.
The most suggestive model of the dynamic process in the Labor 
movement has been that advanced by Ian Turner, in the following terms:
that the trade unions provided most of the impetus for 
change in the movement's policy and struc ture, that this 
impetus for change (in so far as it went beyond immediate 
trade union demands) originated with left-wing minorities, 
and that it succeeded to the extent that these minorities 
won support within the trade unions, which in turn depended 
on the response of workers generally to their social and 
economic situation.^
Almost inevitably this approach involves a concentration upon small 
socialist sects and radical groups in the Labor parties as the 
articulators and popularisers of policy initiatives at the expense of 
the broad mass of the rank and file. Confusion of the attitudes and 
policies of these elites with the views of hundreds of thousands of 
trade unionists is an easy error; needless to say there may only be a 
tenuous relationship between the two. For limitations of space, the 
strictures imposed by theme and inherent methodological problems it 
is not possible to explore this relationship here, though it is suggested
L.W. Milbrath, 'Interest Groups and Foreign Policy' in J.M. Rosenau 
ed. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. New York, 1967.
Industrial Labour and Politics, p. XX.
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that radical programs may obtain mass support in times of socio-economic 
unrest without necessarily involving acceptance or even understanding of 
the theoretical underpinnings. In this way left wing groups and olher 
parties can exert an influence upon the policies of the Labor parties 
out of proportion to their mass support without needing to rely upon 
dexterous manipulation - in fact one of the outstanding features of 
the period was the persistence of support for political Labor from the 
rank and file. This study of the determination of federal Labor policy 
will accordingly be concerned with the success of efforts inspired by 
radical elites to upset or place constraints upon the federal leadership 
in the field of defence and foreign policies.
Being concerned to such a large extent with power in the Labor 
parties, it is necessary to stress the difficulty of ’power* as a concept. 
It will be more useful and accurate to work in terms of an influence/ 
domination continuum, from possession of a mere voice in deliberations 
to complete freedom in determining adoption of policies, with any 
number of gradations in between. By establishing the groups and factions 
upon such a continuum, their zones of acceptance in terms of the issues 
on which they seek to influence or control and the extent to which they 
do effect changes, together with the sections or institutions in the 
Labor parties which are most susceptible to such changes^ it will prove 
possible to specify with greater clarity the origins of and responsibility 
for ALP defence and foreign policies.
1 Making use of ’Some Notes on the Concept of Power’ by P.H. Partridge 
in C.A. Hughes e d . Readings in Australian Government. Brisbane, 1968.
1CHAPTER ONE
1908-16 : the Issues and the Crisis
The Issues Emerge; 1908-16.
After the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) came 
together in 1901 it quickly established itself as a policy initiator 
in the Australian Labor Party, most notably in areas of special 
competence such as defence and foreign policies.^ This dominance was 
exercised despite ALP constitutional provisions, which formally 
empowered the federal conference to formulate the federal platform and, 
later, the federal executive to interpret its planks. The FPLP leader­
ship possessed great prestige and far greater expertise in many areas 
than any other section of the ALP; it exercised this to good effect in 
the absence of concerted action by the various state executives and of 
any coherent union body, apart from the few nationally organised single 
unions and an extremely rudimentary interstate structure. Just as the 
FPLP executive led debate in caucus and presented the Labor policy in 
federal parliament, so it was also able to dominate the triennial federal 
conference and give the lead on such occasions as the drafting of 
election manifestos and statements on international developments as
they arose. Prior to 1916 the caucus leaders’ 'substantial working 
2autonomy’ was amply demonstrated in the evolution of Labor's defence
plank from the 1908 federal conference, where the vague provision for a
'citizen defence force' was enlarged in the form it was to retain for
the next decade, to read 'Citizens' Defence Force with compulsory
3military training, and Australian owned and controlled Navy.' Moved by 
the FPLP leader, J.C. Watson, and seconded by J. Hutchison, MHR, the 
debate was confined mainly to FPLP members, of whom no fewer than twelve 
contributed; this was the culmination of pressure emanating from Watson 
himself and, most loudly, from W.M. Hughes, MHR. Hughes was not a 
delegate to this conference, but was a long time advocate within the 
party of strong defence based upon compulsory military training. Both
 ^ L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party. Melbourne, 1955 is 
bv tar the best introduction, especially chapters one, two and seven.
Ibid. p.8.
3 Carried by 24 votes to 7, Report ALP federal conference, 1908 p.20.
2Hughes and Watson were members of the principal military lobby, the 
Australian National Defence League.^
Although impelled by fears of Japan, this policy was justified
in such a way as to stress its wholesome and salutary democratic nature;
given the need for some defence force, a universal training scheme
precluded formation of a militaristic professional body, as a bulwark
of the capitalist class, and ensured equality of sacrifice by both
2individuals and wealth. While several other caucus members were
unenthusiastic and led the opposition to it, Frank Tudor and King O’Malley
being noticeably in disagreement, the policy was fated to remain and an
amendment in favor of a voluntary training system, moved by J.H. Catts
3MHR and Senator E. Findley, was defeated by 21 to 10. Having gained
assent to what Watson had stressed was just a general principle, it was
in fact left to the federal caucus defence committee headed by Minister
for Defence Senator G.F. Pearce to work out the detailed proposals late 
4in 1909. Opposition to compulsion was not quietened and spirited 
resistance developed during caucus deliberations, at one stage Pearce 
offering his resignation, but approval for the policy was affirmed by 
a vote of 15-9 and opponents who had promised their electors a 
voluntary system were placated by a later amendment enabling them to 
exercise a free hand on the issue.^
Labor policy was effectively implemented by successive non-Labor 
federal governments prior to 1910 so that the Fisher Labor Government 
from 1910-1913, which took office at the height of a public scare over 
Japan, had little to do but add the later suggestions in a report by 
Lord Kitchener to produce an unusually comprehensive and, in practice,
L.F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes. A Political Biography.
Vol. one. Sydney, 1964 pp. 136-147, 220-224.
0
See speeches by Watson and Hutchison and of later speakers such as 
Holman, Report ALP federal conference, 1908 pp. 16-18 passim.
Ibid, p.20.
FPLP 30 September, 6-27 October, 1909.
Ibid 13 October 1909. See also Pearce’s remarks about a ’troublesome 
section’ in his autobiography Carpenter to Cabinet. London, 1951 
pp. 104-106.
3unduly onerous military scheme which after submission to the electors
in 1910 and fresh approval, met with little further opposition from
caucus. Both parties' naval and military policies implemented at the
start of the second decade of the century were near enough to be
described as bi-partisan. The ALP federal conference in 1912 at Hobart
indicated general satisfaction with the Labor government's performance
in reviewing specific details of the Defence Act, which had by then
been operative in its full form for a year. Most contention took place
over the question of employment of the army within Australia and the
desire of many in the Labor movement for an explicit prohibition of the
use of troops in industrial disputes.^" Little by way of public
opposition appeared until 1911-12 when the cost of the scheme came to
be realised by the general public and was given voice primarily by left
2wing minority parties and religious or civil liberty groups. The Labor
parties in each of the states offered little hostility except for an
increasing concern that the burden of participation in the scheme be
as fairly distributed as possible; these dissatisfactions culminated
at the 1915 federal conference of the ALP in Adelaide, where a number
of items submitted suggesting amendments to the Defence Act were
referred on the last day to the government for action without instruction 
3or elaboration. Labor defence policy prior to the conscription crisis 
of 1916 was almost entirely the creation of the federal caucus leaders 
in both general principles and detailed application as approved by the 
federal ALP structure.
Report ALP federal conference, 1912 pp. 47-48.
L.C. Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia. London, 1935 - 
mainly the early chapters; T.W. Tanner, 'The Introduction of 
Compulsory Military Training in Australia, 1901-1914.' ADHS Mar h/ 
April 1968 pp. 17-30, based upon a Ph.D. thesis of the same title, 
University of New England, 1972.
Minutes W.A. state executive 20 February, 1915; Report ALP federal 
conference, 1915 p. 51.
3
4While adoption of a rigorous system of compulsory military
training from the age of 12 to 26 for all fit males and establishment of
an Australian navy of substantial dimensions were impelled in part by
a growing sense of nationalism, it was nevertheless accepted that
Australian fortunes were inextricably bound up with those of the
British Empire and the defence scheme was implemented with this in mind.
According to the Imperial division of labor the Dominions were to look
to local responsibilities within a framework permitting a combined
response to any threat to British Imperial hegemony and although the
exact form of reaction in any emergency had not been spelled out except
for naval co-operation, there was little dispute concerning Australian
involvement as part of the larger unit. This foreign policy of
’imperialist nationalism’ was also largely bi-partisan from 1908'*' and
no platform guide was considered necessary to delineate the relationship
in any detail. Labor Prime Minister Andrew Fisher went to London as the
Australian representative at the 1911 Imperial Conference without any
especial instructions from the party. Consequently it was unsurprising
when at the outbreak of war in August, 1914 the ALP position should be
2fairly firm, although not unanimous. In the midst of a federal
election campaign official policy was set out in a manifesto drafted 
3by Hughes and released under the signatures of Fisher and FPLP secretary 
David Watkins.
Our interests and our very existence are bound up with 
those of the Empire. In time of war half measures are 
worse than none. If returned with a majority we shall 
pursue with the utmost rigor and determination every 
course necessary for the defence of the Commonwealth 
and the Empire in any and every contingency.
On the hustings Fisher himself resurrected in several forms an old
rhetorical phrase and pledged Australia to her last man and last shilling
4in support of a successful result. Addressing Parliament as the newly
C. Grimshaw, ’Australian Nationalism and the Imperial Connection, 
1900-1914.’ AJPH 3,2 May 1958 pp. 161-182; based upon the author's 
M.A. thesis, Some Aspects of Australian Attitudes to the Imperial 
Connection, 1900-1919. University of Queensland, 1957.
J.B. Welfield identifies a small FPLP group which was in serious 
doubts about the war from the start in 'The Labor Party and the War, 
1914-1915'. ADHS November, 1966 pp. 30-43.
According to Frank Anstey M.H.R. C.P.D. 81.28 February, 1917 p. 10750; 
FPLP executive meeting 16 June, 1914.
4 E. Scott, Australia During the War, second edition, Sydney 1937 
pp. 22-3.
5returned Prime Minister with a decisive majority in both Houses this 
was repeated^" and the government plunged itself into the preparation 
and despatch of an expeditionary force to the Middle East, whence the 
Gallipoli venture was mounted in 1915. Recruiting for the force remained 
however a state matter and it was there that Labor opposition to 
reinforcement and, ultimately, to participation in the war itself arose. 
While tensions were inherent in the Labor movement at this time, trouble 
really began between the state parties and the FPLP at the time of the 
accession to federal leadership of W.M. Hughes.
Fisher had been a popular and affable leader in the prewar
FPLP - a consensus man unchallenged in an organisation which was largely
self-regulating and in which the only recognisable faction was a
’torpedo brigade’, a ginger group consisting of King O’Malley, Dr. W.R.N.
Maloney, J.H. Catts and others. Nevertheless there were structural
tensions in the party leading in mid-1915 to a demand from caucus that
the government pay greater attention to consulting the rank and file
2and accept some measure of influence from it. Such problems have been
advanced as the reason for Fisher's decision on 26 October to resign his
parliamentary seat and accept the post of High Commissioner in London,
ostensibly for reasons of ill-health, but there was also the suggestion
that he was helped out of office by the fractiousness of Hughes,
3goading Fisher into an acrimonious determination to leave. Hughes had
long been recognised as the real dynamo in the leadership, though only
Attorney-General, his strength resting on his position in the N.S.W.
party and ability in the federal cabinet rather than popularity in4caucus. He was the natural and unanimous choice as new leader, with 
Frank Tudor replacing him as deputy.^
C.P.D. 75. 14 October, 1914 p. 174.
FPLP 10, 14 June 1915.
N.J.O. Makin, Federal Labour Leaders. Sydney, 1961 pp. 34-35.
Fitzhardinge William Morris Hughes pp. 252-3; ’W.M. Hughes and the 
Federal Labor Leadership’. H,S. 12, 45 October,1965 pp. 123-5.
5 FPLP 30 October, 1915.
6Hughes, the tireless agitator in prewar years for compulsory
military training and home defence, had been an enthusiastic exponent
of whole-hearted involvement in the war from the start. Sir Ronald
Munro-Ferguson, the Governor-General, commended him to the British
government as ’a most sincere Imperialist and to him more than any
other is due the progress made by Australia in naval and military
preparation’.* 23 4 Australian government influence over the conduct of the
war had been minimal and early dispute over the size of the contingent
to be sent overseas was deliberately dampened by the Governor-General,
but the issue of Japan very soon developed as a cause for disagreement
with Britain and for domestic division. German colonial possessions
in the Pacific had been seized at the start of the war by Australian
and Japanese forces, the latter acting under the provisions of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and an effective demarcation line between the
two areas of responsibility had been settled on at the Equator after
consultations in London by the British and Japanese governments.
Australia had then been informed of this arrangement, Munro-Ferguson
instructed to prepare her for a permanent postwar settlement on this
basis and the matter kept from public disclosure. At first the Governor-
General was able to report that the Australian government was likely to
view ’with equanimity, or at any rate without serious protest, a
continued occupation of these possessions by Japan should that be found
2expedient at the peace settlement.' As the implications began to sink
in however Australian political leaders began to register protests and
in April Fisher decided to 'inform his colleagues in the most concise
terms as to the attitude of the home government and seems to have had
3second thoughts about the advisability of such concessions.' Later
though it was reported that he had merely assured cabinet that the
matter would remain one for postwar determination. The issue refused
to die hereafter though and Fisher became subject to serious alarm as
to Japanese ambitions on the basis of such information as he was
4receiving from a variety of indirect and semi-official sources.
Munro-Ferguson - Asquith 5 December, 1915. Novar papers MS 696/699-700
2 Munro-Ferguson - L.V. Harcourt, Secretary of State for Colonies,
24 February, 1915, Ibid 696/665-666.
3 Ibid 13 April, 1915 696/679.
4 The matter has been treated illuminatingly by D.C.S. Sissons in an M.A. 
thesis Australia’s Attitude to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923. University 
of Melbourne, 1956. See also Fitzhardinge, ’Australia, Japan and Great 
Britain, 1914-1918: A Study in Triangular Diplomacy.’ H.S. 14, 54
April, 1970 pp. 250-9 and D.K. Dignan, ’Australia and British Relations
with Japan, 1914-1921.’ A.O. 21,2 August, 1962 pp. 135-150.
7R ig id  c e n s o r s h ip  was imposed by th e  governm ent on any d i s c u s s i o n
o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  c h a l l e n g e  f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  war f o r  f e a r  o f
o f f e n d i n g  w hat was a m a jo r  a l l y  a c t i v e l y  engaged  i n  a s s i s t i n g  to  convoy
A u s t r a l i a n  t r o o p s  to  t h e  f i g h t i n g  z o n e s .  Under t h e  War P r e c a u t i o n s  Act
i t  became an o f f e n c e  to  p r e j u d i c e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  H is  M a je s ty  w i th
J a p a n  by r e f e r e n c e  n o t  o n ly  to  th e  l a t t e r ' s  t e r r i t o r i a l  g a in s  and
a l l e g e d  s t r a t e g i c  i n t e n t i o n s  b u t  a l s o  to  c o lo r e d  l a b o r  and im m ig ra t io n
from  J a p a n  to  A u s t r a l i a ,  f o r  f e a r  t h a t  to  do so would tem pt t h e  v e ry
f a t e  i t  was so u g h t  t o  warn a g a i n s t .  As Hughes h im s e l f  p u t  t h e  p ro b le m ,
'a n  i n s u l t  to  J a p a n  m ig h t  send  h e r  o v e r  to  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  and so
u t t e r l y  d e s t r o y  u s . W h e n  Hughes became P rim e M i n i s t e r  he  was a lm o s t
im m e d ia te ly  im p re sse d  by th e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  when a g g r e s s i v e l y
ap p ro a c h e d  by th e  J a p a n e s e  C o n s u l -G e n e ra l  t o  Sydney, S. S h im iz u ,  o v e r
h i s  g o v e rn m e n t 's  d e s i r e  f o r  A u s t r a l i a n  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  com m erc ia l
a r r a n g e m e n ts  e n t e r e d  i n t o  by G re a t  B r i t a i n  as  p a r t  o f  t h e  A n g lo -
J a p a n e s e  A l l i a n c e .  T h i s ,  co u p le d  w i th  th e  i s s u e  of  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e
P a c i f i c  i s l a n d s  and d o u b ts  as  t o  B r i t i s h  s u p p o r t  of th e  w h i t e  A u s t r a l i a
p o l i c y ,  l a y  b e h in d  H ughes ' d e c i s i o n  to  go a lm o s t  a t  once t o  London. At
t h i s  s t a g e  caucus  a p p e a r s  t o  have  b een  a d v is e d  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  f o r  t h e
f i r s t  t im e  and o n ly  t h r e e  members v o te d  a g a i n s t  H ughes ' p ro p o se d  t r i p
a f t e r  t h e  P rim e M i n i s t e r  'w en t  i n t o  d e t a i l  to  show th e  n e c e s s i t y  of
someone go ing  t o  E ng land  to  p l a c e  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  v iew s  i n  c o n n e c t io n
2
w i th  any s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  w a r , '  b u t  t h e  i n f o r m a t io n  t e n d e r e d  rem a in ed  
r a t h e r  s k e tc h y  and d id  n o t  a p p a r e n t l y  convey any s e n s e  of  r e a l  c r i s i s .
By t h i s  s t a g e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  Labor governm ent 
w i t h  t h e  Labor movement had e n t e r e d  i n t o  an unhappy e r a .  I n  S e p te m b e r ,  
1915 a com pulsory  war c e n su s  had been  t a k e n  w hich  was accom panied  by a 
'C a l l  to  Arms' from Hughes announc ing  th e  need f o r  an a d d i t i o n a l  5 0 ,000  
men i n  t h e  AIF and c o n t a i n i n g  a s e c t i o n  i n t e r r o g a t i n g  e l i g i b l e s  on t h e i r  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  e n l i s t .  G re a t  a n ta g o n ism  was engendered  by t h e  c e n su s  
w i t h i n  t h e  u n io n  wing o f  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  due to  t h e  s u s p i c i o n  t h a t  i t  
fo reshadow ed  m i l i t a r y  a n d /o r  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n s c r i p t i o n ,  as had a l r e a d y  
been  r u l e d  o u t  by F i s h e r  i n  a l e t t e r  t o  t h e  Q ueensland  s t a t e  s e c r e t a r y
Hughes -  P e a rc e  3 Decem ber, 1917. P e a rc e  p a p e r s  AWM 4 1 9 / 8 0 /2 ,
B undle  6 /2 0 .
FPLP 11 November, 1915. J .H .  C a t t s ,  mover o f  t h e  m o tio n  e n d o r s in g  
th e  t r i p ,  l a t e r  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  t h e  r e a s o n s  advanced  had b e e n  c o n n e c te d  
w i th  J a p a n  and A u s t r a l i a n  d e f e n c e .  CPD 84. 24 A p r i l ,  1918 p .  4195.
8of the Labor party. Hughes denied any such intention of changing policy
but the matter was exacerbated when, at a time of increasing costs of
living in nearly every state, the Prime Minister abandonned bills
carried in parliament to permit resubmission of crucial constitutional
amendments affecting economic and industrial powers to referenda at the
2end of the year. This expedient was endorsed by caucus on the grounds 
of the need to avoid partisan strife by accepting a suggestion that 
the six states be asked to surrender the powers needed to the federal 
government for the duration of the war. It aroused a storm of controversy 
however, revealing a basic dichotomy between those in the Labor parties 
who considered the war important enough to suspend matters of salience 
in the platform and in election promises and others who did not regard 
the war as being of such overwhelming importance to justify neglect of 
Labor's program of social reform.
The Victorian state executive especially had been geared up for
the referenda and took strong objection to this disregard of an
explicit federal conference decision, as approved by federal executive
and promised in the federal election manifesto. Failing to obtain
satisfaction in an interview with Hughes it called a special meeting of
the federal executive to consider two resolutions of protest at the
decision. The issue involved seemed quite clear - a disregard of a
specific government commitment; the federal executive had been created
in Adelaide in 1915 especially 'to fulfill similar functions in regard
to federal Labor affairs to those carried out by the executives of the 
3various states.' Senator T. Givens, federal president and a Hughes 
supporter, defended the action when the federal executive met on 6-7 
January, 1916 in Melbourne against a motion submitted by the South 
Australian party
That the executive regrets that the FPLP assented to the 
postponement of the constitutional referendum proposals 
without reference to the Australian Political Labor 
Executive and urges that in future no action in 
opposition to the expressed wish of conference shall 
be taken without consultation with such executive.
Stating that 'our party has no intention of amending the Defence Act 
to provide for compulsory service abroad.' FPLP 12, 19 November, 1914.
By 51-6 at a special meeting, Ibid 4 October, 1915.2
3 Report by NSW federal executive delegates W.M. Hughes and J.D. 
Fitzgerald MLC. Report NSW state executive, 1915.
9This was carried after a long discussion in which Hughes defended himself 
and the Prime Minister swept out of the meeting in protest against the 
censure against him, threatening to leave the movement. His recovery 
was sufficiently speedy though to enable him to subvert the decision 
overnight, intimidating all but the intransigent Victorian delegates 
Laurie Cohen and Arch. Stewart. When the latter arrived at the 
appointed hour for the resumed meeting next day he reported that they 
were 'astounded to find all the other members of the executive assembled.
He asked Senator Givens what it meant, and was told "It is just a little 
informal chat we are having."'^ Hughes' informal chat resulted in 
recommittal of the resolution which was then withdrawn, a modified motion 
approved and the whole matter then brushed aside, to the chagrin of the 
Victorians. This failure of the first real test of federal executive 
authority had far-reaching consequences and instead of being the check 
upon the FPLP originally envisaged it remained a toothless body hampered 
by lack of resources, moral authority and its spasmodic ability to meet.
No substantial brake on the Labor government existed then, apart from 
the federal conference, except for whatever pressure the individual state 
executives could exert.
Hostility in the Labor movement against the federal government 
was not confined to Hughes alone, whom the acerbic Victorian Labor paper 
the Labor Call condemned for the '"hymns of hate" he is always chortling,
his Imperial sycophancy, his anti-democratic legislation and administration
2and his sins of omission and commission against working class principles.'
Next to the Prime Minister, the Postmaster-General, William Webster, was
perhaps the most widely disliked minister, the general secretary of the
Australian Telegraph and Telephone Construction and Maintenance Union
registering 'complete dissatisfaction' at his performance before a in eling
of the Brisbane branch of that union, where he was supported by several
3FPLP members present. Later Webster was censured by his own party at
4the NSW state conference in April for his anti-union attitude. The
Report of the federal secretary, A. Stewart, Minutes ALP federal 
conference, 1918 p. 12.
Labor Call 16 December, 1915.
J.B. Sharpe, J. Page and W.F. Finlayson, MsHR, and Senators Mullan 
and Turley. Daily Standard 17, 20 January, 1916.
4 Australian Worker 27 April, 1916.
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unfortunate George Pearce, later Acting-Prime Minister from 16 January
to 31 July, 1916 during Hughes' absence, was subjected to constant and
often acidulous criticism for his administration of the Department of
Defence.^ Hughes' natural autocratic predilections and inability to
brook interference were reinforced by a High Court decision confirming
his extraordinary powers under the War Precautions Act over the whole
of Australian society, enabling him to govern the country 'with a
2fountain pen and a good lawyer' in marked distinction to Labor 
principles. Indeed, cabinet government as a whole appears ineffectual 
during this period; according to one member of it, Hugh Mahon, the 
Minister for External Affairs,
Each Minister's hands were full of his own departmental 
affairs; the duties of all were onerous and exacting, 
and we fell into the habit of usually accepting without 
much question the advice of the Prime Minister and the 
Minister for Defence on all matters arising out of the' 
war. We had not the time and seldom had the information 
to test the views placed before us ... Indeed, in 
several matters of the first importance, the Cabinet as 
a body was not consulted at all, action having been taken 
by the Prime Minister on his own volition or in consultation 
with one other member of the government.^
As a result of his own experience leading the government, Pearce
concluded that action to strengthen the ministry was essential to
prevent breakdowns in the forthcoming parliamentary session and
proposed a reshuffle of portfolio s and appointment of under-secretaries
to the key ministers to assist the work but not actually sit in cabinet:
4Hughes concurred with this in principle. Under the circumstances this 
trend was probably unavoidable to some extent but the essential point 
is inescapable that a marked divergence from the expected standard of 
behaviour of a Labor government had taken place.
J. Merritt, George Foster Pearce: Labour Leader. M.A. thesis,
University of Western Australia, 1963.
H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader. Sydney, 1940. pp. 367-8.
Address by Mahon in Perth 20 March, 1917. Report W.A. state 
conference, 1917 pp. 4-12.
4 Pearce - Hughes 22 June, 1916 and Hughes - Pearce 25 June, 1916. 
Pearce papers AWM 419/80/2. Buhdle 3/3/82.
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The conscription crisis: 1916
Even before leaving Australia Hughes had equivocated on the
subject of conscription for overseas service, qualifying an earlier
categorical assurance that he would not resort to it by an admission
that it was conceiveable in certain circumstances but that ’no
conscription will be brought into this country without an appeal to
the country.’'*" His visit to Britain and the front lines confirmed his
conviction that Australia must adopt conscription to fulfill its proper
role in the war - partly as a matter of justice, partly through
enthusiasm for the job at hand and the need to replace the high
casualties then being sustained on the Somme and partly because of the
Japanese problem. After consultations in London Hughes concluded that
’all our fears - or conjectures - that Japan was and is most keenly
interested in Australia are amply borne out by the facts,' fearing that
even a temporary Allied reverse would lead to victory of the pro-German
elements in Japan and that further British requests for Japanese
assistance would lead to even greater concessions against Australian
interests. He made it clear to Grey, the British Foreign Secretary,
that his government would be prepared to acquiesce in establishment of
the Equator as a dividing line between Japanese and British possessions
and the conceding of certain commerical rights if necessary, but would
2not go any further. Against the future Hughes determined upon an 
’insurance policy’ strategy to safeguard Australian security by a 
maximum effort on the Empire’s behalf. A well placed observer of 
government policy at the time explained the reasoning behind this:
By our effort from 1914 to 1918 we piled up a credit balance 
that seems to me to outweigh our debt to Great Britain for 
the safety she assured us until 1914 ... Mr. Hughes had
in mind our future claim on Great Britain when he kept 
Australia up to its war effort in the first conscription 
campaign and afterwards.^
Statement to a Brisbane Industrial Council delegation on 8 December, 
1915. Daily Standard 9 December, 1915.
Hughes - Pearce 21 April, 1916. Pearce papers AWM. 419/80/2.
Bundle 3/3/32.
E.L. Piesse writing on 22 May, 1936. Piesse papers MS 882/9/116. 
Edmund L. Piesse, 1880-1947, was Director of Military Intelligence, 
Department of Defence, Melbourne from 1916 to 1919 and Director of 
the Pacific Branch, Prime Minister’s Department, from 1919 to 1923. 
See also his article 'Japan and Australia’, Foreign Affairs. 4,3 
April 1926 pp. 475-488 and Sissons' Australia’s Attitude to Japan 
and Defence.
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By agreement Pearce discouraged public debate on conscription until 
Hughes’ return and refused to admit any projected change of policy, 
arranging independently however for activation of the compulsory call­
up for training provisions of the Defence Act in an attempt to encourage 
enlistments. Upon arrival in Adelaide Hughes made a stirring speecli 
for defence of the white Australia policy which was promptly censored 
in a pattern which must have tried the Prime Minister’s patience to the 
limit - he had very strong arguments for conscription based upon the 
Japan threat but could not voice them because of the necessity for 
circumspection in reference to that country in all public utterances.^
Hughes’ preoccupations led him to adopt the stance of a
convinced Imperialist. Others in his party shared similar fears but
adopted quite opposite conclusions from them, marking a fundamental
divergence of interpretation. Japan had been a subject of interest in
the Labor press as a potential source of cheap colored labour and
immigration by Asians into Australia, as well as more sinister intentions.
Greatly agitated over the Japanese 21 Demands on China one FPLP member,
J.H. Catts, had circulated a memorandum amongst his parliamentary
colleagues in all parties during May, 1916 calling for more efficient
2organisation of home defence forces. At a secret session of both
Houses of Parliament after his return Hughes presented a confidential
resume of his experiences which confirmed for Catts and a number of
others the impression that Japan was intent on leveling requirements
on Australia that she make commercial concessions and agree to permit
3immigration landing rights to Japanese. Despite the censorship the 
same fears were transmitted further afield and were referred to as
4’common knowledge’ at the time of the conscription referendum campaign.
Piesse papers MS 882/9/288-9. Even the military author of the 
censorship provisions in Australia accepted by the press in 1914 
’never for a moment thought they’d stand them.’ C.E.W. Bean,
Two Men I Knew. Sydney, 1957 p. 14.
CPD 81 22 February, 1917 pp. 10575-6 and Ibid 84 25 April, 1918 
p. 4189.
This belief was extensive, see for example the debates on holding 
of the conscription referendum Ibid 80. 14, 15, 20 September, 1916; 
Dr. W. Maloney p. 8593; W. Webster p. 8626; Frank Anstey pp. 8680-1; 
J.H. Catts and J.E. Fenton pp. 8699-8703 and 8731. Also speeches by 
Charles McDonald, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Daily 
Standard 24 October, 1916, Senator Mullan Ibid; W.F. Finlayson MHK 
Ibid 11 October, 1916; Senator W.J. Maughan Ibid 17 October, 1916.
A. McCallum in an address to the Midland District Council, ALF. 
Minutes Midland D.C. 31 January, 1917.
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Several of the key union leaders echoed these views in public statements
at the time, such as the Acting-President of the AWU who replaced the
conscriptionist W.G. Spence, W.J. Riordan,^ and other Victorians who led
2the anti-conscription campaign. The Prime Minister vehemently sought
3to deny any such interpretation but his credibility had so far
4deteriorated that if anything he merely compounded the suspicion, and 
at the height of the conscription campaign the Japanese Consul-General 
himself felt obliged to disavow any malign intentions on the part of his 
government.^
The basic difference between Hughes and FPLP moderates like
Catts, radicals such as Senator Ferricks and later a highly important
group of NSW unionists, was that the latter group believed the Japanese
danger to be so perilous and imminent as to make concentration upon the
Western Front in Europe alone strategic folly. Hughes was content that
any challenge would be mounted diplomatically after the war and desired
to win the gratitude of the British for Australia's part in the war with
this in mind, whereas many of his principle opponents fully expected a
threat to develop before the conclusion of the war, and especially if it
continued to go badly for the Allies. By this reasoning it was deeply
dangerous to send the great bulk of Australian manpower overseas when it
might be needed at home. This is not to deny other honorable or less
admirable reasons for opposition to conscription for overseas service,
£
which was nothing if not a complex question. At the union level
Daily Standard 16 October, 1916.
For example J.H. Scullin and F.J. Riley, secretary of the Australian 
Peace Alliance. Ibid 9 October, 1916.
Register 9 October, 1916.
Piesse papers MS 882/9/301.
Ibid 21 October, 1916.
Most adequate account of the matter is that by T.A. Metherell, The 
Conscription Referenda; October, 1916 and December, 1917: an inward
turned nation at war. Ph.D. University of Sydney, 1971, presenting 
the crisis in terms of domestically-derived imperatives. See also 
H. McQueen, A New Britannia. Penguin, 1970 pp. 76-8. Sissons' 
Australia's Attitude to Japan and Defence provides a vital dimension 
to Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics and L.L. Robson, The First 
AIF. A Study of its Recruitment 1914-1918. Melbourne, 1970.
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conscription aroused misgivings which had been voiced only by a socialist 
and Christian-pacifist minority, namely that the system was inherently 
unfair to the working class. As class antagonisms were sharpened during 
the war years under the social and economic strains encountered, the 
conscription crisis represented for many workers the embodiment of all 
their dissatisfactions: Japan intruded most obviously into their
concerns as a source of cheap goods and cheap colored labour, which the 
anti-conscriptionists were not loath to stress.
While still in Europe Hughes had been warned by Pearce that a
majority of the FPLP was opposed to conscription for overseas service,
after the latter had prevailed upon Labor whip, James Page, to privately
sound as many of the members as possible.'*' Page later publicly claimed2
that 'the Federal Labor party would never consent to it.' The Prime 
Minister's problem then lay in circumventing this opposition while still 
remaining in office and to do so he disregarded the arrangement arrived 
at in January at the federal executive meeting. There
Mr. McCallum (W.A.) asked the Prime Minister if he would give 
his word as head of the government that in order to maintain 
solidarity, he would convene a meeting of the interstate 
conference before introducing conscription. This Mr. Hughes 
refused to do. It was pointed out to him that any action the 
Commonwealth Government or the parliamentary party may take 
in this regard would not bind the organisations. Mr. Hughes 
replied that he understood that perfectly well. However the 
president (Senator Givens) gave his assurance that if the 
government made any move to introduce conscription he would 
summon a meeting of the executive.
Pearce and Hughes sampled Labor opinion in the eastern states before 
committing themselves in August. First came the secret report to 
parliament which failed to swing a majority; Hughes could have carried 
a Bill in the House of Representatives with his Labor supporters plus 
the Liberal opposition, but Labor held 31 out of 36 Senate seats and a 
majority of opponents there could have rejected the legislation or any 
War Precautions Act regulation. The caucus reaction to Hughes' return
G.F. Pearce, Carpenter to Cabinet. London, 1951. p. 136.
Daily Standard 1 May, 1916.
Report of federal executive delegate A. McCallum, Minutes W.A. state 
executive 6 March, 1916.
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was initially encouraging however, the first meeting for the new session
unanimously carrying a motion of welcome and congratulation for his work
in London.“*“ On the next day, Friday 25 August, the Prime Minister made
his move at the preceding cabinet meeting introducing for the first time
the proposal for a referendum on compulsory service. At no time did
Hughes let the cabinet or caucus take a straight vote for or against
conscription, knowing that only Pearce and Webster would support him
2from the ministry, while in caucus two-thirds stood opposed to the
3imposition of compulsory service by law or regulation.
Out of a ministry of ten it appears that an almost equal split
developed over the proposal to hold a referendum but Hughes relied upon
the principle of collective cabinet solidarity to prevent his ministerial
4opponents from carrying their opposition into the caucus. Much 
correspondence had built up in caucus during his absence seeking 
clarification on conscription and debate was initiated on this. Hughes 
took the plunge: ’After having explained our position in relation to
the war I laid certain proposals in connection with the prosecution of 
the war before the party.’“* In a masterly performance Hughes presented 
a typical peroration - vociferous and dramatic, complete with flourished 
telegram ’just arrived from Lloyd-George’ - and presented a case in terms 
of the losses suffered by the Allies and the grave situation on the 
Western Front. It became clear that Hughes was inciting the members to 
disregard their state parties, despite the decisions against conscription 
by the eastern state executives, and appeal over the heads of the 
organisations, which acted in ignorance of the full facts and were under
FPLP 24 August, 1916.
Hughes told the Governor-General that ’he had had no backing whatever 
in his original intention to challenge a vote in parliament on 
compulsory service.’ Munro-Ferguson - Bonar-Law 29 October, 1916.
Novar papers MS 696/834.
Claim by Catts Daily Standard 10 October, 1916, supported by Anstey's 
estimate recorded by Vol. Molesworth in 'Points in F. Anstey M11R speech, 
Town Hall 22 September, 1916.’ Molesworth papers Uncat. MS 243/2/E.
W.G. Higgs quoted in the Westralian Worker 2 February, 1917.
Daily Standard 26 August, 1916. F.J. Riley was the Brisbane paper's 
Melbourne correspondent and was extremely well informed on the FPLP 
proceedings, scooping all papers in Australia in predicting the eventual 
outcome one day before the public announcement in parliament and 
accurately forecasting the split and disruption to follow. Out of 71 
FPLP members 61 were in attendance on the Friday. Mahon was ill, two 
others on active service, six on an official visit to London and one on 
a private trip to the United Kingdom. Ibid 28 August, 1916.
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the influence of 'a worthless section of disloyalists’. He would 'stake 
his life’ that he could carry the hostile sections with him: the FPLP
was responsible only to the electors, 50% of whom could be carried on a 
referendum for approval of compulsory overseas service. He conceded 
in debate that members would in any case have ’unlimited scope to say 
whatever you wish subject to the laws of your country.'^ Caucus then 
met again on the next day, Saturday, in the afternoon and evening 
without decision, then again on Monday afternoon and evening, finally
2concluding the debate at around 2-2.30 a.m. on Tuesday morning, 29 August.
The final decision was a compromise on the original proposal to 
use the Defence Act powers to call up eligibles in the primary class for 
training and to hold a referendum at the end of September to ratify 
their subsequent despatch to France. Instead, a one month period of 
grace would be extended to the voluntary system to fulfil what was set 
down as the minimum quota of replacements.
Mr. Hughes replied to the various speakers and after further 
discussion made a proposition that the government should not 
call up any men to the colors for training, until one month 
went by, but if the men responded by voluntary enlistment in 
sufficient numbers during this m onth and after no men should 
be called up until after the referendum on conscription was 
taken. If on the other hand the number of enlistments was 
not sufficient, men should be called to the colors after the 
month had elapsed.
Even so Hughes had pushed his case to the limit, stringing out debate
until the early hours of the morning when nearly a third of the members
had gone to their homes or hotels, leaving only 44 to participate in the 
4fateful vote. Moreover it appears that the closure of the debate may 
have been just in time to prevent serious embarrassment, as one close 
observer maintained that 'Victorian members had declared their intention
Anstey - Henry Boote, editor of the Australian Worker, dated 'Friday 
night' - obviously 25 August after caucus adjourned. Boote papers 
MS 2070/1/73-78; also M. Blackburn The Conscription Referendum of 
1916. Melbourne, 1936 p. 6.
2 Daily Standard 28-30 August, 1916.
3 FPLP 28 August, 1916.
4 Senator E. Needham - McCallum, 12 March, 1917. W.A. state executive 
correspondence.
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of refraining from voting but of fighting conscription in the event of 
it being put to the people.1 2*4'’ According to McCallum the final vote was 
most irregularly held in conditions of undue haste.
Mr. Hughes rose from his chair and delivered a passionate 
appeal. When his exhortation reached a climax, when what 
he deemed the psychological moment had arrived, he called 
on all those who favored his policy to hold up their right 
hands. 'Twenty-three,' he said. 'All against? Twenty.
I declare the motion carried.' 'What vote?' some of the 
members asked. 'You have no motion. Who moved it? Who 
seconded it? How can you ask us to vote when no resolution 
is either moved or seconded?' Mr. Hughes gave no answer.^
It was enough as far as Hughes was concerned though and he then drafted
his final proposals at a last session of cabinet on Wednesday, 30 August
for presentation to the House and the nation in mid-afternoon. In the
eventual form the proposal for the referendum remained and, if endorsed,
compulsion would be applied to the extent necessary to make up the
shortfall of volunteers for the next month. As an added measure Hughes
called another secret session of both Houses to expose 'pertinent facts
of great moment' which would enable the parliament to reconvene and
consider the details of the referendum plan 'in the full light of all3the knowledge that is in the possession of the Government.' It would 
appear that amongst the information disclosed at the session was a 
reprise of the Japanese threat.
Having informed parliament of the compromise arrived at Hughes 
lost little time in seeking to substantiate his claim that the rest of 
the movement could be talked around, having wired all Labor organisations 
in the interim asking them to suspend judgement until he could put his 
full case. On 1 September he addressed first the Victorian state
4executive but met a blank refusal to support holding of the referendum.
A. McCallum, 'Labor Impeaches the Hughes Dictatorship.' W.A. state 
executive pamphlet, 1917.
2 Ibid.
2 CPD 79. 30 August, 1916 p. 8403.
4 E. J. Holloway, The Australian Victory over Conscription in 1916-17. 
Melbourne, 1966 pp. 5-6.
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The following hectic week began with a trip to Sydney, where he found 
however that opponents had been sent up from Melbourne to present the 
other side of the story, and he met with little luck either before the 
state executive or the Sydney Labor Council.^ Before the executive of 
the PLL Hughes made use of the Japan scare in one of the few instances 
outside of the confines of parliament.
The Prime Minister told a moving tale of a 'white speck 
in a colored ocean.’ It was the sole burthen of a new 
song. Forgotten were the references to German psychology; 
the promises made to the British government; the terrible 
menace of the Hun and the need for men in Europe.
'Australia was but a few day's steam etc.' 'The whole 
course of evolution in the Pacific had catastrophically 
come to a head.' There was an ambassador in London!
'He said to me...! ' 'I put him off!' All this with 
shrugs and gesticulations. There were uncompleted 
sentences which suggested what they did not say. It was 
a night when men read what they willed into the words 
which were more a key to a secret door than the confidential 
statement of a great statesman to the chosen confidants of 
his bosom.'^
A motion in Hughes' favor by his supporters was lost by 21-5 and the
Prime Minister warned that he would be expelled if he persisted in the 
3scheme. One last channel of appeal remained open and Hughes went
straight from Sydney to Adelaide, where he was able to catch the South
Australian state conference of the Labor party on its second last day.
More orthodox arguments here sufficed to win an equivocal resolution
from the conference which his supporters were able to represent as a
vote of confidence in Hughes' leadership, even though the party
4specifically stated its opposition to compulsory service. Again lie had
Minutes special meeting Sydney Labor Council 4 September, 1916.
'The Apostasy of W.M. Hughes.' A.W. 6 February, 1919. Reprinted 
from an article in the Westralian Worker. Also M.E. Lloyd, Sidelights 
on Two Referendums, 1916-1917. Sydney, 1952 and J.T. Lang,
I Remember. Sydney, 1956 p. 66.
V. Molesworth, 'A History of the Industrial Section of the ALP.' 
Molesworth papers, Uncat. Mss 71/2/ Full Story and Documents, pp. 10-11.
4 Minutes S.A. state conference, 1916.
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been shadowed by other members of federal caucus eager to point out 
inconsistencies in Hughes' arguments and impress upon members of the 
state party the strength of opposition to conscription elsewhere.'*’
This last mixed result could not disguise the fact that the
major Labor parties were convincingly opposed to conscription and the
Prime Minister's strategy. Nevertheless Hughes pushed on with the
referendum, which could not resolve the issue by deciding any
constitutional point, for legislation or regulations would still have
to be passed by both Houses if it was carried. Rather it was hoped by
the conscriptionists that a resounding mandate for the policy could be
used to intimidate the Labor movement into acquiescence, however
2reluctant it might have to be. The majority of the FPLP succumbed to
Hughes' bluff that without this minimal compromise he would be forced to
resign. James Page, the Queensland MHR, presented a variant of this
argument as being the reason for caucus approval of the referendum in a
special address to the Queensland state executive; failing action by the
government, Hughes argued, the opposition would have moved a motion of
no-confidence in the government and, after a subsequent election and a
likely win by the Liberals, conscription would have been introduced
regardless and without the accompanying wealth taxes promised as a
corollary to Hughes' scheme. If the party did not agree to the compromise
3Hughes threatened to resign and precipitate the same sequence. Munro-
Ferguson had already offered a dissolution of the House of Representatives
were conscription defeated in a straight vote but the cabinet had
4opposed this to a man. The threat of resignation was sufficient to keep 
the cabinet relatively quiescent during the crisis and to hold individual
Hughes singled out Senator Ferricks and G.M. Burns, MHR for being 
'guilty of conduct treacherous to the party' as a result of this 
episode. FPLP 14 September, 1916. Arch. Stewart and Maurice Blackburn 
also assisted in this regard under conditions in which personal 
emissaries sent from state to state were the only reliable means of 
communication between the respective parties.
See Hughes' speech CPD 79. 1 September, 1916 p. 8425 and Pearce ibid 
p. 8409.
Minutes Queensland state executive 13 September, 1916.3
4 Munro-Ferguson - Bonar-Law 10 November, 1916. Novar papers MS 696/ 
251-4.
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ministers firm against the pressures of the state parties. After Frank 
Tudor resigned despite the principle of solidarity which Hughes had 
insisted upon, a promise was extracted from the remainder that any 
further resignations on the basis of principle would be held over until 
after the referendum: according to Hugh Mahon ’the government was kept
intact only by an understanding that while dissenting ministers need not 
support his campaign they would not oppose him.''*'
While both cabinet ministers and backbenchers were on the whole 
prepared to accept this situation the state parties were decidedly not.
In constitutional terms the FPLP had been indemnified at the beginning 
of the year against attempts at interference by state branches by 
adoption at the January federal executive meeting of a Western Australian 
motion
That each state executive be informed that the decisions of 
any conference other than the interstate conference of the 
Australian Labor party shall not be binding on the federal 
Labor party or the federal government unless endorsed by 
such interstate conference.
Upon this authority many FPLP members felt justified in ignoring the
decisions of their state parties in the initial stage of decision-
2making on the referendum. This ruling had apparently been so little 
recognised and the issues of such great moment that in practice the 
state executives disregarded it. The opposition to conscription had 
stemmed from initially a small group of left-wing unionists and 
socialists and by 1916 was an article of faith for the majority of 
organised labor, being expressed by trade union bodies in the eastern 
states and at national union conferences in Melbourne and Hobart as well 
as in the state conferences and executives of the main Labor parties
Westralian Worker 13 April, 1917. See also the correspondence 
concerning Albert Gardiner’s resignation: Gardiner - Pearce
30 October, 1916; Pearce - Gardiner 2 November, 1916. Pearce papers 
AWM 49/80/2 Bundle 7/39.
Statement by J. Page in a special report to the Queensland state 
executive. Minutes Qld. state executive 13 September, 1916. This 
measure to bolster the power of the federal parliamentary party 
between federal conferences had been sought by Hughes since 1912 
and pre-dated the more explicit delineation of authority laid down 
in the twenties and thirties. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour 
Party pp. 31-2, 58-66.
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before Hughes played his hand. The largest and most powerful individual 
unions had also expressed opposition at varying degrees of militancy"*- 
but because of the nature of FPLP operation were unable and unsuited to 
bring pressure to bear: this was left to the state parties. In 1916 
two-thirds, or 47 out of 71 FPLP members, were also members of the NSW, 
Victorian and Queensland Labor parties, who could further claim the 
allegiance of 6 out of the 10 ministers and, regardless of formal 
provisions, all of these became subject to attempts at coercion.
Of all the state parties the Victorian PLC was most informed
of the manoeuverings which had led up to the referendum decision, due
to the location of the federal parliament in Melbourne. It had been
able to direct the 15 Victorian FPLP members closely and in mid-
September when the enabling legislation was introduced by the Prime
Minister instructed the two cabinet ministers from Victoria to withdraw
from the ministry so that they could openly oppose the measure. Frank
Tudor obliged readily and submitted his resignation to caucus on
14 September but Senator E.J. Russell temporised and was the only
2Victorian federal member to be expelled. An attempt was made to 
embarrass Hughes over Tudor’s action, Catts moving that it not be 
accepted and
That he be informed that refusal to advocate conscription 
for overseas service, either in or out of parliament at 
his own unfettered discretion, is no disqualification for 
ministerial office in a Labor government.
Another amendment was moved by Queensland Senator Mullan accepting and 
approving the resignation in protest against the referendum decision, 
but the Pearce suggestion that the vacancy be left open until after the
AWU opposition at the beginning of the year had been unanimous and 
was reaffirmed at the announcement of the referendum. E. Grayndler, 
general secretary of the AWU, - A. Stewart 28 August, 1916. Quoted 
by Senator Ferricks. CPD 80. 21 September, 1916 p. 8777. For the 
Engineers see K.D. Buckley, The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia, 
1852-1920. Canberra, 1970 pp. 219-20; the Miners’ Federation - 
R. Gollan, The Coalminers of NSW, Melbourne, 1963, Chapter seven; 
the Ironworkers - J. Merritt, A History of the Federated Ironworkers 
of Australia, 1909-1952* Ph.D. thesis ANU, 1967. Cf. the reaction 
of the Printers: J. Hagan, Printers and Politics. A History of the
Printing Unions, 1850-1950. Canberra, 1966 pp. 198-200.
2 E.J. Holloway, The Australian Victory over Conscription. pp. 16-17.
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poll won overwhelming support. It was alleged that Hughes stopped the
rot further by threatening that if any further resignations from the
2ministry occurred he would resign out of hand. A similar situation
obtained in Queensland where on 13 September state executive heard a
report by Page on the federal position and forthwith issued a warning
that endorsements would be withheld from any Queensland member who
3failed to vote against the enabling Bill. Bamford and Senator Givens
defied the order and were expelled from the state party at the end of
the month. W.G. Higgs, the federal Treasurer, was placed in a quandary,
voting for the Military Services Referendum Bill but after barely4escaping expulsion by state executive was forced to come out against 
conscription; this, and his plea that both FPLP factions had recommended 
that he stay in the ministry together with his resignation on the eve 
of the referendum saved him from retribution.^ In NSW the situation was 
more complex with no less than 18 FPLP members belonging to the PLL, of 
whom 3 were ministers, including Hughes himself. As soon as the 
referendum decision had been made state executive wired an affirmation of 
the NSW conference resolution to Melbourne which was intercepted and 
delayed in delivery by the authorities. There was no doubt existing 
as to the party's attitude however and early next month executive was 
petitioned by unions to expel Hughes.^ This was duly carried out with a
FPLP 14 September, 1916.
Report by F.J. Riley, Daily Standard 1 November, 1916.
Minutes Queensland state executive 13 September, 1916.
Ibid 2 October, 1916.
Ibid 20 November, 1916.
P.C. Evans, state secretary - A. Stewart 30 August, 1916, quoted by 
Senator Ferricks CPD 80. 21 September, 1916.
7 J. Burns - J. Power 6 September, 1916. Molesworth papers Uncat. 
MS 243/3/ Letters re formation of the Anti-Conscription League.
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decision to throw the Prime Minister and another supporter, E.S. Carr, 
out of the party on 15 September, Hughes having 'announced in the 
federal parliament a policy which is not only in direct conflict with 
the wishes of the Labor movement, but which was not endorsed by the 
caucus, and is supported by only six out of ten members of the cabinet,' 
as well as in contravention of the instruction to NSW federal executive 
delegates to oppose conscription at all costs.^ Further action was 
initiated to ascertain the views of other members and to take appropriate 
action on similar lines where necessary. Gardiner stayed in the ministry 
until 27 October but Webster left finally with Hughes in the November 
split. None of the three other states attempted to direct their federal 
members and they refused to agree to requests to convene a federal 
executive meeting or special federal conference, there being a requirement 
for the approval of four states for action of this type.
As it was, state party intervention proved to be of little
effect with only twelve eastern states members supporting an amendment
to the second reading of the Referendum Bill 'That, in the opinion of
this House, conscription of human life is inadvisable, and that the
proposal of this government, if given effect to, would be destructive
of the best interests of Australia.' Of the rest only a total of 21 out
of the 71-man FPLP were prepared to oppose the third reading, with 26 
2voting in favor. All ministers voted for the Bill except for the 
Victorians - Tudor opposed and Russell abstained - and the West 
Australian, Mahon, who pleaded sickness. Lack of time, adequate and 
early information and the absence of support from the smaller states 
were the chief reasons for the failure of state efforts to prevent the 
referendum and prevail against the power of the federal Labor leadership: 
as Hughes had desired the battle now moved out on to the public platforms 
where he exercised the authority of office, advantages in access to 
publicity for his cause and considerable influence over the mass media 
and its content.
T.D. Mutch in the A.W. 21 September, 1916.
2 In the House the vote went 47-12 and in the Senate 17-9.
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Freed from the responsibility of causing a dissolution brought 
about by Hughes' resignation and encouraged by the attitude of the major 
parties many more FPLP members were prepared to oppose the conscription 
case in the referendum campaign than were prepared to block its being 
held altogether. Catts, Anstey and Finlayson took organisation in hand 
of caucus dissidents and on 29 September a manifesto was released 
containing the names of no less than thirty-four in opposition to an 
affirmative vote: it was claimed that there were others prepared to
join the anti campaign. At Catts' suggestion a special committee was 
established to liaise with the various state parties, comprising
Victoria F.G. Tudor S. A. G.E. Yates
N.S.W. J.H. Catts W.A. Senator E. Needham
Qld. W.F. Finlayson Tas. Senator R.K. Ready
This body had little actual influence upon events, the state parties and
trade unions themselves being responsible for what co-ordination took
place and, apart from Tudor's heartening example, the anti-conscription
ministers contributed little until the intolerable situation created by
Hughes forced the resignations of Higgs, Gardiner and Russell on the eve
of the referendum, thus further confirming the disintegration of the
2federal Labor government. It was the Labor movement in the states which 
initiated opposition to conscription for overseas service then bore the 
brunt of the campaign against it. Hughes' determination to introduce 
the measure was matched only by his desire to remain in office and 
resulted in the compromise solution arrived at by the federal party.
That Hughes was enabled to get as far as he did with the proposal was 
due entirely to the strong position he enjoyed as federal Labor leader
Finlayson - Catts 27 September, 1916; Catts - J. Mathews 27 Septemlx r, 
1916. Pearce papers AWM 419/80/2 Bundle 1/3/147.
This discreditable incident crowned a campaign of unprecedented 
bitterness, being precipitated by an Executive Council decision made 
by four ministers in Melbourne to reject several dubious regulations 
which Hughes desired to use to intimidate voters at the polls. The 
Prime Minister had them passed by another Council meeting in Sydney 
without informing the Governor-General, who was then present, of their 
earlier rejection and then sought to deny the whole episode when 
three of the ministers resigned in protest. The regulations were 
withdrawn at the last moment. Munro-Ferguson - Bonar-Law 30 October, 
1916 Novar papers 696/248-50.
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and followed naturally from the policy-making pattern which had emerged 
in the ALP by that time and which wartime conditions merely accentuated.
Conscription referendum 
28 October, 1916
Are you in favor of the government having, in this grave 
emergency, the same powers over citizens in regard to 
requiring their military service, for the term of this 
war, outside the Commonwealth, as it now has in regard 
to military service within the Commonwealth?
Under voluntary voting the answer secured from the' country was:
NSW VIC. QLD. S.A. W.A. TAS. Federal Total
Territories
YES 356,805 353,930 144,200 87,924 94,069 48,493 2,136 1,087,557
NO 474,544 328,216 158,051 119,236 40,884 37,833 1,269 1,160,033
The split: November-December, 1916.
Hughes’ essential strategy had been to prevent the opposition 
consolidating so that he could confront the state Labor parties with what 
was expected to be a popular endorsement of conscription. With the 
defeat of the referendum his personal position became gravely jeopardised 
after having escaped challenge, together with other expelled members, 
at the several caucus meetings in September. Action against the federal 
leadership through the federal organs of the ALP had not been ineffective 
meanwhile through lack of trying. Within a week of the announcement of 
the referendum NSW state executive requested the convening of a federal 
conference and won immediate support from the Queensland party.^ It 
seems likely that Victoria also supported the call but it required the
formal approval of at least four of the states and this was not forth-
2coming. Western Australia rejected the proposal on 18 September and 
no reaction was recorded from either South Australia or Tasmania.
Federal executive, a far less unwieldy body and especially designed to 
resolve such problems, also suffered from the same indecisiveness of 
some state leaderships and the rapidity of events. Although the federal 
president gave an explicit undertaking to convene it at the January 
meeting should a change of government policy be mooted, it had obviously 
suffered a decline of confidence after failing its first major test;
Evans - Stewart 7 September, 1916 and McDonald - Stewart 8 September, 
1916. Report ALP special federal conference, 1916. p. 18.
2 Cornell - Stewart 21 September, 1916. Ibid.
moreover one Victorian member, Laurie Cohen, had yet to be replaced 
after his accidental death, while four other members were either 
conscriptionists or FPLP members implicated in the referendum decision^ 
and the Western Australians were in any case hopelessly divided from 
top to bottom. Even after the referendum part-time federal secretary, 
Arch. Stewart, apologetically noted that
owing to two of the state executives, namely Tasmania and 
South Australia, having failed in their financial 
obligations to the federal executive, also to the fact 
that several of the representatives on the federal 
executive had been expelled by their state parties, it 
was impossible for the federal executive in its present 
position to take the necessary steps to convene a special 
conference.^
Some parliamentarians hoped that a federal intervention would prove 
unnecessary provided the FPLP placed its own house in order: Senator
Gardiner wired Catts on the Monday following the referendum
Position critical. Could (state) executive be called 
to consider resolution to withdraw expulsion of all 
members provided loyally support Labor party and oppose 
further attempt to bring in conscription. This would 
prevent coalition of state parties and enable ^
reconstruction federal government. We continue in office.
The great problem however facing the anti-conscriptionists was 
determining how far to take any retributive action so as to appease 
the parties and movement, while preventing any drastic split which 
might permit Hughes to obtain his ends with non-Labor assistance. Other 
ministers such as Higgs entertained the idea that Hughes could be 
deposed but his supporters persuaded to stay and preserve the government 
but such a possibility was dismissed in a dry comment by F.J. Riley that 
’this opinion is not held outside parliamentary circles.
Hughes himself and J.D. Fitzgerald MLC from NSW, E.A. Anstey from 
S.A. and the Queensland Senator Tom Givens.
Statement to Queensland leaders, Minutes Queensland state executive 
10 November, 1916.
Gardiner - Catts 30 October, 1916. Catts papers MS 658/l/8a - 
'Material relating to conscription, 1917'.
CPD 81. 23 February, 1917 p. 1065.
5 Daily Standard 31 October, 1 November, 1916.
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The initiative was in fact seized by the federal party, Higgs
and Gardiner arranging an FPLP meeting with the endorsement of
conscriptionists and anti-conscriptionists to 'consider the good and
welfare of the party' at a date originally set for Wednesday, 8 November.
As the members began to drift back to Melbourne Hughes sounded out his
remaining ministers and the anxious counting of numbers proceeded. By
the end of the week the lines were reasonably distinct and the Hughes
faction was accurately estimated at 24, or little more than one third
of the total.^ By this time the state executives were beginning to
catch up, with the Victorian party taking the leading role. Early in
November that executive carried four resolutions calling for support by
the other states for a special federal conference and demanding an
2attitude of no reconciliation from its own parliamentary members. A 
deputation carried these proposals to Sydney where the NSW executive 
gave its endorsement and following which Stewart went on to Brisbane and 
indicated that 'He was especially desirous that nothing in the way of 
reconciliation should be permitted between the Labor party and that 
section of it which had decided to support Mr. Hughes' conscription 
policy.' Queensland agreed to the federal conference proposal readily 
but wired to its FPLP members warning them that they 'should not take 
any action to compromise themselves or the party until such special
3interstate conference defines the attitude of the party generally.'
Another delegate, E.F. Russell, was despatched to Adelaide and 'forcibly 
stated that the PLC is absolutely opposed to any policy of reconciliation4with Mr. Hughes and his followers.' In South Australia the 
industrialist faction was in the ascendant and the party not only 
accepted the call'* but reported to the other states that it had instructed 
its federal parliamentarians that there must be 'no reconciliation' with
Ibid. 7 November, 1916. This was one less than the eventual number 
of defectors. See H. McQueen, 'Who were the Conscriptionists? Notes 
on Federal Labor Members.' L.H. 16, May 1969 pp. 44-8 and 'Correction 
to Labour History No. 16.' L.H. 18, May, 1970 p. 60.
2 Statement by A. Stewart, Minutes Queensland state executive 10 
November, 1916.
3 Ibid.
4 Daily Herald 6 November, 1916.
3 Birrell - Stewart 6 November, 1916. Report ALP special federal 
conference, 1916 p. 19; Minutes ULP Council 9 November, 1916.
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Hughes and the conscriptionists. Western Australia and Tasmania also
2added their agreement to the call, making the matter unanimous.
Anti-Hughes feeling continued to build in addition to the
hardline attitudes adopted by the Victorian, South Australian and, it
appears, the NSW parties. Resolutions rejecting Hughes’ leadership
began to flow from unions also, notably the National Executive of the
All-Australian Anti-Conscription Trade Union Congress which passed a
resolution timed to coincide with the impending FPLP meeting declaring
’as the view of the industrialist forces of the Commonwealth that
nothing short of the removal of W.M. Hughes from the leadership of the
FPLP and the endorsement of his expulsion from the Labor movement will
3meet with the approval of organised trade unionism.’ With this mounting 
chorus of criticism of the Prime Minister remaining as Labor leader in 
the now super-heated atmosphere of Melbourne any intentions of leaving 
the matter to the federal conference broke down. On 14 November caucus 
met for the first time since the referendum and, contrary to the 
instructions of his Queensland executive, W.F. Finlayson led the attack 
against the leader. After defiant prompting from Hughes Finlayson moved 
the unprecedented motion, seconded by the Victorian J.F. Hannan, 'That 
Mr. W.M. Hughes no longer possesses the confidence of this party as 
leader and that the office of chairman of the party be, and is, hereby 
declared vacant.' Hughes and Givens made a brief attempt to have the 
motion ruled out of order but opinions were so aroused they were forced 
to give way and a cross section of the party representing all states 
spoke for the motion. As later recapitulated by a committee of members 
the grounds for no-confidence were advanced as follows:
1. That the fact that Mr. Hughes as Chairman refused to 
accept any resolutions or amendments respecting a war policy 
as against his dictation of a referendum for compulsory 
military training at the meeting of 24 August and succeeding 
days. After several days' sitting 23 members (a minority of 
the party) agreed at 2.30 a.m. that the Prime Minister might 
pass the referendum bill, on the understanding that every 
member should have a free hand to either support or oppose
 ^ Ibid. and Stewart - Clementson Minutes W.A. state executive 
5 November, 1916.
2 Report ALP special federal conference, 1916 pp. 18-19.
3 Daily Standard 14 November, 1916.
before the public, and that the press censorship would not 
be exercised in a partisan manner. These conditions were 
not complied with. Ministers hostile to conscription were 
prevented from publicly opposing conscription unless they 
resigned from the cabinet and the censorship was exercised 
in a ruthlessly partisan manner.
2. That Mr. Hughes branded those advocating and supporting 
no-conscription generally as traitors in the pay of Germany, 
as enemies of their country and as being responsible for the 
policy of the IWW and that a leader who would hurl such 
unfounded charges against a majority of his own party was 
unfit to be their leader.
3. That Mr. Hughes alleged that unless the Labor movement 
adopted his policy, it was degenerate and unworthy, and 
that as the Labor movement did not endorse such policy, he 
should not continue to lead a movement he so maligned and 
misrepresented.
4. That the issue of regulations by Mr. Hughes on the eve 
of the polling designed to intimidate voters from exercising 
their franchise was a base betrayal of democracy, which 
showed him to be unfit to lead a great political party.
5. That Mr. Hughes, by his assumption of the role of 
dictator and his general conduct, was discredited throughout 
the country, and for the party to allow him to continue to 
lead it would mean ruin and disaster.-^
Mathew Charlton suggested a compromise to defer such precipitate 
action by inviting the six state executives to meet the FPLP 'to discuss 
the position as affecting the movement' and Senator O'Keefe fore­
shadowed a further amendment designed to confirm the status quo until
2federal conference could be convened. Debate raged for some time but 
the advocates for the immediate deposition of Hughes had the bit between 
their teeth and refused to countenance further prevarication. In 
recognition of this development Hughes met with his closest confederates, 
Pearce and Givens, over the luncheon adjournment. To allow himself to be 
deposed as federal leader was both tactically and temperamentally 
inappropriate; rather the best hope lay in making the split as wide as 
possible so as to optimise his position in parliament. 'We agreed that
'Reply to Mr. Hughes. Labor Party's Official Statement.' Drafted by a 
committee comprising Tudor, Higgs, Mahon, McDonald and Catts and 
released under Tudor's signature on 15 November, 1916. W.A. state 
executive correspondence, file 68 - Interstate Labor conference, 
special, 1916.
2 FPLP 14 November, 1916; Daily Herald 15 November, 1916.
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the time had arrived for decisive action, that it was palpably
impossible to hold the party together any longer, except at the price
of surrender ... We determined not to surrender^ When the session
recommenced in the afternoon Hughes permitted the debate to continue
further, but, divining no cooling of ardor on the part of his opponents,
made a dramatic appeal for support and walked out of caucus. He was
followed by 24 others, including Pearce, Jensen, Webster and Russell.
Caucus unanimously carried Finlayson's motion forthwith, then decided to
invite the federal conference to meet caucus representatives to determine
the future of the party. On the following day O'Malley and Mahon
tendered their own resignations from the ministry and Tudor narrowly
defeated Charles McDonald for the position of new leader, the party
2resolving henceforth to sit on the opposition benches.
Federal parliament after 14 November, 1916.
House Senate
Labor 27 Labor 19
Liberal 34 Liberal 5
Hughes 13 Hughes 12
Ind. 1
75 36
The 1916 special federal conference.
If the dispute in the party had come to a precipitate head
within the FPLP on 14 November, the ALP federal conference - 'in effect,
a round table council of war of party leaders' - was the only body which
could make an authoritative ruling on the issue behind the split and
enforce solidarity in the federal Labor movement. Originally intended
for 27 November, the date of the special conference was postponed to
the first week of December to permit the Western Australians time to 
4arrive. The parties were invited to send delegates 'To deal with the 
present political situation in all its aspects' in Melbourne from 
4 December, at the request of all states and on the authority of the
Pearce, Carpenter to Cabinet, p. 140.
FPLP 15 November, 1916; Daily Standard 16 November, 1916.
Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party p. 19.
See correspondence printed in the Report ALP special federal 
conference, 1916 pp. 18-19.
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old federal executive, from which three members had now been expelled. 
Queensland, NSW and Victorian state executives were adamantly against 
reconciliation and instructed their delegates accordingly; in South 
Australia the industrialists in the ULP Council forced adoption of a 
similar hard line and the Tasmanian state executive was also strongly 
anti-conscriptionist. All except S.A. had already expelled state and 
federal members and in the last case failure to do so sprang from 
tactical considerations rather than absence of determination. In 
Western Australia however the party was largely uninformed or misled 
as to the situation elsewhere, being uncertain about the business of 
conference until very late in November and under the impression even then 
that it had been assembled for conciliatory purposes rather than to 
formalise the divorce from Hughes and his followers. Reflecting this 
confusion was its hastily assembled federal delegation, selected by 
the W.A. state executive from the nominations of the District Councils, 
comprising three conscriptionists and three anti-conscriptionists.
Senator Lynch had become a minister in the Hughes National Labor 
government and Reg. Burchell had also left the FPLP before winning 
selection on the delegation. Cornell held firmly to the perogative of 
individual members of his party to determine their own position on the 
matter and of the other three only Alex. McCallum was aware from personal 
experience of the situation in the east. Instructions issued by the 
District Councils, which had formal control over individual members, 
generally favored some form of rapprochement with hughes, with only one 
narrow exception.
Upon arrival in Melbourne the Western Australians were shocked 
to find the conscriptionist members being shunned by other delegates 
and questions were asked as to their eligibility on the first day of 
conference, when it was decided to let the full session handle the matter. 
On their home ground and with the pre-arranged concurrence of four other 
states the Victorians took the initiative at the commencement of the 
second day, submitting
That, as compulsory overseas military service is opposed
to the principles embodied in the Australian Labor party's
platform, all federal members who have supported compulsory
Stewart - Clementson 18 November, 1916. W.A. state executive 
correspondence, file 68, Interstate Labor conference, special 1916.
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overseas military service, or who are members of any other 
political party, are hereby expelled from the Australian 
Labor movement.
Such a declaration was designed to deal summarily and pitilessly with
the FPLP supporters of Hughes and his policy, justified by the mover
J.H. Scullin on the grounds that
the pledge of the Australian Labor party asked that a man 
should conform to the principles of the party, and anyone 
who had not carried out the principles should no longer be 
allowed to be a member of that party. Whether the exact 
words were on the platform or not was merely a quibble, 
because there was no doubt as to the spirit of the Labor 
movement on the subject ... no man could sneak away from 
the principles of the movement merely because something 
was not written down' in black and white.^
Immediate opposition concentrated against the broad scope of the motion
rather than the question of expelling the FPLP defectors and the
Western Australians to a man protested, that as their state had left
conscription up to individual consciences, the politicians who had
espoused it could not fairly be penalised by the other states. As
this sentiment became apparent another Victorian, R.H. Gill, sought to
introduce an amendment ’That no delegate be allowed to sit on the
conference who is not a member of the Australian Labor party.' This
would have left W.A. and the South Australian party free to deal with
conscriptionists in their own ranks by such devices as pre-selection
scrutiny but after points of order were raised this was dropped and
another amendment proposed by the Tasmanian Senators Ready and O’Keefe
3was ruled out of order. Despite a last minute appeal from Gardiner to
separate the motion into two parts to deal with conscriptionists and
defectors as two issues, the motion was put and carried by 29-4.
Western Australians McCallum, Lutey and Gibson were supported solely by
Gardiner in voting against it while Lynch, Burchell and Cornell abstained
4then left conference after it had passed.
In its successful form this was altered slightly in phraseology but 
not import. Report, 1916 pp. 4 and 10.
 ^ Ibid. pp. 4-5.
3 ’That any member of the Australian Labor party who has joined or in 
future joins any other political party thereby ceases to be a member 
of the Australian Labor party.’ Ibid. pp. 12-13.
4 Cornell was not strictly implicated as the other two were but walked 
out in protest against the principle. Ibid. p. 16.
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Only after this business was disposed of did conference agree 
to a request made on the opening day by the FPLP to admit a delegation 
from the federal parliamentarians to address it. Caucus had been 
concerned ever since the walkout on 14 November over what it was to 
report to the highest organ of the ALP^ and on the morning of Wednesday, 
6 December Tudor led a small group into the conference to explain the 
situation. In a general address he argued for federal uniformity, 
stating that ’If machinery could be devised which would ensure harmony 
and unity of action, it would be a good thing for the Labor movement.' 
Senator Needham echoed these remarks:
There were times when action had to be taken quickly, and 
it was highly desirable that a uniform authoritative 
decision should have been arrived at without conflict of 
state view. Consultations between state and federal 
members and the federal executive could be arranged, 
perhaps, when interchange of opinions might be considered 
desirable.
Almost penitently he observed that ’They all belonged to the one Labor
movement, their only differences lying in the spheres of action.' Some
2interrogation of the deputation followed and it then withdrew but the
issues of methods of control and supervision of the FPLP thus raised by
the caucus leaders themselves in the light of the circumstances
surrounding the referendum decision were to be pursued later. The ALP
constitution was referred to the federal executive for consideration of
3alterations and amendments and on Thursday Rae and Carey suggested that
the two Victorian federal executive delegates be empowered to liaise
closely with the FPLP leadership during parliamentary sittings in
Melbourne. It was proposed that they be able ’to consider all matters
appertaining to the political situation until the next triennial
conference, and they communicate promptly with each state executive on
matters of importance that may arise from time to time.’ This was
knocked out however after Western Australian delegates protested that it
4would circumvent the federal executive, representing all of the states.
1 FPLP 15, 27 November, 1916.
3 Report, 1916 pp. 16-17.
3 Ibid, p. 19.
4 Ibid, p. 22.
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Later on still more detailed proposals for the internal 
functioning and external monitoring of the FPLP were submitted by the 
Queensland delegates, on the basis of their state executive resolutions 
prior to the conference.
That a definite constitution for the ALP be drawn up by 
conference.
That the Australian Political Labor Executive have more 
defined powers similar to those possessed by state 
executives, also power to take action on matters upon 
which the platform and constitution are silent, but 
which may arise at any time and may effect the well­
being of the people.
That the FPLP furnish to the APLE a precis of general 
business done at each caucus meeting.'*-
These suggestions were amplified into a specific set of propositions 
aimed at remedying the inadequacies of the federal ALP structure 
revealed in the conscription crisis. It is unclear who was the 
responsible author, although it was possibly the federal executive 
itself or the agenda committee during the overnight adjournment: while
some merely codified what had been caucus practice others marked novel 
departures from past operation.
Special meetings of the party may be convened by requisition 
to the secretary.
(1) If parliament is sitting, by twelve members.
(2) If parliament is not sitting, by one-third of the
members.
(3) In each case sufficient notice shall be given to
provide for the meetings being convened.
Ministers and officers of the FPLP shall be elected by 
exhaustive ballot, and portfolios allocated by the caucus 
at a duly constituted meeting.
Every Labor minister or officer, or member of any committee 
of the party, shall exercise his own judgement and vote in 
caucus meetings, notwithstanding that a cabinet or any 
committee shall have arrived at a majority decision. No 
action of any kind whatsoever will be taken to interfere 
with the freedom of a minority of a cabinet or any committee 
in the caucus meetings of the party.
All business arising at party caucus meetings shall be 
decided by each member exercising his own unfettered judgement 
by speech and vote.
(a) Provision shall be made for private members to
initiate and complete public business, including 
legislation.
1 Minutes Queensland state executive 20 November, 1916.
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(b) Simplification of parliamentary procedure and 
standing orders to expedite public business.
That the APLE be empowered to appoint a representative who 
may attend all meetings of the federal Labor caucus and 
supply confidential reports to the central executive of each 
state.
That the FPLP should furnish to the APLE a precis of general 
business done at each caucus meeting.
Some considerable care had obviously gone into the framing of these 
measures, testifying to the concern felt over the operations of the 
federal party, but the chances for imposing such controls upon the 
FPLP were not good: they trespassed upon the independence traditionally
enjoyed by the federal members and cannot have appealed to the 12 of the 
33 delegates who were themselves parliamentarians in state of federal 
spheres and the two others who were former federal members. The 
conference report does not record whether any debate took place on them, 
merely that all proposals were referred to the federal executive for 
further consideration. Although this body met during the conference 
sessions it failed to hold another business session until November, 1918 
and the recommendations languished accordingly. Nevertheless they were 
of significance as indicative of the dissatisfaction with the FPLP 
engendered during the whole conscription debacle.
As it was a special conference with little by way of a detailed
agenda having been compiled, the conference took the advice of the agenda
committee to define its area of responsibility, unanimously resolving
'That all matters arising out of the conscription issue may be discussed
and decided at this conference.' Almost immediately the scope of this
self-limitation was tested when two Tasmanians sought to amend the
defence plank by affirming party policy to be compulsory military
training at home and voluntary service overseas. The president, E.J.
Holloway, ruled this out of order as being ultra vires, 'a usurpation of
the functions of the ordinary triennial conference,' and this was upheld
2despite an appeal and a lengthy debate. Much of the remaining two and 
a half days was therefore confined to non-policy matters, although the 
war was inevitably touched on. Requests from the Victorian section of 
the Australian Peace Alliance and a Melbourne PLC branch for conference
Ibid. pp. 24-25.
2 Ibid, p. 19.
to receive delegations on the issue of peace were turned down but a 
resolution proposed by Arthur Rae of NSW was endorsed, briefly 
encapsulating the Peace Alliance position:
That this conference, in the interests of humanity, is of 
opinion that Great Britain and her Allies should formulate 
their joint demands upon the Central European powers and 
publish them to the world, and thus pave the way for an 
early and honorable peace.^
This laconic acknowledgement of over two years of war revealed the 
current state of ALP opinion which had only just begun to advance beyond 
general, if grudging, support for the conflict. Within another twelve 
months the demand for peace would grow far more insistent until actual 
opposition to the war became the chief question at issue.
Next day Rae authored another proposal comprising the first 
indication of unease with the Imperial connection to be expressed at 
the highest level in the party.
That any proposal for Imperial Federation involving the 
slightest surrender of Australia’s self-governing powers 
in return for a voice in the Empire's foreign policy would 
be disastrous to Australia's ideals and should not, therefore, 
be entertained.
Fellow NSW member Arthur Blakeley of the AWU seconded this and
said that he was not altogether satisfied with the 
steadfastness of British statesmen to the white Australia 
ideals, and if, as Australians, they took part in any 
Imperial Council, they would be bound in honor to observe 
the decisions of such a Council. Supposing a decision of 
the Council ran counter to white Australian ideals, where 
would they be?
Delegates did not object to Imperial co-operation in principle, rather
3
the 'hopeless complications' it might entail and the motion was carried. 
This marked a substantial divergence from Hughes' approach of moving into 
ever closer involvement and emphasis on harmonising of interests with 
Great Britain as a means to secure future protection from that source; 
Labor was moving to a rejection of that attitude and assertion of 
distinct Australian interests of such importance as to warrant pursuing
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid, p. 21.
3 Ibid, p. 22.
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a far more cautious line on engagement in Imperial quarrels. This was 
most vividly expressed in the later years of the war and was transmuted 
later still into a strong isolationist trend within the Labor movement.
The 1916 special federal conference marked a watershed for the 
party in terms of future policies, but in their initial form these 
remained - always apart from opposition to conscription - rather vaguely 
defined. It was the intention to hold an ordinary federal conference 
in June, 1917 to further elaborate the ALP’s position but circumstances 
dictated that it was to be another eighteen months before the parties 
once again convened in June, 1918. This gap between what was in 
essence the emergency conference in Melbourne and the regular conference 
at Perth proved to be a crucial period for the Labor movement, during 
which the chief question on the agenda became not merely the best and 
most appropriate means of participation in the war but whether or not to 
support involvement in it at all.
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CHAPTER TWO
The ALP as a confederal party - the stories of six states
So far defence and foreign policy making has been examined from 
the point of view primarily of the federal party, with the conscription 
issue marking the first significant deviation from the supremacy of that 
party in these areas. Divided within itself upon the issue the FPLP 
agreed to refer the question to the nation at large, and it was Hughes’ 
intention to employ the referendum device as a means to coerce the Labor 
parties by appealing over their heads to the general public. Anti­
conscription feeling and opposition to Hughes himself stemmed from the 
states in varying intensities during 1916 and in this process the 
confederal nature of the ALP came to be most fully realised. While 
opposition to conscription was determined in the eastern states, only the 
Victorian and N.S.W. parties had threatened disciplinary action in advance 
against any parliamentarian who supported it; the attitudes of Queensland 
and Tasmania became quite clear also but South Australia and Western 
Australia remained equivocal. The reactions of the states were then 
dissimilar and the experience of each party must be examined individually 
in order to assess the impact of the crisis upon the ALP. Here then are 
six separate stories elaborating the course of the crisis in each state 
and the implications of it, not only for the ALP attitude to compulsory 
military service alone, but, in the longterm, for the policy of the 
Australian Labor movement towards participation in the war itself.
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VICTORIA, 1914 - 1918
The Background
The Labor party in Victoria distinguished itself from other 
state parties by achieving a consistent lack of electoral success. 
Irrespective of its reasonable performance in the federal sphere the 
formation of a state government, apart from one miserable affair lasting 
a fortnight and occasioned by temporary differences within the non-Labor 
camp, was an experience yet to be savored and at the election in 1914 
the PLP had reduced the number of seats contested and secured less than 
40% of the vote. Subsequently a Labor ministry of four months’ duration 
survived in 1924, there was another brief affair in 1927 - 8
and an ill-fated Depression ministry, totalling in all less than five 
years of office during the first fifty years of Labor party life in 
Victoria. Such a dismal record, it has been suggested, was more the result 
of persistent misfortune than culpable leadership or a perversely 
anti-Labor electorate but stands nevertheless as a salient feature of 
Victorian politics. [1] Prior to the war this can be explained by the 
singular concentration of Labor electoral supporters in the metropolitan 
area, a weightage of electorates favoring the country and Labor's inclina­
tion to concede such seats to their opponents. On the basis of the 
inevitable comparison with N.S.W.^the Victorian unions were mainly craft- 
based and inclined accordingly to be more parochial, conservative and 
unenterprising than larger industrial organisations. There was a lack of 
tension between the PLP and unions such as existed in the neighbouring 
states of N.S.W., S.A. and Tasmania and a consequent focus upon the 
federal parliament, in Melbourne until 1927, where victories were immedia­
tely tangible. State executive was a stable mixture of unionists, 
politicians and branch members enjoying a notable continuity of tenure of 
the fifteen metropolitan seats and the five country seats,whose occupants 
were required only to attend the quarterly meetings. State conference met
[1] Discussed by D.W. Rawson 'Victoria, 1910 - 66: Out of Step or Merely 
Shuffling?' H.S. 13, 49 October, 1967 pp.60-75; J.Rydon 'Victoria 
1910 - 1966: Political Peculiarities' H.S.13,50 April, 1968 
pp.233-236
40
annually, attracting 160 - 170 delegates but usually lasted for only 
the three days over Easter, inevitably leaving executive to run the 
party with rarely challenged authority. Largest single affiliated union 
was the Victoria-Riverina branch of the A.W.U. and it regularly supplied 
ten or so delegates at state conference and invariably 4 - 5  state 
executive members. Victoria was at least a well-integrated party 
without substantial sections of the movement harboring resentments of 
under-representation, such as provoked powerful forces against the entren­
ched leadership of the three contiguous states and had been avoided in 
Queensland by steps leading up to the 1916 reforms, [l]
Little by way of ideological disturbance challenged this 
situation, the major channel of doctrinal influence upon unions and party 
stemming from the Victorian Socialist Party, established in 1905 by visiting 
British radical Tom Mann with the object not of competing with the Labor- 
party politically but forming an educative force within both the party 
and electorate. When this strategy was reversed in 1908 the running of 
socialist nominees against Labor candidates failed ignominiously and 
by the time of the war this lesson had become engrained in the experience 
of members, though still occasionally disputed by a radical section.
Labor was acknowledged as deficient in many respects as a working class 
party but was to be preferred to other less amenable parties and the VSP 
pursued a role as a propagandising body seeking promotion and dissemina­
tion of 'a knowledge of the economics, ethics and politics of international 
socialism', particularly through the Socialist, a weekly edited in 1914 
by leading member R.S. Ross, and sustained by a variety of social activities 
which enabled solidarity amongst its small group of hard-core supporters.
[2] As the largest and most important single independent organisation 
within the Victorian movement the VSP derived support from a diffuse but 
interlocking group of individuals in Melbourne's socialist/Christian- 
pacifist/humanist intelligentsia which had connections with some craft 
unions. [3]
[1] Rawson 'Victoria 1910 - 1966,' op.cit. and 'The Organisation of the 
Australian Labor Party, 1916 - 1941. Ph.D. Melbourne, 1954.
[2] L Turner ,'Socialist Political Tactics, 1900 - 1920'.L.H.2 May,
1962 pp.5-25.
[3] S. Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn and the Australian Labor Party.
Canberra, 1969 pp.5-6.
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Other organisations of note included the Australian Freedom League, 
opposed to compulsory military training, the revolutionary Australian 
Socialist party and IWW, the Women's Political Association and others. 
While all of these were active organisations the VSP exercised greatest 
influence over the Labor party, primarily because of its provision 
over the years of a cadre of party and union leaders, many of whom 
remained members or loose associates after having moved into broader 
areas. These included key men such as Frank Hyett and P. Hickey of the 
Victorian Railways' Union, E.J. Russell of the Victorian branch, Agri­
cultural Implement Makers' Union, John Curtin, Timber Workers', the 
Rev. F.W. Sinclaire, E.J. Holloway, THC and Labor state executive, Maurice 
Blackburn, MLA, also of the executive, and others who acknowledged a 
VSP background.
Reactions in the VSP to the evolution of Labor's defence 
policy was mixed,with Maurice Blackburn, editor of the Socialist until 
1913, differing from his pacifist or Marxist fellows in defending com­
pulsory training upon the same lines used in the Labor party itself and 
even in July, 1914 when the VSP declared opposition to conscription in 
any form whatever as 'an obstacle in the way of working class advancement 
and the realisation of universal brotherhood'?there were some still 
prepared to support it under certain conditions. [ 1] More determined 
was the Australian Freedom League, formed in 1912 and including Sinclaire 
and unionists J.B. Howie and T.J. Miller, which spread Christian-pacifist 
principles and won support in most states as resistance to the Defence 
Act began to develop. 12 ] Miller especially was an important figure, 
having emigrated from Britain after having been secretary of the 
Independent Labour Party and heavily influenced by Robert Blatchford,
Keir Hardie and the Quakers. As representative of the Painters' Union 
on the Melbourne Trades Hall Council he began agitation there against 
compulsory training after finding, far from a congenial anti-militarist 
environment, that many unions regarded the Defence Act as one of Labor's 
positive contributions and were rather proud of it. Nevertheless Miller
[l ] VSP Minutes, 30 June, 28 July, 1914 
[2 ] L.C.Jauncey,, The Story of Conscription in Australia, London 1935
p . 69 "
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d id  w in  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  THC r a d i c a l s  such  as  H y e t t ,  E . J .  Holloway and 
F . J .  R i l e y  [1] and by e a r l y  1914 th e  THC was fo rw a rd in g  p r o t e s t s  
a g a i n s t  c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  scheme . [ 2 ] S t i l l ,  t h e r e  was a lo n g  
way to  go: when Freedom League p ro p ag a n d a  was c i r c u l a t e d  a t  t h e  Labor 
s t a t e  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  1914 th e  p a r t y  m e re ly  e n d o rs e d  t h e  d e t a i l  
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  t h e  Act fo rw ard e d  by th e  W este rn  A u s t r a l i a n  p a r t y .
An e n c o u ra g in g  deve lopm en t i n  p o p u l a r i s i n g  i t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o u t lo o k  was t h e  VSP s u c c e s s  i n  c i r c u l a t i n g  to  t r a d e  u n io n s  t h e  H a r d ie -  
V a i l l a n t  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  Second I n t e r n a t i o n a l  s u g g e s t i n g ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  
a g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  o f  w o rk e rs  i n  r e s p o n s e  to  an o u tb re a k  o f  w ar and 
e n c l o s i n g  q u e s t i o n s  as  to  t h e  u n i o n s ’ a t t i t u d e s  to  com pulsory  t r a i n i n g  
and r e c e p t i v i t y  to  a  g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  s t r a t e g y .  [3] At th e  T ra d e s  H a l l  
C u r t i n  s u c c e e d e d  i n  o b t a i n i n g  a p p ro v a l  f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y ,  on 
b e h a l f  o f  a  c la im e d  170 ,000  w o rk e rs
as  t h e  m ost e f f e c t u a l  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  w ars  be tw een  n a t i o n s  
and ( i t )  f u r t h e r  em p h a s ise s  t h e  o n e n e ss  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  t h e  w o rk e rs  o f  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  as a g a i n s t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  e x p l o i t e r s  o f  any c o u n t r y  and p le d g e s  
i t s e l f  to  work f o r  t h e  economic o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  
w o rk in g  c l a s s  on th e  l i n e s  l a i d  down to  t h e  end t h a t  th e  
e x i s t i n g  p a r a s i t i c  b a t t e n i n g  on armaments as  a means to  
huge p r o f i t  m aking by t h e  armaments r i n g  c e a s e  ,[4]
Such s e n t im e n t s  came t o  n o u g h t  when w ar b ro k e  o u t  and th e  VSP d e c id e d  
to  s u p p o r t  th e  f e d e r a l  L abor p a r t y ,  d e s p i t e  i t s  a t t i t u d e ,  as  t h e  b e s t  
o p t io n  i n  th e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  The V i c t o r i a n  p a r t y ’ s w eek ly  Labor C a l l  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  t h e  p e ss im ism  o f  t h e  movement i n  i t s  e d i t o r i a l s .
The w o rk e rs  have  n o th in g  to  g a in  i n  t h e  e v i d e n t l y  coming 
s l a u g h t e r  b u t  a l l  t o  l o s e .  I t  i s  a  n o t o r i o u s  f a c t  t h a t  
w here  w ars  have  r a g e d ,  th e  p r i v i l e g e s  t h a t  i t  h a s  t a k e n  th e  
w o rk e rs  y e a r s  to  g a in  a r e  knocked o v e r  l i k e  so  many s k i t t l e s  .
[5 ]
[ 1] T . J .  M i l l e r ,  Some R e f l e c t i o n s . M elb o u rn e ,  1938, p p .5 8 - 9  
[ 2  ] THC M inu te s  19 M arch, 11 J u n e ,  1914 
[ 3  ] Ja u n ce y  o p . c i t . p 91
[ 4  ] VSP c i r c u l a r  6 M arch, 1914. Ross p a p e r s  MS 3222 JAF 5 6 /1 /1 6
[ 5  1 THC M inu tes  26 M arch, 28 May 1914. C. G ray , S e c r e t a r y  M elbourne  THC 
S e c r e t a r y  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S o c i a l i s t  B u reau ,  B r u s s e l s  2 June  1914.
Ross P a p e rs  o p . c i t . JAF 5 6 /1 /5
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Where it is all going to end, no one can tell; but who 
is going to pay for it, everybody can give a good guess—  
the workers. They will have to pay in blood and toil.
They will be food for power and shot whilst the war is on; 
and they are to be the victims who are to be sweated to 
raise the cash again to replenish the coffers of the state 
and Fat and Co. This applies to workers the world over, 
no matter who wins. [1]
With this background Victoria produced the earliest and most varied
array of anti-war and anti-conscription bodies.
Strongest and earliest response came in August-September from 
the AFL, VSP and other groups in the formation of the Australian Peace 
Alliance. For these organisations this was initially as much a defen­
sive step as a positive counter to the war, as explained by founding 
member and principal organiser T.J. Miller in describing reactions by 
Melbourne pacifists, who
met and considered the whole situation and decided that 
an organisation be formed which we named the Australian 
Peace Alliance, and though it had an educational objective 
in matters of the moment ... it was also a protective 
force, as, if any of the thirty or so organisations 
comprising it were in any way attacked, the others would 
stand by them . [ 2]
The Alliance quickly expanded its support amongst Labor branches and some 
unions as an indigenous response to the outbreak of war paralleling the
Union of Democratic Control in Britain and dedicated itself to propagan­
dist activities in support of an early peace upon democratic conditions 
designed to prevent outbreak of similar conflicts . [ 3] Any idea of 
industrial action was clearly regarded as improbable and in fact the 
APA platform devised in late 1914 - early 1915 was quite moderate as to 
methods and highly idealistic as to objectives. Interstate expansion 
during 1915 from its Melbourne base ,where the THC had affiliated with 
it»,gave the Alliance wide coverage but it was limited by the naivety 
of its assumptions and failure in its program to grapple with the hard
[l ] Ibid 13 August, 1914
[2 ] Some Reflections pp 58-9
[3] J. Merritt,’The Australian Peace Alliance, 1914-1922’
Work-in-progress paper, History RSSS ANU 27 October,1964. 
By permission of the author.
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realities of international relations generally and of Australia’s 
situation in particular: its best work lay in contributing to the
general fund of ideas on the war so that, when agitation on that topic 
began in earnest, its proposals were well known and long established.
As a guide to action and initiator of essential ideas the Alliance 
was of limited value.
In addition to expansion of the APA a number of other 
organisations were formed in 1915 with related purposes. At the ini­
tiative of the Melbourne branch of the Australian Socialist Party an 
Anti-Conscription and Anti-Militarist League was established in- July 
in anticipation of conscription for overseas service, supported by 
the VSP and other socialists and also propagandist in methods. [l ] 
Simultaneously, a No-Conscription Fellowship was founded with 
organisational assistance by R.S. Ross and several unionists, essentially 
a draft resistors' union initially based upon religious objections to 
violence but later broadening the basis of its appeal. [2] Other 
prominent participants in this early phase of activity were those in 
the Women's Peace Army (based upon the previous Womens' Political 
Association) led by Vida Goldstein, Cecilia John.and Adela Parkhurst, 
which adopted elements of both VSP and Peace Alliance platforms and in 
turn contributed distinctly feminist demands to the other radical 
organisations . [3 ] Nationally}the socialist women engaged in organi­
sational activities at least equal to those of Bob Ross and T.J. Miller.
Without a state Labor government to concern it dissatis­
factions within the Victorian movement focussed naturally upon the 
federal government. Trades Hall complaints concentrated upon suspen­
sion of Labor's legislative program^made doubly necessary under wartime 
disruption and the unfairly distributed burden of war} [4 ] but moves
[l ] Turner]Socialist Political Tactics’op.cit. VSP Minutes 
26 July, 9 August, 1915
[2 ] Labor Call 21 October, 1915
[3 ] Womens' Peace Army Leaflet No.l*No Conscription! 
Molesworth papers Uncat MSS 243/3 Anti-Conscription 
League dodgers, 1916; also M.Brodney»'Militant 
Propagandists of the Labor Movement'«L.H.5 November 
1963 pp. 11-17
[4] THC Minutes 15, 22 July 1915
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for declarations against compulsory military service did not bear fruit 
until later that year when the THC endorsed a resolution for submission 
at an APA public meeting urging utmost resistance to compulsory 
service .[1] Similarly,the state executive was greatly hostile to 
abandonment of the constitutional referenda at the end of the year, for 
which campaign the party was already fully geared. Events took a 
violent turn when the THC recommended members to ignore the war 
census cards distributed nationally [ 2] and the initiator of the reso­
lution, F. Kata, assistant secretary of the Clerks' Union, was 
assaulted by a gang of soldiers at Trades Hall. Council vehemently pro­
tested this and other examples of suppression of opinion but expunged 
the resolution after it was pointed out that it was a direct 
incitement to break the law on compulsory return of census cards. [ 3 ]
Discontent with the war not only centered upon convictions 
of the inequality of sacrifice, opposition to compulsory service as 
tending to widen that disparity, or the poor performance of federal 
Labor criticised with great acerbity in the Call. By 1915 the Labor 
weekly was carrying an increasing number of articles and editorials 
upon the commercial and immigration challenge posed by Japan, especially 
by writers such as W. Wallis and Frank Anstey, and directly linking 
these issues with conscription. Despite the censorship these articles 
became increasingly strident, even vicious, in tone, readers being 
continually warned that 'The Japanese are out for trade expansion and 
territory, and it beholds (sic) Australia to be on the qui vive ...' 
compared to Germany 'We think Japan is, and always has been more 
dangerous economically, industrially and nationally.'4 Anti-war
[1] Ibid. 16 September, 1915
[2] THC Minutes 9 December, 1915
[3] Ibid. 20 January, 1916
[4] Labor Call 2 March, 1916
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sentiments and opposition to conscription were strongly evident 
trends in Victoria by 1916, it only remaining to be determined how far 
this opinion would translate into decisive action; in turn this depen­
ded upon the effectiveness of radical groups within the party as to 
how far state conference and state executive would venture.
Factionalism in Victoria
At the beginning of the crucial year of 1916 there was no 
rank and file insurgency in Victoria as had developed out of the struggle 
for recognition of dissatisfied and disadvantaged union and branch 
demands within the N.S.W. and South Australian Labor parties, nor was 
there a strong parliamentary leadership maintaining the policy 
initiative as in the Queensland and Tasmanian parties. On the other 
hand, there were a number of groups in the Victorian party possessing 
varying degrees of indirect influence: the A.P.A., planning and organi­
sing for its first federal conference in Melbourne at Easter, which had 
adopted methods of education and propaganda in its role as an attitude 
group; the Anti-Conscription and Anti-Militarism League and No- 
Conscription Fellowship, which were also attitude and self-protection 
groups; the V.S.P. with its cautious approach to relationships with the 
Labor party, and even the Wren machine. Given the climate of opinion these 
groups encouraged and articulated it would nevertheless have been largely 
up to the state executive to determine party policy on conscription 
unless deliberate efforts were made to prescribe its behaviour. Condit­
ions for the development of such attempts were at first sight 
unencouraging, the Victorian state executive having pursued a strict, 
distinctly hostile approach towards intra-party opinion aggregation 
by organised factions. Trouble had arisen in the party in preceding 
years with the emergence of organised Catholics and other, more amorphous 
groups such as the one animated by H.E. Langridge, which had for years 
sought to arrange the numbers at state conference to have employees barred
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from membership of the Labor party. [1] This slightly eccentric concern 
on the part of the ’Wage Earners' Group of Members of the A.L.P.’ for a 
’pure-bred wage earner party’ had resulted in quite large, but always 
insufficient blocs of votes at conferences for its perennially 
recurring motions and with such a limited scope seemed harmless enough.
The former group were of much greater significance. Battle 
had already been joined in previous years when members of the laymen’s 
Catholic Federation, officially supported by Archbishop Carr and 
Coadjutor Archbishop Mannix, [2] had attempted to pressurise Labor 
candidates with the object of forcing a change in Labor's education plank 
in favor of state aid. As a threat both to Labor's organisational 
integrity and an incitement to sectarianism state executive expelled all 
members of the Federation and took the opportunity to simultaneously 
proscribe a miscellaneous collection of other groups, including the 
Victorian Alliance, the Licensed Victuallers' Association, Loyal Orange 
Lodge and Womens’ Political Association. [3] The Wage Earners also 
came within the rubric of this indiscriminate dragnet ordered by state 
president Laurie Cohen, who decreed on the basis of party rule
[1] It was described by Langridge himself as 'A very loosely 
organised body, seldom holding meetings but acting through 
the consultation of the most active spirits by the 
honorary secretary who has been able to devote a large 
amount of time to waiting on them as to their ideas; 
mainly officials in both industrial and political 
departments of organised labor. Its loyalty is unimpea­
chable and unquestioned.' Letter to Labor Call 30 
March, 1916.
[2] Ibid. 4 November, 1915.
[3] Annual Report, Victorian state executive, 1916.
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38 J [1] 'that no members of the P.L.C. had the right to constitute 
themselves an official "group" of the Australian Labor party'. This 
was upheld on appeal at a subsequent executive meeting. Later that year 
the North Carlton branch of the P.L.C. attempted to call a protest 
meeting of other branches on the occasion of Hughes' abandonment of 
the referenda and state executive acted swiftly again to assert its 
authority, declaring such action unconstitutional and defending its own 
stand on the matter. Following personal visits by Cohen this action 
was dropped. [2]
Undaunted, both Wage Earners and Catholics continued to 
organise and the Catholics especially set about highly effective work in 
the unions and branches with a view to securing a distinct Catholic 
bloc at the 1916 Labor conference. They acted through a Catholic 
Workers' Association formed on 1 September, 1915 under the encouragement 
of the hierarchy and were successful at the next state conference of 
the P.L.C. in obtaining a more favorable rephrasing of the education 
plank. Following this victory however they did not sustain as a per­
manent faction in the Labor party and organised Catholic action faded 
from consideration for some time. Both organisations did succeed in 
raising at the 1916 conference the whole issue of factions within the 
party, Langridge having put the case for a pluralist party most 
succinctly in the preceding weeks.
[1] Providing that 'No person shall be eligible to become or 
permitted to remain a member of the PLC who is a member 
of any other organisation which selects or lends support 
to candidates for public positions.' PLC Rules,1915. This 
had been especially passed as an amendment at the 1915 
state conference on the recommendation of state executive 
specifically to deal with the Catholic Federation problem. 
C. Hamilton, 'Catholic Interests and the Labor Party: 
Organised Catholic Action in Victoria and NSW, 1910-1916.' 
H.S. 33, 9 November, 1959 pp.62-73. Also P.J. O'Farrell, 
The Catholic Church in Australia. Melbourne, 1968
pp. 210 - 212.
[2] Labor Call 4 May, 1916.
49
A little reflection will show us that all the unpreventable 
concerted action by members within any political party for 
a particular reform or plank would be better in organised 
form, both for the group itself, and to allow of the adminis­
trative body of the party communicating with those persons 
better than with a 'hole and corner' activity, with 
no recognised head, body or tail. Of course groups, to be 
legitimate must exclude no insider or include no outsider; 
be open to only - but all - members of the party.
We shall conclude also that the more of such groups there 
are in a party, the more important it must be regarded, 
since those deeply concerned and active about the respec­
tive matters grouped upon (sic) use that party in preference 
to other political parties to achieve their ends. $1*3
The Clerks' Union had already announced its intention of moving at 
conference 'such motions as would have the effect of affirming 
Labor's recognition of legitimate organised bodies' like the Wage 
Earners, which the executive had proscribed as unconstitutional, 'all 
group action being deemed by them as disruptive.' [2] The 
initiative was taken in conference by a Catholic AWU delegate,
J.H. Scullin, moving with the assistance of E.J. Hogan, MLA, that rule 
38 J be deleted. Scullin argued that full freedom should be accorded 
to individuals in moral, religious or social organisations to belong 
to Labor, contending that the party was big enough and commonsense 
sufficient to prevent its capture by any one section. FPLP members 
Parker Maloney and Frank Anstey also favored deletion but it was 
finally resolved by 124-30 votes at the suggestion of another AWU man, 
T.P. Holloway, to retain discretionary powers by slightly amending the 
rule to sanction group activity while preventing disruption. [3]
[1] Ibid. 30 March, 1916
[2] Ibid.
[3] Rule 38 J was amended to permit expulsion of anyone whose 
conduct was deemed contrary to the principles and 
solidarity of Labor, or who violated the membership pledge 
to faithfully uphold the party constitution and platform 
and to vote and work for the return of Labor candidates. 
Ibid. 11 May, 1916.
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This victory for the advocates of an open party was 
important in reversing the trend to increasing intolerance of 
intra-party organisations and secured the position of another group 
which had been organising since early in the year with altogether 
more serious implications for Labor’s platform and policy. Since 
1914 there had been dissatisfaction with the content of Labor policy 
on the part of a number of trade union officials deploring its 
insufficient radicalism and despite the avenues already open of 
syndicalism, anti-reformist socialism and moderate democratic 
socialism provided by the IWW, ASP and VSP respectively. The self- 
styled Militant Propagandists of the Labor Movement consciously 
regarded themselves as an elite.
The Militants are the more advanced section in the 
political and industrial activities and desire that this 
movement should proceed in an organised direction on 
Definite and Direct Lines that will hasten an improvement 
in the workers’ conditions. [1]
Notably absent was a platform of specific objects, a rigorous 
ideology or social analysis but rather a belief in the need for a 
vague ’gingering up' of the party. As their name implied the Militants 
believed ’a place must be found inside the Labor party for 
militant propaganda and action of a revolutionary character upon 
fundamental and burning questions of the day'. Chief figure 
behind the body was Jack Cosgrave, secretary of the small Cycle Trades 
Union who believed in the necessity of a radicalising influence 
’to make Labor leaders fight and rouse rebellion in the rank and file 
of organised workers against whose who would nail Labor to the cross’. 
Lacking a developed social critique the objects of the Militants 
were vague and eclectic, appealing to those Laborites 'absolutely 
opposed to conscription and (who) places internationalism before 
nationalism and will fight to abolish capitalism etc.' [2]
[1] Ibid. 11 May, 1916
[2] Report second meeting Militants, Labor Call 
9 March, 1916.
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If it makes you burn like the fires of sin,
Brother, you’re fit for the ranks - fall in!
At Cosgrave’s insistence the Militants, initially comprising some 
50 supporters, stressed from the start their bona fides as loyal 
Laborites, meeting at Trades Hall not merely for convenience but 
to deliberately win legitimacy within the movement as the key to 
effectiveness. Despite early fears about expulsions and a 
temporary withdrawal of the use of Trades Hall premises, this 
constant emphasis upon loyalty and avoidance of clandestinity by 
publication of proceedings in the Call and Socialist paid off, 
the Militants being favorably mentioned by state secretary Arch. 
Stewart and Parker Maloney at the 1916 state conference.
Recognition as an integral and valid group within the 
Labor party was a basic requirement for the Militants’ modus operandi, 
a considerable advance upon that employed before in Victoria. At the 
fourth weekly meeting it was resolved
1. That membership be limited to those Laborites 
affiliated either with the THC, PLC or Eight 
Hours Committee who are prepared to further the 
interests of existing Labor organisations by 
militant propaganda.
2. That a Militants' Roll be established for systematic 
use showing names and organisations and in 
relation thereto that membership cards will be 
issued for those who will enrol yet cannot attend 
meetings.
Normal publicity and propagandising activities would be pursued 
but the salient organisational feature would be the Roll of members, 
as explained by Cosgrave:
Without recognised leaders, but by meeting and deciding 
on concerted action, the militants will initiate, where 
necessary, and by systematic use of the ’Militants’ Roll', 
place a statement and give a lead upon fundamental 
questions and issues of the day that will force the 
fighting. As the roll is made more complete any important 
question can be made a burning one to grip the attention 
of Labor organisations... We conceive that the supreme
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need of the moment is organisation, not to propogate 
specific panaceas, methods or cults, or that certain 
institutions as now rigidly circumscribed must be pres­
erved, but intelligent expression and direction of class 
aspirations and instincts, assuming solidarity upon 
fundamentals of working class emancipation, [l]
This mode of operation more closely approximated that of the success­
ful insurgents in N.S.W. and S.A., although not intended to 
effect basic changes in power structures as in those state parties.
At the same time it offered the opportunity for a more direct and 
effective influence upon the party in Victoria than that of the 
other organised attitude groups at the time when the conscription 
issue reached its maximum importance. Already the thrust of the 
Militants' answer to conscription was apparent, Cosgrave having 
divided the THC in July, 1915 over an APA inspired proposal in favor 
of Britain declaring terms for a peace settlement. [2] Early in 
1916 he and his supporters approached Frank Hyett, secretary of the 
Railways Union and VSP veteran, to support a plan for a general strike 
should conscription be imposed by regulation. Hyett had however 
moved the far more moderate proposal that the THC call a national 
union conference to discuss conscription and the Militants' proposal 
put as an amendment was defeated in favor of the conference idea . [3] 
At the next meeting however it was resolved on the chairman's 
casting vote to refer to the unions for approval presentation to the 
government of a policy calling for all workers in all countries to 
take simultaneous action to force their rulers to openly pronounce 
their terms for peace negotiations. [4] Hyett's scheme was 
meanwhile rapidly implemented with circulars and personal emissaries 
being sent interstate to arrange the conference for early May, [5] 
but the Militants' radical proposals were not to be allowed to lapse.
[1] Ibid. 23 March, 1916.
[2] THC Minutes 29 July, 1915.
[3] Ibid. 2 March, 1916
[4] Ibid. 16 March, 1916
[5] Ibid. 30 March, 13 April, 1916.
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Victorian Labor and conscription
Prior to the annual Victorian Labor conference at Trades 
Hall, 21 - 24 April, the Militants organised their forces after a 
committee appointed on 25 March had investigated the establishment of 
a bloc vote on their special areas of concern, designated as peace, 
conscription, ’war against war', organisation of women and equal pay, 
exclusion of employers from the party, restriction of parliamentary 
representatives on party conferences and state executive and party 
discipline. [1] Following consideration of the agenda a meeting of 
sympathetic delegates was held but it is unclear what proportion of 
the total delegates this comprised or how solid were its votes. Right 
from the opening of conference and the acting-state president’s 
address [2] in which Holloway warned that if the government adopted 
conscription ’the rank and file of the Labor movement would be 
finished with the Labor party’, it was clear that the question would 
not be whether to oppose conscription but rather how far to take that 
opposition. After deploring abandonment of the referenda by the 
FPLP a simple declaration of opposition to compulsory service was 
passed.*then the AWU delegates, McNeill and Mottram, proposed that action 
be taken against parliamentary transgressors of this policy
During consideration of alter­
native proposals Cosgrave and Kat£ placed the Militants' policy 
before conference:
That in the event of any attempt on the part of the 
authorities to introduce conscription in any form, 
conference recommends to unions and PLC 
branches that they reply by a general strike.
Holloway pointed out that this could only be a recommendation, not 
a directive, and it was defeated after further discussion 86 - 5 5.
[1] Labor Call 30 March, 1916.
[2] E.J. Holloway succeeded to the post after 
Cohen's accidental death in February and 
was confirmed, for a full term by conference.
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Victorian Labor’s attitude on conscription became forthwith
That this conference absolutely pledges itself to 
oppose conscription of human life, and that it be a 
direction from this conference to the various PLC 
branches and unions throughout Victoria to take immediate 
action to select candidates to contest the next election in 
opposition to all Labor members who vote in favor of con­
scription, and that the unions and branches in other states 
be asked to take similar action, and in the event of such 
action not being taken by the branches or unions, the 
central executive be instructed by this conference to refuse 
to endorse the nominations.
Both state and federal Victorian politicians can have been in little
doubt as to party policy henceforward.
Debate was later held over peace prospects on a motion 
calling for mutual disclosure of all belligerents' positions; the 
Militants replied with the same proposal they had pushed in the THC and 
now won approval for it by 72 - 69, an effort to recommit this 
lapsing for want of time. The resolution asked that Pearce be 
approached as acting-Prime Minister for assistance in transmitting 
internationally the following declaration:
This conference, representing 200,000 Labor electors 
organised to secure the full result of their industry 
to all wealth producers by the collective ownership of 
the means of production, distribution and exchange, 
sends fraternal greetings to organised workers in every 
country and implores them to immediately take simul­
taneous action to force their respective governments 
to openly pronounce themselves upon the terms of peace 
and a time for negotiation.
A motion for abolition of Labor’s compulsory training defence plank
was defeated after brief discussion once the threat to white Australia
had been invoked. The Militants' ticket for state executive
also met some success, notably with election of Cosgrave to that body,
an advantage lost however when the latter’s Lll-health
excluded him from further activity. These results justified the
Militants' claim that they had 'made themselves felt' but even without
exact knowledge of their floor strength it was apparent that their
influence had not been central. Very largely this was because the Victorian
party was already radicalised over conscription, comparatively speaking,
and the only direct success in policy terms which it is possible
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to  a t t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  M i l i t a n t s  was t h e  p e a c e  r e s o l u t i o n ,  and even 
t h i s  m ust t have  b een  r e c o g n i s e d  as  i m p r a c t i c a b l e  w h a te v e r  
c r e d i t  ' , t h e  V i c t o r i a n  p a r t y  c o u ld  c la im  f o r  i t s  e a r l y  s t a n d
upon th e  i s s u e .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e  M i l i t a n t s ’ n o t  i n a u s p i c i o u s  d e b u t  i n  
p a r t y  c o u n c i l s  e n c o u ra g e d  them to  f u r t h e r  p u r s u e  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  
w i t h i n  t h e  movement a t  l a r g e .
I n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  im m inent n a t i o n a l  u n io n  c o n fe r e n c e  th e  
M i l i t a n t s  d e c id e d  days a f t e r  th e  s t a t e  p a r t y  c o n fe r e n c e
to  i n i t i a t e  im m e d ia te ly  a  b o l d ,  d e te rm in e d  campaign among 
u n io n s  (and  th e  c o n s c r i p t i o n  c o n fe r e n c e )  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  
s t r i k e  a s  t h e  one weapon th e  w o rk e rs  have  to  d e fy  law s 
t h a t  c o n s c r i b e  them to  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  c a p i t a l i s m  and 
smash t h e  d e s ig n  o f  t h e  t r a i t o r o u s  p o l i t i c i a n s  and 
p u b l i c i s t s  who w ould  u se  t h e  w ar s i t u a t i o n  to  f e t t e r  t h e  
p i o n e e r i n g  democracy i n  A u s t r a l i a .  [1]
S e c u re  once a g a in  i n  th e  T ra d es  H a l l  p re m is e s  th e y  h e ld  t h e i r  l a r g e s t  
m e e t in g  y e t  on 6 May and d e c id e d  t o  c i r c u l a r i s e  a l l  d e l e g a t e s  to  
th e  u n io n  c o n fe r e n c e  w a rn in g  them o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o n s c r i p t i o n  
b e in g  imposed ’by some c r a f t y  and i n s i d i o u s  m ethod ' and s u g g e s t i n g  th e  
g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  r e s p o n s e ,e v e n  t o  i t s  g r im  c o n c lu s io n  -
Shou ld  c o n s c r i p t i o n  become law by any m eans, i n  s p i t e  
o f  th e  p ronounced  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  o r g a n i s e d  l a b o r ,  t h e  
governm ent w i l l  t h u s  c h a l l e n g e  o r g a n i s e d  r e v o l t ,  and have  
to  t a k e  th e  l i v e s  o f  th o s e  who w i l l  u p h o ld  t h e  b a s i c  
w o rk in g  c l a s s  p r i n c i p l e s  a t  any c o s t .  [2]
O th e r  f o r c e s  w ere  a l s o  a t  work i n  s o l i c i t i n g  s u p p o r t ,  n o t a b l y  th e  
APA w hich c i r c u l a t e d  m a t e r i a l  n a t i o n a l l y  s e e k in g  t o e x e r t  
p r e s s u r e  upon t h e  FPLP [3 ]  b u t  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  such  methods 
was d o u b t f u l ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  APA o r g a n i s e r ,  T . J .  M i l l e r ,  i n  
p r e - d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s :
I  was s u r p r i s e d  to  f i n d  so  many r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  who had  
n o t  r e a c h e d  a d e c i s i o n  o r  t h e  u n io n s  th e y  b e lo n g e d  to  had 
n o t  done s o ;  i n  f a c t ,  some a c t u a l l y  a g re e d  t o  c o n s c r i p ­
t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  i t  m eant c o n s c r i p t i o n  o f  w e a l th  a l s o .  [4 ]
[1 ]  L ab o r  C a l l  4 May, 1916
[2 ]  M ercury 12 May, 1916
[3] D a i ly  S ta n d a r d  19 A p r i l ,  1916
[4 ]  Some R e f l e c t i o n s  p p .6 0  -  1.
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Of the 29 delegates who gathered at Trades Hall on 10 May the major 
proportion were Victorians, many of whom held proxies from interstate 
bodies, and there was a distinct lack of direct representation from 
N.S.W. and Queensland. With the adoption of a card vote 
however the assembly could fairly claim to represent over 250,000 
unionists,or half the Australian total. AWU delegate McNeill 
introduced a lengthy motion rejecting conscription on principle 
but affirming 'active sympathy' with the Allied cause and suggesting 
that adequate volunteers should be encouraged by enhancing conditions 
of enlistment .[l]
South Australian unionists supported conscription conditio­
nally but this attitude was rejected by a substantial margin,[2]
Next day McNeill withdrew his motion,which one delegate said was 
'more an essay',and replaced it with another apparently drafted over­
night which was approved by 258,018 - 753.
That this Congress records its uncompromising hostility 
to conscription of life and labor and, on behalf of the 
industrially organised workers of Australia, resolutely 
declares against any attempt to foist conscription upon 
the people of Australia.
Federal parliament was commended to implement a number of measures to 
encourage the recruiting it desired and when the Militants' 
proposal that Congress recommend the unions/m^et imposition of con­
scription, by whatever strategy^with 'a general cessation of work'
coordinated by a national executive/was defeated 129,730 - 103,728- 
this was narrow enough to result in a compromise decision asking all 
Australian trade unions to take a referendum of their members on 
the advisability of the scheme. Approval of action against all cons- 
criptionist parliamentarians was endorsed and an executive of twelve 
established and a president and secretary appointed. All of these 
were Victorians: six of the fourteen were members of the Victorian
state executive - including its president and a vice-president - 
while others represented were the VSP, Militants and prominent union 
leaders, being empowered by the Melbourne THC to raise funds and
[1] Australian Trade Unionism and Conscription, being
a Report of Proceedings together with Manifesto of the 
National Executive, Melbourne 1916 pp.11-12.
[2] Ibid, pp.12-13
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employ the services of Holloway as secretary, later succeeded by 
John Curtin. Frank Anstey drafted the manifesto released by the 
National Executive condemning conscription as 'an instrument of 
working class subjugation’ [1] and on 18 May another, unrelated trade 
union conference in Hobart comprising union representatives from all 
states except for Queensland and W.A., also unanimously recorded 
’uncompromising hostility to conscription of life and labor’. [2] 
Disappointed, at their next meeting the Militants expressed ’a con­
sensus of opinion that in refusing to recommend use of the general 
strike weapon, congress utterly failed to rise to a great 
occasion’  ^ [3] having in effect discovered the limits of action of 
the most active majority of Australian unions. q nly the radical 
Brisbane unions and the Queensland AWU branch endorsed it.
When the manifesto was circulated by the Melbourne THC 
under the authority of the National Executive the government censored 
it extensively and a military raid on the Trades Hall ensued to 
confiscate the supply of complete copies. Pearce brushed aside 
objections from a highly aggrieved delegation on 2 August [4] 
but nine days later a more representative delegation was led before 
Pearce at the instigation of state executive by Robert Mathews MHR. 
Comprising members of the Victorian state executive, FPLP, PLP and 
Trades Hall Council this was highly conciliating in approach and 
in effect offered the last opportunity for an understanding between the 
federal government and the Victorian Labor movement. State president 
Holloway stated that they wanted avoidance of a split and invited 
Pearce to give assurances that conscription would not be introduced: 
the latter however refused to be drawn on government intentions and 
pursued an adamant line. [5] Once Hughes' plans became clear at 
the end of the month state executive instructed FPLP members to 
resist in caucus and demanded of state and federal parliamentarians
[1] Manifesto of Australian Trade Union Congress 18 July,
1916. Ibid, pp.3-6.
[ 2] Report of Interstate Union Congress. Hobart 15 - 18 May 
T916 p.18. This was a successor to the urand Council of 
Labor, a prototype ACTU and had met to devise unification 
proposals forAustralian unions, unrealised until 1927.
[3] Labor Call 18 May, 1916.
[4] Alf Bennett, Holloway, Hyett and H.E. Foster. Pearce 
papers AWM 419/80/2 Bundle 7, item 42.
[5] .Memo re Anti-Conscription Manifesto seized at Trades Hall
and Labor Call Office 11 August 1916. Ibid.item 42.
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'that unless they show reason for exemption, they are required to 
speak in opposition to conscription! [1] THC merely reaffirmed 
its previous attitude and threatened expulsion for non-complying 
unions. [2] FPLP members complied readily enough in the confused 
circumstances but because of the quandary in which the two Victorians 
in Hughes' cabinet were placed state executive ordered them to 
resign on 12 September to lead opposition in parliament. Frank 
Tudor obeyed willingly [3] and resigned at the caucus meeting two days 
later. Senator E.J. Russell hung back, accepting Hughes' threat 
that the latter would surrender his commission if any further 
ministers left cabinet before the referendum. Russell pleaded that 
he opposed conscription and would in any case resign and enlist 
in November, remaining only to prevent a political crisis?but state 
executive was unimpressed, demanded that he place his services entirely 
at its disposal by 29 September and upon receiving no reply to the 
ultimatum, expelled him from the party. [4] Russell followed Hughes 
out of caucus and continued in office as a Nationalist: he, with
PLP member William Main who was expelled on 27 September, were the 
leading Victorian rats. PLP leader George Elmslie suffered a personal 
conflict leading to a breakdown and after undertaking to speak 
neither for or against conscription was granted sick leave during the 
referendum and remained in office. [5]
Labor's campaign against the referendum in Victoria was a 
joint effort by the executives of the party. Melbourne THC and 
Trade Union Anti-Conscription Congress, the personnel of which were 
closely interlocked. The last-named played a rather limited national 
role to justify its title, holding only one other interstate
[1] S. Blackburn quoting Victorian state executive 
Minutes for 1 September, 1916 in Maurice Blackburn and 
the ALP, op,cit. p.8.
[2] THC Minutes 31 August, 28 September, 1916.
[3] Although May Brodney claims only because the Militants had 
got at his federal electorate organisations. 'Militant 
Propagandists of the Labor Movement' op.cit.
[4] Stewart-Russell 30 September, 1916. This and the preceding 
correspondence on the affair was published in the Labor Call
21 December, 1916.
[5] E.J. Holloway, The Australian Victory over Conscription in 
1916-1917. Melbourne, 1966. pp.16-17. Labor Call
5 October, 1916.
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c o n f e r e n c e  b e tw e en  May and O c to b e r  when th e  g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  i s s u e  was 
r a i s e d  a g a in  as a r e s p o n s e  to  t h e  c a l l  up o f  men i n  e a r l y  
O c to b e r .  At t l i i s i n t e r s t a t e  c o n fe r e n c e  on 25 Sep tem ber i t  was 
d e c id e d  to  s p o n s o r  a 24 h o u r  n a t i o n a l  s to p p a g e  i n  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  th e  
c a l l - u p  and t h e  N a t io n a l  E x e c u t iv e  a d o p te d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  o r g a n i ­
s a t i o n .  The r e s p o n s e  was d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y  low on th e  a p p o in t e d  day 
when p r o c e s s i o n s  and d e m o n s t r a t io n s  o c c u r r e d  s im u l t a n e o u s l y  i n  
M e lbou rne ,  Sydney and B r i s b a n e .  I n  V i c t o r i a  a number o f  u n io n s ,  most 
n o t i c e a b l y  t h e  AWU, a b s t a i n e d  c i t i n g  f e a r  o f  in v o k in g  A r b i t r a t i o n  Act 
p e n a l t i e s  o r  o f  v i c t i m i s a t i o n  and t h e r e  w ere  some r e c r i m i n a t i o n s  i n  
th e  THC. [1 ]  I n  N.S.W. th e  Sydney L abor  C o u n c i l  s u p p o r te d  t h e  c a l l
and a q u i e t  d e m o n s t r a t io n  to o k  p l a c e  w h i l e  i n  B r i s b a n e  th e  r e s p o n s e  
o f  t h e  BIC was m ost e n t h u s i a s t i c  o f  a l l ,  b u t  t h e  4 O c to b e r  s t r i k e  was 
f a r  from  t h e  o r i g i n a l  scheme o f  t h e  r a d i c a l s  and was m e re ly  a p r e l u d e  
to  t h e  g r e a t e r  drama o f  re fe re n d u m  day . A p a r t  from  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  t h e  
c h i e f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  by th e  N a t io n a l  E x e c u t iv e  was th e  d i s s e m i n a t i o n  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  and th e  l i a i s o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  by o f f i c i a l s  l i k e  
T . J .  M i l l e r .  On 21 O c to b e r  V i c t o r i a n  v o t e r s  gave a b a r e  m arg in  i n  
f a v o r  o f  c o n s c r i p t i o n  o f  353 ,930  to  3 2 8 ,2 1 6 .  F u r t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l  
a c t i o n  was c o n te m p la te d  by a n o th e r  i n t e r s t a t e  u n io n  c o n fe r e n c e  i n  
M elbourne  on 11 November to  f o r c e  r e l e a s e  o f  men a ssem b led  i n  camps, 
c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  t h e  P r o c la m a t io n  and abandonment o f  t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  
o f  d e f a u l t e r s  b u t  a g a in  i t  was f e l t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e f e r  t h i s  b ack  to  
th e  u n io n s  b e f o r e  a c t i n g ,  [2 ]  and b e f o r e  t h i s  cumbersome p r o c e d u r e  
c o u ld  be co m p le te d  t h e  g r i e v a n c e s  w ere  removed by governm ent a c t i o n .  
D e s p i t e  t h e  m is g iv in g s  o f  some o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and i n d i v i d u a l s  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  E x e c u t iv e  was t h e n  d i sb a n d e d  and i t s  a f f a i r s  wound up by a 
j o i n t  THC -  V i c t o r i a n  s t a t e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it tee .  [3]
[1] R e p o r ts  THC m e e t in g s  5 ,  12 O c to b e r  i n  L abor C a l l  
12 , 19 O c to b e r ,  1916.
[2] Memo to  T ra d e  Unions I b i d . 9 ,  16 November, 1916.
[ 3 J F rank  H y e t t  e s p e c i a l l y  w arned  o f  f u t u r e  r e i n t r o d u c t i o n  
and t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  c o n t in u e d  v i g i l a n c e  b u t  a g re e d  
to  work on th e  j o i n t  c o m m it tee .  I b i d . 30 November, 1916.
wFollowing the referendum Victorian state executive took the 
initiative in demanding a policy of no-conciliation, resolving in 
early November
1. That this executive favor the immediate calling of
a special interstate conference to deal with the present 
political situation, and that the secretary be 
instructed to communicate with the other state 
executives.
2. That the executive inform the Victorian members
of the federal and state party that there must be no 
reconciliation with the members of parliament who were 
expelled from the movement, or who supported conscrip­
tion during the recent referendum. [l]
Delegates carried these resolutions to the eastern state capitals and 
when the ALP federal conference convened in December, Scullin and 
Stewart moved the fateful resolution along the same lines as the 
latter clause.
The Agitation for Peace, 1917 - 18
After the conscription split in November, 1916 the major 
focus of Victorian radical groups returned to the peace issue.
The APA was convinced of the potential for success and bent to the 
task with renewed fervor, [2] while the Militant Propagandists rever­
ted to current controversies such as the IWW Twelve as well as peace.
On 11 November the Militants discussed an international working class 
peace conference and resolved ’Members should press the matter for­
ward throughout the leagues and unions as one of vital policy’. [3j 
Immediate results were obtained in the THC in gaining approval for 
their resolution that, as the workers were chief sufferers in time
[1] Statement by Arch. Stewart to Queensland state executive, 
CPE Minutes 10 November, 1916.
[2] Turner, Industrial Labor and Politics, p.171
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o f  w ar
t h i s  C o u n c i l  c o n s id e r s  t h a t  th e  t im e  has  a r r i v e d  i n  t h e  
European  war f o r  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  th e  te rm s  o f  p e a ce  
and t h i s  C o u n c i l  t h e r e f o r e  u rg e s  t h e  f e d e r a l  governm ent to  
e x p r e s s  t h i s  v iew  to  t h e  I m p e r i a l  g o v e rn m en t;  [ l ]
y e a r
and a n o th e r  e a r l y  i n  t h e  n e ^ /c o m m itin g  C o u n c i l
to  im m e d ia te ly  b e g in  a p e a c e  campaign by h o l d in g  p u b l i c  
m e e t in g s  a t  w hich  th e  p e o p le  m ig h t  be  shown how t h e i r  
i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  b e  b e t t e r  s e r v e d  and t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n s  more 
th o ro u g h ly  a t t a i n e d  by th e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h i s  w ar th ro u g h  
n e g o t i a t i o n  i n s t e a d  o f  by a c o n t in u a n c e  o f  t h i s  inhuman 
c a rn a g e :  t h e  e x e c u t iv e  o f  t h e  PLC be  i n v i t e d  to
c o o p e r a t e  [2]
L a t e r  C o u n c i l  r e f u s e d  to  p r o v id e  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on t h e  S t a t e  
R e c r u i t i n g  Committee [3 ]  though  i n  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  m a in ta in e d  d e l e g a t e s  
on th e  m u n i t io n s  com m ittee  and o t h e r  war work o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  [4]
T h is  work com plem ented t h a t  o f  t h e  APA whose s e c r e t a r y  announced 
t h a t  th e  f o r th c o m in g  f e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  s h o u ld  be  fo u g h t  on t h e  i s s u e s  
o f  p e a c e ,  th e  demand f o r  A l l i e d  war aim- s t a t e m e n t s  and e x p o s i t i o n  
o f  th e  w o rk in g  c l a s s  v iew  [ 5 ] ,  o r g a n i s a t i o n  b e g in n in g  f o r  a n o th e r  
P e a c e  A l l i a n c e  f e d e r a l  c o n f e r e n c e  i n  M elbourne o v e r  E a s t e r  t o  
e x p e d i t e  t h i s  w ork .
At t h i s  s t a g e  though  t h e  r a d i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  r a n  i n t o  
t r o u b l e  i n  d e v e lo p in g  t h e i r  a g i t a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  L abor  movement when 
t h i s  and th e  d e c i s i o n  by th e  M i l i t a n t s  to  push  f o r  a c t u a l  s t r u c t u r a l  
changes  i n  t h e  p a r t y  to  s e c u r e  g r e a t e r  u n io n  c o n t r o l  [6] a ro u s e d  
th e  s u s p i c i o n ?th e n  h o s t i l i t y  o f  s t a t e  e x e c u t i v e .  As i n  Q u e e n s la n d ,  
t h e  v e ry  s u c c e s s  o f  r a d i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  r a n k  and f i l e  a ro u s e d
[1 ]  THC M in u te s  21 December, 1916
[2] I b i d . 18 J a n u a r y ,  1917.
[3] I b i d . 1 F e b r u a r y ,  1917.
[4 ]  I b i d . 26 J u l y ,  1917
[5]  T u rn e r  o p . c i t . p p . 171 -2 . S o c i a l i s t  26 J a n u a r y ,  1917.
[6 ]  L abo r  C a l l  8 F e b r u a r y ,  1917
62
the antagonism of the established party leaders and the APA 
conference was proscribed . [1] When VSP and Peace Alliance figure 
Vida Goldstein refused to relinquish nomination as an independent 
Senate candidate, as both APA secretary F.J. Riley and the VSP 
urged, the state executive stand was strengthened and all but one 
branch withdrew from the Alliance conference . [2] Nevertheless the 
APA remained dependent upon the possibilities of influencing the 
Labor party as the only realistic avenue to success, maintaining
that the situation demands a prompt declaration on the terms 
of peace favored by the Commonwealth, and that of all 
parties the Federal Labor Party, in keeping with the struc­
ture and goal of the Labor movement, should make known and 
proclaim to the world its sympathy with such a declaration 
as necessary for the welfare of the warring peoples. [3]
State executive’s fear that all this agitation would be turned 
against it was borne out at the state Labor conference from 7 - 9  
July. In his presidential address Holloway referred to continued 
opposition to conscription but included the phrase 'We hope for 
a speedy and successful termination of the war’, an aspiration challen­
ged by the Militants who moved amendment of the report to substitute 
the following:
We hope for a speedy termination of the war, and maintain 
that the idea of victory by force of arms is not in the best 
interests of the working classes, and advise the conference 
to press the question of a peace without annexations or 
indemnities.
And that the incoming executive be instructed to use every 
means in its power to bring this about.
In debate one critic characterised the retiring leadership as a 
’bone-headed executive' out of touch with fundamentals but the 
implied censure was defeated by 7 0 - 6 6 .  E.J. Hogan, MLA then launched 
an attack on executive member Frank Anstey for an alleged equivocal
[1] Socialist 2 March, 1917
[2] Turner op.cit.pp.172-3. In the VSP the divisive issue of 
running socialist candidates against official Labor 
party ones had been reawakened and a motion postponing 
consideration of this tactic until after the federal 
elections had only been passed by a few votes. VSP Minutes 
28 March, 1917.
[ Report 1917 APA conference, Socialist 20 April 1917.
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attitude to conscription. Holloway himself left the chair to add his 
own criticisms and it seemed as if the whole conscription campaign 
was to be acrimoniously refought until Anstey rebutted the charges 
personally and easily survived in a vote 96 - 32. Still dissatisfied, 
the original amendments to the report were recommitted by the radicals 
and this time obtained 86 out of 182 votes in support: however this
was deemed insufficient to cause recommittal which required 2/3 , 
or 94 votes. More efforts followed to have the reference deleted 
altogether, then to refer the report back to the executive ,but its
defenders persevered and it was adopted ultimately without amendment.
[1]
When a Militant-inspired motion seeking abolition of compul­
sory training from Labor’s defence plank was put up^Blackburn 
countered with an amendment to restrict its operation to men over 21 
years of age, supported by Scullin and Calwell, while Barnes argued 
for the status quo. On this matter the Militants proved to have 
the numbers and they insisted that federal conference delegates be 
bound to this decision. Consolidating their strength the Militants 
next succeeded in having endorsed by 82 - 63
The abolition of the manufacture by private enterprise 
of all material and implements for war and the establish­
ment of international arbitration to finally settle 
international disputes.
Such an intermingling of quite substantial issues in this last 
led to reference of the questions of peace and attitudes to the war 
to a committee for drafting of proposals, comprising three VSP 
members (A.W. Foster, P.H. Hickey and M. Blackburn), a principle 
Militant (Ben Mulvoghue of the Builders' Laborers), Hogan from 
the PLP and other union leaders D.P. Russell, E.J. Russell,
P.J. Brandt and P.J. Clarey. These delegates withdrew to consult 
A.C. Willis?who had arrived from Sydney with details of the NSW Labor 
conference peace resolution, drafted principally by himself and Arthur 
Rae upon the basis of APA policy. While this took place a more or
[1] Report Victorian 1917 state conference pp.6-10.
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less routine affirmation against compulsory service and economic 
conscription (enlistment deliberately induced by causing unemployment 
amongst eligibles) was moved but the Militants were unpacified and 
McGowen moved a similar motion including its sting at the end -
Further, this conference expresses dissatisfaction at the 
weak-kneed attitude adopted by the central executive with 
respect to recruiting by Labor members of Parliament.
McGowen called for a definite instruction to be issued: ’Conference
ought to say that Labor members should not go on recruiting plat­
forms and bring about economic conscription as had been happening*. 
Deletion of the censure was immediately proposed, Holloway leaving 
the chair to defend the executive which 'had not swerved one hair's 
breadth' from conference policy. Scullin and Blackburn were among 
executive members who defended their administration and the amendment, 
minus the censure was carried. Further on Mulvogue moved another 
Militant resolution adopted less than a week after the referendum [1] 
'That the central executive be instructed not to endorse the candida­
ture of any member of parliament who did not publicly assist in 
the anti-conscription campaign'. Obviously aimed at figures like 
the unfortunate George Elmslie, immediate objections resulted in this 
being dropped. [2] When Foster presented the report of the peace 
plank committee it proved to be a recommendation that the NSW policy 
be adopted in toto. Willis was admitted, addressed conference in 
support of the report and it was duly approved as Victorian policy also. 
Blackburn introduced a five clause statement on the war attributing it 
to the causes defined by the Ziramerwald-Marxist conference and this was 
adopted in addition. [3]
By and large the state executive survived quite safely 
the organised attempt to embarrass it led by the Militants. A basic 
continuity in its composition was maintained and even though the major 
resolution on peace had drawn so heavily on the APA it must be stressed
[1] Labor Call 9 November, 1916.
[2] Report p.19.
[3] Ibid, pp. 18-19.
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that this was because of other reasons than the success of 
Alliance agitation or conversion of the majority of the Victorian 
party in conformity with its self-chosen mode of operation. Rather, 
the peace plank had been adopted despite the recently developed 
peak of antagonism between the Victorian state executive and the 
local Alliance, owing much to the indirect creation of a receptive 
climate of opinion but stemming directly from the N.S.W. resolution of 
April, for which Willis and Rae had adapted the APA platform at 
their own convenience. Paradoxically, the Peace Alliance achieved 
perhaps its greatest and most direct success in Queensland, within the 
Brisbane Industrial Council, whereas in N.S.W. it was at best a 
marginal and indirectly effective group; in Victoria, though it 
is hard to distinguish responsibility for particular success between 
a number of groups participating in the peace agitation, the 
Alliance in its home state was undoubtedly central but was encoun­
tering major problems in its relations with the Labor party at this 
most crucial stage. For their part, the Militants found their support 
had peaked and was insufficient to dictate the pace of action within 
the party and could not effect an upset in the power structure. Without 
a coherent social critique and competing with equally determined, 
but less extreme anti-conscription and anti-war groups, the rank and 
file did not have to go far beyond their established leaders for 
provision of radical alternatives. In contrast to N.S.W., where 
the pitched battle against an entrenched and reactionary party 
leadership permitted development of a broad base of support by union 
radicals and consolidation of structural changes confirming their 
position, the Militants in Victoria were essentially confined to 
agitation on current issues and did not survive attrition of their 
animating spirits, collapsing by the end of the war. The VSP 
had survived and its sympathisers continued in high party office, but only 
by conforming so closely to the Labor party as to become at times 
indistinguishable from it.
State executive had won its battle to move at its own pace 
and proceeded to hasten slowly, rejecting a THC recommendation inspired 
by the Militants to direct all Labor parliamentarians to decline
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assistance inthe voluntary recruiting campaign: those responsible
in the THC were prosecuted under the War Precautions Act and some 
fined. [lj Leading figures in the executive such as Blackburn and 
Scullin were by no means conservative, being strongly anti-conscription 
and dubious as to the value of continuing the war, but were also 
concerned with broader issues of defence and protecting white Australia 
and remained acutely aware of electoral considerations. By mid-1917 
executive issued a warning to Australian Labor organisations about 
re-introduction of conscription and convened a conference of 
Victorian unions and TLCs to prepare them. [2] When the second 
referendum was announced the Victorian response was as a result far 
more coordinated, executive forming an Anti-Conscription Campaign 
Committee with the THC with representation from VSP, ASP, Women's 
Peace Army and No-Conscription Fellowship?but these it was stipulated 
were 'entirely under our direction to avoid overlapping'. [3].Again 
E.J. Holloway was seconded by the THC for full-time organising duties. 
On this second occasion Victoria changed to a rejection of the 
government proposal
Victoria Yes No
1916 353,930 328,216
1917 329,771 332,490
At successive occasions thereafter the party used electoral platforms 
to push its peace policy, stressing that as the war was no longer 
a matter of the very survival of the Empire 'We favor the immediate 
cessation of the war and the calling of an international conference 
to settle peace terms'. [4] It also began to sponsor peace rallies
[1] THC Minutes 19 July, 1917.
[2] Labor Call 14 June, 19 July, 1917.
[3] Report of Joint Committee THC and state executives 
THC Minutes 8 November, 1917.
[4] Grampians federal by-election manifesto issued by 
Victorian state executive. Ross's Monthly 19 January 1918; 
Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics pp.173-4.
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on Sunday afternoons in Melbourne [1]. Perhaps the best exemplar 
of the situation at this time was the VSP decision to seek approval by 
two state executive members, Anstey and Foster, for its own peace 
manifesto and acceptance of their amendments before its adoption by 
the annual general meeting and submission to the next Peace Alliance 
conference in Sydney. [2],
At state conference 24 March - 1 April, 1918 there was a 
marked difference from the preceding one: when criticism was offered
by Foster, an executive member, of the performance in federal and 
state elections by the party he was fiercely assailed by his colleagues , 
who seemed to regard any such reflections as disloyal and even 
treacherous . [3]. Even while Foster was re-elected unopposed as party 
treasurer another executive membei; R.H. Gill^ successfully brought in 
new party rules designed to secure the leadership from the threat of 
hostile factions by prevention of canvassing for selection as conference 
delegates and the preparation, distribution or conniving at conference 
tickets. [4] Scullin, Stewart, Holloway, Blackburn, Bennett and 
Barnes - all executive members - were chosen during 1917 by 
rank and file ballot as federal conference delegates and were 
already constrained to vote against compulsory training in the party's 
defence plank. No scope was permitted for further direction however, 
Blackburn and Holloway presenting a motion which they claimed 
represented a composite of all the agenda items on the subject -
That this conference enthusiastically reaffirms its resolutions 
of 1917 upon peace and war; approves what has already been 
done in the work of propagating these ideas, instructs the 
incoming executive to continue to extend that work and to 
secure the discussion of peace in the federal parliament. 
Further this conference recommends the federal conference to 
make it a plank of the federal platform that Australia shall 
engage no more in oversea wars.
[1} Statement by C.J. Bennett, Minutes 1918 ALP federal 
conference, p.5.
[2] VSP Minutes, 6, 11, 27 February, 1918
[3] Labor Call 11 April, 1918
[4] Ibid.18 April, 1918.
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Speaking to his motion Blackburn affirmed that 'It was better that 
there should be European powers in the Pacific than another nation 
which they knew of'. According to Holloway 'there was a great 
problem confronting Australia in the maintenance of its ideals, and 
they would be worse than children if they failed to recognise that the 
presence of European powers in the Pacific was a national safeguard 
for the future'. Introduction of the Japanese problem into the 
debate on the war was no coincidence, it having been a constant 
theme prior to the conscription crisis and reiterated despite the 
censorship on an almost weekly basis in the pages of the Labor Call[l] 
Scullin, Barnes and Bennett were also impressed by the Japanese 
menace and the motion was carried. Conference also indicated a 
desire for Australian representation on any peace conference and again 
affirmed hostility to conscription. [2]
State executive was disinclined to attend the Governor- 
General's recruiting conference at first because of the 'embittered' 
state of the working class, demanding of the government that it 
'bury the hatchet' and undertake certain indicated reforms, [3] but 
when other states agreed to attend Scullin was sent as state presi­
dent and Elmslie represented the PLP, helping to draft the eventual 
declaration at the conference. Melbourne THC declined to attend at 
all. When federal conference was held at Perth the Victorians loyally 
stood by their instruction to oppose the existing defence plank, 
Bennett, Barnes, Scullin and Blackburn indicating though that their 
personal preferences lay with the compromise. Although there had 
been moves on state executive in the absence of a recruiting policy 
to define a position ,' the full executive decided that, as there had 
been no direction by (state) conference, the recommendation by the 
metropolitan members should not be dealt with / [4]. Victoria subse­
quently supported the policy on participation in the war submitted to
[1] Even the socialists divided on this issue. Blackburn's 
views were shared by Riley of the VSP and APA. Socialist 
26 January, 1917. Only a few, such as Adela Pankhurst, 
had dared mention the possibility of controlled immi­
gration of Japanese in an address upon the color problem . 
Ibid. 15 June, 1917.
[2] Report Victorian 1918 state conference pp.4-5.
[3] Stewart - W.A. state executive.ALF state executive Minutes 
8 April, 1918.
[4] C.J. Bennett, Minutes 1918 ALP federal conference.p.5.
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the party plebiscite [1J and with Blackburn appointed by the 
executive as part-time editor of the Call to assert greater control 
over content [2] that paper urged Labor supporters to endorse 
conference policy, which was duly approved by 2:1 margin. Upon the 
declaration of the Armistice the Victorian party looked with some 
self-satisfaction upon Labor's role during the war and its eventual 
policies, regarding the outcome as a fulfilment of them. 'The 
general principles are settled. And they are ours'. [3]
[1] Speech by J.H. Scullin Bijou Theatre,
Melbourne, 1 September, 1916. Labor Call
5 September, 1916.
[2] State executive annual report, 1919. Ibid.
24 April, 1919.
[3] Corangamite federal by-election manifesto issued 
by Victorian state executive. Westralian Worker
6 December, 1918.
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QUEENSLAND, 1914 - 1918
Queensland Labor exhibited features peculiar to the geographic, 
economic, political and social characteristics of that state, conditions 
which bear so importantly on the experiences of the various Labor 
parties. It also compels attention as an exceptional case: 
where other Labor parties, except in Victoria, suffered undeniable 
failures during the war the Queensland branch thrived. Not only did the 
Ryan government maintain its hold on office from 1915 but it avoided 
also substantial schism at all levels in the ranks. Reasons for this 
can be attributed mainly to the late development of Labor governments in 
Queensland in contrast to all other states, again excepting Victoria. 
Before 1915 the party had known only coalition with progressive 
liberals, broken off when the majority had decided that the short term 
benefits had been realised and that they must pursue their future as a 
separate entity. [1] Whereas also party organisation had been fixed 
for some time in other states, evolution of the Queensland party 
continued with adaptations of the machinery until midway through the war. 
By the end of this process the advantages of relative satisfaction 
with the power structure and confidence in its capabilities in the 
Queensland movement were in marked contradistinction to several southern 
states.
Unionism in Queensland was regionally divided between the 
Brisbane metropolitan organisation, which suffered severe reversals 
after its 1912 general strike, and the bush and outback unions, enjoying 
greater numerical and organisational strength from a process of 
amalgamation culminating in 1913 with creation of the giant Queensland 
branch of the AWU. Henceforward this union offered a fruitful source 
of parliamentary talent and a strong bulwark of moderate leadership
[1] Fortunately the sum of research on early Labor history 
in the state has been published in D.J. Murphy, R.B.
Joyce and C.A. Hughes (eds.) Prelude to Power: The 
Rise of the Labour Party in Queensland, 1895 - 1915. 
Brisbane, 1970; especially D.P. Crook's chapter 'The 
Crucible - Labour in Coalition; 1903 - 07.' The Dawson 
government in 1899 may be dismissed as an aberration.
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in  l a t e r  y e a r s .  Union v s .  p a r lia m e n ta ry  c o n f l i c t  had n o t been unknown 
b u t re fo rm s in  1916 s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  accommodated un ions on th e  b a s is  of 
numbers .[1] When Labor won o f f i c e  in  1915 w ith  52% o f th e  v o te  i t  
was th e  r e s u l t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n t  le a d e r s h ip  from th e  PLP le d  by T .J .  Ryan, 
who re c o g n ise d  th e  need fo r  a b road  ap p ea l to  r u r a l  and u r b a n - l ib e r a l  
i n t e r e s t s  and e x p lo i te d  war engendered  i n f l a t i o n  e x a c e rb a te d  by th e  
incum bent a d m in is t r a t io n .  Ryan im m ediate ly  embarked upon m easures 
v ig o ro u s ly  im plem enting  Labor p ro m ise s , in c lu d in g  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e v is io n  
o f  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  laws imposed a f t e r  1 9L2 and commencement o f a l e g i ­
s l a t i v e  program  in  c o n s u l ta t io n  w ith  th e  AWU and B risb an e  I n d u s t r i a l  
C ouncil e s t a b l i s h in g ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  s t a t e  e n te r p r i s e s  in  th e  su g ar and 
m eat i n d u s t r i e s  e x e r t in g  a to tem ic  id e o lo g ic a l  v a lu e  in  a d d i t io n  to  
p r a c t i c a l  and e f f e c t iv e  p r i c e  c o n t ro l .  D em onstra tion  of d i l i g e n t  adherence 
to  th e  Labor p la tfo rm  by th e  Ryan governm ent fed  th e  optim ism  
e x p e rie n c e d  w ith  e l e c t o r a l  v ic to r y .  [ 2Ü S a t i s f a c to r y  government 
perfo rm ance was r e in fo rc e d  by th e  changes in  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  approved a t  
th e  p a r t y f s t r i e n n i a l  L a b o r - in - P o l i t i c s  C onvention in  F ebruary-M arch ,
1916 g iv in g  s t r e n g th  p ro p o r t io n a te  to  s i z e  to  a f f i l i a t e s  on b o th  
co n v en tio n s  and th e  CPE. S ta te  e x e c u tiv e  now com prised 11 members 
e le c te d  by c o n v e n tio n , one each from  th e  PLP and Q ueensland members o f 
th e  FPLP and a v a ry in g  number o f d i r e c t  nom inations from la r g e r  un ions 
a d m itte d  a c c o rd in g  to  a f ix e d  fo rm u la .
Under t h i s  arrangem ent th e  AWU became th e  l a r g e s t  s in g le  b lo c  
on th e  CPE. S ince  1913 th i s  un ion  was le d  by E.G. T heodore, MLA who 
became Ryan’s s t a t e  t r e a s u r e r .  O l ig a rc h ic a l  in  s t r u c t u r e ,  th e  AWU
[1] The p ro c e s s  o f e v o lu tio n  i s  d e sc r ib e d  in  Murphy and 
o th e rs  i b i d ,  and by J .B . D alton  The Q ueensland Labour 
Movement, 1889 -  1915 and P.J.  Bray, E.G. Theodore and th e  
Q ueensland Labour Movement, 1909-1925, bo th  B.A. honors 
th e s e s  ,U n iv e rs i ty  o f Q ueensland ,1961 and 1951 r e s p e c t iv e ly .
[2] D em onstrated  in  th e  f i r s t  Annual R eport o f  th e  BIC D aily  
S tan d a rd  23 J u ly ,  1915 and a recom m endation by th e  BIC 
f o r  a f f i l i a t i o n  by un ions to  th e  C e n tra l P o l i t i c a l  Execu­
t i v e  I b i d . 19 November, 1915. A lso F.M. Forde in  th e  
Foreword P re lu d e  to  Power ; J .  Larcombe ,Notes on th e  
P o l i t i c a l  H is to ry  o f th e  Labour Movement in  Q ueensland 
B risb a n e , 1934; D .J . Murphy , ’The E s ta b lish m e n t of S ta te  
E n te rp r is e s  in  Q ueensland , 1915-1918.' L.H.14 May,
1968, p p .13-22.
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in c l in e d  to  m od era tio n  in  p o l i c i e s  d e s p i te  s tro n g  r a d ic a l  f ig u re s  
in  i t s  ranks p o p u la r ly  su p p o rted  by th e  ran k  and f i l e  and w hich th e  
le a d e r s h ip  c l iq u e  took  some tim e to  i s o l a t e .  [1] Once th e  f i r s t  
ran k  o f le a d e r s h ip ,  men l i k e  Theodore and W. McCormack, became eng rossed  
in  p a r lia m e n ta ry  d u t ie s  a s t a b l e  h ie ra rc h y  emerged under W .J. R io rdan , 
s t a t e  p r e s id e n t ,  W .J. D unstan s e c r e ta r y ,  and a group of o th e r  r e l i a b l e s  
whose names re c u r  in  d e le g a tio n s  -to Q ueensland Labor b o d ie s  as w e ll  
as th e  c o n tin g e n t to  n a t io n a l  AWU c o n v e n tio n s . A ccording to  C h ild e  th e  
u n io n  d isp o sed  o f th e  s e r v ic e s  o f 32 f u l l y  p a id  o rg a n is e r s  [ 2 ] ,  as w e ll 
as i t s  CPE and co n v en tio n  v o te s  and p a r lia m e n ta ry  r e p r e s e n ta t io n ,  
making i t s  im prim atu r in v a lu a b le  f o r  c an d id a te s , e s p e c ia l ly  in  n o r th e rn  
and w es te rn  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  and i t s  p o l i t i c a l  funds w ere a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r ty  
re so u rc e  -  £400 was g ra n te d  to  th e  CPE in  th e  1915 e l e c t i o n  y e a r .
Based in  B risb an e  »the AWU organ  Q ueensland Worker reach ed  o u t to  a 
b ro a d e r  au d ien ce  th a n  th e  m e tro p o li ta n  Labor new spaper th e  D aily  S tandard  
and d is s e n t in g  o p in io n s  w ere excluded  from i t s  c o n s i s te n t ly  o rthodox  
e d i t o r i a l  l i n e .  W hile th e  ap p ea l o f f ig u r e s  such as  E rn ie  Lane could  
n o t be p re v e n te d , h i s  se n tim e n ts  depended fo r  su p p o rt on membership 
m ili ta n c y  and i t  p roved  p o s s ib le  to  i s o l a t e  him o r g a n is a t io n a l ly  to  
p re v e n t developm ent o f a perm anent power b a se . [3 ] A m o n o lith ic  s t r u c ­
tu r e  f a c i l i t a t e d  c o n tin u in g  su p p o rt fo r  p a r lia m e n ta ry  a c t io n  and an 
am icab le  though n o t in v a r i a b le  AWU -  PLP r e l a t i o n s h ip .  [4]
in  im portance
Next /to  th e  AWU was th e  Q ueensland R ailw ays Union w ith  a 
r a d ic a l  le a d e rs h ip  d e s tin e d  to  p la y  an im p o rta n t r o le  in  p a r ty  a f f a i r q  
B risb an e  m e tro p o li ta n  un ions w ere o rg a n ise d  from J u ly ,  1914 
under th e  B risb an e  I n d u s t r i a l  C ouncil»w hich was a t  l e a s t  in  p a r t  
th e  embodiment of s m a l le r ,  u rban  u n io n s ’ d i s l i k e  o f th e  v a s t ,  o l i g a r c h ic a l
[1] A b i t t e r  accoun t by one o f  th e  p r in c i p le  AWU r a d ic a l s  
i s  p ro v id ed  by E.H. Lane, Dawn to  Dusk .R em iniscences of 
a R e b e l, B risb a n e , 1939 e s p e c ia l ly  p p .146-50, 158.
[2] How Labour Governs p p . 69-70
[3] L ane, p p .1 4 2 , 146-7. He worked f o r  m ost o f th e se  y e a rs  as 
i n d u s t r i a l  w r i t e r  on th e  S tan d ard  under th e  nom de plume 
'J a c k  Cade’ .
[4] R. Murray su g g e s ts  th a t  i t  was n o t u n t i l  th e  t h i r t i e s  
th a t  the  un ion  a t ta in e d  i t s  peak o f  p a r ty  c o n tro l  under 
F o rg an -S m ith . The S p l i t  M elbourne, 1970.pp307-8.
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and meliorative AWU . [1 ] This antipathy was nicely illustrated at 
the beginning of the war. It was a characteristic reaction to that 
event of the Labor movement that amidst the launching of patriotic 
funds and associations Brisbane unions formed within a week a combined 
committee to deal with unemployment and anticipated social dislocation. 
Chief convenor E.G. Theodore was elected chairman by the 14 unions 
represented, [21 but by November the BIC began protests that the 
committee was usurping its own functions until, with Theodore's 
resignation under pressure of the election preparations and a decline 
in the urgency of the problems, the committee was wound up and its 
duties transferred to the BIC. In fact the Industrial Council belied 
its title, only a few affiliates being true industrial unions and the 
others craft-based: indeed one initial objective was seen as regrouping
unions on an industry-wide basis. Nevertheless a substantial and 
impressive shift to the political left is discernible once the war 
began to progress. Whereas in Sydney and Melbourne union organisations 
the same process owed considerably to the gradual success of a 
radical minority seeking to lead opinion shifts as mass militancy 
increased, BIC delegates appear to have instinctively adopted radical 
attitudes from the start, opposing compulsory registration of manpower 
by 17 - 1 [3 ] and writing to the FPLP stating their preparedness to
'strongly oppose conscription ... in any other form’. [4.] 
Establishment of an Anti-Conscription and Anti-Militarism League and 
the arrival of organisers from the south seemed less to galvanise 
militancy than channel that already prominent. On the initiative of 
local Quakers and with assistance by Adela Pankhurst and Cecilia John
[l ] S.H. Procter, "The rise and decline of the Australian 
Building Industry Employees' Union in Brisbane, 
1912-18'. L.H.13 November, 1967.pp.26-32.
[ 2 ] Later increasing to 25, Minutes Combined Unions of 
Brisbane 9 August,1914.
[ 3 ] BIC 7, 21 July, 1915
[ 4 ] D.S. 23 July, 1915
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from Melbourne, an Australian Peace Alliance was established in 
Brisbane on 14 November ,1915 and Immediately began propagandising unions 
from its offices in Trades Hall. [ 1] Within two years of its 
formation BIC secretary George Gavin proudly referred to the class­
conscious approach, concerning war-related issues particularly, which 
’has established a reputation for uncompromising militancy throughout 
Australia'. [21 ®y 1918 the BIC developed policies against the
war second only to the extreme opinions in the N.S.W. Industrial 
Vigilance Council. Unions disagreeing with this leftward stance 
tended to drop out of the BIC and transfer their Labor affiliations 
to several other organisations, ’ leaving the radicals in control.
In 1913 the advanced section of the AWU failed at the first 
of Queensland branch's delegate meetings (That is, state conference: 
delegates were elected by popular vote from five geographical regions 
enabling men such as Lane to obtain selection) to achieve a condem­
nation of compulsory military training,after invocation of the 
'Asiatic menace' and a milder objection to possible anti-working 
class use of the military was approved instead. [ 3 ] Brisbane Combined 
Unions Committee initially refrained from expressing purely political 
opinions but the BIC declared against compulsory registration in 
mid-1915, complained about FPLP advocates of recruitment, [ 4] and, 
after checking the opinion of its affiliates,requested members not to 
assist the manpower census as being opposed to unionism and democratic 
practices. [5] Anti-conscription activity began to flourish in
[1] Ibid. 15 November, 3, 22 December 1915, BIC 5 January, 
1916.
[2] Second annual report, BIC. D.S. 11 July, 1916.
[ 3 ] Lane p.121
[4] BIC 4 August, 1915.
[5] D^S. 23 July, 1915.
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Brisbane union circles as Universal Service League agitation 
commenced and the Standard established that a majority of PLP 
members appeared to oppose conscription by a survey of public figures.[l] 
To the BIC must go the honor of first forceful opposition to 
Hughes when the newly selected Prime Minister travelled to the Wide 
Bay electorate north of Brisbane for the by-election caused by Andrew 
Fisher’s resignation. Sharing Melbourne THC resentment of the supple­
mentary questions concerning enlistment attitudes on the federal war 
census cards, the BIC advised its members to ignore these interrogations 
and arranged a deputation to notify Hughes of their opposition to 
'veiled conscription’. [2] On 8 December their president A.
Skirving and two others in company with J.B. Sharpe, Labor MHR for 
Oxley, publicly interviewed Hughes at his hotel. When the latter 
declined an invitation to address Council the delegates presented a 
resume of their views against conscription,which affronted Australian 
democratic tradition and threatened hard-won union benefits. ’We feel 
that the Federal Labor party is too acquiescent insofar as the mandates 
of the Imperial Government are concerned’ - Australia had quite 
separate ideals and should accord them priority. Hughes in reply 
stressed his own union leadership credentials, promised that compulsory 
military service would not be introduced without an appeal to the 
country and stated that he hoped it could be avoided - but there 
were certain circumstances which, if they knew of them, would cause every 
Britisher among them to enthusiastically approve conscription. With 
a final adjuration against defiance of the law the Prime Minister termi­
nated the interview .[3] Next evening the delegates notified 
Council of their dissatisfaction with Hughes' replies and proposed a 
censure of the federal government on account of them and its abandonment 
of the 1915 referenda. Council however split evenly, 9 - 9 ,  over the
[1] The sample was highly selective and took care to 
present conscription as undesirable but represents a 
useful early recording of views. Ibid.4-13 October, 1915.
[2] BIC special meeting 6 December, 1915;D.S. 7 December,1916.
[3] Ibid. 9 December, 1915.
76
suggestion to deny support to the Wide Bay candidate,who in the event 
lost by 86 votes.[1] The principle of retaliation against politicians 
over conscription had made its first appearance.
Early in new year the BIC endorsed the Peace Alliance platform 
unanimously and protested to the ALP federal executive against the 
recruiting drive as only fa step from conscription’. [2] Almost 
simultaneously, the AWU delegate meeting strongly opposed conscription 
in a debate acrimoniously condemning the federal cabinet and momentarily 
toyed with the idea of withholding campaign contributions for 
conscriptionist parliamentarians. [3] So far Labor state executive 
was more moderate, leaving participation of party branches on local 
recruiting committees, as suggested by the State Recruiting Committee, 
to the individual branches instead of proscribing assistance to them as 
one member suggested [4] and as the BIC had already decreed. [5]
So matters stood when the triennial state convention was held in 
Rockhampton from 28 February - 4 March. Delegates lost little time in 
condemning conscription as unnecessary and inequitable [6] and turned 
their attention to a Peace Alliance-based motion in favor of democratic 
control of foreign policy.
In support of his motion Mr. T.H. Wood referred to the 
recent Anglo-Japanese Alliance ... which, he said, the 
workers of Australia were not at all conversant with.
The subject matter should have been made available to
[1] Because of the BIC deadlock no action appears to have 
followed and it is impossible to determine the share 
of the conscription issue in this defeat. Ibid.10,21 
December, 1915.
[2] The APA platform was that formulated by the Victorian 
parent branch in 1915. Ibid. 7 January, 1916
[3] A motion to that effect was ruled out after it was 
explained that no controls could be exerted over the 
annual subvention to CPE .Ibid.17 January, 1916
[4] CPE 19 January, 1916
[5] BIC 19 January, 1916; D.S.21 January, 1916
[6] Changing a militantly-couched phrase ’to fight’ 
conscription to the more conciliating 'protests against'. 
Minutes Labor-in-Politics Convention, 1916, p.90
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let them know how they stood. The Australian Labor 
Movement had long pledged itself to upholding a white 
Australia policy, and should be made acquainted with the 
result of the Alliance. [l]
With more appropriate phrasing »reducing the item to a ’request' to the 
FPLP to urge adequate Australian representation at the peace conference » 
the motion was carried unanimously. [2] Insufficient support for 
a proposal denying party endorsement for Labor conscriptionist politicians 
submitted by the Oxley Workers' Political Association (that is, party 
branch) ,could be attracted and several alternatives were also rejected, 
speakers regarding such a forthright declaration as premature. £3  ^
Structural changes approved at this convention establishing as fair a 
basis of representation in the party as formal organisational constraints 
permitted hereafter determined that so long as the PLP retained AWU 
support on state executive it could exert the predominating influence 
there: only a very deep and extensive antagonism by a united union
movement could upset this situation.
Following the 1916 convention Queensland Labor became even more 
firm against conscription. FPLP members Sharpe, Page and Senator Mullan 
addressed themselves to union fears at the Brisbane Eight Hours Day 
banquet [4] and the BIC stand was unequivocal at the occasion of the 
Australian Trade Union Congress in Melbourne that month . [5] As the 
apprehensions increased preceding Hughes' return to Australia so did 
consolidation of trade union support grow, resulting in the first mass
anti-conscription meeting, organised by the APÄ with Industrial Council 
support , at which Senator Myles Ferricks and W.J. Finlayson MHR
fll Ibid, p.92; Cf. Official Report Labour-in-Politics
Convention, 19F6. The latter record contains more 
detail*, both can be profitably supplemented by accounts 
in the Labor papers.
[2] D.S. 6 March, 1916.
[3] Minutes, p.101; Official Report
[4] D.S. 1 May, 1916.
[5] The BIC proxy was given to R.S. Ross of the VSP, 
Ibid. 18, 25 April, 1916.
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spoke and several PLP members attended. [l] Resolutions were passed 
calling upon the federal government to stand by the class it represented ,
[2] and finally on 26 August, while in Melbourne the FPLP was locked in 
debate over the conscription referendum proposal, a meeting of all 
unions was convened by the BIC on the suggestion at the TUC in May
for a general strike against the imposition of conscription. [3] 
Fifty unions sent representatives and also included were a number of 
non-voting delegates from the APA, local Womens’ Peace Army, IWW and 
other organisations. President of the BIC, R.J. Mulvey, announced the 
object as being to secure agreement upon a concerted response should con­
scription be introduced and, although the meeting was concerned with 
industrial action, AWU president Riordan warned that 'already the political 
graves are being prepared for the politicians who advocated conscription 
and also for those who were too cowardly to come out in the open against 
the menace'. [4] The next day the meeting 'enthusiastically and 
unanimously' adopted the plan to meet conscription with a general strike 
and set a committee to work to lay preparations. [5] General industrial 
action had been urged by a left-wing minority at the Melbourne national 
TUC and referred to the constituent organisations as being too contro­
versial: no other industrial body appears to have endorsed it, though
many later participated in the 24 hour stoppage protesting proclamation 
of the call-up in October organised by the national executive of the 
TUC. Brisbane unions' decision to adopt the original scheme was a measure 
of the advanced state of feeling there.
[1] D.S. 4 August, 1916.
[2] These were drafted by E.H. Lane, Dawn to Dusk p.167
[3] BIC 2, 9, 16 August, 1916.
[4] D.S. 28 August, 1916.
[5] These conclusions of the conference were suppressed
by heavy censorship of the report but the first edition 
of the Standard escaped interference and the results 
widely publicised by other means. SeeNo Conscription 
Manifesto, Brisbane Trade Union Congress 26 - 27 
August, 1916 and other confiscated material collected by 
Neil Gow L.H. 26, May 1974 pp.87-91.
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C o rre sp o n d in g  w ith  t h e s e  d ev e lo p m en ts  was a f i r m e r  s ta n d  
by th e  CPE, w hich  i n  e a r ly  A ugust u n an im o u sly  a f f i rm e d  th e  Rockham pton 
r e s o l u t i o n  on c o n s c r ip t io n  and f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e  e x p l i c i t l y  w arned  
p a r l i a m e n ta r ia n s  t h a t  i t  w ould e n fo rc e  c o m p lia n c e . [1 ] Once th e  
re fe re n d u m  was announced th e  CPE r e f u s e d  an i n v i t a t i o n  by Hughes to  
sen d  a d e le g a t io n  to  m eet him  i n  M elbourne to  h e a r  h i s  c a se  , [2 ]  
and denounced  th e  FPLP d e c is io n  a s  an  ’ e x tre m e ly  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
p r o c e d u r e '.  I t  was r e g r e t t e d  t h a t  f e d e r a l  e x e c u t iv e  had n o t  b een  
convened  as  had been  p ro m ised  and a c a l l  by N.S.W . p a r ty  f o r  a  s p e c i a l  
ALP f e d e r a l  c o n fe re n c e  i n s t e a d  was e n d o rs e d ; m eanw hile i t  was d e c id e d  
to  u rg e  a l l  L abor o r g a n iz a t io n s  i n  th e  c o u n try  to  lo bby  FPLP members 
a g a in s t  a p p ro v a l o f  e n a b lin g  l e g i s l a t i o n  f o r  th e  re fe re n d u m . [3 ] 
E x e c u tiv e  h e s i t a t e d  b e fo r e  em bark ing  upon an a n t i - c o n s c r i p t i o n  cam paign 
i n  o r d e r  to  s e c u re  more a c c u r a te  in fo r m a t io n  on th e  d e c is io n  from  P ag e , 
who a t te n d e d  on 13 S ep tem ber and p r e s e n te d  a  w r i t t e n  r e p o r t  and v e r b a l  
summary o f  th e  r e a s o n in g  b e h in d  cau cu s  a p p ro v a l f o r  th e  re fe re n d u m .
T h is  how ever c o n firm ed  th e  CPE i n  i t s  a t t i t u d e  and Q ueen slan d  FPLP 
members w ere a c c o rd in g ly  in fo rm e d
t h a t  en d o rsem en t w i l l  n o t  be g iv e n  to  th e  c a n d id a tu r e  o f  
any s i t t i n g  member, e i t h e r  o f  th e  House o f  R e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
o r  o f th e  S e n a te ,  who does n o t  oppose  by h i s  v o te  i n  th e  
F e d e ra l  House th e  p a s s a g e  o f th e  C o n s c r ip t io n  R eferendum  
B i l l  now b e fo r e  th e  H ouse. [4 ]
As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  d e la y  by th e  CPE th e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  o r g a n is in g  
th e  a n t i - c o n s c r i p t i o n  cam paign w ent e ls e w h e re  by d e f a u l t .  AlÄfU s t a t e  ex ecu ­
t i v e  made th e  f i r s t  c o n c e r te d  move by c a l l i n g  a c o n fe re n c e  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
from  th e  CPE, P a r l ia m e n ta r y  L abor P a r ty ,  BIC and n ew ly -fo rm ed  M e tr o p o li ta n  
D i s t r i c t  C o u n c il f o r  th e  p u rp o se  o f  fo u n d in g  a j o i n t  cam paign com m ittee
5
and g r a n te d  an  i n i t i a l  £100 to  a  f i g h t i n g  fu n d . M e tr o p o li ta n  C o u n c il 
had a l r e a d y  s u g g e s te d  a cam paign
[1] CPE 7 A u g u s t, 1916
[2 ] The i n v i t a t i o n  was r e l a y e d  by Jam es Page MHR, Q ueensland  
FPLP r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on th e  CPE and governm ent w hip in  th e  
R e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  I b i d .  4 S ep tem b er, 1916.
[3 ] I b i d . 8 S ep tem b er, 1916.
[4 ] I b i d . 6 , 13 S ep tem b er, 1916. A r e q u e s t  r a t h e r  th a n  a f l a t  
i n s t r u c t i o n  to  t h i s  e f f e c t  was s u g g e s te d  by m ore m o d era te  
members and d e f e a te d .
[5 ] I b i d . 8 S e p tem b e r, 1916; D .S .9  S ep tem b er, 1916. The 
M e tr o p o li ta n  C o u n c il had b een  la u n c h e d  on 21 A ugust to  
com bine L abor p a r ty  b ra n c h e s  w ith  B r isb a n e  u n io n s  
u n a f f i l i a t e d  to  th e  BIC. I b i d . 22 A u g u s t, 1916.
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fund on 4 September and the Standard began acknowledgement of the firstthe
contributions two days later. [1] After/CPE agreed to 
representation and allocated its own £100 donation the meeting took 
place on 14 September at the Worker building of all Labor organisations
[2] and it was resolved to constitute themselves the Queensland Anti- 
Conscription Campaign Committee with Theodore elected chairman and 
state secretary Lewis McDonald as secretary._ This organisation led the 
Queensland forces at both 1916 and 1917 referenda and was firmly con­
trolled by Theodore ,who was concerned by the more extreme proposals 
advocated by such members as Lane, chairman of the literature sub­
committee. Indeed some resentment was expressed at political domination 
of the committee at the start, the Metropolitan Council for instance 
insisting upon augmenting its representation to ensure pursuit of a 
hard, uncompromising line. [3]
One advantage enjoyed by Queensland Labor was the support for 
anti-conscription by the PLP. Premier Ryan had supported the war 
from the start [4] and a five-month trip to America and Europe, 
including tours of the front, did nothing to undermine his attitude for 
the remainder of the war [5], but he appears to have been unwilling to 
sacrifice the hard-won Labor government over a controversy concerning 
methods of participating in it and consequently became the only 
Australian parliamentary Labor leader to commit himself to defeat of 
the referendum. Individual PLP and FPLP members had been prominent in 
early agitation against conscription, but the PLP as a whole remained 
undecided, several members being equivocal or actually favorable to the
[J] Ibid. 5, 6, September, 1916
[2] Comprising: CPE - J.S. Collings, M. McCabe, G. Lawson 
and L. McDonald; PLP - J.A. Fihelly, W. McCormack,
E.J. Theodore and J. Stopford: AWU - W.J. Riordan,
W.j. Dunstan and E.H. Lane; two from the BIC and four 
from the Brisbane TUC of August; 2 from the Metropoli­
tan District Council; the editors of the Worker and 
Standard, plus representatives from large unions such as 
the AMIEU and later the QRU and Watersiders.Ibid.15 
September, 1916.
[3] Ibid. 15, 26 September, 1916.
[4] For example presidential address Report Labour-in 
Politics Convention 28 February 1916, p. 16
[5] D.S. 18 August, 1916. Also D.J. Murphy, T.J. Ryan:
A Political Biography, Ph.D. Queensland, 1972.
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referendum despite exertion of pressure against at least one MLA who 
'had already been hauled over the coals', [l] After abundantly 
clear affirmations by unions ,/*&% and the AWU though,the parliamentary 
party also announced after a six hour meeting its opposition to 
compulsory service and cooperation in the campaign. Labor's legisla­
tive program would not be interrupted by an adjournment but participa­
tion by members who so desired would be facilitated* [2] Only 
one PLP member, the Minister for Railways John Adamson, was of 
sufficiently strong conviction to resign over conscription; Adamson 
had become a vice-president of the Universal Service League, proscribed 
by the CPE in early September but was permitted to leave quietly 
without noticeable rancor or bitterness on 2 October./T^*E then circu­
lated all PLP members to ascertain their attitudes and coordinate their 
participation in the campaign [3] Two FPLP members from 
Queensland ignored state executive's directive by voting for the Military 
Services Referendum Bill [4] and were duly expelled  ^[5] Federal 
treasurer W.G. Higgs also supported the legislation and remained in 
the ministry Respite his avowed personal opposition to conscription under 
the influence of Hughes' threats and came within a single vote of 
similar treatment, [6] being fortunate to escape censure altogether.
[7]
[1] D.S. 5 September, 1916
[2] Ibid. 12 September, 1916
[3] CPE 2 October, 1916
[4] T.W. Bamford and Senator Givens, federal executive 
president and crony of Hughes. CPD LXXX 20 September,
1916 p.8763 and ibid 22 September, 1916 p.8969
[5] CPE 30 October, 1916
[6] Ibid. 2 October, 1916
[7] .Ibid. 20 October, 1916. Higgs' case was postponed for 
some time and a final vete on whether or not to withdraw 
his endorsement went 8 - 5 in his favor after support 
from Ryan.
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First official mass meeting in the campaign was held on 28 
September under Campaign Committee auspices, addressed by Ryan, who 
had barely returned from Melbourne and spoke against compulsion but in 
support of F.G. Tudor’s attitude in endorsement of a volunteer-based 
war effort. Theodore also spoke, delivering a typically analytical 
argument against compulsion while other speakers gave warnings of the 
peril to white Australia, a recurrent theme in Queensland as elsewhere.. 
[ 1 ] For some this was a secondary factor while others obviously 
placed greater emphasis upon it for its emotional appeal and because 
colored Labor was still an issue, amongst Queensland sugar workers for 
example • [ 2 ] Brisbane unions meanwhile maintained close liaison with 
the Melbourne-based TUC national executive, approving its call for a 
mass stoppage on 4 October to protest the call-up proclamation,[3] 
which was accordingly held and proved a minor success with 6 - 7,000 
unionists participating in a demonstration addressed by Ryan, current
Theodore and other notables, added point being lent by Hughes’/presence 
in Brisbane. [4] Class antagonism was clearly a polarising 
influence in the Queensland campaign, the specifically anti-working 
class character of conscription bearing no less of an appeal to one 
side than the Liberals’ anti-socialism and hostility to Ryan's 
administration to another. [5] Herein lay much of the significance 
of the controversy over indiscreet remarks/ma9etby1 23456*li?i^e^ly at an 
Irish Association function
[1] D.S. 29 September, 1916. Warnings concerning colored 
Labor were advanced during the prolonged debate by 
Theodore ibid.4 October, McCormack>the Speaker ibid; J.A. 
Fihelly, Minister without Portfolio ibid. 11 October; 
Riordan, AWU president,29 September and 16 October;
BIC leaders Mulvey and Boulton ibid.
[2] Ibid.27 July, 1916.
[3] Ibid. 2 October, 1916.
[4] Ibid. 4 October, 1916.
[5] G.P. Shaw»’Patriotism and Socialism : Queensland's Private 
War, 1916.*AJPH.14, 2 August, 1973.pp.167-178
[6] The minister characterised her as an island of ’cant,
hypocrisy and humbug’.D.S. 13 October, 1916. Upon publici-
sation of the remarks by the non-Labor press the
Governor refused to sit in the Executive Council with
Fihelly until Ryan managed to extract a qualifying
statement from the miscreant and blandly smoothed over the 
affair.
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A measure of violence was added by clashes between anti-conscriptionists 
and soldiers^which seriously egcalated following shooting of an officer 
and the formation of a Labor Volunteer Army to counter disrup­
tion .[1] Ryan attempted to counter Hughes' propaganda amongst Australian 
troops abroad by presenting a resume of the anti-conscription cause to 
the Queensland Agent-General in London for dissemination by British Labor 
M.P. Philip Snowden, but the coded cable was suppressed by the Australian 
censors - there was regrettably no code word for 'conscription' which, 
recurring in plain text,alerted the authorities to the nature of the 
communication. [2] Queensland provided a No majority on 28 October 
of 158,051 to 144,200.
As in NSW, Victorian and Tasmanian parties,Queensland had already 
expelled state and federal parliamentarians as the FPLP split began and the 
state Labor movement generally was strongly disposed against reconcilia­
tion. [3] Certainly there was no doubt about the CPE policy after 
Arch. Stewart arrived from Melbourne to address it and urge endorsement of 
his party's stand. Initially the CPE desired Queensland FPLP members not 
to act until federal conference had convened and issued a directive, [4] 
but this went by the board in Melboume^and Queensland federal conference 
delegates were instructed to support the Victorian attitude on expulsions. 
[5]
Despite this happy accord within the party on opposition to 
compulsory service during the crisis of 1916 there had been a significant 
conflict within the Campaign Committee between those interested solely 
in organising the No vote and another section desiring to broaden the scope 
of the work while they had the chance. E.H. Lane recorded that
there was a very clear-cut division between the purely 
political anti-conscriptionists and the anti-war 
section. Our forces were very evenly divided with the 
politicians headed by Theodore and camp followers, which
[1] Ibid.10,11,13 October, 1916.
[2] Ibid. 21 December, 1916.
[3] BIC 1 November, 1916; Metropolitan Council D.S.
7 November, 1916; a reconvened Brisbane TUC on 11 
November ibid. 13 November, 1916.
[4] CPE 10 November, 1916.
[5] Ibid. 20 November, 1916.
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included Riordan, Dunstan and other reactionary delegates.
Many bitter fights were waged in the committee meetings 
between these two contending forces, principally on 
questions regarding support of the war. All proposals in 
the direction of peace or even criticism of the righteousness 
of the Allies' cause were ruthlessly opposed and defeated by 
the politicians who regarded the returning of votes and poli­
tical power of far more importance than principles of 
humanity. [l ]
After the referendum result the radicals were encouraged to press 
further by the presence of APA official T.J.Millerwho spent two months 
organising in Queensland during early 1917 with special attention to 
obtaining trade union and BIC support not only for the Alliance platform 
but for repeal of the compulsory clauses of the Defence Act itself# [ 2 ]
Such agitation was especially significant insofar as the ALP intended 
to hold a federal conference in 1917 and it drew opposition from more 
moderate sections in the Queensland party who naturally resented inter­
ference from the divisive and electorally embarrassing extremists. On 
the ACC this was manifested in steps to block delegation of representatives 
to the 1917 national conference of the APA in Melbourne but,after 'the 
most virulent and unscrupulous opposition of the pro-war section of the 
committee' throughout several meetings,it was agreed to send two members 
financed by private subscription,after Theodore refused to disburse 
ACC funds for the purpose^ [ 3] Lane and W.J. Wallace attended the 
Peace Alliance meeting despite a last minute withdrawal of ACC credentials 
in a snap vote of that organisation back in Brisbane; according to Lane 
a concerted effort was made by N.S.W. and Queensland leadership to 
prevent Labor association with the conference, which the Victorian execu­
tive had already proscribed.
Later that year the ACC was reconvened in anticipation of new 
federal government action, this time with local APA representation elimi­
nated and an attempt to keep Lane out only failing after the latter 
secured the proxy of another organisation. This time Lane claimed that the
[1 ] Dawn to Dusk p.164 
[2\ Socialist 18 May, 1917.
[3] Dawn to Dusk, p.177
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militants had a small majority of anti-war members and could have captured 
the position of secretary but declined to use their numbers for fear 
of destroying the consensus necessary for successful opposition to con­
scription. [1] Stimulating the radicals in this upsurge of energy 
was the apparent relapse of the Labor party to its previous attitude 
of support for the war; to the ’warm, patriotic sentiment’ prevailing 
during the renewed voluntary recruiting drive in early 1917, which 
anti-conscriptionist parliamentarians Mullan and Page were assisting 
and Ryan and other PLP members approved. [2] Even when the CPE 
gave endorsement to the NSW 1917 state conference peace plank, 
drawing heavily on the APA platform, and recommended that it become ALP 
policy on the war, [3] Queensland radicals were unsatisfied with 
the scope this gave for maintenance of support for the war effort on 
unchanged lines. Their objections were reinforced by a broader discon­
tent, leading the BIC to complain, at a special conference between its 
representatives and others from the state executive and PLP in September, 
of a widening gulf between industrial and political wings. Union 
interests, it was said, were disregarded by the government unless 
its attention was compelled by organised pressure and, after specific 
industrial grievances were ventilated, Collings added the complaint 
that exception was taken in many quarters to the party's attitude on 
war and recruiting. [4] Lane, Moroney and other CPE radicals 
tenaciously maintained pressure, one victory being adoption of a 
resolution in response to Labor Senator Maughan's attitude respecting 
postwar disposition of German Pacific colonies, declaring Queensland’s 
opposition to statements in federal parliament on foreign policy not 
in accordance with 'the spirit of the international character of the 
Labor movement'. At the second conscription referendum in December,
1917 the same machinery swung into action as before and improved on 
the result of the first campaign.
[1] Ibid, pp.180-2.
[2] Memo by Capt. G.M. Dash, organising secretary State 
Recruiting Committee 11 June, 1917. Catts papers
MS 658/Seriesl/No.6
[3] CPE 16 July, 1917; L. McDonald - P.C. Evans 19 July,
1917. Copy W.A. state executive correspondence, file 
118 War-peace movement.
[4] CPE 10 September, 1917.
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No Yes
1916 158,051 144,200
1917 168,875 132,771
Principal feature of the 1917 controversy was Ryan’s celebrated clash 
with Hughes over censorship of Ryan's speeches and statements,[ 1 ] 
which further improved the Queensland Premier’s increasing stature as 
leading Labor anti-conscriptionist and helped blunt the force of 
left-wing criticisms.
Again, success in the referendum campaign encouraged the 
peace advocates in Queensland unions and in early January, 1918 the 
BIC began cooperation in anti-war agitation with the APA,[ 2] 
which had continued its tactful approach to its work in the Labor 
movement.
The Alliance did not desire in the least to dictate to the 
unions. It only wanted to help them in this matter, and 
wanted the unions to take their part in the peace propa­
ganda and use the whole strength of their organisations 
to bring about an early cessation of this and all other 
wars . [3]
Its success with this tactic in Queensland was marked compared to its
NSW counterpart, which adopted the tactic only belatedly, and the 
parent organisation in Victoria^which succeeded in antagonising the 
party leadership to the detriment of its objectives. Union radicals 
and APA pressure ensured the prominence of war and defence at the 
Labor-in-Politics Convention held from 28 January - 7 February, 1918. 
Delegates there gave unanimous support for the NSW peace plank already
[1] D.J. Murphy, T.J. Ryan; A Political Biography. 
Robso^ The First AIF pp.174-77
[2] D.S. 4 January, 1918.
[3] A.F. Gorman, APA spokesman. Ibid. 18 January, 1918.
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approved by the CPE and it became a Queensland recommendation for 
the federal ALP conference. [1] Lane though conceded that the 
militants could rely upon only a third of delegates and the struggle 
proved difficult when on the final day discussion turned to one of 
a number of similar submissions on the agenda paper -
That the Convention urges upon the federal Labor Convention 
the necessity, in the interests of the workers of Australia, 
of the immediate repeal of the compulsory clauses of the 
Defence Act and that the Queensland delegates to 
Federal Convention be instructed to vote accordingly.
Prolonged debate took place before this motion gained approval in a 
division of 3 8 - 2 0  [2] , with main disagreement centering upon the
threat of Japan, the adequacy of home defence and the necessity 
of compulsory training for this task.
Return of the Ryan government in the March, 1918 state 
election with an increased majority further strengthened the political 
leaders and their supporters against the radical campaign for peace 
and cessation of Labor support, particularly by parliamentarians, of 
recruiting. The differences of attitude were revealed by reactions 
to the Governor-General's recruiting conference which both PLP and CPE 
agreed to attend j sending their leaders - Ryan and W.H. D^maine 
respectively. By contrasty the BIC executive replied to the invitation 
with a declaration
That this Council considers that the time has arrived 
for the present slaughter in Europe to cease and, instead 
of considering a scheme of recruiting, peace by negotia­
tion is the first consideration of the workers of 
Australia. [3]
Ryan proved to be the outstanding Labor delegate at the recruiting 
conference sat which the participants resolved to urge support for 
voluntary enlistment. BIC executive again countered with its own 
submission on what Labor's attitude to the war effort should be, 
in a circular to Queensland unions that
[1] Minutes, Labor-in-Politics Convention 1918, P.148
[2] Ibid, pp.174 -5; Dawn to Dusk. pp. 211-14.
[3] D.S. 12 April, 1918
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it appears to us that there is a cowardly fear on the 
part of many responsible leaders in the Labor political 
and industrial life of this state, both in and out of par­
liament, that the war spirit must be pandered to, that the 
talk of peace by negotiation on the basis of Tno annexations 
and no indemnities' is bad political tactics, that 
recruiting must continue, and that Labor must participate 
therein; in other words, that votes and support for our 
party - no matter how secured - are of more importance than 
the fundamental principles of our movement, or than even 
the lives of our brave Australian men now being so 
ruthlessly sacrificed in the protection of the interests 
of Labor's historic capitalist enemies.
We, therefore declare -
(1) That inasmuch as the workers provide the blood and 
treasure to wage and pay for all wars, war is always the 
enemy of all workers in every land.
(2) That we, the workers, always lose in every war, no matter 
which side to the quarrel wins.
(3) That, therefore, the sole interest of the workers of all 
countries lies in stopping the present war.
(4) That we demand, therefore, that the Empire, of which 
Australia is a part, shall at once endeavour to secure an 
armistice upon all fronts with a view to opening immedia­
tely negotiations for peace on the basis of 'no indemnities 
and no annexations'.
(5) That we declare it our sincere belief that any member of 
the Labor movement in this state, whether attached to
the parliamentary, political or industrial wing of the move­
ment, who appears upon the recruiting platform or in any 
other way does any other act involving any further participation 
in the war by Australia, fails to correctly interpret the 
views of the workers upon this question, and displays 
lamentable ignorance of the fundamental principles of the 
working class movement. [1]
Although it was reported that the BIC adopted this 'unanimously
and enthusiastically' the CPE remained unimpressed when Lane moved
[1] Ibid. 20 May, 1918
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a paraphrase of the declaration in that body: Theodore rounded on the
proposal and it was defeated, [1] delegates resolving to leave Labor’s 
attitude to the war and recruiting up to federal conference. [2]
One last chance remained for the radicals to effect a shift 
in Labor policy in their favor, by determining the instructions given 
to the state federal conference delegation. Having already been bound by 
state conference to the abolition of compulsory training for home 
defence,Theodore and Fihelly challenged the principle of instruction 
itself. In ruling that the practice was valid, Demaine did agree 
that it would be understood that an instruction only extended to the 
principle of the issue involved. One last attempt to compel the 
federal delegates to oppose participation by state or federal politicians 
in recruiting was barely defeated by 8 - 7. [3] In Perth the NSW radicals 
made the running and managed to pick up support from most other states, 
including Ferricks and Collins from Queensland, on the extreme proposal 
that the ALP oppose any further despatch of troops overseas. After this 
was lost by a narrow margin several other Queensland members disregarded 
state conference decision on the defence plank and upon their return 
an attempt by the radicals to visit retribution upon them was defeated on 
the casting vote of the chairman. [4] State executive then accepted 
APA assistance in urging endorsement by the party rank and file of the 
1918 federal conference recruiting policy,stipulating conditions for 
continued ALP support of the war effort, [5] and it can have been only
with mixed feelings of satisfaction that the radicals welcomed the 
largest majority id the party plebiscite of any state branch of 3:1
[1] Dawn to Dusk pp. 215-16.
[2] CPE 25, 27 May, 1918.
[3] Ibid. 31 May, 1918
[4] Ibid.10 October, 1918.
[5] Ibid.l August, 12 September, 1918.
[6] Report/9^turning officer E.J. Holloway, Report ALP 
federal conference, 1919, p.13
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Despite their solid entrenchment in the BIC and consistent 
representation in the state councils of the Queensland party, the 
radicals had not been essential in ensuring firm opposition to conscription 
and in their most determined endeavour to swing Labor against participation 
in the war had manifestly failed. Faced with confident and capable party 
leadership from the PLP and extra-parliamentary wing^ their numbers on 
state conference, the CPE and the Anti-Conscription Campaign Committee 
proved just insufficient on the crucial occasions. Rank and file support 
for this section continued after the war for some time but had passed 
its peak, and the renamed Queensland Central Executive [l] lost 
little time in launching a determined campaign against those ’seeking to 
spread a crafty and disruptive propaganda in the working class 
movement’ . [2] Ostensibly aimed against IWW agitators^there seems 
justification for Lane’s charge that the latter merely afforded the QCE 
a stalking horse against militant Laborites of any denomination^ [3]
The stage was set at the end of the war for a turbulent decade for 
relationships in the Queensland Labor movement between moderate PLP 
leaders and their supporters and the remaining radicalston industrial 
issues and control of the party,but the first round had already been deci­
ded in the conflict over conscription and the war in favor of the former.
[1] After adoption of the title Queensland branch, ALP. 
QCE 20 November, 1918
[2] Solidarity or Disruption QCE official manifesto 11 
March, 1919; also P.C. Conroy Political Action, 
Brisbane, 1918.
[3] Dawn to Dusk, pp.225-8
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THE POWER STRUGGLE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA, 1914-18.
Events in the South Australian Labor movement during the war 
provide another example of the conjunction between disagreement on a 
substantive policy issue and a fight for control of the party machine.
The United Labor Party [1] was a development from Adelaide trade union 
growth in the 1880s. Annual conference provided the highest source of 
authority and the party was administered during the year by a state 
executive elected by conference. A legacy of the particular conditions 
of development was the ULP Council, a body of anything from 100-200 
representatives from metropolitan unions, branches and other affiliates 
which met monthly and to which state executive presented regular reports 
for consideration and approval. In size the Council was almost a mini­
state conference and provided a vital forum for the registration of 
opinion changes within the party lacking with the less flexible state 
conference/executive structure of most states. Most important combined 
union organisation was the United Trades and Labor Council of Adelaide.
Central to an understanding of the dynamics of South 
Australian Labor politics was the special relationship between Adelaide 
and the country. [2] From 1904 the ULP was the first party to couch its 
appeal in terms attractive to both metropolitan and rural electors, 
making special concessions to conciliate the latter by fostering rural 
party branches with the offer of greater control of finance and 
weighted representation on the hitherto urban-dominated party organs.
Its success broadened the ULP from its metropolitan base but had grave 
implications for power distribution within the party and ultimately 
proved disruptive. Prior to the conscription crisis in 1916 the PLP 
leadership exercised greatest influence over the party, finding state 
conference support from moderate unions and urban branches and amongst 
the disproportionately numerous country representatives providing on
[1] ULP until 1918 when in compliance with federal 
conference decision it became South Australian 
Branch, ALP.
A theme explored by J . B. Hirst, Adelaide and the 
Country. Melbourne, 1973 especially pp. 174-178, 
193-207.
[2]
92
average some 30% of delegates between 1904-17. [1] Some protests had
led to progressively more equitable representation for large unions in 
the prewar years but the biggest unions such as the AWU and United 
Laborers remained under-represented and resentful of this. In 1914 these 
two amalgamated to form the Adelaide branch of the AWU, by far the most 
powerful union in South Australia.
Developing from this theme was an acute parliamentarian vs. 
industrialist conflict expressed in terms of union resentment of the 
'black-coated brigade' of non unionists prominent in the PLP leadership. [2] 
Symptomatic of the unions' sense of grievance were unsuccessful motions 
at succeeding state conferences for adoption of a card vote. Outside 
the Labor party was a small but vocal radical community prior to the 
war; the Industrial Workers of the World first achieved prominence in 
Adelaide before Sydney became the Wobbly stronghold, [3] and an anti­
militarist Australian Freedom League had been active in generating a 
climate of criticism of the Defence Act leading to detailed suggestions 
for reform at state conference in November, 1914. Combining with other 
socialist/religious elements after the war broke out, a branch of the 
Australian Peace Alliance was established, [4] but it had overstepped the 
bounds of prudent conduct over the matter of independent parliamentary 
candidates and incurred the antagonism of the Labor party. The role of 
local radicals proved to be a minimal one in affecting South Australian 
politics, [5] even when the prospects of serious trouble within the 
ULP were considerably enhanced by formation of a Labor government 
following the state elections in March, 1915. PLP leader Crawford 
Vaughan headed a ministry of whom two out of six had bona fide union 
backgrounds and the anticipation of this moved AWU state secretary
[1] According to Hirst, ibid. p. 199.
[2] N. J. 0. Makin, A Progressive Democracy. Adelaide, 1918 p. 7; 
T. H. Smeaton, The People in Politics.Adelaide, 1914;
J. I. Craig, A History of the South Australian Labor Party 
to 1917. M. A. Adelaide, 1940.
[3] Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics p. 64.
[4] Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia pp. 77-8.
[5] J. Playford, The Left Wing of the South Australian Labor 
Movement, 1908-1936. B.A. honors Adelaide, 1958.
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Frank Lundie to forecast ’calamity' for South Australian workers, [l] 
During the campaign AWU organiser E.A. Miller took offence at the speech 
of a Labor candidate before a rural electorate which disowned the AWU 
log of claims, the very pandering to the country vote that outraged 
union leaders however electorally remunerative it might prove. Miller 
raged that the truth of the matter was that
persons who masquerade under the name of the State Labor 
Party forget that they are servants, not leaders nor 
masters. The unions are the masters; the Labor politician 
is merely a necessary evil to enable the unions to register 
their devices.
Irrespective of party electoral promises the AWU and other 
unions will carry on their own policy, and at the proper 
time they will enforce that policy ’cocky’s’ vote or no 
’cocky’s’ vote. [2]
As this conflict began to grow during 1915 conscription also 
emerged as a matter for Labor concern. In response to Universal 
Service League agitation and a direct appeal by one of its leaders,the 
UTLC carried a motion opposing the objects of the League. [3] State 
conference in September-October 1915 struck a motion against conscription 
unless sanctioned by a referendum off the business paper however and 
state secretary J.H.S. Olifent quoted Fisher’s last man, last shilling 
promise with approval in his report, merely calling for more war infor­
mation to be released. [4] Opinion was still not much advanced in ULP 
Council in December when a declaration for the federal executive meeting 
against conscription per se was defeated by 2 : 1 majority and the two 
South Australian delegates were cautiously advised to support compulsory 
service abroad only in conjunction with appropriation of wealth. [5]
Not until the intra party dispute over control developed to the point of 
open confrontation did the cause of anti-conscription acquire real 
importance.
[1] Letter,F.W. Lundie Register 1 November, 1916
[2] Hirst Adelaide and the Country quoting Register 25 
February, 1915.
[3] Address by Professor Jethro Brown UTLC Minutes 8 October, 
1915. Resolution recorded UTLC half-yearly Report 31 
January,1916.
[4] Minutes state conference 1915. Olifent soon volunteered 
and served as an officer.
[5] Minutes ULP Council 9 December, 1915.
94
In fulfilment of Lundie’s prediction discontent on industrial 
issues and government attitudes grew apace. Vaughan condemned the 
Broken Hill miners' strike, antagonising Adelaide unions, [l] who sent 
a deputation of protest to R.P. Blundell, Minister for Industry, to 
raise the 'chaotic and generally unsatisfactory nature of state indus­
trial legislation which is a distinct menace to industrial peace' and 
demand replacement of wages boards with conciliation and arbitration 
courts. [2] Agitation for a firmer stand on conscription continued, [3] 
and while turning down a motion declaring absolute hostility towards it, 
the UTLC approved compulsory service subject to three stipulations which 
had been previously circulated among the unions for comment:
this Council is opposed to conscription of males of 
military age unless it is clearly shown by those who are 
prosecuting the war that there is no other way out, and 
in that case the wealth of the nation shall be first the 
subject of conscription, and a referendum of members 
of organisations be taken to confirm the consent of 
trades unionists. [4]
After the UTLC Executive had received a delegation from Melbourne THC 
urging attendance at the Anti-Conscription TUC» the 5 May meeting decided 
to delegate a member to transmit this resolution and accordingly the 
views of nominees on the conscription question were heard. T.P. Howard, 
originator of the successful resolution, was elected in a vote of 
45 - 16 against J.H.S. 01ifent»who supported the war. [5] At this 
stage the views of the ULP Council paralleled those of the organised 
unions, [6]
[1] UTLC Minutes 10 February, 1916.
[2] Ibid.25 February, 1916.
[3] Ibid. 10 March, 1916.
[4] Carried by 36 to 19 Ibid. 7 April, 1916.
[5] Ibid. 5, 6 May, 1916.
[6] After an extended debate in early March, Council approved 
a resolution from a number of alternatives, 'That no form 
of conscription of service shall be made legal unless 
measures be taken whereby the wealth of the community 
shall bear the whole cost of the war'. Union officials 
attempted to have the matter referred to affiliates but 
this was headed off by Reg Blundell and later quashed. 
Minutes ULP Council 9 March and 13 April, 1916.
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but after the intensity of opposition became known to the trade union 
body following the Melbourne Congress and decisions adopted by the 
Victorian and NSW Labor party annual conferences, it changed from 
conditional approval to outright opposition to compulsion. Whereas 
Council merely noted the Melbourne proceedings and left the issue for 
further consideration by the party at its own state conference, [l] the 
Adelaide unions reacted enthusiastically to the example set in the 
east [2] and later that month circularised all Labor parliamentarians
respectfully pointing out to them the resolution of the 
Council to oppose any member on the next plebiscite who 
dares to support the pernicious policy of conscription 
and to ascertain from them whether it is their intention 
to carry out the desire of the industrial workers, which 
is to oppose the conscription of males of military age, 
and also the new scheme of a citizens' levy which is being 
engineered by the capitalistic class of this country.
Members were given thirty days in which to respond, [3] but a collective 
reply of non-commital nature was returned by the PLP. ('4] Davelopment of
this militant swing in opinion held significance second only to the 
formation of an organisation aimed at capturing control of the party.
Initiative to capitalise on union discontent was seized by 
c hiFrancis Walter Lundie, for many years of the AWU in South Australia.
Never a good public speaker, [5] Lundie never attained public office 
outside the realm of municipal politics but excelled at the art of 
union organisation. Genuinely opposed to conscription - as Adelaide 
branch delegate to the AWU National Convention Lundie seconded the motion 
pronouncing that union absolutely opposed to compulsory military service 
on principle [6] - he would have been well aware of the efforts by 
the NSW union branches to compel more favorable reception of their demands
[1] Ibid. 8 June, 1916.
[2] UTLC Minutes 2 June, 1916.
[3] Ibid. 30 June, 1916.
[4] Letter by F.S. Wallis MLA to Reg 1st er 12 October, 1916.
[5] As attested to by a union colleague who wa« - S.K.
Whitford. Memoirs Autobiographical MS, 1958.S.A. Archive«.
[6] Report of AWU National Convention 28 January 1916.
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by gaining greater influence on Labor party organs. While the S.A.
situation was on a far smaller scale compared to the insurrection brewing
in Sydney, the tactical principles were similar. One month before state
conference Lundie called for a pre-conference caucus of union delegates
' ... with a view to coming to a common understanding in regard to all
industrial questions to come before the conference’. [1] Immediate
countermeasures by the government resulted: Blundell, who was emerging
as Vaughan’s chief apologist and union troubleshooter, issued a circular
advising against attendance and, while refraining from attacking the
organiser, drew attention to the dangers inherent in such a step, the
thin end of the wedge in Labor solidarity. ’We must not lose sight of
the fact that the industrial vote alone is not sufficient to return
candidates in various districts.'[2] On 15 August only 34 of some
100 invitees attended the meeting at the AWU office in Grote Street,
but it was a start. In the contest for the chairmanship Lundie defeated
the far more cautious TLC figure Hugh Gilmore and a sub-committee
was then established to prepare recommendations concerning the conference
agenda. At a subsequent meeting the committee reported back and its was
advice/considered seriatim. Apropos the conscription and other military 
items it was suggested that the section move as their united view
That this conference, being absolutely opposed to the 
conscription of human life, hereby pledges itself to 
refuse to endorse the nomination of any candidate for 
parliament, state or federal, who favors in any form the 
principle of military or industrial compulsion- [3]
While the majority of delegates supported the item some favored leaving 
the whole matter to the Prime Minister and others were inclined to 
accept conscription provided equality of sacrifice was established in 
the form of wealth tax. Further meetings left only six business items 
to a free vote and a ticket was arranged for the annual executive 
elections. [4]
[1] Advertiser, 9 August, 1916.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Daily Herald, 23 August, 1916.
[4] Ibid. 29, 31 August, 1916.
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Several contrasts with the NSW situation may be made.
Most obvious is the small size of the industrial section in South 
Australia, some 34 of the nearly 200 accredited conference delegates, 
who were themselves unable to achieve unanimity on such a crucial issue 
as conscription. No formal platform, constitution or rules appear to 
have been devised and the group was evidently viewed as being purely ad 
hoc rather than having long term functions. [1] In distinction to 
Holman's vain bid to rally Sydney Labor Council support the counterstroke 
by the Vaughan government was successful in minimising active dissent, 
indicative perhaps of the less advanced stage of union disillusionment 
and the still powerful effect of calls for unity in South Australia. As a 
measure of Lundie's frustration was his public jeering at Blundell 
when the Minister was mollifying Labor critics at the party's regular 
stand in the Adelaide Botanic Gardens. [2] Nevertheless there was 
some cause for cautious optimism in the reaction of the UTLC to an 
invitation from Hughes to suspend its judgement on conscription until he 
could personally brief its officers on federal policy. [3] Led by 
C.R. Baker, newly elected TLC President and sympathiser of the industria­
list section, a small delegation journeyed to Melbourne, had several 
sessions with the Prime Minister and witnessed his announcement of the 
referendum in the House. Baker remained unimpressed, giving no undertak­
ings on behalf of his organisation and Hughes added the S.A. state 
conference to his itinerary of Labor bodies he would personally appeal 
before for support of his policy. [4]
When state conference opened in Adelaide on 4 September, 
it became apparent that the industrialists could dispose of some 80 - 90 
votes on major questions, which was only a minority but substantial 
enough to enable capture of all but one position on the agenda committee. [5]
[1] Lundie's own story of the section is the fullest single 
account to date. Ibid. 6 November, 1916.
[2] Ibid. 21 August, 1916.
[3] W.M. Hughes - T.B. Merry 29 August, 1916. UTLC Minutes 
22 September, 1916.
[4] The Premier, Crawford Vaughan, saw eye to eye with Hughes 
on the war - Advertiser 5 September 1916 and had been in 
Melbourne at the same time,where Hughes most likely 
secured the overture,though the S.A. state executive 
claimed that the invitation was an independent and unani­
mous initiative of its own devising. Report State Presi­
dent W.C. Melbourne, 1916 State Conference Minutes.
[5] Register 5 September, 1916.
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Chaired by Baker the committee reported in favor of holding the conscrip­
tion debate midway through the week rather than waiting for Hughes to 
arrive on Saturday. Blundell, the sole non-industrialist member, 
entered a minority report condemning this as an anti-parliamentary 
section stratagem and suggesting the debate on this topic be held over: 
this was approved by conference 107 - 83. Hughes arrived on Friday, 8 
September dogged by two eastern state opponents, [l] and immediately plun­
ged into a three hour address that afternoon before answering written 
questions. His remarks echoed those delivered to the House of Representa­
tives on 30 August - the military situation had changed over the last year 
and troop reinforcement was now imperative; new taxation proposals would 
be used to compel equable contributions of wealth; Joseph Cook and the 
Liberals could win a commission to implement conscription if Labor did not 
act. When Hughes subsided Vaughan moved that conference express 
’ ... its confidence in the Prime Minister and in the Federal Labor 
Government’, explicitly denying that this implied any commitment for or 
against conscription. Lundie objected strongly, moving a more neutrally 
couched motion of thanks but after excited debate in which Vaughan 
repeated his assurance conference carried his motion by 123 - 88. [2]
South Australian policy on compulsory service was decided 
that evening. The Port Adelaide Electorate Committee provided a 
motion drafted some time previously closely following Victorian and NSW 
party resolutions in directing penalties against conscriptionist parlia­
mentarians and conferring absolute discretion upon state executive
[1] Senator Ferricks and Maurice Blackburn. The 
industrialists failed in a bid to have them seated 
as regular delegates. Ibid. 11 September, 1916.
[2] Lundie's statement ibid. 1 November 1916. Hugh 
Gilmore supported the contention that an assurance was 
given through the chair that adoption of the motion 
would not pre-empt a later decision by full debate on 
conscription. Daily Herald 13 November 1916.
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to withhold endorsements. [1] Several amendments were then moved; one 
from Vaughan, ’That in regard to the Federal Government's proposals, 
this Conference approves of the matter being submitted to a referendum 
of the electors,' was explained by its author as leaving the matter 
solely to the conscience of industrialists but was rejected as 'too 
drastic' a formulation. From the other extreme a further amendment,
'That this Conference protests against the adoption of conscription as 
it will be against the spirit of Australian democracy and full of dangers 
to the liberties of the people', was also defeated. [2] The final 
compromise drafted at the end of the evening by Baker, 'That this 
Conference supports the taking of a referendum but is opposed to the 
conscription of human life', proved acceptable and conference adjourned 
the next day without further reference to the matter, leaving much other 
business incomplete. [3]
[1] Viz. (a) This conference solemnly pledges itself to 
oppose by all lawful means the conscription of human 
life for military service abroad and directs all 
affiliated Unions and Leagues to take immediate steps 
to oppose all Labor members who vote for or otherwise 
support conscription, so as to make this matter a 
clear cut issue between the forces of democracy and 
despotism, where Unions or Leagues fail to take such 
action the central executive is hereby instructed to 
refuse, under any circumstances, to endorse conscrip- 
tionist candidates.
(b) That it be an instruction to the delegates 
on the interstate executive to oppose at all costs the 
policy of conscription.
(c) That copies of the foregoing resolution be 
sent to the central bodies of the Labor organisations 
of each State, the Acting Prime Minister (Senator 
Pearce) and the Minister of Customs (Mr. Tudor)'.
1916 State Conference Minutes. It was almost identical 
to the resolution of the NSW state conference on 8 May.
[2] Paper entitled 'Business transacted at annual conference, 
1916', appended to 1916 State Conference Minutes.
[3] No reliable single record of the conference exists. The 
Minutes and appended documents and clippings are laconic 
and provide an abbreviated account. This version has 
been supplemented by reports in the Daily Herald, 
Advertiser and Register, plus other accounts, to obtain 
what appears to be the correct sequence.
100
In  every  way th i s  tre a tm e n t was u n fo r tu n a te ,  p ro d u c in g  a compromise 
w hich , on s t r i c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  would le a v e  th e  referendum  one f o r  
in d iv id u a l  d e c is io n  and n o t p a r ty  p o lic y  as in  W estern A u s t r a l i a ;  t h i s  
would have been ad eq u a te  had th e  m oderate  consensus in  th e  w est been 
p re s e n t  in  South A u s t r a l i a  -  i t  was n o t .  L a te r ,  when th e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  
s e iz e d  upon th e  is s u e  as a weapon to  u se  a g a in s t  th e  PLP le a d e rsh ip , th e  
in t e n t io n  o f co n fe ren c e  became a c r u c i a l  p o in t  o f a d eb a te  w hich on 
b a lan ce  j u s t i f i e d  th e  p r o - c o n s c r ip t i o n i s t s . One d e le g a te  r e c a l l e d :
' I  do remember th a t  th e  Chairm an, Mr. G ilm ore, sh o u ted  above th e  d in  of 
v o ic e s :  "Everyone i s  f r e e  to  fo llo w  th e  d i c t a t e s  o f h is  own c o n sc ie n c e " , 
o r  words to  th a t  e f f e c t ’ . [1] G ilm ore h im s e lf ,  who was n o t th e n  in  th e  
c h a i r ,  w hich was s t i l l  o ccup ied  by W.C. M elbourne, c laim ed  l a t e r  though 
th a t  'The e x - P r e s id e n t 's  r u l in g  was g iv e n  amid th e  co n fu s io n  o ccasio n ed  
by d e le g a te s  r e tu rn in g  to  t h e i r  s e a ts  a f t e r  th e  d iv i s io n  and was n o t 
h ea rd  by many p r e s e n t ' . [2 ] T his am bigu ity  was v o c i fe ro u s ly  e x p lo ite d  
by bo th  s id e s  a c t in g  upon in t e r p r e t a t i o n s  w hich w ere to  p rove i r r e c o n ­
c i l a b l e  and L a b o r 's  re sp o n se  to  th e  referendum  in  South A u s t r a l i a  was 
d iv id e d  a c c o rd in g ly .
A lthough a m a jo r i ty  o f PLP members, le d  by th e  P re m ie r , 
advoca ted  a Yes v o te  i t  i s  n o t c l e a r  how s in c e r e ly  m o tiv a ted  they  
w ere . B u t t e r f i e l d ,  one o f th e  a n t i - c o n s c r i p t i o n i s t  m in o r i ty ,  s t a t e d  
t h a t  a g r e a t  many had been  p ersu ad ed  to  su p p o r t i t  fo r  e l e c t o r a l  
re a so n s ; '.. .m e m b e rs  o f P a r lia m e n t th o u g h t i t  would be a p o p u la r  
th in g  and th a t  i t  would be c a r r i e d  by 10 to  1. His own id e a  was th a t  
th a t  id e a  had p r e v a i le d  w ith  members: he d id  n o t  b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e re
w ere many c o n s c ie n tio u s  c o n s c r ip t io n i s t s  amongst them a t  a l l . ' [ 3 ]  I f  
s o ,  th e  PLP s to o d  doubly condemned -  f o r  n o t a c c u ra te ly  ju d g in g  p u b lic  
o p in io n  and f o r  s e t t i n g  such  an e rro n eo u s judgem ent a g a in s t  th e  o p in io n  
o f o rg a n ise d  unionism  to  w h ich , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  a rg u ed , th e  p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s
[1] S.R . W h itfo rd , Memoirs o p . c i t .
[2] D aily  H era ld  13 November, 1916.
[3] R eport ALP S p e c ia l  F e d e ra l C o nference , 1916, p .1 5 .
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owed greater allegiance than to the electorate at large. When the 
PLP group was vindicated by the referendum result they won the 
allegiance of otherwise moderate party opinion. [1] Since June, 1916 
the Daily Herald had been edited by Henry Kneebone, generally considered 
sympathetic to the union cause but policy during the campaign was 
equivocal and space was allotted to both sides. Kneebone maintained an 
embarrassed editorial neutrality right up to the poll despite union 
requests for a more forthright stand. [2]
Interstate contacts proved important from the earliest stage, 
when anti-conscription campaigning was stimulated by the arrival of Tom 
Miller, organiser of the Trade Union Anti-Conscription Executive in 
Melbourne and a pacifist of Christian-Socialist beliefs for many years. 
Finding a very quiet situation in Adelaide after his experiences in 
Melbourne and Sydney, Miller was encouraged by Frank Lundie with facilities 
and support, engaging initially in small scale union meetings and 
addresses. [3] Only on 28 September was an Anti-Conscription Council 
formed at a meeting of unionists chaired by Baker of the UTLC after 
a suggestion by the Tramways’ Union. [4] Lionel Hill MLA led a group 
of anti-conscriptionist parliamentary colleagues who protested their 
loyalty to the cause and Hill was elected President of the body which 
then unanimously resolved to fight for a No vote.y Official
meetings began on 1 October, a manifesto was issued and advertising 
started, while the services of interstate speakers were utilised at 
the major rallies.  ^ Exaggerated though the influence of the
[1] . A point established by Gibson,'The Conscription Issue
in S.A. ’ pp. 49-50, 79.
[2] UTLC Minutes 20 October, 1916.
[3] T.J. Miller, Some Reflections.Melbourne, 1938. pp.65-71. 
UTLC Minutes 14 July, 1916.
£4^ ] The UTLC pledged support in advance by 55-12. Ibid.
22 September, 1916.
[5] Register 29 September, 1916.
(6) Prominent amongst such visitors were Miller, E.F. Russell, 
Secretary of the Federated Agricultural implement 
Makers* Union, and A. Lewis, organiser of the Victorian 
Carters’ and Drivers. The Resist er singled out Miller
and Russell in particular as instruments of eastern state 
subversion of an otherwise pacific Labor movement.
Ibid 27 November 1916.
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predominantly Victorian propagandisers may have been by the conservative 
press, the reassurance they provided to Adelaide antis that they 
were part of a far wider and respectable movement must have been heart­
ening against the influence wielded by the Premier, his cabinet, the 
PLP majority and the irresolution of state executive. A similar type 
of reassurance was singularly lacking in Western Australia for example, 
with serious consequences in that state. South Australian propaganda 
was closely modelled on that of the eastern states; the antis 
argued that voluntaryism was sufficient if given proper support and 
opportunity; conscription was both undemocratic and anti-working class; 
it was essential to uphold the white Australia policy by preventing 
importation of colored Iabor and preserving domestic capacity to repel 
any colored invasion. [1] South Australia registered a majority 
against conscription on referendum day of 119,236 to 87,924. [2]
The split in South Australia
Once the forces in the party polarised over the conscription 
referendum the industrialists seized the opportunity presented, not 
only to fight for defeat of conscription but in the long run to dispose 
of the 'black-coated brigade' and its baneful influence on the workers' 
party. State executive could not be cajoled into pursuing a hard line 
interpretation, so the industrialists took the initiative where they 
could make use of their numbers. On 12 October Council declared 
by a four-fifths majority:
Seeing that the annual Labor conference held September,
1916 has declared its opposition to the conscription of 
human life this Council condemns the action of the Labor 
members in iciding to agitate for an affirmative vote 
in the forthcoming referendum because for a Labor represen­
tative to act contrary to the decision of the annual 
conference is violating the basic principle of the Labor 
movement - majority rule.
[1] ACC manifesto Register 4 October, 1916; see also 
reports of ACC rallies and demonstrations ibid.
2, 24 October, 1916.
[2] A close analysis of voting patterns is provided by 
Gibson, 'The Conscription Issue in South Australia'.
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An amendment seeking to give Council members 'the fullest liberty of 
action ... without any prejudice whatever' was brushed aside in favor 
of this stringent reading of the conference resolution, [1] but 
even the unanimous support of Council could not enforce this 
upon any parliamentarian. Statutory power for upholding discipline 
lay under Rule 44 enabling anyone to lay charges of disloyalty or 
prejudicial conduct against individuals but would necessitate lengthy 
and involved proceedings. Furthermore it would cast the complainants 
in the role of vindictive disrupters and be unreliable under all but 
optimum conditions. The solution adopted was more subtle and offered 
a better chance of success: Adelaide unions had already approved the
first part of the NSW policy threatening to oppose conscriptionist 
politicians at preselections, [2] and at the Council meeting of 12 
October two unionists obtained suspension of standing orders and moved 
that plebiscites (the local term for party preselections) be held 
immediately for federal and state seats. Several speakers opposed and 
the motion had been talked out without result. [3] In the following 
week the industrial section appropriated the strategy and at a 
caucus meeting decided to put up three proposals at a special Council 
meeting.
1. Obtaining validation of the interpretation that the 
conference decision binds every member of the party to 
oppose conscription and a declaration that all who do not 
comply may be found disloyal.
2. To obtain a ruling that all electorates and local 
committees affiliated to the Council are obliged to work 
and vote against the referendum.
3. Initiate the whole preselection process and declare 
no-confidence in state executive supporters of 
conscription. [4]
[1] ULP Council Minutes 12 October, 1916. Register 13 
October, 1916.
[2] UTLC Minutes 2, 30 June, 1916.
[3] ULP Council Minutes 12 October, 1916.
[4] Register 19 October, 1916.
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Even before the referendum had been taken the industrialists were 
seeking to force the issue with the parliamentarians, one spokesman 
being widely quoted:
While the conscription issue is hot we want to see 
where our relations begin and end with the present 
Labor parliamentarians who have flouted the conference 
determination ... This is the time to deal with these 
chaps, while the conscription issue is keen 
and before we have time to cool off. [l]
State executive realised the implications and succeeded 
in stalling the proposed special call of Council until after the 
referendum, Lundie blaming unidentified 'interests1 23 at work for this 
frustration. [2] When the Council did assemble with 314 delegates 
on 2 November it was larger than a state conference. A preceding caucus 
of industrialists established their own strength at around 100 delegates, 
but on the floor of Council an equally large group of uncommitted and 
previously moderate delegates supported the stand taken by the section. 
Lundie and Baker cojointly sponsored a motion calling for plebiscites 
for metropolitan state and federal seats and for country districts to 
be requested to act likewise. Debate was gagged after the minimum 
of two replies, [3] and the motion passed 198 - 100. The 
industrial leaders then secured early deadlines for the plebiscites and, 
rather than leave the necessary duties to the state executive, secured 
their own nominee as returning officer - J. Smith, Assistant-Secretary 
of the AWU. State President Hugh Gilmore ruled the motion calling for 
condemnations for disloyalty out of order as conflicting with the
[1] Ibid. Gibson,'The Conscription Issue in South 
Australia', pp.52-3.
[2] Daily Herald 6 November, 1916.
[3] One report states that blows were exchanged on one 
heated moment between L.L. Hill and C. Goode, 
Commissioner of Crown Lands. Register 3 November, 1916.
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Septem ber co n fe ren c e  d e c is io n  and th e  second was d isc h a rg e d  as o b v io u sly  
red u n d an t. [1] The i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  n e x t tu rn e d  t h e i r  a t t e n t io n s  to  
th e  s t a t e  e x e c u tiv e ,  w hich c o n ta in e d  b o th  c o n s c r ip t io n i s t s  and a n t i s . [2] 
With i t s  n a tu r a l  fa v o r in g  o f u n ity  th e  e x e c u tiv e  occup ied  a m iddle 
ground betw een th e  PLP, w hich happened to  be n e a r ly  th r e e - q u a r te r s  
c o n s c r i p t i o n i s t , and th e  C ouncil in  w hich th e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t io n  had won 
c o n t ro l  o f th e  num bers. D uring th e  campaign e x e c u tiv e  r e f r a in e d  from 
s u p p o r tin g  e i t h e r  th e  P rem ier o r th e  A n ti-C o n s c r ip tio n  C o u n c il, 
endorsed  Hughes as FPLP L eader a f t e r  h is  e x p u ls io n  by th e  NSW Labor 
p a r ty  b u t g e n e ra l ly  ducked any f irm  commitment. [3] C o n sequen tly , a f t e r  
a d e b a te  w hich spanned an ad journm ent u n t i l  th e  fo llo w in g  even ing  and 
in  w hich th o se  a f f e c te d  defended  t h e i r  a c t io n s  u n s u c c e s s fu l ly ,  C ouncil 
endorsed  th e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t  c e n su re : 'T h a t a v o te  of no co n fid e n ce  be
passed  on th o se  members of th e  e x e c u tiv e  who su p p o rted  c o n s c r ip t io n ;  
f u r th e r  th a t  M essrs . A nstey and B i r r e l l  be asked  to  r e s ig n  from th e  
F e d e ra l E x e c u t iv e '. [ 4 ]  For th e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  p r e s e le c t io n  b o d ie s  a
[1] ULP C ouncil M inutes S p e c ia l  M eeting 2 November, 1916.
[2] Of th o se  who can be c l a s s i f i e d ,  Hugh G ilm ore, th e  
P r e s id e n t ,  was a m oderate  opponent o f c o n s c r ip t io n ;
H i l l ,  J u n io r  V ic e -P re s id e n t,  was le a d e r  of th e  A n ti-  
C o n sc r ip tio n  C ouncil and G.E. Y ates MHR seems to  have 
e a r l i e r  fa v o re d  c o n s c r ip t io n  b u t was lo y a l  to  th e  P a r ty .  
P a s t - P r e s id e n t  W.C. M elbourne was in  fa v o r  o f compul­
s io n  and Reg B lu n d e ll and Henry Jackson  w ere b o th  members 
o f th e  Vaughan c a b in e t .  T re a su re r  F.W. B i r r e l l ,  who came 
to  a ls o  f u l f i l l  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  a b se n t s e c r e ta r y ,  
O l i f e n t ,  ap p ea rs  to  have su p p o rted  th e  a f f i r m a t iv e  cau se .
[3] E x ecu tiv e  R ep o rt, ULP C ouncil M inutes S p e c ia l  M eeting 
2 November, 1916.
[4] ULP C ouncil M inutes A djourned S p e c ia l  M eeting 3 November, 
1916. A c la u s e  v o tin g  no c o n fid e n ce  in  c o n s c r ip t io n is t s  
on th e  D a ily  H era ld  Board was s t r u c k  o u t -  th o se  m a le fac ­
to r s  d id  n o t e scap e  however and a s p e c ia l  r e s o lu t io n  
c a l l in g  f o r  t h e i r  r e s ig n a t io n  was l a t e r  p a sse d .
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resolution listing the pro-compulsion parliamentarians by name and 
declaring them disloyal to the state conference decision on conscription 
was approved. However a motion that the seven loyal PLP members be 
recognised as the only Labor representatives was declared ultra vires by 
Gilmore, [1] so while the PLP leadership was still within the party, the 
preselection process had been set in motion and the weeding out could 
follow.
The subjects of this coup fully realised the fate awaiting 
them: ’Under present conditions the plebiscite cannot be a calm
expression of opinion of the rank and file, but it is a magnificent 
opportunity for people to vent their spleen on some particular members 
of Parliament and for some aspirants to reach the height of their 
ambition'. [2] C. R. Baker confirmed their fears; now the industrialists 
were ’top dogs’, he boasted, ’They have no intention to be satisfied (sic) 
with having frightened the offenders, but are determined to see the thing 
right out’. [3] Vaughan gathered a group of close supporters and drew 
up a manifesto, which was then signed by 29 state and federal parliament­
arians announcing their refusal to submit their names for the plebiscite 
[A] and forcing Gilmore to issue a rejoinder. [5] In short order 
though, the FPLP miscreants were removed from the field by their own 
action. Adelaide unions had already been notified that their Melbourne 
counterparts favoured ’leading action’ in preventing conciliation 
with the conscriptionists, [6] and when E. J. Russell arrived in Adelaide 
again to address the local Labor bodies he obtained state executive 
approval for a special federal conference; moreover executive instructed 
S.A. FPLP members to repudiate Hughes and Council selected an
[1] Ibid.
[2] R. P. Blundell in Register, 7 November, 1916.
[3] Ibid. 9 November, 1916.
[4] Daily Herald 11 November, 1916.
[5] Ibid. 13 November.
[6] Ibid. 6 November, 1916.
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anti-conscriptionist federal conference delegation of 3 PLP and 3 
unionist members, so instructed. [1] When the federal caucus split on 
14 November only Yates and Senator O'Loghlin remained loyal; seven 
others threw in their lot with Hughes. [2] Hereafter the battle in S.A. 
became one of to what extent the state parliamentary party was to split.
Vaughan and his group’s refusal to submit themselves for 
preselection 18 months before the next scheduled state election was only 
a stop gap tactic; their hope for survival lay in postponing the pleb­
iscite until the storm had abated and they had won a space in which to 
rehabilitate themselves with the organisation. Accordingly, they 
appealed to their staunchest base, the rural branches and moderate 
metropolitan branches and unions to reverse the decision. With the 
industrial section on guard against manipulations of defunct affiliates 
and other practices, [3] Baker was able to scorn this effort, with no 
more than ten out of over 330 affiliated bodies supporting the PLP leaders 
[4] By the next Council meeting however some 26 organisations favoured 
some form of compromise and a motion for a debate on changing the pre­
selection deadlines was talked out. [5] Thus encouraged the parliament­
arians called a special meeting of Council by petition for 27 December to 
consider whether or not to entertain a motion for postponement of the 
dates, appealing once again for party solidarity. [6]
Some 211 delegates were accordingly distracted from their 
Christmas revelries to participate in a warm debate over whether to
[1] Executive report and ULP Council Minutes 9 November, 1916.
[2] Messrs. Poynton, Archibald and Dankel - the last of 
German birth who had wisely kept a very low profile 
during the conscription campaign - with Senators Senior, 
Story, Guthrie and Newland. Register 16 November, 1916.
[3] Daily Standard, 6 December, 1916.
[4] Register, 1 December, 1916.
[5] ULP Council Minutes 14 December, 1916. Register 15 
December.
[6] Ibid. 27 December, 1916. Although there was some conten­
tion about it, it was eventually decided that rule 14 
applied, preventing debating of a Council decision within 
three months of its approval unless a special call was 
granted and could only be rescinded by a two-thirds 
majority of that special meeting.
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permit a review of the decision - the industrial section holding the 
line on a division of 110-100. With ill-concealed reluctance Gilmore 
could only announce that the plebiscites would be held as originally 
specified. [1] Only one card remained for the parliamentarians to 
play, the calling of a special state conference which executive granted 
almost immediately. [2] Acting-Secretary Birrell circularised the party 
to this effect before even Council had time to ratify the decision. [3] 
Presented with this fait accompli the industrialists in Council 
refused to endorse the decision, [4] but were constitutionally unable 
to prevent it once the executive took it upon its own responsibility.
[5] They were capable though of ensuring a maximisation of their 
strength. With some bravado Birrell had announced 'Our object is to 
have a thorough clean-up in the movement and the Labor party will, 
for the time being, go into the melting pot'. [6]
[1] ULP Council Minutes Special Meeting 27 December, 1916; 
Daily Standard 29 December, 1916.
[2] Register 4 January, 1917.
[3] Advertiser 26 January 1917. Briefly, the agenda
circulated was very broadly defined: to consider the
federal conference delegation report, to deal with the 
positions of federal and state parliamentary parties 
and all events pursuant thereto and to prepare for 
the next scheduled federal conference.
[4] Ibid. 18 January, 1917.
[5] Advertiser, 26 January, 1917.
[6] Ibid. 16 January, 1917.
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To be scrupulously fair the executive laid down the principle of 
representation at conference on a basis of strict proportion to member­
ship size. [1] Taking advantage of this provision the AWU obtained 
its highest proportion of delegates so far, 10% of the total of close to 
300. [2] As a further insurance the section captured all three 
positions on the credentials committee, [3] giving it power to foil 
packing by the opposing faction or its appropriation of loose proxies.
This advantage proved useful almost immediately when on 22 
January state executive unanimously [4] decided to circularise all PLP 
members who had signed the November manifesto to ascertain their attitude 
to the Nationalist Labor party. [5] Only 12 of the PLP members 
quizzed offered replies, so the credentials committee withheld tickets 
of accreditation from all parliamentarians who had been nominated as 
delegates, pending conference examination of the replies and determination 
of the situation. As the industrialists would dominate conference this 
time if they held their strength, it would prove possible to exclude the 
most dangerous PLP members altogether. [6] For their part the parlia­
mentary group, meeting to decide tactics, divided between those favoring 
immediate formation of a local breakaway party and others holding hope
[1] Ibid. 16 January, 1917.
[2] Hirst, op.cit. There were 28 AWU delegates in all.
[3] ULP Council Minutes 18 January, 1917.
[4] Including the ministers Blundell and Jackson, part of the 
Vaughan group from the beginning of the rift. Register 
12 November, 1916.
[5] Advertiser 9 February; C.Vaughan’s statement Register 13 
February 1917. This referred to the federal incarnation 
of the breakaway FPLP faction which intended to field 
candidates against its late colleagues, some South Australi­
an parliamentarians having already assisted municipal 
candidates against endorsed Labor ones, Daily Standard
29 December, 1916. Vaughan himself participated in the 
formation of National Labor in Melbourne and was South 
Australian representative on its federal executive.Register. 
12 February, 1917.
[6] Document outlining industrialist strategy, adopted probably 
at their 10 February pre-conference session.Register
21 February 1917.
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for some form of reconciliation. [1] State executive attempted mean­
while to obtain the services of an external arbitrator in the person 
of Frank Tudor, to explain Labor’s attitude to the schismatics, 
further participation in recruiting and other vexed questions but pres­
sure of federal business intervened. [2] South Australians would have 
to resolve their own differences.
On the same day that conference opened, Monday 12 February, the 
state executive met and decided to permit attendance of the parliamen­
tarians excluded by the credentials committee. Acceptance of this 
decision was another thing though; when Vaughan and his close 
supporters - Blundell, Jackson, Coneybeer and others - attempted to enter 
they were prevented by the door keeper until Gilmore hurried down from 
the chair and personally secured their admittance. Undismayed by this 
development the industrialist leaders Lundie and Barker moved: 'That
Mr. Vaughan and all other members of parliament who did not carry out the 
mandate of the September Conference be asked to place in the hands of 
this Conference a written assurance that they will abide by the decisions 
of Conference. Failing this they will be asked to leave the room.'[3] 
This challenge, if sustained, would have bound the ALP leaders to the 
direction of the industrialists and was totally unacceptable to the 
Premier. After debate had raged and the motion carried by a substantial 
majority, Vaughan and his group made brief statements and walked out. [4] 
The industrialists’ plan to avoid individual expulsions and force 
out only their main enemies in the party had been achieved without having
[1] Ibid. 9 February, 1917.
[2] Ibid. 12 February, 1917.
[3] Minutes 1917 Special Conference.
[4] Crawford Vaughan's statement, repeated for the benefit 
of the press, clearly established the point at issue over 
which the PLP group broke away from the party. The reso­
lution was 'intolerant and vindictive'; 'I told them 
Straight I would not sign, first because the motion conta­
ined a vote of censure against us, and secondly because I
had signed the platform of the party prior to the last 
elections, and was in honor bound to carry out that plat­
form during the life of this Parliament, and any alteration 
of that platform could not take effect until the next gene­
ral elections. It was utterly undemocratic to single out a 
few of the Labor Party for expulsion because they were mem­
bers of Parliament, because if they were to be condemned, so 
should those of the rank and file of the party who voted 
for conscription.' Register 13 February 1917.
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to use the preselection instrument. [1]
That the industrialists did not intend a mass purge against 
all pro-conscriptionists but were concerned to assert the authority of 
the movement over the PLP 'black-coated brigade' was confirmed by the 
debate over the late federal conference at the following sitting.
Gilmore ruled that a motion for adoption of the S.A. delegates' report 
and endorsement of the Scullin resolution would necessitate wholesale 
expulsions of all conscription supporters. His ruling when disputed 
was upheld by 176-65; eventually it was decided merely to receive the 
document. Cavanagh and Lundie then persuaded conference to expunge all 
reference to the ruling from the official report to prevent people 
drawing the logical conclusion, that the industrialists' indignation had 
been selectively applied. [2] They desired to cleanse the party, not 
destroy it. Industrialist supremacy was underlined shortly after the 
Vaughan group had left by a decision to hold evening sessions of 
conference only, a measure decided on by the section's pre-conference 
caucus as a precaution to maintain optimum attendance by their bloc.
[1] Resistance had been encountered in some of the
affiliates to the early preselection, some organisations 
returning the papers to the party head office without 
distributing them to the membership or left blank in 
protest. Advertiser 25 January, 1917. The post­
special conference state executive, led by Lundie himself, 
later disclaimed any intention of indiscriminate use of 
the weapon: 'It is believed that if the legislators
affected had allowed themselves to be nominated in the 
plebiscites nearly all of them would have been successful. 
Strong resentment was felt concerning two or three only, 
and these had been markedly offensive in the conduct of 
the conscription campaign'. Manifesto ULP executive, 
Register 2 March, 1917.
[2] Minutes 1917 Special Conference.
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On top of the PLP walkout and the manifestly collusive origin of the 
industrialist majority, many country delegates left in disgust after 
the first day rather than waste whole days disconsolately patronising 
Adelaide public houses while knowing that they were outnumbered upon 
any future vote. This left the field securely to the metropolitan- 
based forces and underlined the wiping out of the special privileges 
accorded the rural wing since 1904. [1]
Next day a spill of executive positions was called for and 
all candidates for the presidency other than Lundie stood down.
Lundie's star was now at its ascendant; he was concurrently General 
President of the AWU, Secretary of the Adelaide Branch, AWU, President 
of the ULP and in first place on the party's Senate ticket. Most on the 
industrialist executive ticket were returned, the only notable omission 
being failure to unseat the state secretary, J.H.S. Olifent, and his 
stand-in Birrell, although this was for special reasons. [2]
Little remained but the registering of the decisions of the pre-conference 
session: opinion favoring scrapping of the plebiscites was crushed and
the declaration of parliamentarian disloyalty affirmed. [3]
Collective hostility to the federal plank on compulsory military 
training was declared and participation in the recruiting campaign left 
to the consciences of party members. [4] Finally, conference agreed 
to alter the record of the September, 1916 conference to retrospectively 
legitimise the industrialists' interpretation of the crucial conscription
[1] Daily Herald, 12-16 February; Register 21 February, 1917. 
295 delegates were confirmed in the final report of
the credentials committee on opening day; on the last 
day at the end of the week only 180 attended. Ibid.17 
February, 1917.
[2] The principle involved was an established Labor one 
that servicemen's jobs should be preserved while they 
were on active service. As Olifent was still on 
indefinite leave in the army C.R. Baker was persuaded to 
withdraw his arranged candidacy for secretary. Minutes 
1917 Special Conference 15 February. Birrell remained in 
the party after the split, seemingly un-penalised.
[3] Ibid. 14 February.
[4] Ibid. 15 February.
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resolution, a provision not publicised but inevitably leaked by a 
disgruntled delegate. [l] Party history would henceforth be the his­
tory of the victorious faction. [2]
Conscription in South Australia provided the issue needed by 
a resentful unionist section to mount an insurrection against the 
established party leadership. While interstate support and assistance 
had been invaluable, the conscription issue within the S.A. party was 
fought out on the basis of pre-existing lines of cleavage and concerned, 
ultimately, control within the party rather than compulsory service per 
se or more base motives such as careerism. While the party failed to 
gain office for another seven years after the split and formation of 
a Liberal, then Liberal-Nationalist state government, the essential 
point had been won. Indicative of the crux of the dispute was the reso­
lution on the final day of the 1917 special conference, suggested by 
the Sturt Electoral Committee and going beyond what the industrialists 
had formulated as necessary; ’That all resolutions carried at 
conference shall be binding on Labor members of Parliament providing 
that they to not refer to any planks on the party's platform’. [3]
Within a month the resolution was quietly abandoned as unworkable after 
representations by the loyal PLP to the new state executive, [4] 
but its approval at all was the significant fact. Structurally, the 
1917 special conference marked final abolition of the preferment given 
to the country wing and inauguration of a long era of AWU/ 
metropolitan-based, dominance. It marked a turnover of elites and hence­
forth the South Australian party would be as radical as the AWU and its 
supporters were inclined to make it. [5]
[1] Ibid. 16 February; Register, 21 February, 1917.
Alteration consisted of addition of the emphasised words 
to the original resolution: 'That this conference supp­
orts the principle of a referendum but is opposed to the 
conscription of human life’.
[2] For example, the series of newspaper articles later pub­
lished by N.J.O. Makin as A Progressive Democracy op.cit.
[3] Minutes 1917 Special Conference 16 February.The modifying 
clause was added as an amendment to the bald motion.
[4] Executive report ULP Council Minutes 8, 19 March, 1917.
[5] D. Hopgood, ’The View from Head Office. The South 
Australian Labor Political Machine, 1917-30’.Politics 
6, 1 May, 1971 pp.70-78.
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Recovery: the South Australian Labor party, 1917-18
Apart from the federal members, no parliamentarians were 
expelled from the Labor party in S.A. for support of conscription or for 
casting in their lot with another political party, as in the other states. 
The principle involved in dealing with the Vaughan faction however was 
much the same as elsewhere, being the crucial issue of authority in the 
party and the willingness of the politicians to accept the decisions of 
the majority of the membership. After the special state conference the 
PLP schismatics became involved in organising a breakaway party with the 
encouragement of Pearce from Melbourne [1] and a struggle resulted for 
the allegiance of the rank and file, which, as in the equally badly 
divided Western Australian party, was eventually resolved conclusively 
in favour of the official organisation. Divisions within the remainder 
of the ULP once the Vaughan clique had left and the supremacy of the 
AWU/urban union majority asserted were not deeply antagonistic, though 
the Daily Herald undoubtedly protested this too vehemently at the time.
There was no leader - if there was even a party at 
the (February, 1917) conference - who was altogether 
opposed to the industrial aims and objects. Some 
of the delegates were forced into a position of 
apparent opposition at times because they could 
not go as far as the extreme industrialists. [2]
After the split there was no doubting, nevertheless, who was in charge, 
and the secure tenure of the new leadership had repercussions for South 
Australian Labor policies during the remaining part of the war.
Following an earlier decision by the UTLC concerning partici­
pation in the voluntary recruiting campaign, [3] special conference also 
declined to appoint Labor representatives on the State Recruiting 
Committee and left the question of recruiting up to individual consciences. 
Conference also decided to instruct its federal ALP delegation to oppose 
retention of compulsory military training in the ALP defence plank. [4]
[1] Pearce papers, NLA B8 213/2/28.
[2] Cutting, n.d., Volume of clippings and leaflets, 1916-17.
ALP head office, Adelaide Trades Hall.
[3] Minutes UTLC 12, 26 January, 1917.
[4] Several amendments were defeated. Minutes ULP conference 
15 February, 1917.
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Immediately following the conference, efforts were directed towards 
minimising the effects of the National Labor party organisation’s appeal 
and the Daily Herald was saved from the hands of the opposing faction.
[1] Co-operation between the sections of the party was secured by 
formation of a combined ULP-UTLC committee to deal with further attempts 
at imposing conscription, after close contact with interstate Labor 
representatives. [2] Subsequently, a combined committee report in 
August, influenced by communications from Sydney and Melbourne,[3] 
accepted the scheme devised by the Sydney Labor Council for concerted 
opposition to any second appeal on the issue. When the party’s second 
conference, its regular annual conference, was held in September, 1917, 
the Commonwealth Director-General of Recruiting, Donald Mackinnon, was 
admitted to speak to delegates and was treated to a motion of thanks 
carried by acclamation. Conference unanimously carried a loyal motion 
declaring fealty to the cause of the Allies and hoping ’that we are on 
the threshhold of a glorious victory and lasting peace’. [4] More to 
the point however were later, separate motions calling for insertion of 
a plank opposing compulsory military service in the ALP federal platform, 
another opposed to further compulsory military training and a third 
stating that, in the event of any war, all means of transport and pro­
duction should revert to government control for the duration. The NSW 
party’s peace plank was considered seriatim and adopted. Council had 
already endorsed its being cabled to the British Labor Party conference 
as representing ALP policy. [5]
Consequently, when Hughes' second conscription referendum was 
announced in November, the state executive already possessed contingent 
authority to sponsor a No campaign. As compared to the previous occasion, 
the executive led the anti-conscription forces, with solid backing from 
the rest of the movement. The 1917 referendum saw a reduced majority 
returned for the No case, but this was largely due to federal government-
[1] Executive report, ULP Council Minutes 8 March, 1917 and 
ibid. 10 January, 1918.
[2] Minutes UTLC 15 June, 27 July, 1917.
[3] Adopted by the ULP, Minutes ULP 9 August, 1917 and the 
unions, Minutes UTLC 10 August, 1917.
[4] Minutes ULP conference, September, 1917.
[5] Minutes ULP Council 9 August, 1917.
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imposed franchise restrictions. [1]
South Australia and conscription 
1916 1917
YES 87,924 86,663
NO 119,236 106,364I
The Adelaide unions were to remain the chief radical influence on policy. 
Although, after repeated requests, the UTLC finally delegated one of its 
few ardent recruiting supporters to the State Recruiting Committee, [2] 
it reacted strongly to the attendance, at short notice and before Council 
consideration was possible, of their president F. D. Williams at the 
Governor-General’s recruiting conference. [3] At its next meeting, a 
censure of the TLC executive for accepting was lost only by 24-22 votes 
and Council refused to consider the president’s report, [4] later 
challenging the federal and state governments to implement the decisions 
arrived at by conference. State executive had proved to be a little 
more accommodating, having earlier met Mackinnon privately and made 
suggestions as to how the recruiting campaign could best be carried out. 
The tenor of the reforms mentioned implied support for the campaign but 
suspicion of the federal government and others backing the recruiting 
drive. [5] These points formed the basis of South Australian complaints 
at the Governor-General's conference in Melbourne during April; Frank 
Lundie attended in place of Lionel Hill, with J. Jelley, MLC and Council 
adopted their subsequent report and urged the non-Labor forces to carry 
out their undertakings. [6]
South Australian delegates to the federal conference in Perth 
were fairly inconspicuous in the debates on the war, Tom Grealy, Norman 
Makin and Stan Whitford being the only three representatives from the
[1] Gibson, 'The Conscription Issue in South Australia.' 
op. cit.
[2] Minutes UTLC 8 March, 1918.
[3] Ibid. 18 April, 1918.
[4] Ibid, special meeting, 3, 17 May, 1918.
[5] Executive report, Minutes ULP Council 14 February, 1918.
[6] Ibid. special meeting, 2 May, 1918.
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state. Apart from the retention of compulsory training, they had little 
difficulty in accepting the compromises reached [1] and had their own 
resolution, a variation of the NSW peace plank, accepted for the debate 
on the attitude to the war. At state conference in September, 1918 the 
Perth resolutions were endorsed, although a bid was made by the AWU 
delegates to oppose all compulsory training rather than just that for 
youths below 21 years of age. [2] More difficulty was encountered over 
the attitude on the war and recruiting. John Gunn, MLC and Senator 
O ’Loghlen moved that instead of accepting the full federal recommendation, 
the party instead reaffirm its previous decision to leave recruiting a 
matter for individual conscience. Although not directly spelled out, it 
was clear that many genuinely supported the voluntary war effort and 
feared that recruitment and the ALP’s reputation would both suffer if 
support for the war was to be made conditional. Conference president, 
Lionel Hill, staunchly believed in the war [3] and ruled that, contrary 
to Makin’s insistence, the South Australian Labor party was not obliged 
to hold a plebiscite on the federal policy as recommended. The motion 
to this effect was carried with only one dissenter, an incorrect ruling 
considered a breach of federal authority by the next ALP conference.
Thus S.A. avoided further painful wrangles over recruiting at the slight 
cost of admonishment by the federal party.
Despite the not inconsiderable impact of the conscription 
split in South Australia, the party did not become the source of any 
radical innovations during or after the war. The UTLC, most consistently 
radically-inclined section, had merely kept pace with developments in 
eastern state unions and indigenous left wing bodies proved to possess 
little influence on the movement. The vehicle used for enforcing a 
militant conscription policy by the chief unions in 1916-7 did not 
survive after its original purpose had been fulfilled. Protests against 
the industrialists’ caucus had been made at the 1917 annual conference 
[4] and there was no reason once the parliamentarians had been soundly 
defeated, as far as Lundie and his principal aides were concerned, to 
continue its activities, unlike the position in New South Wales. Lundie 
was himself succeeded as party president in 1917-8 by Lionel Hill, and
[1] Report of federal delegates, Ibid. 18 July, 1918.
[2] Minutes ULP Conference 13 September, 1918.
[3] Ibid. Presidential address.
[4] Minutes ULP Conference 10 September, 1917.
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then a succession of similarly moderate figures through into the 
’twenties, most of whom were AWU men. With the end of the war Labor in 
South Australia reverted to its more accustomed tranquil state.
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WESTERN AUSTRALIAN LABOR AND THE WAR
’In the West the position was quite different’.
A. McCallum, general secretary, ALF. 
Report special ALP federal conference, 1916, p.8.
Alone of the Australian Labor parties the Australian 
Labor Federation in Western Australia failed to officially oppose con­
scription, either in 1916 or the following year after the party had 
split. External pressures predominated in causing the party to break 
up following the conscription crisis in what proved to be an object 
lesson in the problems of operating a federally united condominium of 
independent members. The dissimilarity of the Western Australian 
experience to those of its counterparts elsewhere has been well 
recognised, [1] attention being drawn particularly to the isolation 
of the community from eastern Australia, its homogeneously 
Anglo-Saxon composition and deep British Empire loyalty, the distinctly 
moderate spirit and consensus nature of the political community and 
respect for the established leaders. [2] To this might be added 
the relative economic stability during the war in W.A., where there 
was only a negligible variation of effective wage levels which con­
sistently remained well above the Australian average. Such features 
affected the structure, policies and style of the W.A. Labor movement.
The Australian Labor Federation was a unique organisation 
combining political and industrial wings of the Labor movement within 
a single body. Its constituent units, the district councils, enjoyed 
a marked degree of autonomy, directly nominating and instructing 
individual members of the W.A. federal conference delegation for 
example and exercising close supervision over their representatives 
on the ALP Executive Committee (hereafter the state executive).
[1] Notably by J.R. Robertson in a pioneering study ’The 
Conscription Issue and the National Movement in West- 
Australia, June 1916-December 1917’.University Studies 
in Western Australian History 3, 3 October 195 9 pp. 
5-57 based upon his The Scaddan Government and the Con­
scription Crisis 1911-17 M.A. University of Western 
Australia, 1958.
See remarks concerning W.A. by T. Metherell The Con­
scription Referenda, October 1916 and December 1917.
Ph.D. Sydney, 1971.
[2]
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This executive met at least monthly as the ruling authority between 
triennial state conferences, consisting of eight officials elected by 
ballot of all district council members, one representative each from the 
PLP and state members of the FPLP, and further delegates from the councils 
on the basis of size: one for the first 500 and one for each succeeding
thousand members. Councils re-elected their delegates annually but were 
able to instruct or to withdraw individuals as desired. Only one, the 
Metropolitan District Council in Perth with which the state executive 
shared quarters, possessed a full-time secretary and there were no 
separate TLCs. Membership was overwhelmingly unionist, reflected in the 
composition of State conferences, and the party had been distinguished by 
originating the exercise of caucus control of parliamentary party leaders 
though the practice of election of cabinet ministers [1] - yet the ALF 
was resolutely moderate.
A state Labor government from 1911-16 under John Scaddan 
enjoyed basically amicable relations with the extra-parliamentary party, 
secure in a sustaining faith in political action relatively undiluted by 
socialist or syndicalist doctrines. Despite discontent over some 
industrial matters there was no active anti-parliamentary resentment 
as in other states and a W.A. Socialist Party from 1910, pursuing an 
entrist policy towards the ALF, included several prominent Labor names 
but met with little success. By the war its influence was imperceptible 
and several members became conscriptionists. Unions with the potential 
for a state-wide power base were split up geographically under a 
provision which compelled sections of the AWU, for example, to direct their 
allegiance to the territorially divided district councils instead of 
being able to wield a bloc vote at conference or on state executive [2].
[1] D. McHenry, ’Caucus over Cabinet. Pioneering in Western 
Australia’. University Studies in History and Economics 
2, 3 September 1955 p.p. 32-47.
[2] Rules as endorsed Report ALF Congress May 1916.
121
When an opportunity was presented in late 1915 for an attack upon the 
PLP leadership for scandalous administrative practices it was allowed 
to pass and Scaddan’s defeat in the House in July, 1916 was precipitated 
by disunity in PLP ranks. At both state executive and district council 
levels the reaction was to close ranks and in fact one of the later 
prominent anti-conscriptionists and nearest equivalent to a socialist 
leader, Don Cameron, resigned his own preselection for a state seat in 
favour of Scaddan for a resultant by-election. [1] Notwithstanding the 
numbers rejecting compulsory military service on principle there lacked 
a ready made basis for organised opposition in the west - no Peace 
Alliance framework or vigorous left wing or party faction capable of 
espousing the cause as a weapon in intra-party politics. Neither was 
there a lead from the PLP or state executive, with the consequence that 
conscription was not treated as part of a structural conflict within 
the ALF or as a matter for strong party leadership but as an issue of 
conscience only.
Misgivings over the Defence Act scheme had been registered 
prior to the war [2] and general reactions to the outbreak of hostilities 
in August, 1914 were summarised by state executive, blaming the German 
military caste for the conflict, distinguishing between it and the German 
working class, enjoining members not to succumb to ’racial hatred’ and 
concluding that the duty of Labor was to ensure protection of the 
workers' interests, especially if and when peace was finally negotiated.[3]
[1] J.R. Robertson, ’The Internal Politics of State Labor 
in Western Australia, 1911-16'. L.H. 2 May, 1962, 
p.p. 48-75.
[2] For example, proposed amendments to the Act Report ALF 
Congress July 1913, pp. 88, 99.
[3] Annual report state executive, 1914 ALF state 
executive correspondence, file 84. This did not 
prevent bigotry against German-descended workers 
being exhibited by Fremantle waterside workers 
though.
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Executive struck a resolution condemning the war off the list of items 
for consideration as state recommendations to the 1915 ALP federal 
conference but proposals for amendment of the Defence Act were forward­
ed to Adelaide, to be referred from there to the FPLP.[l] More 
significant was the difference apparent between the two major district 
councils which were to form the most moderate and most militant centres 
respectively in the ALF during 1916; the Metropolitan Council considered 
the defence system and offered 'no recommendation with regard to the 
principle of compulsion1 2345 (of men to be trained) while the Eastern 
Goldfields Council desired compulsory training to be used only in defence 
of Australia against invasion. [2] Mild protest against the war and to 
aspects of the Australian defence system were voiced in W.A. from the 
start but predominant opinion favored dutiful participation in the conflict.
During 1915 agitation for compulsory service overseas began amongst 
Universal Service League supporters but the PLP attitude was to curb this 
as premature and divisive [3] and state executive discouraged advances 
from local Peace Alliance enthusiasts. [4] Not unaware of gathering 
opposition to conscription in the eastern states the executive also twice 
declined invitations to participate at the Australian Anti-Conscription 
TUC in Melbourne during May, 1916, [5] preferring to leave the issue for 
decision by state conference which convened on 31 May at Kalgoorlie. 
Communications from the Victorian and N.S.W. Labor parties relating their 
resolutions against conscription were read to conference on 5 June when 
debate began on that subject over a private motion by Don Cameron closely 
following their example. An amendment followed favouring compulsory
[1] Minutes state executive 20 February 1915.
[2] Ibid.
[3] W.A. Parliamentary Debates LII Legislative Council
19 October, 1915 p.p. 1684-9; 17 November p. 2503.
[4] Minutes state executive 16 August, 1915.
[5] Ibid 17 April, 15 May 1916.
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service in correspondence to proportionate sacrifices of wealth and,after 
preliminary skirmishing established the temper of delegatesf Cameron 
watered down his proposal by removal of all mention of sanctions against 
parliamentarians, whom he accused of ’waiting to see which way the cat 
jumped’. In a debate ranging over three days Cameron's motion was 
defeated 58-8 and on the evening of 7 June a compromise was adopted ’That in 
the interests of the defence of Australia and the Empire, this Congress 
desires to express its confidence in the federal executive’ [1] . A further 
amendment leaving the question to be decided by the federal government 
subject to a referendum was defeated ’by a large majority’.
This decision made sense only in the context of undertakings 
given earlier that year by the federal authorities when Alex. McCallum, 
general secretary of the ALF, attended the federal executive meeting in 
January, 1916 at Melbourne and taxed Hughes specifically on the conscription 
issue. The Prime Minister had been evasive but conceded that any action by 
his government or the FPLP as a whole could not bind the state parties and 
although refusing to agree to call a special federal conference if 
conscription was thought necessary, the federal president, Senator Givens, 
had assured delegates that if the government decided in favor of such a 
policy the executive would be summoned for consultation . [2] This passing 
of the buck by the ALF should have been tempered by the federal 
executive’s record as a check upon the government but at the time seemed 
to avoid any substantial clash over what was as yet a hypothetical issue. 
When Hughes returned to Australia, neglected to consult the federal Labor 
machine and plunged on with the referendum, the Western Australian movement 
was embarrassed by its irresolution and a conscience vote on 28 October 
became inevitable unless a decision could be forced by anti-conscriptionist 
pressure.
[1] Ibid p. 29
[2] Report W.A. federal executive delegates, State executive 
correspondence, file 2.
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Upon the announcement of the referendum at the end of August 
the majority of PLP members indicated support for an affirmative vote. 
Scaddan’s views in favor of conscription had been made clear at state 
conference; acting-general secretary, in McCallum's absence on sick 
leave, James Cornell MLC, was also known to agree. State executive 
indicated a willingness to await the promised further arguments from 
Hughes [1] but rejected requests for convening of a special federal 
conference fromN.S.W. and Queensland parties.[2] Consequently the 
possibility of effecting a change in policy rested upon unofficial 
elements and it was characteristic that these required an initial 
stimulus from interstate. At the direction of the Melbourne-based 
Anti-Conscription TUC executive, T.J. Miller visited W.A. to rally 
supporters and co-ordinate their efforts with those in the east.
During Miller's stay an Anti-Conscription League had been formed with 
Cameron as president, state AWU chie£ T.C. Butler as secretary and 
other prominent Labor members participating. Following Miller's 
example agitation began and approaches were made to all Labor organ­
izations couching the appeal along lines that conscription was inimical 
to union interests and fostered the use of cheap colored labor. 'In 
principle it is an instrument of national defence; in practice it is 
made an instrument of working class subjugation'.[3] There was a 
discouraging response at first, state executive treating an appeal by 
Miller with diffidence [4] and declining even to disseminate the report 
of the Anti-Conscription TUC,[5] but by the end of September the flow of 
information regarding the anti-campaigns in the east and the first 
results of ACL activities in their own party brought about a perceptible 
shift from the attitude of neutrality. A motion that Cornell be 
accredited to the affirmative campaign committee was defeated 19-10 {6]
[1] Minutes state executive 4, 11 September, 1916
[2] Ibid 18 September 1916.
[3] ACL circular, Minutes Metropolitan District Council 
21 September, 1916.
[4] Minutes state executive 7 August 1916.
[5] Ibid 21 August 1916.
[6] Ibid 18 September, 1916.
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and early next month the executive balance was close enough to tie on a 
motion declaring that it was desirable for all Laborites to vote No.il]
The battle continued in the district councils in an effort to 
have a majority agree to state executive changing the state conference 
stand. Midland Council had been first to declare against compulsion 
following an address by Tom Miller on 16 August and it later affiliated 
with the Anti-Conscription League, recommending that state executive 
join in the No campaign.[2] As the tempo of the campaign increased 
the councils defined their positions until the balance stood at four 
opposed to conscription, two in favor and a further three either neutral 
or desiring some form of compromise.[3] This was insufficient to 
permit any sort of authoritative decision to be made but did not 
preclude attempts to obtain a recommendation by the executive. The 
opportunity to swing the fine balance in favor of the antis came at the 
meeting on 16 October when the manifesto of the 34 FPLP opponents of 
Hughes was considered and a motion endorsing their position was carried 
14-13; a further motion by Cameron that the executive 'advise1 23 a No 
vote was defeated 14-12. Even this relatively mild decision caused 
Cornell to resign as acting-secretary, to be replaced by ACL member 
Andrew Clementson; this was accepted only with regret and a resolution 
carried forthwith gave all officers a free hand on the vote. Thus the
[1] Drawn 16-16 on a voice vote, then lost 17-15 with 
delegates standing. After a division was insisted 
upon it was affirmed lost by 18-16. Had the proxy 
of a known anti-conscription member been accepted 
the story hereafter might well have been different. 
Ibid, 2 October, 1916.
[2] This produced a reaction from some of its own members 
but after a campaign to sell the ACL decision a motion 
for recission of the affiliation was defeated by 2-1 
majority. Minutes Midland Council 12, 25 October 1916.
[3] Of those councils whose views are ascertainable the
breakdown went : Opposed: Midland, Eastern Goldfields,
South West and Albany District Councils. In favor : 
Metropolitan and North Coolgardie Councils. Neutral
or ambiguous : Fremantle, Eastern Agricultural and
Murchison Councils.
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ALF executive remained substantially divided on conscription and even 
though the antis exploited the decision to the full, circulating the 
FPLP manifesto as ’convincing proof of the antagonism conscription has 
aroused in the ranks of democracy', [1] there was still no official 
policy. J. Hilton, conscriptionist editor of the AWU-financed weekly 
Westralian Worker, maintained his policy of giving representation to 
both sides in his pages despite the protests this had aroused and 
defended it as essential for the preservation of ALF unity.[2] As a 
reflection of Labor opinion in Western Australia, this seemed perfectly 
justified and the state as a whole gave the largest favorable majority 
to the government in Australia - 94, 069 to 40, 884.
The split in Western Australia, 1916-17
Following the referendum on 28 October state executive opted 
for a conciliatory attitude towards the parliamentary conscriptionists, 
announcing
that we desire to have the breach in the ranks of the party 
healed and that we are opposed to the expulsion of Labor 
members who supported conscription, believing this to be a 
matter which should be left to the Laborites to decide at 
future selection ballots. [3]
The PLP indicated its understanding of the position by unanimously 
re-electing Scaddan as leader on 31 October despite his statements during 
the simultaneous by-election and referendum campaigns which had aroused 
resentment in the movement. [4] This forebearance was partly due to the 
moderation in Western Australian politics and partly to a marked failure 
to appreciate the acerbity of the issue elsewhere, on both counts due to the 
the isolation of the state. Until completion of the transcontinental 
railway in 1917 the only contact between Western Australia and the east
[1] Circular to district councils, signed by Clementson.
18 October, 1916, State executive correspondence, 
file 27.
[2] Editorial W.W. 12 January 1917.
[3] Minutes special meeting state exeuctive 4 November 1916.
[4] Scaddan belonged to the strongly anti-conscription Eastern 
Goldfields Council and ignored their protests at his conduct*
Minutes Eastern Goldfields District Council 30 October, 13 
November 1916.
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was by sea. The cable link was subject to wartime censorship and the 
cost of exchanging personnel was such as to inhibit the free flow of 
party members which alone could have permitted a close understanding 
of events by the ALF. McCallum had been in the east when the crisis 
broke and remained there until December, being ideally placed to keep 
his executive informed of the intensity of the struggle. Yet he wrote 
from Adelaide
I am very much afraid that the movement in Western Australia 
does not know one half of what has been going on. From my 
own experience with the Censor I am satisfied that you have 
not received nearly all the information that has been sent 
you .[ 1]
In examples given later in a speech to state executive widely circulated 
in pamphlet form McCallum claimed that the censor had cut out his 
references to Labor militancy and the epic proportions of the crisis in 
the east,[2] which came as a shock to the Western Australians, even 
Hilton registering surprise at the revelation of abuses by the conscription 
side during the campaign. There was a lack of undistorted information 
about even the nearest state and the true alignment of forces within the 
Labor movement[3] and other observers confirmed the serious misapprehen­
sions which had been allowed to develop.[4]
[1] McCallum - Cornell 10 November, 1916. State executive 
correspondence file 135.
[2] Minutes state executive 21 January 1917 reproduced as 
as Labor Impeaches the Hughes Dictatorship.’
[3] J.T. Lutey in a speech to the Goldfields Council.
W.W. 12 January 1917.
[4] L. McDonald, Queensland state secretary Daily Standard
13 December, 1916; Adela Pankhurst, APA organiser and
VSP member, toured W.A. early in 1917 and reported that 
isolation had made it a conscriptionist state and 
allowed Labor there to be misled up until the federal 
split. 'The greatest need in Western Australia is 
communication with the East', Socialist 20 April, 1917. 
McCallum was quite blunt: 'The censor is the man who
is responsible for the W.A. vote'. McCallum - Cameron
14 November, 1916. Cameron Papers MS 1005/1 Conscription.
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Significantly, one of the differences between the campaigns 
on opposite sides of the continent was summarised by McCallum in a 
confidential address before the Midland Council during a tour to acquaint 
the ALF with recent events.
The details were given of the Japanese menace to Australia 
which had been responsible for Mr. Hughes being called hot­
footed to England, and surprised most of those present, 
though the speaker pointed out that such information was 
common knowledge in the East and was used on the public 
platforms.[1]
Although Western Australians had been alerted to the danger of cheap 
coloured labor as a consequence of conscription, and the fortuitous arrival 
of a boat-load of unsuspecting Maltese immigrants had been exploited as a 
precursor of the flood to come, the Japanese scare had not been prominent 
at all during the campaign in the west.
Symptomatic of the breakdown in communication between the ALF 
and its counterparts was the mistaken assumption that the special ALP 
federal conference scheduled for December was intended to prevent rather 
than consumate the split. Western Australia was the only party not to 
receive a delegation from the Victorian state executive to canvass support 
for the proceedings. On the day after Hughes led the walkout of 
supporters from the FPLP in Melbourne, the state executive officers met in 
Perth to consider the federal conference request and concluded that, 
'Judging from the telegrams it was apparent that a special conference was 
regarded as the only body likely to save the federal body from being 
broken up/ [2 ] Under the pressing circumstances state executive itself 
grouped the W.A. delegation to include three conscriptionists (J. Cornell, 
MLC, Reg. Burchell, MHR and Senator P.J. 'Paddy' Lynch) and three anti- 
conscriptionists (McCallum, H.C. Gibson and J.T. Lutey). When Stewart 
indicated from Melbourne that the former component might not exactly meet 
the approval of the other states, since Lynch had accepted a portfolio
[1] Minutes Midland District Council 31 January 1917.
[2] Minutes state executive 15 November 1916.
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in Hughes’ new ministry and Burchell had also left the FPLP, state 
president Doland repeated his belief that conciliation was the chief 
objective [1] and on the day that Hughes was announcing the name of his 
new party Doland was still talking of a 'possible split' in the federal 
caucus.[2] All councils, including the anti-conscription ones, issued 
general instructions in favor of a reconciliation. While the delegation 
was en route it was decided to reopen federal preselections, four FPLP 
defectors having already been re-endorsed, but this signified little and 
was not in anticipation of federal conference decisions. Indeed a strong 
conscriptionist won a place on the new ticket after the split took 
place.[3] When federal conference excluded Lynch and Burchell, Cornell 
withdrew on a point of principle, and there was a spontaneous reaction of 
surprise and widespread indignation in the ALF.
In Melbourne a Queensland MLA put the case for full federal 
authority most succinctly:
If a majority of the states considered that the action of 
alleged Western Australian Labor men was detrimental to the 
interests of Labor, there was no remedy but to expel them.
He believed it would be a good'thing if Mr. McCallum and 
his colleagues on their return started anew with the Labor 
movement on a fresh footing.[4]
Gardiner and three Tasmanian Senators were concerned over the expulsion 
decision but only one joined McCallum, Gibson and Lutey in voting against 
it. Later it was suggested that a deputation be appointed to return with 
the W.A. loyalists to present the situation to the ALF but McCallum 
vigorously rejected this as a reflection on his party and an infringement 
of state sovereignty : it was finally agreed to leave it to federal 
executive and the ALF to decide with power for the former to send in an 
organiser to straighten out the branch if necessary.[5] Some threat
[1] West Australian 22, 23 November 1916.
[2] Ibid 24 November 1916.
[3] G.F. Dennis, who did not recant his views until the second 
conscription referendum. Minutes Metropolitan Council
13 November,1917.
[4] Report ALP special federal conference, 1916, p. 9; also 
Rae ibid p. 6
[5] Ibid p. 26.
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of federal intervention, though tactful and sympathetic, remained in the 
sending of Frank Austey and Gardiner to Perth with the returning delegation. 
State executive was in the dilemma of having to reconcile federal policy 
with its past decisions and still prevent a disastrous split, a task which 
it proceeded to tackle with some delicacy. Fortunately the FPLP break­
aways provided little problem as most district councils were prepared to 
admit the justice of their treatment and after a week of careful 
deliberation state executive voted by 25-5
That as the state congress left the question of conscription 
an open one this executive cannot expel any member for either 
supporting or opposing conscription but, as Messrs. Pearce, 
Lynch, DeLargie, Henderson, Buzacott and Burchell have left 
the Labor party by joining another political party they have 
severed their connection with the Australian Labor Party.[1]
One final offer was made to accept them back if they broke immediately with 
Hughes but executive was spared the embarrassment of any acceptances. A 
circular communicating the terms of this deal ’In view of the fact that 
there may have been some misunderstanding so far as the attitude of the 
party in this state was concerned', elicited the reply drafted by Pearce 
declining the offer:
As the whole of the Official Labor party has handed over its 
freedom to the state executives ... the Western Australian 
members would be handing over their freedom ... to the state 
executives of the various states.[2]
With Pearce directing at long range, efforts were made to found 
a National Labor party in Western Australia in conjunction with similar 
attempts in South Australia and Victoria and appeals were made for support 
from ALF members and organisations, a fatal mistake as participation in 
this party by conscriptionists within the ALF gave state executive the 
same excuse for expelling them as had been accepted in relation 
to the FPLP breakaways. A special state confernece was called for March to
[1] Minutes state executive 18, 21 January 1917.
[2] McCallum - Pearce 23 January 1917. Pearce papers NLA 
B8 213/2/11 and Pearce’s reply 213/2/15-17.
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include all unions and branches of whatever sympathies and business was 
decided by a joint committee of pro- and anti-conscriptionists with whom 
PLP leader Scaddan was invited to confer.[1]
The idea is that Congress should be a true reflex of the
opinion of the movement and that once the decision of the
majority is made known that the movement will be solidified
on those decisions.[2]
Anybody remaining out after that would have only themselves to blame - 
'When it comes to a choice between individuals and the movement, the 
individual must go’.[3] McCallum and all others who could be spared 
were sent out to address the organisations to obtain support and solid­
arity was assisted by the replacement from January of Hilton as 
Westralian Worker editor by John Curtin. This had been arranged by 
Anstey during his visit to Perth; Curtin was his protege, a VSP member 
and had been secretary of the Anti-Conscription TUC national executive.
With his arrival the Worker pursued sound and far more informed Labor 
policy and even the problem of isolation was relieved with establishment 
of the rail link to the east. The pro-Hughes faction organised but with 
little conviction and less hope of success . [A]
In a foreword to the official report of the 1917 conference 
state executive reviewed development of the crisis in mildly self-reproving 
tones - 'without any lead from the quarters which should have supplied a 
lead, the whole movement fell a victim to disintegrating factional fights 
in the executive, in councils and in ALF branches'. Developments in the 
eastern Labor parties had left the ALF in a ’highly critical' situation 
after the referendum and now that the 'soul' of the rest of movement had 
been understood a reappraisal was in order*[5] Several temporising
[1] Minutes state executive 5, 7 February 1917.
[2] Circular to district councils 6 February 1917, State 
Executive correspondence, file 60.
[3] ALF manifesto drafted by A. McCallum for state executive, 
Minutes state executive 7 February 1917.
[4] Hilton - Pearce 2 March 1917, Pearce papers NLA 213/2/66-7.
[5] Report Special ALF Congress March 1917 pp. i-iii.
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amendments were overwhelmingly defeated and the state executive attitude 
towards the FPLP defectors was endorsed. Trouble was encountered over a 
third state executive recommendation
That the people of Australia, having decided by popular 
referendum the question of conscription, thus removing it 
from the sphere of practical politics, and in view of the 
urgent necessity of solidarity amongst the workers in 
order to effectively protect their interests when dealing 
with future serious industrial and political problems that 
must inevitably arise out of the war, this congress 
declares that no future referendum or action arising out 
of this controversial question shall be permitted in the 
movement.
Chairman P.L. O ’Loghlen explained that the executive intended that the 
motion ’should apply only to past campaigns and not to the future’ and 
resisted all efforts to get conference to make an outright declaration 
against conscription. The motion was lost and accordingly the party still 
possessed no authoritative policy on the subject.[1] This same caution 
on major policy issues extended to the war itself in a debate over two 
privately submitted motions; one declaring the war justifiable and 
urging ’continuous and energetic effort in order to ensure a speedy victory 
and an honorable peace', while the other asked that Britain and her Allies 
should formulate their joint demands upon the Central Powers to pave the way 
for an early and honorable peace, an Australian Peace Alliance demand . 
Delegates complained that they could be put in a false position, that their 
loyalty had not been questioned and that either statement would be misunder­
stood - the motion to proceed with next business was carried on the 
voices.[2]
It was made abundantly clear that no penalties would be exacted 
from conscriptionists by the conference, that advocacy of compulsory service 
was not at issue in the treatment of Hughes - Pearce faction supporters.
[1] Ibid p.23.
[2] Ibid p.28.
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Rather the point on which the ALF split was membership of or support for 
another political organisation, on which state executive could feel quite 
safe in asserting its authority. On the opening day, O'Loghlen declared 
E.E. Heitmann to have placed himself outside the movement for participation 
in establishing the National Federation and nomination as a candidate 
against a sitting pro-Tudor Labor member.[1] All others supporting 
Nationalist candidates were repudiated by unanimous vote of conference [2] 
and at the request of McCallum executive invested with the power
to declare any organisation which refuses to abide by the 
decision of conference a bogus organisation and to take 
necessary action to combat the existence of such organisation 
and further that the state executive be authorised to take 
whatever action they deem necessary regarding any member who 
refuses to abide by the conference decision.[3]
Closely following conference was the federal election campaign in May, for 
which occasion these sweeping powers had obviously been intended to apply. 
Nine PLP members declared during its course that they felt constrained to 
support non-Labor candidates [4]; eventually this number totalled 14 
members, including John Scaddan. Conscription was not the issue as several 
who had advocated it remained in the party and some retained parliamentary 
endorsements.[5] In contrast to N.S.W., Queensland and Victoria where 
expulsions had taken place even before the referendum purely on the issue 
of support for conscription, or South Australia and Tasmania where 
conscription was used to drive out unpopular political leaders and their
[1] Ibid, pp. 2-3.
[2] Ibid, p. 24.
[3] Ibid, pp. 28-9.
[4] Letters to state secretary, State executive correspondence
file 81 - Rats.
[5] Robertson,’Conscription in Western Australia’ p. 30.
134
supporters, the split in Western Australia took place over the extension 
of a federal faction fight into state politics by the attempts to organise 
the National Labor party there. The FPLP split was irrevocable and had 
been forced against the wishes of the ALF but had not Scaddan and his 
followers insisted on running and supporting candidates against the Labor 
party it is entirely possible that the movement would have accommodated 
them.
Recovery and the remaining war years, 1917-18
Extensive disagreement over conscription meant the enforced 
split in Western Australia achieved significant proportions, but, lacking 
the rancour associated with those in other states, it was also compara­
tively short lived. McCallum was detailed to devote full-time efforts to 
cajoling disaffiliated unions into returning [1] and although the extent 
of rank and file division remains vague evidence does indicate substantial 
early union support for the Nationalist defectors, fully justifying ALF 
concern. The healing process was immeasurably aided by the W.A. Labor 
movement remaining relatively unscathed by the social conflict experienced 
in some eastern states. This was admitted by McCallum in a reply to a 
request by J. H. Catts, FPLP secretary, early in 1918 inquiring about 
details of damage suffered by the industrial wing in the wake of the 1917 
strikes. McCallum advised that no union had been deregistered in his 
state and that only about 200 unionists were affected by government 
discrimination, the Fremantle Lumpers having loyally complied with 
national union directives and struck in support of the NSW unions from 
August to October. Apart from the watersiders, he reported that ’there 
is practically no alteration of union conditions arising out of the 
recent strike’. [2] Indeed, greater efforts remained directed at
[1] Minutes state executive 18 June, 1917.
[2] McCallum - Catts 3 April, 1918. State executive 
correspondence, FPLP.
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coaxing recalcitrant unionists back into the movement after the conscrip­
tion split than to lending succour to casualties of the class war. [1]
The importance of class-conscious industrial grievances for 
encouraging support for more radical policies than would normally be 
adopted is suggested by the experience of the ALF during the remaining 
period of the war. The 1917 conscription referendum campaign saw a far 
more coherent and almost unanimous stand adopted against compulsory 
service even though, after the receipt of warnings from the eastern 
parties, an attempt to initiate a poll by state executive members of 
their respective organisations to be followed by a meeting to determine 
a common party attitude failed. Instead it was argued that only state 
conference could pronounce binding policies. [2] By this time economic 
conscription, the dismissal of able-bodied men by employers in an effort 
to force them to enlist, was beginning to raise protests after it had 
been blatantly adopted by the Perth Recruiting Committee in an effort to 
pressurise the federal government to impose conscription at once. [3]
In July, 1917 the previously overwhelmingly pro-conscriptionist Metropolitan 
District Council initiated efforts to unite the organisations in 
opposition to the practice, considering it ’perhaps the most important 
facing the Labor movement today’. [4] A delegation was organised to 
protest to the State Recruiting Committee and was supported by state 
executive and other district councils. [5] Protests were sent off to 
the Prime Minister against economic conscription and the censorship 
system, condemned as having been ’grossly prostituted for political
[1] See the report of full-time organiser W. D. Johnson, 
Minutes of the Organising Committee 3 March, 1918.
State executive minutes.
[2] Minutes state executive 18 June, 1917.
[3] R. F. Vincent, Vice-chairman W.A. State Recruiting 
Committee - Pearce 28 July, 1917. Pearce papers AWM 
File 419/80/2 Bundle 7, item 41.
[4] Minutes Metropolitan D.C. 10, 24 July, 1917.
[5] Minutes state executive 6 August, 1917. State executive 
felt constrained still however by the necessity to let 
only state conference formulate policies and determine 
attitudes for the ALF as a whole. See also though Minutes 
Midland D.C. 15 August, 1917; Minutes Eastern Goldfields 
D.C. 10 August, 1917; Minutes Fremantle D.C._ 21 August 
1917.
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purposes’. [1] State executive simultaneously endorsed Melbourne THC 
protests against economic conscription and the peace proposals of the NSW 
state conference of the Labor Party but made no expression of opinion on 
further participation in the recruiting drive. [2] As the second refer­
endum on recruiting approached, factional bitterness in the ALF had begun 
to heal: by August one of Pearce’s supporters reported to him that the
National Labor party was ’moribund' and subsequent correspondence 
confirmed the detumescence of this organisation. [3] Similarly an 
Industrial Vigilance Committee, formed to rally support for the ALF at 
the time of the split, [4] was never meant to be more than a publicity 
group assisting the established party and was little heard of again.
Even in the absence of intra-party factionalism operating to 
polarise attitudes, the reaction to the second conscription referendum 
was markedly different to that of the first. Upon its announcement state 
executive convened a special meeting and resolved unanimously on the 
motion of McCallum
That in the opinion of the state executive 
conscription of human life is opposed to the 
principles of the Labor movement, and it 
therefore urges all councils, branches and 
unions in the Federation to do all they can 
to prevent its adoption.
Immediate steps were undertaken to appoint committees to lead the 
campaign against the government's proposal. [5] On the urging of the 
South Fremantle branch of the ALF and the Lumpers’ Union Fremantle D.C. 
had already reversed its neutrality of the previous year and declared 
uncompromising hostility to conscription of human life. [6] Responding 
to the state executive’s example, other councils fell into line and a 
meeting of the Metropolitan D.C. saw the spectacle of strongly conscrip- 
tionist delegates from the previous year indulge in what amounted to a
[1] See exchanges in state executive correspondence, file 24.
[2] Minutes state executive 6 August, 1917.
[3] Hay - Pearce 17 August, 1917 Pearce papers NLA 213/2/105.
[4] W.W. 2 February, 1917.
[5] Minutes state executive 12 November, 1917.
[6] Minutes Fremantle D.C. 30 October, 1917.
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mass recantation of their views. [1] Other councils also resolved to 
support the recommendation and to co-operate with the Anti-Conscription 
League to defeat the referendum. Although the weight of the ALF could 
not reverse the state result of October, 1916 the margin in December,
1917 was clearly reduced and the W.A. party had done something to acquit 
itself of its delinquent reputation.
YES NO— —  j — - ■
1916 94,069 40,884
1917 84,116 46,522
After national defeat of the conscription referendum the ALF 
was anxious to follow a policy on voluntary recruiting uniform with that 
of the other Labor parties. In January, 1918 the W.A. State Recruiting 
Committee requested Labor speakers for its platforms and was informed 
that recruiting was a matter of federal Labor policy and that no position 
could be adopted until after the ALP federal conference in Perth later 
that year. [2] The disposition of the ALF to support the war effort can 
hardly have been encouraged by the addition of the inoffensive Philip 
Collier, successor to Scaddan as PLP leader, to the small but growing 
list of victims of the War Precautions Act. Collier had been charged in 
the previous year with making statements prejudicial to recruiting and 
likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty and the case dragged on until 
mid-way through 1918. John Curtin, as editor of the Westralian Worker, 
was another victim and there were others besides. [3] Such irritations 
help explain the opposition by the majority of the state executive to ALF 
participation in the Governor-General's recruiting conference in Melbourne 
during May. The state executive officers accepted the invitation at very 
short notice and deputed Collier and McCallum as W.A. Labor representatives 
[4] but opposition by the full executive was vociferous. A motion was 
passed by 14-6 declaring that the officers should not have accepted [5] 
and some members wanted a statement endorsed opposing any further
[1] Minutes Metropolitan D.C. 13 November, 1917.
[2] Minutes state executive 7 January, 1918.
[3] See material in state executive correspondence, file 
199 Legal Defence.
[4] Minutes state executive 8 April, 1918.
[5] Ibid. full executive meeting.
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reinforcements being sent overseas at all, [1] though most district 
councils approved the officers’ action.
On issues of defence and foreign policy at the ALP federal 
conference in Perth this conflict of strong opinions was most evident 
with W.A. delegates taking sides on the basis of eastern state attitudes. 
Cameron and, to a certain extent F. A. Baglin, supported the radical NSW 
position and W. Roche and W. D. Johnson acted as the spokesmen for J. H. 
Catts in pushing the compromise view and appear to have worked closely 
with the latter in tactical manoeuvering. The majority of the ALF was 
happy to concur with the policies on the war and recruiting eventually 
settled upon there, and conscientiously set about the task of securing 
assent to the recruiting declaration submitted by conference to a 
plebiscite of the Australian Labor parties’ membership for ratification.
[2] When the practical difficulties entailed in the unprecedented task 
became manifest executive favoured scrapping of the plebiscite and an 
open declaration by the federal authorities of conference policy. [3] 
Despite criticism from some union quarters that the movement in W.A. 
generally and its spokesmen specifically had ’failed to grapple with the 
war situation and democracy’s attitude thereto’, [4] the ALF nevertheless 
did produce a ’substantial majority’ in favour of federal policy. [5] 
When the Armistice in November rendered the just completed plebiscite 
redundant (Tasmania and South Australia having failed to implement it) 
the Western Australian Labor party did at least have the satisfaction of 
ending the war years in accord with federal Labor policy.
[1] Ibid. 15 April, 1918. This was subjected to second 
thoughts by its sponsors and defeated 14-4.
[2] Ibid. 5 August, 2 September, 1918.
[3] Ibid. 7 October - 28 October, 4 November, 1918.
[4] A criticism directed by implication at the state PLP. 
Minutes Combined Propaganda Committee 14 August, 1918.
[5] W.W. 7 March, 1919; Report of state executive, 1918-19.
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TASMANIAN LABOR DURING THE WAR
Tasmanian Labor was affected by the disadvantages of society 
in that island state - small, scattered populations, poorly organised 
unions, many of which persisted in cautious craft union attitudes, and the 
absence of a powerful trade union movement. Political Labor had establi­
shed itself almost despite the apathy of unions and distrust of politicians 
by unionists was a characteristic feature of pre-war years since the 
establishment of the Tasmanian Workers’ Political League upon the basis 
of the NSW Labor model in 1903. Such development of trade unions as did 
take place owed much to the assistance of mainland organisers; the two 
major TLCs in Hobart and Launceston were only created in 1909 and 1910 
respectively and comparatively large unions, such as the AWU in 1908 
and an independent Miners' union in 1910, were late arrivals on the scene 
also. By contrast the development of the political wing had been much 
more highly advanced,with a first Labor government in 1909 and again 
under John Earle from April, 1914 - April, 1916. [1] Upon this poorly
integrated and developmentally unbalanced foundation the effects of Labor 
in office were to be disastrous. A committee established to investigate 
closer unity proposals at state conference in 1916, the culmination of 
efforts over a number of years by activists to reform the party, merely 
confirmed what had been established previously, but this was disturbing 
enough. Growing numbers of unionists, it was reported, increasingly regar­
ded political activity as ’comparatively unimportant'.
There was dissatisfaction with some members of the PLP
towards questions affecting the unions and there seemed to
be a good deal of disappointment at the general results
of the Labor government’s term of office. There was
evidence that this feeling was fast developing into active
hostility to the Labor party and a stage had already been
reached wherein proposals for running direct union
nominees for Labor seats were contemplated in all seriousness. [2]
[1] Indispensable sources for this period are M. McRae,
'Some Aspects of the Origins of the Tasmanian Labour
Party', THRA 3, December, 1953 pp.21-27 and 'The 
Tasmanian Labour Party and Trade Unions, 1903-1923'. 
THRA 5, 1955, pp.4-13.
[2] Report presented by W.A. Woods MHA to TWPL special con­
ference, 1917. Daily Post 12 January, 1917.
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Simultaneously the party branches also had reached a low point in 
membership and activities. Reorganisation schemes were considered 
with glacial slowness and Hobart TLC president Bigwood supported
a motion in favor of direct union representation in parliament by 
industrial candidates at the Interstate Trade Union Congress in 
Hobart, 15 - 18 May, because
in Tasmania the industrialists had no say in the election 
of parliamentary Labor candidates. Though unions could 
affiliate the conditions were not satisfactory to them, and 
men got into parliament as representatives of Labor who 
were not in sympathy with the industrial movement. [1]
The parallels with the situation in the N.S.W. and South Australian 
Labor movements are striking,yet the outcome quite different.
One clearly distinguishable difference between the Tasmanian
j union
/wing and those in other states was the lack of strong and enterprising 
leadership in the former. Due to the size of the organisations there 
were few unions or industrial bodies which could afford full-time 
officials and what staff were available were submerged with mundane 
administrative work and had little time for political work of orthodox 
Labor or more radical nature. Any socialist or other left wing 
elements in the Tasmanian movement were indistinguishable from their 
more moderate fellows: at least the reaction to the war and to the
buildup to the conscription crisis seems to have encited no radical 
agitation to speak of and consequently there was no pressure behind 
coherent, persistently argued policies on the war and defence. In 
general the mass of Tasmanian unionists seemed as uninterested in these 
matters prior to the crisis as they were in reorganisation schemes 
for the movement,on which the initiatives were deriving wholly from the 
political wing. Tasmanian annual conference met at Launceston in 
July, 1916 and delegates found themselves obliged to declare a 
position on compulsory overseas service. A vaguely worded motion implying 
the need for conscription failed to gain more than a few votes and 
the successful declaration was suggested by Edmund Dwyer-Gray, Irish-
[1] The motion was lost. Report of Proceedings,
Interstate Trade Union Congress, 1916. pp.10; 
McRae,’Tasmanian Labour Party and Trade 
Unions’, pp.7-8.
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Australian editor of Hobart Labor paper the Daily Post. After 
strongly deprecating what he termed the ’extreme resolutions’ 
of some other Labor conferences Dwyer-Gray moved
That in the opinion of this conference the introduction 
of conscription is inimical to the civil and national 
interest of Australia, and should only be resorted to 
to save those interests from foreign invasion.
It further expresses its trust and confidence that the 
young men of Australia will, by voluntary enlistment, do 
all in defence of the empire that can reasonably be 
expected. [1]
Although a far cry from the determined resolutions of N.S.W. and 
Victorian parties, or the Anti-Conscription Congress in Melbourne 
two months previously at which no Tasmanian representatives attended, 
the intention of this policy must have been quite clear even to the 
PLP leader and ex-Premier Earle who presided over conference .
Nevertheless shortly after Hughes announced his referendum 
policy Earle joined Liberal Premier W.H. Lee to become deputy-chairman 
of the pro-conscription National Referendum Council in the company of 
other political opponents, prominent business and social figures 
and clerical and military luminaries. [2] A branch at Launceston and 
several other small bodies came out in support of the referendum [3], 
but these elements were overwhelmed by the response against 
conscription. Hobart TLC was represented on the State War Council , 
but for the pragmatic reason of being able to speak out on recruiting 
procedures and repatriation schemes  ^[4] and its immediate reaction 
was to ’appoint an Anti-Conscription Executive, send Bigwood to 
Melbourne for the Anti-Conscription TUC meeting there and begin
[1] Daily Post 29 July, 1916
[2] Ibid. 27 September, 1916
[3] Launceston No.l TWPL censured state secretary Senator 
Guy over his opposition to Hughes. Letters and Press 
Comments on the Actions of the Hon. John Earle in
the Great National Crisis, compiled by R.D. Lord. Hobart 
1917. p.8.
[4] Daily Post 14 September, 1916.
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preparations for a campaign . [1] Its opinions on the issue were very 
much ones concerning the cost of conscription to Australia, the 
envisaged breaking down of unionism, flood of cheap colored labor and 
strain of resources which could accompany it. Robert Cosgrove told a 
mass meeting of unionists after it had unanimously affirmed absolute 
opposition to conscription that
It was a fight for unionism, for all it had ever 
accomplished, for all it stood for, and they would be 
worse than curs if they stood idly by and let their 
rights be filched from them without a fight. [2]
Some minor resentment of Earle and his failings as a Labor Premier 
was expressed but there seemed no conscious attachment of conscription 
to the political leadership situation.
Strongest response came from the party leadership, the 
remainder of the PLP and the state executive, and owed most to the 
efforts of J.A. Lyons, deputy leader of the PLP and former state 
treasurer and state president of the TWPL. Joe Lyons genuinely regretted 
the war and declined to support the voluntary recruiting campaign but 
his views at this time are hard to fully establish, being an amalgam 
of idealism, half-digested socialism and reformist which together 
tended to make him a radical in the Tasmanian context. [3] In state 
executive Lyons secured approval from all except Earle for a lengthy 
declaration against conscription and then gained the signatures of all 
but a few in the PLP in endorsement of it, presenting the result as 
official Labor policy at a mass meeting in the Town Hall with Frank 
Anstey as feature speaker. Taking its authority from the state 
conference resolution the executive condemned conscription as destructive
[1] Ibid. 25 September, 1916.
[2] Ibid. 2 October, 1916.
[3] P.R. Hart; J.A. Lyons: A Political Biography. Ph.D.ANU 
1967.»' J.A. Lyons, Tasmanian Labour Leader’ .L.H. 9 
November, 1965.pp.34-42; Dame Enid Lyons, So We Take 
Comfort .London, 1965.
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of national interests and civil liberties and conducive to business 
and industrial disorganisation and the ruin of primary industry , 
without the prospect of decisively affecting the war. Going beyond 
this however it was further claimed
that if threats of compulsion were removed and the 
voluntary system were placed on a sound basis, and the 
whole financial resources of the Commonwealth utilised to 
ease the burden of the people, the young men of 
Australia would, by voluntary service, do all that is 
required ... to the point when further depletion of 
the fit manhood of the nation might become a peril to 
the Commonwealth itself. [l]
The following campaign was not everything that the Labor organisers 
considered necessary [2] and Tasmania became one of the three 
states to give a majority in favor of conscription: 48,493 - 32,833.
Tasmanian Labor had not specified penalties for support of 
conscription and in fact it was not denied thatf^ lPfp secretary had 
presented as official policy the attitude that all members were 
permitted a free vote on the issuet [3] but when only two PLP members 
adopted the pro-conscription stand,Lyons and his supporters could 
not resist the opportunity. Parliament was still in session and so, 
four days after the referendum a spill was called in caucus ’in view 
of the strained relations existing in the party’. [4] The coup 
met with surprised reactions in parliament and press and appears 
not to have been unanimously supported: Earle and Howroyd, the
victims, were replaced at a resumed caucus meeting next day only ’after a
[1] Daily Post 7 October, 1916.
[2] Matt O ’Brien, secretary, TLC Anti-Conscription Executive 
Mercury 26 October, 1916.
[3] C.R. Howroyd Mercury 3 November, 1916.
[4} Ibid. 2 November, 1916.
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long and somewhat acrimonious discussion' was reported. Lyons and 
Ben Watkins won election to the vacant places and the resignations of 
their predecessors were formally received by state conference. The 
despatch with which the numbers had been utilised evidently rankled with 
some party members but it is quite clear that this act by Lyons rather 
than pressure from the rank and file or from interstate ^ caused the 
split in Tasmania. President of the Launceston No.l branch resigned 
over the state executives' conscription policy and the treatment of 
Earle and a number of branches disbanded or were dissolved by state con­
ference in 1917 in the post-referendum recovery [1], a fairly light 
injury compared to the whole-sale defections in NSW, South Australia 
and Western Australia. Tasmanian unions called for the deposal of Hughes 
as FPLP leader only on 11 November, so it remains unclear how much the 
PLP developments encouraged the two Tasmanian MsHR^Jens Jensen and 
W.H. Smith ,to defect with the Prime Minister on 14 November. One further 
casualty of the conscription split occurred with Senator R.H. Ready 
of Tasmania succumbing to the inducements of Hughes to resign while 
two other Tasmanians, Senators Gray and Long, were also encouraged to 
absent themselves from the federal parliament and so destroy the Labor 
Senate majority in the complex early months of 1917.
It has been maintained that the conscription crisis had the 
paradoxical effect of galvanising the ailing Tasmanian Labor movement 
back to life, not only by giving Lyons his chance at the PLP 
leadership but in benefiting the unions as well» [2] Affiliation with 
the Melbourne TUC national executive and the visit of leading Victorian 
party members D.J. Russell and P. Loughnan were the immediate causes 
of the first state-wide conference of Tasmanian unions sgiving them the 
first experience of concerted action on shared political goals. The 
conscription crisis was cited as having a readily apparent effect in 
encouraging acceptance of the new constitutional framework presented
[1] Letters and Press Comments pp.15-16.
[2] Editorial Daily Post 12 January, 1917;' McRafe- 'The 
tasmanlan Labor Party änd Trade Unions1 2'. pp.lG-11.
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at a special state conference in January, 1917. Chief figure behind 
the scheme,W.A. Woods,drew the moral that both political and industrial 
wings worked more advantageously in concert than when opposed, [1] 
but the dogged insistence by a member of the consulting TLC delegation 
that ’the movement for closer unity came from the political side' 
remained valid. [2] If the party structure was to be changed for 
the benefit of the unions without their own initiative being involved, 
it augured poorly for their effect on policy. Successful use of 
union strength depended upon commonality of aims and the ability to 
agree over specific tactics, the very characteristics most wanting 
in the Tasmanian movement. Certainly little of them were evident at 
the conference duringfor example, the debate concerning continuing 
support for compulsory military training or the abolition of compulsory 
Defence Act provisions altogether,initiated by FPLP delegates.
Although most of the leading unionists seemed disposed towards the 
latter alternative it was defeated 22 - 20 and Watkins guided debate 
to the eventual compromise -declaring Tasmanian support for compulsory 
military training on the fulfilment of certain conditions regarding 
wealth tax and upon use of such troops in Australia. Later, conference 
resolved in favor of the declaration of peace terms by the Powers 
and a negotiated peace,but when it came to the attitude on continuation 
in the war it was Bigwood of the TLC himself who secured unanimous 
approval for the renewed voluntary recruiting scheme for the AIF. [3]
The implications for the Tasmanian party of its new
structure based upon the Western Australian model were soon to be 
tested at the inaugural conference of the renamed Tasmanian Labor 
Federation, 7 - 9  April 1917. Here the representation favored the 
unions to a greater extent than before,comprising some 40% of the total. 
R. Cosgrove of the Carters and Drivers submitted a motion which seems 
to have drawn upon current Peace Alliance and radical thinking on the 
mainland and called for the state executive to seek the support of 
Labor in other states to bring about an international workers' peace
[1] Daily Post 12 January, 1917.
[2] Ibid. 13 January, 1917.
[3] Ibid.
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conference on the initiative of the Australian movement. Although 
Shoobridge and Woods, MsHA, supported this it was easily disposed of 
by an amendment affi xing the words 'after the war'. The TLF experi­
ment did not survive the end of the year amidst electoral defeat, 
financial adversity and plain inefficiency; the unions were the first 
to seek their freedom to return to the old political/industrial 
division against the inclinations of state executive, [l] and the 
Tasmanian movement reverted to the old organisation in May, 1918.
In the interim executive had conformed with other states by endorsing 
the NSW 1917 peace plank [2] and in the second conscription referen­
dum joined with the PLP on 19 November in an Anti-Conscription 
Executive under Lyons again. This time the Hobart TLC had no formal 
participation, being in process of reconstruction after the TLC 
experiment and in fact/ requested to suspend this activity temporarily 
to avoid emphasis upon Labor organisational problems during the 
campaign . [3] On 20 December the state returned a bare majority for 
conscription in a marked change from 1916.
During the final year of the war few changes were effected
in attitudes to the war and defence. Lyons attended as Labor executive
and PLP delegate at the Governor-General's recruiting conference and,
remaining unenthusiastic about the war, reported diffidently to state
conference that he could see no reason not to support the voluntary
the ,system and that /fconcessions obtained had made it a useful exercise.L4J
Dwyer-Gray, withdrawing from the Recruiting Committee during the
last referendum, resumed his assistance and his appeal to state conference
[1] State executive minutes 15 October, 19 November, 1917; 
5 February, 1918.
[2] Ibid. 15 August, 1917.
[3] Ibid. 19 November, 1917.
[4] Daily Post 9 May, 1918.
Yes No
1916 48,493
1917 38,881
37,833
38,502
147
for support of the new appeal was greeted with acclamation. [1]
Delegates also agreed that Labor policy towards participation in 
future wars should be defined to restrict the discretion of a Prime 
Minister, resolving
That no action be taken by Australia in any future wars 
without the approval of the electors as expressed by 
means of a referendum, unless Australia be directly 
attacked# [2]
Except for the final phrase, added to the original motion by Enid 
Lyons ,the decision closely approximated part of the actual defence 
policy adopted at Perth. Conference further determined to continue 
support for compulsory military training for home defence in the 
face of strong opposition to maintenance of the old system, one unionist 
referring to it as ’the one blot on the escutcheon of the Australian 
Labor party’. As a concession to this feeling it was determined to 
increase the age at which training began,to make Labor defence policy 
’Citizen Defence Force with compulsory military training and voluntary 
enlistment for active service and that the Defence Act be amended to 
raise the age of training to 18 years’. [3] Because of financial strin­
gency only Senators Long and O ’Keefe with W.E. Shoobridge MLA 
represented Tasmania at Perth but the services of Curtin and McCallum 
were obtained to bear proxies. On the major issue over the NSW 
proposal on continued support of the war effort ,all pursued the moderate 
line and it was due to the objections by Tasmania and the other two 
small states that the final compromise to resort to a rank and file 
plebiscite was devised.
Tasmania is an interesting comparison case for Labor history 
in this period »possessing many of the classic conditions for conflict; 
with an under-represented, dissatisfied union movement facing a
[1 23] Ibid. 10 May, 1918
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid. 11 May, 1918.
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dominant PLP in government for several years. However the division 
within the Labor movement was an unequal one caused by historic and 
socio-economic reasons effectively confining the unions to the status 
of small, unfinancial bodies dominated by parochial concerns 
suspicious of politicians but confining action to vague talk of 
running independent candidates and sending deputations to ministers. 
There was no coherent ideology to act as a unifying factor although the 
common danger of conscription forced unity and seemed to suggest 
the value of a closer relationship. Once the TLF experiment was 
abandoned,though,in favor of the old system of organisation yeven the 
emergence of a large single union after the Miners' merger with the 
AWU failed to secure a determining union voice. The Tasmanian branch 
of the ALP remained very much a parliamentarian-dominated party.
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THE RISE OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS 
N.S.W., 1915-16
The parliamentary representative of the workers tends 
to set himself up as a leader and to claim the right 
to neglect the recommendations of Conference, and even 
the sacred platform itself in accordance with his 
interpretation of the interests of the Party ... This 
is plainly contrary to the Labour theory of self- 
government, and has to be checked by the exercise of 
the authority of the governing organs of the Party.
V. Gordon Childe,
How Labour Governs, p.31
Two crises were destined to break upon the N.S.W. Labor party 
(then entitled the Political Labor League or PLL) in 1916 - the issue of 
control over the party itself and that of conscription for overseas service. 
In the largest state with the strongest working class movement the Labor 
party had been in office since 1910 and was led from 1913 by the brilliant 
W.A. Holman,whose dominance over the PLP was extended to the state executive 
and, when necessary, the state conference of the party. Since inauguration 
of the Labor governments there had been a steady resentment building up 
against the politicians over their failure to enact legislation in the 
interests of the working class who put them in office and pursue the 
implementation of the Labor platform. Grievances ranged from demands for 
preference to unionists, arbitration act amendments, workmen's 
compensation, a minimum wage and other matters all exacerbated since 1914 
by inadequate protection from the erosion of real wages by inflation,which 
had proved worse over the aggregate of the last three years than in any other 
state and had always been below the Commonwealth average since 1901. [1]
In his defence Holman could and did cite war time stringency, the 
obstruction of the N.S.W. Upper House and the difficulties of 'packing' 
that chamber and other arguments, but all failed to placate the critics 
within his own parliamentary party and in the Labor movement at large. [2]
[1] C.Y.B. 14, 1901-1920.Variation in Effective Wagen p. 1006.
[2] H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader. Sydney, 1940.
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The Premier’s attitude towards his party had become increasingly arrogant 
and at state conference - 'the annual escape pipe of the movement through 
which waste steam goes off' [1] - in July, 1915 he survived an attack upon 
him over a number of issues led principally by the Australian Workers'
Union after having skilfully isolated it in anticipation of the attempt. [21 
A year later however his tactical adroitness at such manoeuvres would not 
only have been emulated but improved upon by his opponents.
Holman's principal opposition stemmed from the several N.S.W. 
branches of the AWU, the largest Australian union with branches in every 
state and much latent power. This union's advantages lay in the size 
conferred upon it by a series of pre-war amalgamations and the claim 
based upon that for representation upon state Labor conferences and executives.
A well organized bureaucracy of paid officials at the apex of this 
oligarchic organisation formed a base for political as well as solely 
industrial activities and included some very tough operators. AWU policy 
at national level was formulated at annual congress in Sydney of all the 
branch leaderships and consisted of a curious mixture of the radical and 
moderate - for example it took the first opportunity to condemn 'warfare 
which is against the workers’ interests' and express hopes for 'the overthrow 
of capitalism and militarism and the triumph of working class movements 
throughout the world',[3] but when Western Branch delegates J. Cullinan 
and C. Last moved the withdrawal of AWU financial support from the N.S.W.
Labor party due to its poor performance in office this was rejected by 
14-9 by those affirming that the appropriate strategy was to work within 
the party. [4] In fact the AWU was far from revolutionary, being an example pa] 
excellence of an entrenched union machine. Veteran founder and General- 
President, Senator W.G. Spence, was overwhelmingly re-elected the next year 
against a more lively Queensland contender admitting to IWW ties, but on 
certain matters the AWU as the embodiment of the Australian rural ethos 
exhibited something of the radical-nationalism by then beginning to fade.
[1] Evatt quoting Holman in 1914. ibid p. 339
[2] V. Molesworth, The Industrial Section of the A.L.P.
Molesworth papers MS 71/2; A.W. 8, 15, 22 April 1915.
[3] Ibid pp. 28-30.
[4] Official Report AWU Convention 28 January 1916 pp. 11-12.
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Solely on industrial issues alone there were grounds for complaints,
General-Secretary Ted Grayndler having to lobby the FPLP, assisted by 
Senators Spence and Barnes, to obtain necessary amendments to industrial 
legislation to regularise its standing after direct approaches to the 
Hughes cabinet were stalled.[l] By this time the initiative was being 
taken by Central Branch, AWU leaders Jack Bailey and W.H. Lambert, the 
President and Secretary respectively,who were strongly hostile to Holman,
[2] and began to develop links with Sydney unions by the end of 1915.
Early in new year the Branch resolved unamimously to transfer its head­
quarters from Orange to rooms at PLL Head Office, Macdonnel House, in 
Pitt Street, Sydney. [3] Urged on vociferously by AWU national weekly 
the Australian Worker, the branch proposed at 1916 National Convention 
that the union campaign to capture Labor Senate preselections but this 
was turned down,though even Grayndler acknowledged that action in N.S.W. 
was imperative. [4] Rejection of another motion for disaffiliation 
from the N.S.W. party by the AWU in that state left only one option 
remaining, to capture the party from inside to compel implementation of 
Labor policies.
There was no lack of left-wing critiques of the war, the Labor 
governments and the existing order in N.S.W. by the Australian Socialist 
Party, the Socialist Labor Party, Industrial Workers of the World and 
others. The last-named was to become political bete noire of conservatives 
in all parties and was even then greatly exaggerated in its direct 
influence, proclaiming more by its existence than actual accomplishments. [5]
[1] Ibid pp. 3-4.
[2] Report Central Branch Executive 6-9 October, A.W. 28 
October, 1918.
[3] Report, half-yearly meeting Central Branch ibid 13 
January, 1916.
[4] Official Report AWU Convention 1916. pp. 67-70.
[5] V.G.Childe, How Labor Governs, pp. 145-150 and P.J.
Rushton The Industrial Workers of the World in Sydney 
1913-1917, M.A. University of Sydney, 1969.
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There was a considerable ferment of radical ideologies feeding on growing 
dissatisfactions, including the growing importance of conscription. 
Opposition to compulsory overseas service developed under the stimulus of 
Universal Service League agitation which Holman supported. A number of 
socialist activists founded an Anti-Conscription League in conjunction 
with militant leaders of the Ironworkers, United Laborers and other 
unions [l] to carry out propaganda in the Labor movement. Within a month 
it had already moved to the extreme conclusion
It was to be some time though before the socialists' broad analyses began 
to attract consideration on a wider level; meanwhile there was an 
instinctive reaction against the prospect of conscription from all major 
Labor organisations.
When the Sydney Labor Council first considered conscription in
September, 1915 it turned down its own Executive^ recommendation, merely 
observing that no reason for it was yet apparent and demanded instead that 
wealth be conscripted before human life.[3] Council represented 
metropolitan unionism and dominated the rest of organised Labor throughout 
the state; although discontented with Holman's record also it was still 
politically cautious and rejected the idea of separate industrial 
parliamentary representation.[4] Later the AWU went even further carrying 
with minimum of debate a resolution specifically aimed at influencing the 
rest of the Labor movement:
That this Convention absolutely opposes the principle 
of conscription as being opposed to the spirit of our 
time and race; and more especially is this so in 
Australia, which has contributed more men under the 
voluntary system in proportion to its population than 
any other portion of the British Empire.[5]
[1] ACL Minutes 23 September, 1915. >
[2] Records of votes were unusual : this resolution was carried 
22-6, Ibid 27 October, 1915.
[3] Minutes Labor Council Executive 28 September; General 
Meeting 30 September, 1915.
[4] Ibid, 6, 14 October, 1915.
[5] Official Report AWU Convention, 1916, p.10.
that the only way for the workers of N.S.W. to prevent 
conscription from being passed, or enforced, is for 
" lised workers of Australia to strike against
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This attitude was seen as being in no conflict with the justifiable pride 
in the enlistment nationally of over 20,000 AWU members in the AIF. [l] 
Indeed the Central Branch had already endorsed the program publicised by 
the newly established N.S.W. section of the Australian Peace Alliance in 
favour of negotiation of a democratic settlement.[2] By late 1915 this 
attitude had spread to the highest party levels and state executive, 
subjected to 'sheaves of correspondence' from all over the state, passed 
by two to one majority a resolution at the end of two nights debate warn­
ing that Labor support for the Universal Service League was inadvisable - 
a direct rebuff to Holman and several of his ministers who favored the 
USL aims.[3] Hughes himself was apprehensive of the build up of 
pressures in his state party and its potential implications for the FPLP, 
advising attendance by N.S.W. federal caucus members at state executive 
meetings to counter 'sinister and ill-advised attacks'.[4] Nevertheless, 
conscription remained a side issue during the actual organising of an 
insurrection against the political leadership by formation of a faction 
within the party known as the industrial section.
As delegates to the 1916 Labor conference were elected by their 
respective organisations they were circularised by a group inviting their 
attendance at a meeting to secure 'a greater interest on the part of trade 
unions in the political machine and by closer co-operation at such meetings 
as the coming conference and elsewhere secure the fruits of active 
affiliation with such bodies'.[5] The first meeting took place on 6 
March conducted by prominent AWU men Bailey, Cullinan and Lambert with
[1] Ibid General Secretary's report p.p. 3-4
[2] A.W. 23 December, 1915; Report half-yearly meeting Central 
Branch AWU 3 January, 1916 ibid 13 January, 1916.
[3] Endorsed 15 October and publicised 3 December 1915. Report 
of N.S.W. state executive, 1916, p.4.
[4] W. Webster, MHR - J.H. Catts MHR, 20 January 1916. Catts 
papers 658/1/5(18)
[5] Circular from Affiliated Political Unions Committee contained 
in Full Story and Documents with a History of the Industrial 
Section of the ALP, including annual reports and balance 
sheets by Vol. Molesworth. Molesworth papers M.L. Uncat
MSS 71/2.
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A.C. Willis of the Aust. Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation, also 
lodged at Macdonnel House, and other supporters. A pro-tem executive 
was elected, Phil. Adler of the Blacksmiths becoming president and 
organisation intensified. Formation of the group coindided with similar 
stirrings at Trades Hall which had been ineffective in the Labor Council 
and both sections combined and began regular meetings, broadening its 
membership to include bona fide Labor party branches as well.[l] Holman 
recognised the threat, published a pamphlet defending his government’s 
record and,keeping informed by confidential reports by industrial section 
secretary L. Hermann, attempted to counter-organise .[2] The 
industrialists' attack on Holman was designed to center upon a censure 
motion at conference over failure to deal with the obstructionist 
Legislative Council blamed by the Premier for inaction on many matters.
It was further decided to support introduction of the card vote to ensure 
that union representation at future conferences corresponded to actual 
size and to back a ticket for the new state executive. Successful 
candidates would be required to lodge signed, undated letters of 
resignation with an industrialist officer and would be obliged to 
surrender membership of the section so as to maintain a distinction 
between the war council of unions and branches and the controlling body 
of the party. A solid industrialist vote on the floor of conference was 
to be ensured by voting in 'threes' - section members to submit their 
completed ballot for verification by two others before handing it in.
[l] See statements by Phil. Adler A.W. 23 November, 1916 and
Jack Bailey ibid 30 November, 1916. Also Molesworth op.cit♦ 
and his The Story of the N.S.W. Labor Party, 1891-1917 
Mo 1esworth papers 243/5/15; J. Bailey Information for 
Political and Industrial Students in Connection with the 
1917 No-Conscription Campaign, 8 pp. M.S. Mitchell Library 
A 2425.
[2 ] Childe^ How Labour Governs pp. 61-4.
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When conference opened on 22 April the section had 84 delegates 
on side, less than the two-thirds necessary to impose major changes on 
the party in divisions over its motions to prohibit or severely limit the 
proportion of parliamentarians on state executive [1] and to adopt the 
card vote.[2] On the crucial issue concerning the Fremietr however many 
other delegates enthusiastically followed and the censure motion was 
carried after an excited debate 105-68, but it was by no means desired to 
supplant the ministry, only force a more zealous implementation of the 
Labor platform and in this lay Holman’s strength. In a boldly pursued 
series of manoeuvres the Premier resigned as PLP leader and was replaced 
by > stunned caucus with John Storey. While the implications of this were 
being explored negotiations were opened between Holman’s cabinet colleague 
Arthur Griffith and the industrialist^ resulting in a compromise being 
effected. Holman undertook to conduct a referendum on abolition of the 
Legislative Council at the approaching state election in return for 
confirmation as leader by conference, support from it and the new executive 
against refractory elements in the PLP and a quelling of party criticism 
of his government. Confounded by their success the conference accepted 
this deal, [3] and conference was concluded with a voice-weary Holman 
outlining his new program and its acceptance without close scrutiny.[4]
Amidst this excitement the issue of conscription was raised only 
towards the end of conference on 8 May with the results of the Victorian 
party conference at Easter already available. Introducer of the indust­
rialist motion was Arthur Rae who presented in place of 14 agenda items 
what he termed a composite proposal taking account of the Victorian decision.
[1] A.W. 27 April, 1916
[2] Ibid 18 May, 1916
[3] To the disgust of a hard core or intractables led ironically 
enough by Worker manager Hector Lamond who lost his position 
later for supporting conscription. A.W. 11 May,1916.
[4] Holman’s speech ibid and 18 May, 1916. Also the reports in 
the Daily Telegraph, Evatt op. cit. pp. 383-8, Bailey op. cit.: 
J.P. Osbourne Nine Crowded Years Sydney 1921 pp. 105-6 and 
Official History of the Reconstruction of the Labour Party 
1916 incorporated with state executive Report 31 December, 
1916.
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Rae took pains to establish that he was 'heart and soul' with Great Britain, 
having two sons in the AIF and prevented by age and physique from himself 
enlisting. Compulsory service, he maintained, was a menace to unionism 
as an invitation to martial rule and the erosion of hard-won living standards 
and civil rights. Newly elected state president, the industrialist 
nominee J.W. Doyle, over-ruled an objection by dissidents and was upheld on 
challenge by 74-35. When moderates began to walk out, threatening the 
quorum, debate was hastily concluded and the motion carried on the voices. 
Principal clause of the resolution, unchallenged by Holman in remaining 
days, declared
That this conference solomnly pledges itself to oppose by 
all lawful means conscription of human life for military 
service abroad and directs all leagues and affiliated unions 
to take immediate steps to oppose all Labor members who vote 
for and otherwise support conscription, so as to make this 
a clear-cut issue between the forces of democracy and 
despotism : where unions or leagues fail to take such action 
the central executive is hereby instructed to refuse under 
any circumstances to endorse conscriptionist candidates.
The industrialist bloc proved decisive in the executive elections in which 
they swept nearly all positions, with the notable exception of Holman 
himself and one vice-presidency : the last position was lost after the 
industrialist candidate incorrectly nominated.[l] One of the problems 
encountered by the section in drawing up the ticket was the lack of a 
suitable nominee for party president. Only one PLP member had offered 
support before conference, R. J. Stuart-Robinson, a persistent enemy of 
Holman in caucus,[2] and in their search for a sound but reasonably well- 
known figure the industrialists selected J.W. Doyle, an undistinguished 
affable character whose chief recommendation was that as secretary of the 
Eight Hours Demonstration Committee and organiser of its art union for 
many years he was a familiar throughout the party. In what had been 
expected would be a close contest Doyle beat the Holman candidate E.
Farrar by 100-69 [3] : in future the industrialists would lose their
[i ] A.W. 4 May, 1916
[2] PLP Minutes 1, 3, 5 December, 1915
[3] Lamond picked up 14 votes. A.W. 4 May, 1916
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diffidence about gaining party office. A number of leading figures had 
however decided to transfer their activities into the executive; these 
including Adler, Bailey, Lambert, Willis, McPherson, McKell and others, 
and hereafter both executive and the section were to co-operate on major 
issues though administrative duties remained with the former. On a 
final note conference concluded with Willis moving cojointly with a 
state minister and Universal Service League sympathiser, J.D. Fitzgerald, 
a declaration of assistance for the Allies in securing victory over 
militarism by the voluntary method [l] - an expression of forced unity 
to be rudely shattered before the year was out.
Conscription and the N.S.W, split, 1916
Almost immediately the advantages gained by the industrialists 
were registered when state executive issued a threat of expulsion to any 
member associating with conscriptionist bodies and began official 
participation in the anti-conscription meetings now being organised at 
the Domain.[2] By this time Sydney Labor Council had also aligned 
itself with active opposition by delegating speakers to the same meetings 
and obtaining representation on the socialist supported Anti-Conscription 
League#[3] Other attempts to consolidate union power were less 
successful, specifically the efforts of a committee established by the 
section to act with state executive in supervising fulfilment of Holman’s 
promises by legislative action. Some detailed measures were worked out 
but the PLP refused to be dictated to and refused admittance to caucus of 
an industrialist deputation on the grounds that the section had no official 
standing.[4] Having now constituted itself as a permanent organisation 
with a full-time executive, regular meetings, a printed platform and a set 
of rules,the role of the Industrial Section within the Labor movement 
became one of a passive watchdog. Only at annual conferences did the
[1] A.W. 25 May 1916
[2] Ibid, 22 June 1916
[3] Ibid 15, 22 June 1916
[A] Simon Hickey, PLP secretary - 
secretary 6 September, 1916. 
Documents op. cit.
J.M. Power, Industrial Section 
Molesworth,Full Story and
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Section attain its full authority as the voice of the most active and 
committed rank and file, trading on the almost institutionalised 
suspicion of the parliamentary leaders in N.S.W., and before its anomalous 
existence was terminated in 1919 it was to remain a powerful piece in the 
Labor organisation.
Certainly it was not the dominant factor in the conscription 
campaign, acting essentially as a reinforcing element. When Hughes 
returned to Australia he was feted in Sydney by Holman and the establish*- 
ment at a banquet. Later in August the Prime Minister forced through the 
conscription referendum plan and made representations to the Labor 
movement seeking support or at least a neutral attitude. Accompanying 
him to Sydney with news of his rebuff by both the Victorian state 
executive and Melbourne THC were several anti-conscription opponents.
On 4 September Hughes spoke at Macdonnel House to the N.S.W. executive, 
stressing the threat to white Australia,but after the Industrial Section 
views had become known he was defeated by 21-5 and threatened with 
expulsion if he persisted with the plan. [1] Executive issued a request 
to other parties that a special federal conference be convened to decide 
the issue. Hughes met the Labor Council executive on the same day and 
bullied it into convening a special cäll of Council, held three days later, 
when Hughes put his case and supporters moved that conscription be left an 
open question for the referendum. Council rejected this and endorsed the 
attitude of state executive by 116-60, rejecting a further amendment by 
socialist Ernie Judd.[2] The desultory liaison with Melbourne unions» 
excused earlier by lack of funds,began in earnest and a local section of 
the Anti-Conscription Trade Union Congress contacted the Industrial Section 
for support and petitioned state executive for expulsion of Hughes»[3^
[1] Official History of the Reconstruction of the Labor Party, 
1916 p. 5; J.T. Lang, I Remember,Sydney, 1956, pp. 65-6; 
W.A. Holman N.S.W, PD Second Series 66, 7 November,1916 
pp. 2452-3.
[2] Minutes special meeting executive committee Sydney Labor 
Council 4 September, 1916; Minutes special meeting Labor 
Council 7 September1 2, 1916.
J. Burns, Anti-Conscription Congress secretary - J. Power 
6 September 1916. Letters re the formation of the Anti- 
Conscription League Molesworth papers 243/3/L, 24.
[3]
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However, state executive took organisation in hand by inviting 
five delegates each from the major Labor bodies - the Anti-Conscription 
Congress based at Trades Hall, Sydney Labor Council itself, the Anti- 
Conscription League and the Industrial Section - to a meeting on 8 
September, where Burns was elected secretary and it was resolved to 
circularise all Labor politicians 'asking them to do all in their power 
to prevent the taking of a referendum on the question of conscription of 
human life for military or industrial service'. It was argued that war­
time conditions prejudiced a fair public airing of both sides of the 
question.[l] Adopting the title No-Conscription Council it was 
intended that this lead the fight in N.S.W. and include representation 
from Labor and bona-fide anti-conscription organisations elsewhere.[2] 
Later it became embroiled in further wrangling for control over the 
campaign between itself and another state executive committee controlling 
the substantial party facilities at Head Office in Macdonnel House, only 
resolved by formation of a combined campaign headquarters committee under 
Director and general organiser James Howard Catts, M.H.R. [3]
Labor Council members approved the one day stoppage on 4 October 
in protest against the call up by Hughes of trainees [4] but preferred to 
await the results of the referendum before considering more extensive 
industrial action as urged by the radicals Judd and Power [5] on behalf of 
the Anti-Conscription League.[6] This attitude conformed with that taken 
by the AWU general executive meeting in Melbourne on 25 September.[7]
[1] Circular to Parliamentarians n.d. ibid
[2] Minutes NCC 8, 12 September,1916.
[3] Cf. Minutes of the Campaign Headquarters 4 October-1 November, 
1916; Minutes of the No-Conscription Council 8 September-
21 November,1916 and Minutes of Anti-Conscription League 
21 October-11 November,1916 - all copied by Molesworth ibid
[4] Minutes Sydney Labor Council 21, 28 September,1916
[5] Ibid special meeting 24 October,1916.
[6] Minutes ACL 15, 23 August,12J6
[7] Daily Post 26 September,1916
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W hen Hughes went ahead with the Military Service Referendum Bill state 
executive took the fateful step of expelling him together with another 
FPLP supporter. Endorsements of Holman and three PLP colleagues were 
withdrawn, the distinction between these two tactics being in practice 
a fine one.[l] Letters were sent out requiring all other parliament­
arians to indicate their attitudes : all cabinet members excepting John 
Estell supported Holman and, responding to their leaders’ pressure, so 
too did half of the PLP. Executive went ahead inexorably with the purge 
of conscriptionists, despite entreaties by a PLP delegation of loyalists 
on 13 October who argued that this was too harsh and in favour of sparing 
moderate conscriptionist ministers such as McGowen and Hoyle.[2] After 
a two hour meeting the state secretary Evans emerged with a laconic 
summary: ’Today’s deliberations came to a dead end. The executive will 
not compromise’.[3] Within a week of the referendum some 18 parliament­
arians had been dealt with and three places on the executive declared 
vacant - those of Holman, Hermann and J.C. Watson. N.S.W. recorded the 
largest majority against compulsory military service of all the states, 
474, 544 to 356, 805.
In the PLP the remaining members elected Durack to the leader­
ship and their censure of Holman in the House was adjourned while the 
latter forged a coalition with the Liberals; only then was he expelled 
by caucus and state executive. Holman’s support for conscription had been 
adamant and -merely added to the long list of instances in which he had 
differed with the Labor movement. T.C. Carey from Melbourne addressed 
state executive on the Victorian party's decisions to proceed against the 
conscriptionists without compromise and N.S.W. agreed to the holding of a 
special federal conference.[4] The Labor Council and unaffiliated unions
[1] A.W. 21 September 1916; Molesworth, The Story of the N.S.W. 
Labor Party pp. 216-17.
[2] The delegation comprised John Storey, Simon Hickey, Jabez 
Wright and J.P. Osbourne. Osbourne, Nine Crowded Years p p . 
125-6; E. Judd, The War and the Sydney Labor Council.
[3] Register 14 October, 1916.
[4] Daily Standard 11 November, 1916.
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endorsed the Anti-Conscription National Executive policy of no 
conciliation at federal or state level also.tl] N.S.W. delegates 
at the A.L.P. special federal conference in Melbourne included chief 
industrialists Adler and Bailey, although both Senator Gardiner and 
Arthur Rae inclined to forebearance towards the split Western Australian 
party delegation and Gardiner joined the three Western Australians who 
voted against exclusion of Senator Lynch and R.J. Burchell, M.H.R. [2]
The N.S.W. Labor split marked the confluence of two separate 
issues - the conscription crisis and antagonism towards the parliament­
arians who had wielded control of the party. As a result of the latter, 
machinery was formed within the party to facilitate the assertion of 
rank and file control and when conscription arose was ready to hand to 
enforce state conference decision. This machinery was intended to be 
permanent and so even after the purge it remained intact, an essentially 
irresponsible organisation available as a lever to be used by radicals 
for the alteration of policy towards the war and Australian participation 
in it. For this reason N.S.W. more than any other state was responsible 
for continuing the challenge to FPLP policy-making dominance in the 
aftermath of the conscription crisis: during the remaining half of the
wat ALP policy derived almost wholly from the clash between federal and 
N.S.W. state parties.
[1] Industrial conference Minutes Sydney Labor Council 
14 November, 1916; the Council itself was prepared 
to make allowance for its own members who had 
advocated conscription. Special meeting, ibid 
25 November, general meeting 7 December, 1916.
[2 ] Report ALP special federal conference 1916 p.p. 5-16.
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CHAPTER THREE
FEAR AND DREAD: The ALP and participation in the war, 1917 - 18
The FPLP and the war, 1917 - 18
Whatever else it accomplished the federal ALP conference in 
December, 1916 did not provide the party with an authoritative policy 
on the war and defence in general, confining itself to obiter dicta upon 
diversely related topics but not the broader issues. This lack was 
not remedied until the 1918 federal conference where, for the first 
time, the central points on participation in the war and Australian 
interests were tackled directly. In the interim party policy remained 
based upon the attitude in August, 1914 and such changes as occurred 
must be deduced from reactions to domestic events. Following upon 
the conscription split and reconstruction of the FPLP the two 
federal sides had their first opportunity to try out their paces at 
the elections in May, 1917. These proved disastrous to Labor, the 
Nationalist coalition winning 53 seats to the former's 22 and sweeping 
all 18 Senate vacancies as well. [1] Such a result did little to 
establish the new federal leadership in the eyes of the Labor 
parties: Frank Tudor was by no means a strong figure in personality
or capacity and owed election to the leadership of the FPLP to 
his impeccable anti-conscription credentials and the absence of 
any rival figures with comparable attainments such as his. [2]
Under the signatures of Tudor and FPLP secretary David Watkins the ALP 
manifesto released in Melbourne on 20 March proclaimed continuity of 
commitment.
The war is still the most pressing and insistent question 
confronting us. Our attitude as a party is identical with 
our attitude at the last election ... If again entrusted 
with the control of Australia's share in the war we will 
continue under the voluntary system to secure the services 
of every man fit and willing to proceed to the front.
However the first official, considered expression of doubts concerning 
Hughes' all or nothing approach can be detected:
[1] G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 
1901-1929.Melbourne, 1956. pp.157-8.
[2] N. Makin, Federal Labour Leaders Sydney 1961. p.70
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In doing this we shall not neglect the vital necessities 
of Australian home defence, including the extension of 
our ship building industry: and we shall assist Great 
Britain and her Allies by stimulating the production of 
food supplies and metals so essential to maintain an 
army in the field.
Recognition of the 1916 federal conference decisions was provided in 
other sections stressing the retention of Australian self-government 
and willingness to participate at the Imperial Conference provided 
that the Australian government be permitted to ratify any decisions 
there affecting it. [1]
A hint concerning the slightly cooler tone towards 
participation was contained in one particular allusion to a theme 
established during the conscription debates:
Recent developments in aerial and submarine warfare 
indicate the perils which would threaten this continent 
if a potential enemy were permitted to acquire or 
resume sovereignty of the islands adjacent to Australia.
In enemy control the islands would furnish numerous bases 
of operation for incessant raids on our coasts. [ 2]
This oblique reference to Australia's position in the Pacific was 
supplemented in a remark by the cautious Tudor on the subject of 
tariff protection given during the actual policy speech at Richmond 
at the end of the month. ’Germany is driven out of the market place 
pro tern, and another progressive nation has taken its place*. [3]
Such statements, though, received far less prominence than their 
importance in the actual decision-making on compulsory service the 
previous year merited and provided the only real attempt to air at 
the highest public level the matters of substance determining 
Australian policy obscured at that time by claims of secrecy and national
[1] Daily Post 28 March, 1917*
[2] Ibid.
[3] Labor Call 5 April, 1917.
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interest. Tudor's no doubt prudent failure to place them on the agenda of 
open discussion ensured that anti-Japanese suspicions were confined, with 
anti-war feeling, to covert debate within certain sections of the party, 
to culminate in powerful form by mid-1918.
Federal PLP authority in defence and foreign policy fields was 
tenuous and almost wholly defensive during this period, responding to 
pressures from below - in the caucus itself and from the 
state parties. Within the FPLP Tudor's role as an initiator came to be 
almost totally eclipsed by the party's new secretary, J.H. Catts, [1] 
whose position and ex-officio membership of all caucus committees, including 
the Defence, Naval and Military Committee, now matched more closely the 
scope of his ambitions. Catts’ priorities in framing defence policy were 
in order, the threat of Japan, the running down of Australian industry 
and the welfare of soldiers, their dependants and returned servicemen. [2] 
His ideas on the third aspect were urged upon caucus and adopted after 
redrafting by the Defence Committee [3] and became Labor policy in the 
parliament. [4] Although the party had stuck by the 1917 election 
manifesto as the basis of its policy on the war and recruiting, [5] the 
adequacy of that position however was becoming increasingly dubious.
After the second conscription referendum in December, 1917 Catts took the 
opportunity of the first caucus meeting in the new year to move a 
notice of motion of signal importance for later party deliberations:
[1] Replacing Dave Watkins who retired for reasons of
ill health after the 1917 elections. FPLP 13 June, 1917.
[2] Ibid. 9 July, 1917.
[3] Ibid.10, 12, 19 July, 1917.
[4] Ibid. 26 July, 1917.
[5] In reply to representations from Victorian women 
socialists Ibid. Executive meeting 19 July, 2 August, 1917.
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1. That immediate measures should be taken to 
provide for military, naval and aerial defence 
in order to protect the freedom and safety of 
Australia.
2. That the requirements of Australia in manpower 
should be ascertained and met with respect to
(a) defence of Australia
(b) maintenance of Australian industry
(c) necessities of wealth production to meet 
our financial obligations arising out of 
the war - as the first duty of Australians 
to Australia.
3. That voluntary recruiting of soldiers to assist 
the United Kingdom be based upon the Party’s 
soldier and repatriation proposals and be subject 
to the foregoing Australian requirements. [1]
Formal debate on the Catts proposals was prevented by the high drama 
of an Opposition censure motion against Hughes, primarily over the 
Prime Minister's promise to resign on defeat of the referendum, in which 
Tudor turned in a stolid, pedestrian speech and clearly conceded debating 
honors on the Labor side to Catts who directly followed him. Taking full 
advantage of the opportunity the latter took upon himself the mantle of 
party spokesman and enunciated principles unblessed as yet with approval 
from any official quarter.
I repeat that Labor today stands where it did at the
beginning of the war -
1. For the maintenance of the public law of nations
2. For the honoring of publicly made treaties
3. For the liberty of and independence of small nations.
I set out Australian war aims in this way -
1. To help Great Britain in maintaining the publicly- 
declared objects for which she entered the war to 
the best of our ability, consistently with 
Australia's paramount and essential needs.
2. To bring about an enduring world peace on terms of 
equity and justice for all mankind. [2]
[1] Ibid. 3 January, 1918.
[2 ] CPD 88. 15 January, 1918, p. 2957.
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Two themes in particular were stressed as the most cogent reasons for 
Labor’s position:
You cannot expect us to give you assistance when we find that, 
for your party purposes, you are taking advantage of the war to 
smash the Labor organisation ... I am for Australia first... 
The curse of this country has been that a number of men 
imported from overseas are more concerned about giving a little 
assistance to Great Britain at great disadvantage to Australia 
then in caring what becomes of Australia in the future, [l]
It was clear that Catts' role in federal caucus at this time was a 
leading one, far surpassing that of the titular leadership in development 
of policy initiatives and depended upon their aptness in an increasingly 
radical climate of opinion rather than his personal following or official 
position. Even more obvious was this climate within the state parties, 
where the time was increasingly ripe for severe questioning of Australian 
participation in the war and the form and level of any future commitment, 
having regard to purely domestic material and strategic interests as an 
Asian - Pacific country within the British Empire. However much this 
pressure from below corresponded with the democratic rank and file myth 
of party operation, it was something very different to what had been estab­
lished as the norm in practice.
Illustrative of the impotence of the federal leader and his 
state party counterparts is the episode of the Governor-General’s conference 
on recruiting. By early 1918 the war effort in Australia had flagged 
considerably. The nation had been subjected to yet another bitterly 
divisive campaign over introduction of conscription, war weariness and 
disillusionment were growing and recruiting figures were correspondingly 
low. Considerable ingenuity had been employed in attracting volunteers, 
ranging from the subtle to the crudely coercive but lack of results led 
some observers, including Donald Mackinnon, the Commonwealth Director 
General of Recruiting in a report dated 7 February 1918, to blame the 
Government’s credibility gap and the antagonistic political climate. [2]
[1] Ibid, p.2973
[2] Scott,Australia During the War pp. 440-443.
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Mackinnon, although a Liberal cabinet member of the Victorian 
government who had been elevated to his federal position in late 1916 after 
competent handling of that state’s recruiting effort, possessed a patient 
and conciliatory spirit and in private probably deplored the confrontationist 
tactics of Hughes and his supporters. Mackinnon had revealed a willingness 
to listen to grievances and courted the support of all sections in the 
community, most Labor leaders regarding him as ’fair-minded and impartial’.[1] 
When Captain A.C. Carmichael - former Holman Labor government minister who 
enlisted in 1915 and returned to become an enthusiastic recruiter - 
approached Mackinnon suggesting an all-party conference to attempt to forge 
a common approach to the recruiting drive, he found the latter to have 
been pondering a similar initiative.
At first Mackinnon moved cautiously, testing the idea with
Hughes and Labor leaders such as Tudor and Ryan as well as influential
caucus figures like J.H. Catts. Labor’s response was unenthusiastic but
not unfavorable, so Carmichael was sent to approach the Governor-General,
Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson (later Lord Novar) as a figure of sufficiently
neutral prestige to convene such a meeting and so avoid the odium which
2would have inevitably attached to Nationalist government sponsorship. 
Officially neutral, the British aristocrat Munro-Ferguson possessed atti­
tudes appropriate to his class and, being a forceful individual, definite 
sympathies coinciding with his vice-regal duties leading to a close 
relationship with Hughes, whom he alternately praised as being the only 
political figure capable of sustaining Australian support for the Imperial 
cause, and despaired of for his willful and combative style and generally 
erratic performance. He had neither understanding for nor tolerance of 
what he characterised as Labor’s obnoxious caucus system of operation. [3]
[1] Report of Alex. McCallum, general secretary of the 
Western Australian ALF. Minutes ALF state executive 
21 April, 1918.
[2] Daily Standard 4 April, 1918. Tudor had been approached, 
by Carmichael on 23 March. Minutes of Proceedings at the 
Conference summoned by the Governor-General on the subject 
of securing Reinforcements by Voluntary enlistment for 
the AIF. Melbourne, April 1918. CPP Session 1917-18 Vol. 
IV.p.54. Hereafter cited as Proceedings.
[3] Munro-Ferguson - Bonar Law 11 June, 1915. Novar papers 
696/720-1 and 13 July, 1915 696/729 - 30.
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Munro-Ferguson enthusiastically pressed the suggestion on Hughes,who 
agreed to the proposal at a time when the last great German offensive 
of the war had just begun. Invitations were sent to leaders of all 
parties in every state and to employer and working class organisations to 
assemble in Melbourne to consider the Imperial appeal for more men, 'and 
thereafter to endeavour to reach unanimity in favour of common policy 
in which all will cooperate in a supreme effort to provide adequate 
reinforcements for Australian Imperial Forces', [l] Accordingly, some 
40 delegates gathered at Parliament House, Melbourne from 12 - 19 
April. All state Labor branches were represented though their response 
was neither concordant or enthusiastic.
Tudor and his deputy Albert Gardiner,obtained caucus endorse­
ment of their acceptance only the day before conference, over the objections 
of Catts who wanted pre-established conditions to prevent stage-management 
of the conference so as to compromise the party. [2] The majority 
deferred to the wishes of their leaders, [3] but did instruct caucus 
executive to draw up a list of of objectionable matters regarded as hindr­
ances to recruiting (see below). In NSW Storey was happy to attend as 
state Labor leader, W.H. Lambert representing state executive only after 
a majority vote to that effect, [4] while Morby attended as Sydney Labor 
Council president on the decision of its executive. [5] From Queensland, 
T.J. Ryan and W.H. Demaine received approval from cabinet and state 
executive respectively but the Brisbane Industrial Council refused to 
attend any function for the facilitating of recruitment. The BIC had 
become increasingly radical on the issue of the war, stimulated by the 1917 
referendum victory and the example of British Labour Party - TUC 
decisions in favor of negotiations. [6] it had developed a close
[1] Minutes ALF state executive 8 April, 1918.
[2] Daily Telegraph 4 April, 1918.
[3] FPLP 11 April, 1918.
[4] Molesworth, Material concerning the Industrial Section pp.1-6
[5] Minutes Executive Committee, Sydney Labor Council 9 
April, 1918.
[6] Daily Standard 4 Januaiy , 1918.
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relationship with the local branch of the Australian Peace Alliance, [1] 
which had increased its influence over local unions by a policy of 
permeation. [2] Following the 1918 Peace Alliance conference in 
Sydney R.S. Ross, VSP organiser and a chief speaker at the conference, 
made a trip to Brisbane and was present at the BIC meeting which con­
sidered the Governor-General's invitation on 10 April and at which an 
A.M.I.E.U. resolution declaring the search for a negotiated peace to 
be more important than recruiting was carried. [3]
Much the same representation resulted from Victoria. George 
Elmslie appeared for the PLP and J.H. Scullin the state executive, but the 
Melbourne THG rejected by 62 - 46 votes a recommendation from its 
executive that a representative be sent. [4] Elsewhere, the shortness 
of notice provided lent a fortuitous haste to the decision on attendance: 
from Adelaide a delegation of J. Jelley (PLP), Frank Lundie (state 
executive), and J.D. Williams (president of the United TLC) left with 
the concurrence of their executives only. Western Australia was 
represented by Collier of the PLP, ALF president P.J. O'Loghlen and 
general secretary McCallum after hasty approval given by the executive 
officers at a meeting convened at 11 a.m. on 8 April; later that 
evening the full executive met and revoked that decision, declaring that 
the leaders should not have accepted, although refraining from 
actually ordering them to break off their mission midway across the 
Nullabor. [5] Lyons was the sole Tasmanian Labor representative, on 
behalf of the PLP and executive, but was personally opposed to active 
recruiting; Hobart unions were hostile both to attendance and the sending 
of more recruits overseas. [6]
[1] Ibid. 18 January, 1918.
[2] Ibid.21 January, 9 February, 1918.
[3] Ibid. 12 April, 1918.
[4] The unusual procedure of recording the division was 
adopted. THC Minutes 11 April, 1918.
[5] Minutes ALP state executive, 8 April, 1918.
[6] Scott, Australia During the War p.447.
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Nor did this nevertheless widely representative selection of 
Labor leaders go without instructions from their organisations. The 
FPLP had met on 11 April and on the urgings of Catts appointed the 
executive - Tudor, Gardiner, W.G. Higgs, Mathew Charlton and Catts 
himself - to draft a statement on Labor's attitude to recruiting. After 
deliberating all day the executive reported that evening with an 
eleven-point list of 'matters requiring attention as a preliminary 
to securing national unity and the cooperation of all classes to help 
Britain', framed upon terms formulated by Catts the previous year in 
relation to soldier and repatriation policy and early in the new year 
in regard to the broad issues of war and recruiting attitudes. Considine 
moved that the party 'have nothing to do with recruiting while the 
present Government is in power', surprisingly being seconded by 
Gardiner, but this was defeated and after exclusion of extraneous 
matters the report was adopted by caucus, an important statement of 
Labor's concerns at this stage of the war. It proposed:
1. Restoration of the status, of which they have been 
deprived, of deregistered unions, restoration to 
their employment of victimised unionists, abolition
of bogus unions and bureaux for the employment of scab 
labor. In other words, the restoration of unions 
and unionists to the position occupied at, and prior 
to, the first conscription campaign in 1916.
2. Repeal of all War Precautions Regulations not vital 
to the conduct of the war.
Abolition of press censorship and limitations on 
free speech, except as relating to military 
news of value to the enemy. Cessation of politi­
cal and industrial prosecutions under the War 
Precautions Act and refund of fines and cash in 
connection with all political prosecutions 
prior to this date.
3. Adoption of Labor's Soldier and Pension policy.
4. Adoption of Labor's Repatriation policy.
5. Cost of living - genuine regulation of prices.
6. Definite and unambiguous statement of Australia's 
war aims.
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7. The requirements of Australia in manpower to be 
ascertained and met with respect to
(a) Defence of Australia
(b) Maintenance of Australian production, commerce 
and industry as the first duty of Australians 
to Australia.
8. No compulsion, military or economic, upon any Australian 
citizen. [1]
Other Labor organisations also laid down guidelines for their 
delegates which, although arrived at independently, demonstrate a 
similarity to the FPLP statement attesting to the widespread currency of 
such pre-occupations. In particular South Australian Labor had presented 
an almost identical statement to Mackinnon personally when he had 
attended a state council meeting earlier that year, [2] and state 
executive instructed Lundie to present these again with certain additions 
to the Melbourne conference. [3] Similar suggestions were made by the 
officers of the Western Australian executive, [4] and were also 
reflected in remarks by AWU kingmaker in NSW, Jack Bailey. [5]
Taken together, the conference records, in the words of one delegate, 
’contain practically the whole of the salient features of the Labor 
organisation's case against the governing powers of the continent'. [6] 
Furthermore, these Labor delegates were far from representing the most 
radical elements in the movement; nine of the sixteen Labor men were 
parliamentarians, and the radicals may have been able to insist upon 
more intransigent conditions had more time been available. Refusals of 
participation from Brisbane, Melbourne and Hobart unionists, declarations
[1] FPLP evening session 11 April, 1918.
[2] Executive minutes, ULP Council 14 February, 1918.
[3] Executive report ibid.11 April, 1918.
[4] Minutes ALF state executive 8 April, 1918.
[5] Age 9 April, 1918.
[6] Report by A. McCallum op.cit.
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by the BIC and Hobart TLC against sending of any further reinforce­
ments overseas - which a significant minority of the moderate Western 
Australian executive were disposed to support [l] - are all indica­
tions of the advanced state of disillusionment with the war.
Even as the Labor representatives arrived in Melbourne it was 
clear that they would be outnumbered by Nationalist politicians and 
employers by some six or seven votes. Only four hours before the opening 
session of conference the federal leader convened a Labor caucus of 
delegates to reveal his forebodings.
Mr. Tudor expressed his firm conviction that the 
Conference was a trap, and that the Commonwealth Government 
was behind the convening of it, and that the desire of the 
Commonwealth Government was that the Labor organisations 
would refuse to accept the invitation and give the 
Government an opportunity of making political capital of 
such action throughout Australia. [2]
General discussion ensued with Gardiner eventually moving that notwith­
standing the late hour, the Labor side should withdraw; however the 
embarrassment occasioned by such refusal seemed to be almost as bad. 
Finally the meeting decided to maintain a firm insistence on keeping 
the proceedings open and on the public record, avoiding secret sessions 
or private deliberations to minimise the likelihood of being compromised 
with their organisations and the electorate at large. Discussion of the 
FPLP statement took place until debate was overtaken by the opening 
ceremony. Punctually at 2.30 p.m. on 12 April Munro-Ferguson welcomed 
the delegates, stressing in his opening address the critical situation 
in France and delicately observing that Australia was suffering ’a 
discrepancy between her will power and her man power'. [3] Conference 
had been convened to eliminate this discrepancy and the Governor- 
General suggested adoption of a resolution of his own devising announcing 
readiness to 'consider impartially and with all good will' such propo­
sals for voluntary reinforcement as might be made. His Excellency 
then retired. Mackinnon was elected chairman and a press committee 
comprising the latter, Minister for Repatriation Senator Millen and 
Tudor was elected to supervise official releases - Labor's proposal 
for full press access being defeated by the other side.
[1] Minutes ALF state executive 15 April, 1918.
[2] Report by A. McCallum op.cit.
[3] Proceedings, p.4.
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Munro-Ferguson had desired a carte blanche to be given 
for such proposals as the government thought necessary,whereas Labor 
adopted the tactics of avoiding any early commitment and drawing firm, 
detailed proposals from the government. With Hughes ill in bed it was 
left to R.B. Orchard, newly appointed Minister for Recruiting, to 
propose on the second day a scheme involving voluntary submission of 
names by eligibles to a ballot for raising the necessary numbers. [1] 
Labor considered this totally unsatisfactory and desired the opportunity 
to present their grievances; on the other hand they did not wish to be 
seen striking a bargain of support for renewed recruiting in return 
for concessions, a stand both morally crude and impracticable insofar 
as no delegate felt confident in committing his organisation to any 
specific scheme for which he held no mandate. On the same day then 
as the Orchard proposal, Tudor presented a five point summation of the 
FPLP statement as an indication of obstacles to further recruiting 
success. [2] If these were surmounted, he argued, Australian society 
would revert to the tranquil state productive of the desired cooperation> 
such as had existed before introduction of the apple of discord 
conscription - 'fear and dread' of which even now hung over the 
community. [3] Tudor studiously avoided giving any undertakings, lack 
of which became the principle stumbling block at the conference, 
exemplified in the following exchange between him and W.A. Holman:
Mr. Holman - Supposing they (Labor's five demands) are done, 
what then?
Mr. Tudor - You will get the harmony that you have not got today
The thing becomes automatic once you get harmony in the 
community.
And later with Queensland National Political Council president:
Mr. Pritchard - If these things were removed, would you be prepared
to give any guarantee of more satisfactory results? 
Mr. Tudor - How can I give you any more guarantee than you can?
I said at the outset that every one of us could only
[3.] Ibid. pp.11-16.
[2] Ibid.' p. 17
[3] Ibid, p.19.
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speak for himself ... This conference was called 
to try to obtain harmony, and I am pointing out 
reasons why, in our opinion, harmony does not exist 
today. [1]
The conference can be said to have effectively foundered upon this 
point, the Nationalist side requiring guarantees of Labor leaders’ 
support of the new recruitment proposals in return for concessions, 
while Labor denied any interest in striking a bargain because they 
dared not make promises which internal party conditions could prevent 
them honoring. Conference adjourned over Sunday with no further 
progress from this position.
The Governor- General was displeased at this turn of events, 
rather unfairly blaming Mackinnon for letting debate drift into stale­
mate, [2] and wrote to Hughes observing with a note of asperity that 
agreement on the recruiting scheme should have been established first.
A serious tactical error had been made; ’Our whole effort should be
to get a promising recruiting scheme - and then let the onus of the 
collapse of the conference rest upon those who, having agreed to it, 
refuse for party reasons to support it'. He advised Hughes to present 
the scheme before conference again next day and, if failing to recapture 
the initiative, ’then the Conference cannot too soon be brought to a 
close. [3] Lacking fresh proposals to make, the Liberal party 
leader and coalition partner Sir Joseph Cook attempted on the Monday to 
sidetrack the bargaining into a joint committee. Labor refused and 
later that day Hughes made his first appearance, reading a statement 
strongly denying the alleged responsibility of his government for 
inhibiting recruiting and placing the onus for deadlock upon Labor for 
unpatriotic bargaining. Shrewdly, Hughes sought to create the impression 
of a government being forced to make undeserved concessions and he 
finished by moving that a committee of seven per side be formed for 
hammering out a deal. [4] Jelley, South Australian PLP leader,
[1] Ibid.pp.19 - 20
[2] Munro-Ferguson - Walter Long 22 April, 1918 Novar papers 
696/1025/7
[3] Munro-Ferguson - Hughes 14 April, 1918 Ibid.696/1030
[4] Proceedings pp. 50-1
175
immediately countered with the demand for a public airing of grievances, 
instead of a covert backroom operation. Ryan and Tudor vigorously 
responded also - they had attended expecting a spirit of free 
enquiry into the reasons for low voluntary recruiting and accused the 
government of using the occasion as a political ploy; discussion became 
heated:
Mr. Hughes - ... when you have gone back to your organisations and
said ’Gentlemen, if you will give that cooperation 
complete and cordial that the Commonwealth and State 
Governments require, then all these things to which you 
are now taking exception, all these hindrances will be 
swept away'. We say, 'Give us this cordial cooperation 
and all these things shall be added unto you'.
Mr. Ryan - And we say, 'Give us all these things and you will get 
cooperation automatically'.
Mr. Storey - The position put by Mr. Hughes is the reverse of that 
which we have put. We say that we will do certain 
things if you will give us some sort of guarantee'.[1]
On the afternoon of 16 April, after further fruitless debate, 
in which Hughes demanded - quite impossibly - pro-recruiting resolu­
tions as earnests of good faith from such bodies as the NSW state 
executive and Sydney Labor Council, he presented an offer agreed upon 
by the non-Labor side in private conclave which addressed most of 
Tudor's grievances. [2] Labor would not be denied however and, by 
insisting upon consideration of Hughes' proposals seriatim, converted
[1] Ibid, p. 56
[2] Ibid, p. 71
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conference proceedings into a general grievance debate lasting for 
three days, in which delegates embarked upon an epic presentation of 
all that they found wrong with pursuit of the war effort. All the 
Prime Minister's concessions were probed, clarified and eventually accep­
ted, including an equivocal undertaking extracted painfully from Hughes 
not to resort to conscription. Having suffered this Hughes indicated 
on the last day of conference the payoff he expected: in return only
for his 'expressed willingness' to remedy grievances, he demanded a 
pledge from Labor leaders in the form of a resolution promising
firstly, their full personal cooperation and, secondly, the 
most strenuous exertion possible of their influence with the 
... organisations they respectively represent, to ensure an 
immediate and continuing increase in Australian recruiting 
on a voluntary basis. [1]
This was unacceptable to Labor, union leaders Morby and McCallum having 
stated bluntly that their organisations would laugh at them for 
acceptance of verbal undertakings from Hughes. Tudor consulted his 
colleagues over a short adjournment and presented a milder, non-committal 
motion, 'That this conference, meeting at a time of unparalleled 
emergency, resolves to make all possible effort to avert defeat at the 
hands of German militarism, and to secure an honourable and lasting 
peace.' [2] Hughes and Holman held out for definite undertakings, then 
a compromise was suggested by Victorian Nationalist Premier H.S.W. Lawson, 
and seconded by Collier, pledging whole hearted support for voluntarism. 
[3] Gardiner suggested a further amendment drafted by Victorian PLP 
leader George Elmslie avowing conference decisions to be productive of 
harmony and urging support for recruiting, a stronger formulation than 
the Lawson amendment. However Scullin objected that adoption of 
Gardiner's suggestion with amendments Hughes wanted added proclaimed a 
whole bargaining process and was less than honest in speaking of unity 
of opinion - fWe have not secured anything like what we were wishing
[1] Ibid, p.159
[2] Ibid.p. 161
[3] Ibid. p.163
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to obtain’. With bad grace the Lawson amendment was carried:
That this Conference, meeting at a time of unparalleled 
emergency, resolves to make all possible efforts to avert 
defeat at the hands of German militarism and urges the people 
of Australia to unite in a whole hearted effort to secure 
the necessary reinforcements under the voluntary system. [l]
Although agreed to unanimously for the sake of form, the measure of 
failure of the conference was indicated by the recording in the officially 
released summary of proceedings Hughes’ and Holman’s expressions 
of 'regret and disappointment' at the outcome. [2]
In terms of its stated objectives the recruiting conference 
was a failure; a temporary influx of recruits took place in May, but it 
was arguable whether this had been encouraged by the negotiations, news 
of battle losses or the departure of Hughes for England. [3] It 
failed to the same extent that Australian society was divided, all 
delegates returning to their respective states and organisations and 
charging the other side with responsibility for implementation of the 
terms of the disguised bargain as a pre-condition of their own compliance. 
Even where Nationalist authorities proved cooperative it was quite another 
thing to remedy at a stroke all the ills of which Labor had complained. [4] 
Labor leaders supporting recruiting such as Storey and Ryan continued to 
meet humiliations at the hands of win-the-war fanatics on the public 
platform and the inflow of volunteers remained small. The conference 
exhausted the last reserves of good faith and trust in cooperation 
between the parties.
[1] Ibid, p. 164
[2] Summary of Proceedings, Ibid, p. VI.
[3] Munro-Ferguson - Long 18 June, 1918 op.cit.696/1046;
L.L. Robson,The First AIF: A Study of its Recruitment, 
1914-1918. Melbourne, 1970 pp.192-3.
[4] For example, the vain attempt by NSW Minister for Labor, 
G.S. Beeby, to have the arbitration court re-register 
fifteen unions struck off on his own applications at 
the time of the 1917 strikes. A.W.16, 23 May, 1918.
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Major effect upon the Labor movement generally was the 
marking of a shift from unenthusiastic support for the war to growing 
demands for withdrawal. Above all, the salient point which 
emerged was the attitude of the unions towards supporting the war 
effort; Brisbane, Melbourne and Hobart had refused to participate at all 
in the conference and only two union representatives did attend, Morby 
from NSW and Williams from Adelaide. When they returned it was to an 
unequivocal reception - consideration of Morly’s report by the Sydney 
Labor Council furnished the issue which the socialist left under Judd 
required to defeat the moderate, craft-based leadership. In a move 
engineered by Judd Council endorsed a resolution cataloguing the by 
then familiar complaints and condemnations of the war and concluding:
we refuse to take part in any recruiting campaign and 
call upon the workers of this and all other belligerent coun­
tries to urge their respective Governments to immediately 
secure an armistice on all Fronts, and initiate 
negotiations for peace. [1]
When Williams returned, his executive barely escaped censure for permit­
ting his attendance at all, [2] and the TLC refused even to receive 
his report, much less debate it. [3] More than any other single 
event then, the recruiting conference revealed an almost total lack of 
enthusiasm for the war amongst organised Labor and a strong opposition 
by some influential elements to continued support for it. Such attitudes 
had spread to the FPLP itself, as revealed by the caucus statement on 
conditions for re-establishing social harmony in Australia, which 
concentrated upon social justice at home and domestic defence. The 
authority wielded by J.C. Watson or W.M. Hughes as federal Labor leaders 
in determining policy had vanished: instead the most influential figures
had proved to be Catts and T.J. Ryan - the one a non-charismatic 
figure who nevertheless remained the only original thinker in caucus, the 
other emerging with enhanced stature and great popularity as a firm,
I
[1] Minutes, Sydney Labor Council 2 April, 9, 16, 30 
May, 1918. See appendix.
Minutes, United TLC 18 April, 3 May 1918,[2]
[3] Ibid. 17 May, 1918.
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moderate leader of immense capacity. In fact, in the aftermath of the 
conference comment within both the party and the general public specula­
ting on a replacement of Tudor by Ryan was such that the FPLP felt 
obliged to have Tudor issue an official disclaimer. [1] Catts’ 
policies and Ryan's prestige as a leader became henceforth the 
critical factors in the struggle over defence and war policy planks 
at the Perth ALP conference in June. Despite its failure then, 
the recruiting conference was an important bench-mark in the 
development of the party's policies and abundantly revealed the loss of 
initiative by the traditional innovators in these special areas.
It remained to be seen how much this loss could be exploited by 
radicals in the state parties at the forthcoming federal ALP conference.
The agitation for peace, 1917
During 1917 the process began which was to change Labor 
policy in perceptible stages from simple anti-conscription to 
opposition to the war itself. Except for fringe left-wing groups and 
pacifist sects no position on the war had been advanced beyond support 
for Great Britain as stressed by federal Labor politicians at the 
elections in May. First significant departure from vague general support 
of a negotiated peace occurred at the NSW state Labor conference in June, 
1917 and the lead given on this occasion met with such gratifying 
responses from other Labor parties as to encourage ambitious and far 
more radical pressure on Labor war policy in the following year. In 
both instances the initiatives came from the NSW party,where the 
instability of 1916 had wrought changes going far beyond those in all 
other states,and can only be traced against the background of the 
changing alignment of forces in that party.
After their victory over the politicians in 1916, and 
tempered by Labor electoral defeats by the Nationalist coalition under 
Holman in March and Hughes in May,the Industrial Section was far less 
prominent in 1917, meeting only monthly at Macdonnel House and not 
recapturing momentum until the second conscription referendum at year's 
end. Lack of really major questions which the state executive could
[1] FPLP 9 May, 1918.
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not satisfactorily handle permitted the executive an independence from 
Section control which was substantial and the principle talent from 
1916 transferred to the state executive or to parliament after the 
conscription purge. No specific war-related proposals appear to have 
been thrown up by the Section during the split, though it was 
alleged that in late December, 1916 state executive had passed a reso­
lution by a large majority opposing participation by PLL branches or 
parliamentarians in the voluntary recruiting camapigns. Author of 
these charges was an executive member and former Sydney Labor Council 
president W. Cahill, who announced his resignation over the matter and 
made disclosures to the press. [1] Executive spokesmen denied the 
story in its entirety and sought to discredit Cahill as a malcontent, 
who had been equivocal on conscription and was merely looking for an issue on 
which to leave. Labor policy, it was emphasised, left participation in 
or support for the recruiting campaign entirely up to individual members 
and did not seek to direct them on it; [2] certainly NSW state 
and federal parliamentarians took part in some of the recruiting which 
followed, but the matter remained highly contentious.
Under moderate craft union-based leadership the Sydney Labor 
Council was quiescent and the AWU contented itself at its annual 
federal meeting with reiterating opposition to conscription. [3]
Nevertheless domestic dissatisfactions were building up in a prelude to 
that great socio-political upheaval, the 1917 great strike, [4] 
whose climate was favorable to growth of a more radical attitude to 
the war. In shaping that hostility lay the chief contribution of external 
pressure groups.
[1] Register 22 December, 1916.
[2] Westralian Worker, 12 January, 1917.
[3] Official Report AWU Congress 23 January - 7 February, 
1917 pp. 62-3.
[4] Dan Coward, ’Crime and Punishment: the Great Strike in 
New South Wales, August to October, 1917’. in
J. Iremonger and others (eds.) Strikes Sydney, 1973.
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Best organised and most important peace group to emerge 
in Australia during the war was- the Australian Peace Alliance, formed 
in Melbourne within months of the outbreak of the war and founded 
initially upon the hard core of the Australian Freedom League, an 
anti-militarist organisation opposing the compulsory military training 
scheme implemented by Labor and Liberal governments. The APA 
attracted primarily religious pacifists such as the Society of Friends, 
and assorted socialists, most notably members of the Victorian Socialist 
Party. [1] With branches in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland 
and South Australia,the success of the Alliance in the Labor move­
ment was uneven. A branch had been established in Sydney on the basis 
of a weak AFL chapter on 30 November, 1915 [2] and pursued a
chequered career as a pressure group. While Alliance policy was to 
appeal to as broad a section of society as possible to maximise 
support, it was obvious that its natural constituency lay in the Labor 
movement. This was recognised in its first platform-advocating 
termination of hostilities at the earliest possible moment and nego­
tiations aimed at abolishing the causes of war, which were seen as 
aggressive nationalism and imperialism and defective methods of 
forming and exercising foreign policy. Clause (d) of the document 
espoused an entrist strategy towards organised Labor in addition to the 
normal propagandist and educative measures, viz. 'The organisation 
of the trade unions and workers associations, with a definite view of 
ending war*.[3]
[1] Unfortunately APA records preserved by F.J. Riley, 
one time secretary of the Alliance in Victoria, and 
lodged in the Riley papers, NLA are closed to resear­
chers at the time of writing. Best single account based 
upon these sources is John Merritt's The Australian 
Peace Alliance, 1914-1922.Work-in-Progress paper, Depar 
ment of History RSSS at the ANU. 27 October, 1964. By 
permission of the author. Turner in Industrial Labor 
and Politics also had access to the collection while 
Jauncey in Conscription in Australia possessed the 
advantage of near contemporaneity with his subject.
[2] Ibid, p.120
[3] Australia and the Coming Peace: A constructive Policy 
by J.B. Howie for the Victorian APA Council. APA 
Pamphlet No.l. Melbourne, 1915. See appendix.
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However, the Sydney branch rejected this approach in a clash 
at the 1916 Easter conference of Alliance affiliates in Melbourne and 
broke away to promote a much simplified platform omitting reference to 
a specific appeal to Labor or to the effecting of an early negotiated 
peace. [1] Consequently, although affiliation by the Sydney Anti- 
Conscription League with the AUDC in late 1916 brought it ties with a 
number of radical union leaders, [2] it appears that no concerted 
effort was being made by the AUDC to influence the Labor party, a 
strategy only changing at the end of 1917. [3] Thus, although adoption 
of whole clauses from the original APA platform by the NSW Labor party 
in 1917 has been stressed as a direct consequence of Alliance agitation 
within the party; this seems doubtful, especially as the APA was in bad 
odour with the major Labor party executives at this stage. An APA 
federal conference had been scheduled for Easter, 1917 in Melbourne with 
as broad an appeal made as possible, but the Victorian state executive 
proscribed it as a threat to the party and the two Queensland delegates 
from the Anti-Conscription Campaign Committee, after a major row in that 
organisation in Brisbane, had their credentials withdrawn at the last 
moment and had to rely on proxy accreditation from another organisation. 
One of the Queensland delegates explained
[1] Jauncey, Conscription in Australia p. 136; Turner, 
Industrial Labour and Politics pp. 170-1.
[2] Minutes ACL 1 November, 1916; 21 February, 1917.
[3] See general-secretary’s report. General Meeting 
AUDC 18 June, 1918. It also marked a change of 
heart and platform in a decision to re-affiliate 
with the parent body as the NSW branch of the APA. 
A.W. 4 July, 1918.
t
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It was not only in Queensland but in every state, 
the Labor politicians with very few exceptions, were 
strongly opposed to any effort to agitate for peace...
The NSW politicians were particularly hostile and 
were in private communication with the Queensland 
politicians in their endeavours to kill the conference, [l]
Only a handful of unions and the Broken Hill AMA attended from the 
Labor movement and the conference passed a few general resolutions 
contributing nothing to the earlier platform. Paradoxically then, 
the Alliance had its major success in terms of acceptance of its 
platform by the Labor party at a time when it was in strong 
disfavor with the party executives over its operations. Undoubtedly 
familiarity with the APA platform as a lucid summarisation of the 
peace by negotiation school facilitated co-optation of significant 
portions of it by the Labor party but original additions and later 
fundamental divergences from the Alliance position significantly reduce 
the party’s debt to the APA. [2]
When the NSW Labor conference opened on 4 June, 1917 
a formal motion on the occasion of a British Labour Party - TUC 
conference resolution opened up the whole subject of Australian Labor’s 
attitude to the war. Albert Willis launched into a passionate denun­
ciation of the conflict and moved that a committee be set up to 
formulate recommendations on the matter, carried after an extended 
debate with only one dissentient voice. [3] Most prominent committee 
members were Willis himself and leading Industrial Section member,
Sam Rosa. While staunchly anti-conscription, Willis eschewed 
the socialist extremes of some of his colleagues, believing in more 
fundamental Christian-democratic values. [4] Rosa was Industrial 
Section president in 1917 and a most influential figure in that 
organisation. Australian b o m  but educated in London he had been an 
officer of the Social Democratic Federation of Great Britain at 18
[1] E.H. Lane. Dawn to Dusk pp. 177-9.
[2] Cf. Turner. Industrial Labour and Politics p.126.
[3] A^W. 7 June, 1917.
[4] I. Young, ’A.C. Willis, Welsh Nonconformist, and the 
Labor Party in New South Wales 1911-1933’. Journal 
of Religious History 2, 1962-3. pp.303-13.
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years of age and influenced by Hyndman and William Morris. After a 
spell in the Socialist Labor Party of America he had returned to 
Australia, helped organise the Social Democratic League in Melbourne, 
and after moving to Sydney aided organisation of the Australian Social­
ist League in 1890, becoming a colorful member and one-time president.
Rosa had become involved in Labor politics as the first Labor Electoral 
Leagues were founded but advanced no further until by the time of the 
war he was leader writer on Norton’s Sydney Truth and secured it as the 
only non-Labor anti-conscription paper in NSW. One of the original 
Industrial Section members, he had unluckily missed out in the rush for 
office created by the conscription purge after topping preselection 
for Hughes' seat of West Sydney, when he was disqualified for illegal 
canvassing. All his energies were then channeled through the 
Industrial Section. Another member of the committee, M. P. Considine, 
had been elected in May to the federal seat of Barrier, encompassing 
the militant stronghold of Broken Hill, and then regarded parliament 
with socialist scorn as a convenient platform. Two state Legislative 
Assembly men, T. D. Mutch and W. Davies, were of rather more moderate 
disposition and together with a Mrs. Locke Burns made up the rest of the 
committee. Arthur Rae was appointed secretary; he at least had known 
Peace Alliance sympathies though none appear to have had formal 
connections with that organisation.
On 8 June the committee report was circulated at conference 
in close secrecy to prevent press criticism. Rosa immediately moved 
that the debate be adjourned over the weekend to permit 'discussion within 
the movement', that is perusal by the Industrial Section. Both Willis 
and newly-elected PLP leader John Storey opposed direction from this 
quarter and debate was initiated straightaway. Though Storey and state 
vice-president Dave Guihen criticised the proposals as too radical, they 
were unable to muster support for an addendum to qualify the preamble by 
a declaration of staunch support for Britain and her Allies. By the 
end of the day the major clauses had won approval. Peace Alliance 
influence was obvious in the preamble attributing responsibility for 
the war to a system of capitalist production and demanding initiation 
of immediate negotiations to obtain equitable terms of peace.
There followed a nine-point program based upon APA demands:
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1. The right of small nations, including Ireland, to 
political independence.
2. That the European countries invaded during the 
present war be immediately evacuated and their 
future territorial integrity guaranteed - 
provided that the ownership of disputed territories 
shall be determined by a plebiscite of the inhabitants 
under the protection of an international commission.
This course would dispose of Alsace-Lorraine,
Poland and similar cases on the democratic principle 
that all just government must rest on the consent of 
governed.
3. That prior to the disbandment of the combatant 
armies they shall be utilised under international 
control for the restoration of the devastated 
territories at the expense of the invaders.
4. That where an amicable agreement cannot be reached
by the peace conference in regard to captured colonies 
and dependencies, such territories shall be placed 
provisionally under international control.
5. That the freedom of the seas be secured on the lines 
laid down by President Wilson of America in May,
1916 where he advocated ’A universal association of 
the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the 
highway of the seas for the common and unhindered 
use of all the nations of the world’.
6. The abolition of trading in armaments and the prohi­
bition of private manufacture thereof.
7. The abolition'of conscription in all countries 
simultaneously.
8. The control of foreignrrelations under a democratic 
system based upon publicity, in lieu of the present 
methods of secret diplomacy.
9. That the existing machinery for international arbitra­
tion be expanded to embrace a Concert of Europe, 
ultimately merging into a world-wide Parliament as 
advocated by President Wilson in a recent message to the 
American Congress. [1]
[1] S .M.Ü. 11, 12 June, 1917. See appendix for full text 
of peace plank as adopted in enlarged form at ALP 
federal conference, 1918.
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Ireland found many champions during the debate, resulting in 
the specific reference in point one. Significantly, inclusion of the 
other British colonies, such as Egypt and India, under this demand was 
rejected, one committee member alluding to the 'immense colored race 
problem that would arise' should such an ambitious scope be accepted.
The proposals were endorsed in toto on 11 June after the weekend break 
during which it appears no attempt was made by the industrialists to 
upset them, and it was determined to disseminate the plank amongst the 
other Labor parties and abroad. [1] In content it reflected the 
prevailing current of opinion within large sections of the movement, 
drawing freely from the same sources which had already influenced the 
Peace Alliance and other socialist bodies generally. Most notably, the 
plank drew for its specific recommendations upon the program of the 
British Union of Democratic Control, [2] but also from current European 
Marxist thinking on the war, as represented by the Zimmerwald conference 
declaration of anti-war sociiists, from the idealistic internationalism 
addressed by Woodrow Wilson, and specifically Australian features such 
as anti-conscriptionism and anti-imperialism in its Irish context.
Within twelve months, a slightly expanded version had won unanimous 
endorsement from all other bodies making up the ALP and was referred by 
the federal executive officers to the British Labour party later in 1917 
as representing ALP policy on the war. [3]
[1] Ibid. 11, 12, 20 June, 1917.
[2] This organisation in the United Kingdom was to exercise a 
powerful influence there, being founded by disaffected 
Liberals primarily, but obtaining its greatest mass support 
from the British Labour party. At the end of 1917 the UDC 
had its program adopted virtually in its entirety by the 
Joint British Labour party - TUC conference. See the study 
by M. Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British 
Politics during the first World War. Oxford, 1971 and
P. Stansky (ed.) The Left and War: The British Labour Party 
and World War 1. O.U.P., 1969.
[3] Adopted by the Queensland executive, CPE Minutes 16 July,
1917, and state conference, Official Report Labor-in-Politic: 
Convention 31 January, 1918; with direct representations from 
Willis before the Victorian party, Official Report Victorian 
state conference 7-9 July, 1917 pp. 18-19; in Tasmania,
Minutes state executive 15 August, 1917; in South Australia, 
Minutes state conference 10 September, 1917; Western Australia, 
Minutes state executive 6 August, 1917; endorsed by the AWU, 
Official Report AWU National Congress 22 February, 1918
pp. 75-6; and finally, the ALP federal executive, Report of 
federal executive delegates, Minutes S.A. Council 9 August, 
1917.
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Until ratification .and further development by the ALP federal
conference in June, 1918 the NSW peace plank represented the consensus 
of Labor opinion on the war, being most obviously deficient in 
prescribing actual policies on recruiting and the Australian war effort 
generally. The efforts to repair this also stemmed from the NSW Labor 
party.
NSW Labor and recruiting, 1917.
When the second referendum on conscription took place 
the NSW party had been embittered by the severe reverses suffered in 
the great strike of August - October and its aftermath. In itself the 
strike phenomenon in the state was a crystallisation of material 
grievances and social fears and a high degree of class conscious mili­
tancy in the Labor movement which account for the readiness of 
support, breadth and duration of what amounted to a deep seated social 
conflict. Such a militant reaction in defence of ’trade unionism’ and 
other working class values suggests the reasons for susceptibility of 
the mass movement to radical policies on the war and Australian parti­
cipation articulated by opinion leading elites. Briefly, the activities 
of unionists in their work situation both encouraged and validated 
the class conflict ideology which became pervasive in the party 
during the war and in succeeding years. Given this atmosphere, 
reintroduction of the conscription issue in late 1917 was no surprise; 
socialists in the Sydney Labor Council having raised the possibility 
in mid-year; [1] a sub-committee was formed which reported to a 
joint meeting of Council and unaffiliated unions on 14 June and was 
accorded full powers to deal with the whole question should it 
revive. [2] Main fear was of imposition of conscription by regulation 
under Hughes' returned Nationalist government and a second referendum 
was not anticipated. [3] Chief participants in Labor’s December
[1] Minutes Sydney Labor Council 10, 31 May, 1917.
[2] Ibid.16 June, 1917.
[3] Statement by E.E. Judd ibid.5 July, 1917.
campaign were parliamentarians and the AWU, which by non-involvement 
in the strikes had retained its strength, [l] Once again though 
the state returned a substantial No majority:
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NSW Yes No
1916 356,805 474,544
1917 341,256 487,774
Certainly the strikes did not diminish the extent of mass 
discontent and the final year of the war saw a culmination of all the 
exasperations suffered in the preceding three years: in the Labor
party, focus for union and party rank and file unhappiness, this was 
manifested in the development of strong opposition to further support 
for the war itself. Dissatisfactions were general but by chance the 
first break occurred in the Labor Council at the instigation of the 
socialist left. Representatives from the NSW Labor movement on the 
Gove mor-General' s recruiting conference in early April, 1918 were 
PLP Leader John Storey, W.H. Lambert, the state president, and William 
Morby, president of the Labor Council. Whereas Lambert maintained 
neutrality, both Storey and Morby supported the voluntary effort to 
reinforce the A.I.F. and were faced upon their return with serious 
challenges on the issue. Morby reported to the Council on 2 May and 
was accompanied by Lambert and Rosa who recounted their suspicions of 
the federal government promises. Rosa warned delegates of the 
’reign of terror’ under the War Precautions Act and after loss of a 
motion by a narrow margin to hold the discussion in camera, counselled 
them against saying anything that could be construed as prejudicial
[1] Claims by Jack Bailey, however, in Information for 
Political and Industrial Students, loc.cit, that the 
AWU single-handedly defeated the referendum cannot be 
seriously entertained. More accurate was the observa­
tion of the General Secretary of the Western Australian 
A.L.F. who drew an unflattering picture of the post­
strike union movement in NSW and did not attribute 
the state result to Labor leadership at all: ’It is 
obvious from the most casual enquiry that conscrip­
tion was defeated from without, not from within'.
'Report by A. McCallum on the result of the strike in 
the Eastern States - arising out of the introduction 
of the Card System.’n.d. ALF State Executive correspon­
dence file 85: Reports - general.
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to recruiting by the authorities. [1] Nevertheless,when Council 
reconvened next week and Morby moved endorsement of the recruiting con­
ference resolution that all parties turn their energies to making 
recruiting a success, opposition was determined and vociferous.
Under the leadership of Socialist Labor Party member Ernie Judd the 
left circulated a statement condemning the war as a capitalist 
quarrel and all forms of militarism as contrary to working class inte­
rests, cQncluding defiantly that
Therefore, whilst fully expecting anti-Labor forces to 
misrepresent and calumniate our action, we refuse to take 
part in any recruiting campaign and call upon the workers 
of this and all other belligerent countries to urge 
their respective governments to immedicately secure an 
Armistice on all Fronts and initiate negotiations for 
peace. [2]
The whole second meeting was confined to arguments for and against
recruiting by Morby and Judd. [3j
Both Labor Council factions organised strenuously. At 
a following meeting the chairman ruled Judd's statement out of order 
as a direct negative to Morby's motion but the ruling was overturned, 
81 - 54 votes, the first crack in the moderate majority. [4] Judd 
sensed the critical moment and moved that Morby's motion be ruled out 
of order instead for conflicting with the Labor Council endorsement in
[1] Minutes Special Meeting Labor Council 2 May, 1918;
Sun 3 May, 1918. These inhibitions, perfectly 
justified in view of the liberal use of censorship 
provisions and wartime regulations, had the general 
effect of stifling debate in the movement and 
reducing much of it to elliptical or prevaricating 
public statements. Council records are laconic during 
this episode.
[2] See appendix for full text. Judd admitted to author­
ship a week later, Sun. 17 May, 1918. The circular was 
given a wide currency and prompted immediate action 
by the censor, Judd being prosecuted for both its 
contents and his supporting speeches.
[3] l£id. 16 May, 1918.
[43 Öne report blamed the attempt to rule out the amend­
ment for its victory by needlessly antagonising many 
in the middle ground. Sun. 17 May, 1918.
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January of the 1917 NSW peace proposals. Amid scenes of high disorder 
this retaliatory action was carried 79 - 75 and the Judd amendment 
became the motion. [1] Storey, who had attended each meeting hitherto 
as a visitor, chose this time to intervene but, given fifteen 
minutes to speak, he was forced to discontinue in a tumult of interjec­
tions and amidst general uproar Morby adjourned the meeting, leaving 
Judd and Boote to harangue the excited delegates. [2] Echoes of 
this dramatic turn resounded in following days in which at least 
one delegate resigned and a schism was foreshadowed. [3] Both 
sides openly marshalled their forces for the next meeting and a small 
group led by McGrath of the Printing Industry Employees began organis­
ation of a new industrial representative body. The arguments supporting 
the Morby case for trusting the government were not assisted moreover 
when Justice Heydon of the state arbitration court, after consultation 
with his learned colleagues, rejected Holman’s promised application 
to cancel deregistration of certain unions for participation in the 
1917 strikes. [4] One attempt at compromise nevertheless was 
heralded when the Electrical Trades Union announced it would submit 
an amendment proclaiming that it was necessary to support the war* at 
least until the Central Powers evinced a sincere desire to negotiate. 
While rejecting win-the-war patriots, it equally condemned peace-at-any- 
price fanatics and although disparaging the Governor-General’s 
conference as a political trick, endorsed the agreement reached there 
and made further suggestions which it was hoped would facilitate 
recruiting. [5] Undoubtedly this position stood a good chance of 
attracting the middle ground between the Mofby/Judd extremes but it 
was not to be given a chance.
[1] Minutes Special Meeting Labor Council 16 May, 1918.
[2] Sun 17 May, 1918.
[3] Ibid.19, 20 May, 1918.
[4] Ibid. 21 May, 1918.
[5] Ibid.
191
One day before the next scheduled Council meeting the 
executive of the Municipal Employees’ Union in collusion with Morby 
withdrew Judd’s credential and presented him with his clearance on very 
dubious charges pertaining to administrative activities. Morby then 
imposed strict door control procedures to ensure that Judd was kept out. 
It was a cheap shot of personal antagonism which must only have alien­
ated many moderates and did nothing to assuage the serious doubts of 
the delegates which the radicals were addressing. It failed, Judd 
arriving with impeccable timing a few minutes before opening of the 
23 May meeting with a credential from a sympathetic union, [1] where­
upon Morby flung open the meeting to visitors and used the resulting 
uproar to declare the meeting adjourned. Many delegates remained 
after Morby swept out and Judd seized control of the meeting: a chairman 
was elected and Judd explained the manoeuvre against him as a plot 
assisted with advice from the Premier's office. An attempt to roll 
the entire executive was headed off by the acting-secretary, J.S. ’Jock’ 
Garden, on the grounds of its uncertain legality and the proximity in 
any case of the annual elections next month. This meeting was then 
adjourned, still without a vote on the anti-recruiting motion. [2] 
Executive ruled that the 30 May meeting would be closed and strictly 
controlled, [3} and on its eve the Judd faction held a rally of 
supporters addressed by Judd himself, Henry Boote and Arthur Rae. [A] 
Their hard core opponents gave up the cause and some broke away to 
form a provisionally titled Labour Federation of NSW, [5] which rem­
ained small and was quickly seen as insignificant: Morby himself
chose to remain within the Council.
On this issue the radicals had the numbers,a further attempt 
at compromise charging the governments and employers with responsibility 
for creating conditions conducive to voluntary recruiting was defeated 
93 - 79 and Judd's motion was carried 101 - 75. [6] While the size
[1] The Miscellaneous Workers A.W.6, 13 June, 1918.
[2] Sun 24 May; A.W.30 May, 1918. No official record of 
the meeting exists in Council minutes.
[3] Sun 29 May, 1918.
[4] A.W. 6 June, 1918.
[5] Sun 25, 27 May, 1918.
[6] Minutes Special Meeting Labor Council 30 May, 1918.
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of the minority in favor of the compromise is noteworthy, Morby's 
tactics probably largely prejudiced his case with the undecided element.
An immediate outcome was disaffiliation by the Newcastle TLC and defeat 
of Morby by Garden for the position of Labor Council secretary in a 97 - 44 
vote. [1] By standing his ground however Morby succeeded in beating 
the AWU outsider Jack Bailey for the presidency of Council by 74 - 65 
later in the year, [2] although only at the expense of appearing alongside 
such as Willis, Rae, Garden and Judd as a supporter of the One Big 
Union. [3] An attempt by Judd to expel Morby from office over adminis­
trative malfeasance failed badly. [4] Doubtless,antagonism between 
craft unions and more militant industrial unions played a part in this 
dispute, one union official referring to the breakaway group as the 
'aristocracy of labor' which had been antagonistic to Council affiliation 
with large unions, such as the AWU and Coalminers, and pro-conscription 
in sympathies. In Newcastle this configuration of forces had been 
revealed in an earlier schism, larger unions setting up a Newcastle 
Industrial Council in opposition to the craft-led TLC and both groups 
divided upon the Judd resolution Pn these terms. [5] Indeed, Jock 
Garden played up the support he divined from the split for closer unionism 
under the O.B.U., [6] but probably most important for the radicals' 
success was the extent of support their position on the war was finding 
within the movement. As one PLP member, W. O'Brien said:
The delegates following Mr. Judd were supporters of the union 
movement but their support did not necessarily mean that they 
would assist in his party political views. He had command 
of the majority of the Council and the significance of this 
was that the delegates on his side represented the feelings 
of the big majority of the people of Australia in regard to 
the war. [7]
[1] Ibid. Garden had heavy editorial backing from Boote 
A.W. 30 May, 1918.
[2] A.W. 8 August, 1918.
[3] Ibid. 15 August; Daily Telegraph 7 October, 1918.
[4] Minutes Labor Council 1, 15 August. In a vote 77-48, then 
division 83-53. A.W.22 August, 1918.
[5] A.W. 20 June, 1918. )
[6] Even at the end of the year ten unions remained suspicious 
of any re-affiliation moves, citing the OBU scheme. Daily 
Telegraph 22 October, 1918.
[7] W. O'Brien MLA in the Domain 26 May. A.W. 30 May, 1918.
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Judd's ascendancy failed to bear fruit in a vendetta against Morby, 
supporting the interpretation that it was the radical issues which were 
winning adherents: reports by Peace Alliance and S.L.P. officials at
this time note an increasingly favorable reception for anti-war 
propaganda which the Labor Council and industrialist radicals eagerly 
exploited. [l]
The NSW Labor party opposes the war»
That the initiative had been taken in the Labor Council was 
simply fortuitous! the Industrial Vigilance Council (In 1918 the 
Industrial Section changed its name to one seen as more accurately 
reflecting its breadth of support in the Labor party) determined to 
consider Labor's attitude to the war as early as 12 April but did not 
actually appoint a sub-committee on it until 10 May, when Judd had 
already formulated his proposal. While links between the Labor Council 
radicals and the I.V.C. are unclear, generally speaking the latter group 
were career unionists fully oriented towards parliamentary strategy, 
whereas the Judd group tended to abhor parliamentary Labor politics and 
concentrated upon organising in the unions. [2] Arthur Rae, who 
never joined the IVC on principle, was one party official who courted 
the socialist left but apart from him Judd's main supporter appears to 
have been Henry Boote who certainly did not reflect the official AWU 
line. The IVC remained as an effective lever for moving the state Labor 
conference and through it the federal ALP, and as such remained a prize 
of great potential.
With the focus for activists in the large unions shifting to 
the newly available parliamentary positions and the state executive, 
power within the IVC shifted to a group of radicals different to the
[1] Secretary's report, Annual Meeting of the Australian 
Union of Democratic Control 18 June, 1918. A.W.4 July, 
1918 and the Australian Socialist Party Annual Report, 
International Socialist 26 January, 1918.
[2] The S.L.P. had already split over this issue. Socialist 
1 June, 1917; The War and the Sydney Labor Council. An 
address delivered by E.E. Judd at Trades Hall, Sydney, 8 
March, 1917. S.L.P. pamphlet, Sydney, 1917 gives the 
defence of standing socialist candidates against endorsed
Labor men.
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AWU bosses and Miners’ representatives who had founded the original 
section. The new leaders were also ready to use the machinery for 
self-advancement - a popular jibe portrayed the IVC being run by 
’thirty wealthy farmers who owned motor cars and twenty aspiring 
politicians' [1] - and one principle figure, J. Power, had unsuccess­
fully nominated against sitting state and federal members; [2] 
many others were alleged to be interested in obtaining their share of the 
spoils of office. [3] By 1918 there were some 68 regular affiliates, 
unions and leagues in the Sydney area mainly who supplied the hard core 
of attendance throughout the year between annual party conferences, when 
the Vigilance Council began its vital work of co-opting conference dele­
gates, deciding the ticket for party leadership and formulating its 
policies for the year. Some regular attenders were founding members 
serving as monitors of activity for their organisations, like Jack 
Cullinan, AWU, while others participated out of dread fascination with 
the machine such as C.C. Lazzarini, MLA, another original member, 
or Vol Molesworth, a journalist representing the Auburn P.L.L. To 
Molesworth’s jaundiced eye at his first IVC meeting,
The remainder ... contained the usual crop of union and 
league officials. None showed outstanding brilliancy but 
all possessing the usual stock phrases of 'class war’,
'humanity is the only country I recognise’, ’solidarity’ 
and so on. [4]
Although he pretended to detect a spirit of ’Bolshevism’ in the organisa­
tion, Molesworth himself paid grudging tribute to 'this little band of 
hard working (and mainly sincere) extremists who have control', [5] 
and in fact these men did reflect genuine attitudes abroad in the 
Labor movement. I.V.C. control of the party was most intense at the 
state conferences but, as adoption of the 1917 peace plank demonstrates,
[1] Report of 1918 Labor conference, A.W. 20 June, 1918.
[2] Molesworth, Material conferning the Industrial Section p.37
[3] Ibid, pp. 1 - 3 .  ’
[4] Ibid.
[5] Molesworth - T.J. Ryan 18 May,1918. Ibid, pp.14-16.
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it was not responsible for every major accomplishment there. Having 
supplied the state executive by means of the ticket, Vigilance Council 
scrutiny of its nominees, who could not hold simultaneous I.V.C. 
membership, was reduced to regular reports of activities from the state 
president and on important issues the executive appeared capable of quite 
independent action and the IVC proved no less susceptible to the 
persuasive wiles of parliamentarians than any previous body, [1]. To 
exercise control on matters of policy as they arose the IVC needed time 
to marshal its forces and follow up its decisions: just such an issue
as the controversy over Labor’s war policy provided.
Stimulated by the Governor-General's initiative on recruiting, 
and with a view to forthcoming state and federal Labor conferences, 
the IVC set up a sub-committee at a joint meeting with the state executive 
on 10 May to discuss results of the Governor-General's conference. 
Comprising state president Lambert and IVC radicals Rosa and Power, 
this reported a week later to a similar meeting at Macdonnel House. Its 
report reviewed the failure of calls for peace negotiations such as that 
in 1917 to elicit any response and proclaimed the need for a bold 
declaration of Labor beliefs rejecting the aim of a 'knock out blow' 
and blaming capitalist greed, ambition and chauvinism for prolongation 
of the war. Turning to Australia's own position the report drew attention 
to the nation's exposure as the 'lone outpost of white civilisation', 
menaced by a danger growing worse by the day which was compounded by 
the government-encouraged 'mad stampede' of able bodied defenders to 
Europe with grave consequences for local defence, industrial output and 
the financial burden. 'The remainder of the policy proposed that all 
future war activities in Australia should be in the direction of preparing 
for the defence of Australia in Australia, particular reference being 
made to the Japanese menace' . [2] The most vital provisions were the
[1] On April 26, 1918 for example PLP Leader Storey was
carpeted for speeches he had made on recruiting. Storey 
treated the Vigilants to a flow of oratory and, far from 
sacrificing his belief that conscription might yet 
prove necessary, turned aside a motion of censtfre and won 
a unanimous vote of confidence in his leadership. Ibid.p.1-6.
[2] V. Molesworth ibid, p. 6.
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conclusions, recommending that:
Taking these facts in conjunction with our Government’s 
refusal to negotiate for peace, this conference therefore 
declares:-
(a) That the policy of the ALP is opposed to any men in future 
leaving Australia for military service abroad.
(b) That, failing the consent of the Imperial authorities to at 
once open up negotiations for peace, the Australian divisions 
on service abroad be brought back to Australia.
(c) That we call upon the organised workers of every country 
engaged in the war to take similar action.
Consideration of the report was then undertaken seriatim. Rosa 
argued that adoption of the policy would enable the Labor party to 
re-establish its support in Australia. More accurate predictions were 
made by several delegates, including Molesworth, who argued that the 
proposals were not only futile but dangerous, inviting conscription from 
a backlash they would provoke if publicly advocated. Vehement opposition 
was declared by John Storey and T.D. Mutch, MLA but despite this resista­
nce and, according to Molesworth, after many of the opposing delegates 
had left in disgust the first clause was carried by 35 - 8 votes and the 
meeting adjourned until 19 May for consideration of the remainder, 
which it appears were also carried. [1]
[1] Ibid, pp.7-10. The IVC itself does not appear to have had 
separate minutes and because meetings were closed to press 
and public, members were free to debate uninhibited by 
the War Precautions Act. We are dependent upon Molesworth‘s 
personal recollections and documents for the crucial 
events accounted here, namely Material concerning the 
Industrial Section»ibid; Full Story and Documents with his­
tory of the Industrial Section of the ALP. Uncat MSS 
Set 71, Item 2; The Story of the New South Wales Labor Party 
from its inception in 1890 to 1917, including its reconstruc­
tion in 1916. MS typescriptdated January, 1918. 239 pp. Uncat. 
MSS Set 243/5/14; Industrial Vigilance Council letters and 
notes 1918. Uncat MSS Set 243/2/1,10. Molesworth attended 
IVC meetings from April, 1918 first out of curiosity, then 
became a supporter of the AWU faction, was elected to its 
executive and wrote its epitaph when it was finally broken 
up in 1919. His hostile account is supported by documents, 
notably Proposals for discussion re the attitude of the 
Labor movement on war and recruiting (incomplete) in 
Material Concerning the Industrial Section pp.34-35 and 
information leaked to the press eg. SMH 20 June, 1918.
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Motivations behind these proposals were several: war weariness, 
the widening currency of left wing and radical ideology stimulated by 
such events as the great strike and Bolshevik successes in Russia, resent­
ment of the infringements of liberty under wartime regulation, disillusion­
ment with the course of the conflict and lapses on the Allied side, not 
least of which were the treatment of Ireland and attempts at imposing 
conscription in Australia. There was abroad also that feeling, bred of 
desperation, that a retreat to basic principles in the face of electoral 
adversity was the only road to salvation. One crucial factor however 
was the extent to wh ich home defence had become a real matter of 
concern. Anti-Japanese sentiment from before the war flourished during 
the conscription campaigns and, used by Hughes as an argument in favor 
of acceptance of compulsion, had taken root with a vengeance by 1918 in 
an unintended form. Many Labor men argued the necessity to concentrate 
Australian resources at home, even at the expense of the European commit­
ment which dragged on in indecisiveness as fears of Japan increased. 
Paradoxically the belief exerted a powerful appeal over the broad spectrum 
of Labor opinion, equally seizing radicals and moderates. Judd alluded 
to Japan indirectly in his case against recruiting made before the Sydney 
Labor Council, dilated upon further when he was tried for making statements 
in that speech prejudicial to recruiting.
I believe that if the virile manhood of the white races was 
killed off, and the enormous colored populations living 
adjacent to Australia left intact, that it would be practically 
an invitation to their rulers to strike when they knew the 
manhood of the white races was so bled that they would not be 
able to put up a fight. [1]
His apprehension was so powerful that it led this revolutionary socialist 
to look favorably upon maintenance of European colonies to Australia's 
north as hostages against the Japanese thrust. [2] Within the 
iVc-state executive it was the motivation permeating the proposals on 
war, recruiting and defence, even W.H. Lambert stating that he was
[1] Judd's Speech from the Dock, SLP pamphlet. Sydney, 1919 
pp. 52-3; also the information laid for the second 
indictment, ibid.
[2] Ibid, p. 53.
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’prepared to take up the gun against the Jap’. [1] Moderate Labor 
opinion was also affected; the AWU in national conference had narrowly 
asserted a greater fear of the Asian than of militarism by agreeing 
15 - 12 to retain an amended scheme of compulsory training for Australia. [2] 
J.H. Catts’ obsession over the Japanese threat was well known and he was 
more concerned with the electoral consequences of the 1918 peace proposals 
than the reasoning behind them.
Opposition to the radical position was not confined solely 
to the ranks of the parliamentarians, as the debates at the Labor Council 
and IVC confirm. Upon the shoulders though of the Labor politicians 
would fall the consequences of party approval of such policies. Storey 
himself attributed loss of the Upper Hunter by-election in early June, 
in which he had pronounced continued support of recruiting, to the 
effects of the Labor Council and state conference stands [3], apart 
from any personal objections to the policy itself and the PLP shared 
his views. [4] Federal members Arthur Blakeley MHR, Senator Gardiner 
and Catts recognised the danger [5] and Molesworth was so pessimistic as 
to the chances of opposing the policy at state conference in the 
current climate that he attempted, unsuccessfully, to enlist the support 
of Queensland leaders T.J. Ryan and E.G. Theodore for a last minute 
appeal. [6] Conceding that there would be ’easily an ascendancy of 
anti-war delegates' on conference the moderates settled for a more 
indirect strategy:
[1] Material concerning the Industrial Section p.8.
[2] Official Report AWU Convention 16 February 1918 pp.58-9.
[3] Daily Telegraph 8 June, 1918.
[4] The Telegraph reported that a majority of members 
ridiculed the proposals'. Ibid.13 June, 1918.Con.Wallace,
MLA told Molesworth that the party 'will never stand for 
it'. Material concerning the Industrial Section pp.17-18.
[5] Ibid.
[6] V. Molesworth - Ryan 18 May, 1918. ibid.pp.14-16; Ryan - 
Molesworth 5 June (?), 1918. ibid, p.23
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Realising the impossibility of defeating the absolute 
anti-war and anti-peace proposals the moderate section 
decided to modify them wherever possible, and to modify 
the personnel of the six delegates to the Interstate 
Conference to assemble at Perth on July 17.[1]
This objective proved successful when state conference met, 1 - 1 5  
June, in debates totalling over 27 sitting hours on this one topic, 
speakers being confined in the main to five minute speeches. [2]
Circulars were distributed and debate began on 3 June, conference 
going into committee on the motion of Rosa who argued 'it was 
important that these matters should not be discussed openly'. [3]
Four agenda items of far more innocuous nature were discarded in favor of the 
scaled down executive/industrialist proposal and the issue was conclu­
ded on the night of Saturday 8 June, the last possible moment for despatch 
of the federal conference delegation, with the state secretary merely 
informing the press that the discussion was to be resumed in Perth.
As had been hoped some modifications of the proposal were 
effected but the substance of the recommendations was preserved in the 
eventual resolution. [4] Where the moderates did triumph was in 
alteration of the composition of the federal conference delegation by 
substitution of two of their own number for a pair of union radicals, 
thus ensuring what later proved to be the critical margin in federal 
voting on the NSW policy. In anticipation of the proposed federal 
conference in 1917 a delegation of six members had been elected for 
NSW at the preceding Easter, comprising Arthur Rae, A.C. Willis,
J. Power, Gavan Sutherland, J.J. Graves and May Mathews. All except 
Rae were-industrialists although Willis, a party vice-president, had 
suffered second thoughts as to the value of the IVC. Nevertheless at 
least four and possibly five of the 1917 delegation would have voted 
for the new policy in Perth, so reduction of the staunch radical element 
to a bare two was a major coup and reflected a basic shift once again 
in the power structure within the party. This change was precipitated 
when leading figures behind formation of the original industrial
[1] Ibid, p.19.
[2] Sun. 9 June, 1918.
[3] An amendment to admit only the Labor press was defeated 
82-53, the motion passing 93-31, much to the displeasure 
of the Worker A.W.6 June, 1918.
[4] Daily Telegraph 10 June, 1918; Material concerning the 
Industrial Section p.32. See appendix.
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faction decided that it had served its purpose well and was no longer 
justified. Having won promotion to the state executive and filling the 
parliamentary seats of their vanquished opponents of 1916, prominent 
leaders of the AWU and Miners' Federation were not averse to kicking 
away the ladder to office they themselves had so lately ascended and 
accordingly decided to bring the IVC back under control. Adoption of 
the war and defence proposals did not alone precipitate this decision, 
which had been forming for some twelve months but no doubt emphasised 
the dangers of tolerating such an unpredictable body.
Matters had come to a head at the IVC meeting on Sunday 2 
June, essentially the usual pre-conference caucus of industrial vigilants, 
at which the agenda was reviewed and, most vitally,the ticket for the 
next year's party executive was chosen. As the chief faction in the 
party, IVC selection was mandatory for party officer and state executive 
aspirants. Rosa, Adler, Power and other radicals ruling the IVC 
realised this and had attempted to restrict voting for the ticket to 
the regular 45 unions and 23 branches. The AWU however, relying on the 
IVC rule whereby any conference delegates could be co-opted, ’nobbled' 
some 30 country delegates as they arrived in Sydney and under the 
organisation of Bailey and C.B. Trefle these were added to the 25 
AWU delegates and 15 Miners' Federation representatives who met on 
Sunday morning to receive instructions. As a clear half of the 150 or 
so delegates currently supporting the IVC at the official Sunday after­
noon meeting, the AWU-Miner leadership could rely upon sympathetic Sydney 
regulars to dominate the proceedings. This proved to be the case,
Lambert easily defeating Rosa for the ticket endorsement as president» 
while Bailey and Willis captured the vice-presidencies with Rosa again 
knocked out. Willis then moved that there be no ticket for the 30- 
member executive committee but was ruled out of order; as pre-arranged 
it was then moved that the IVC devise a ticket for only half of the places, 
leaving the other 15 to be supplied by free vote of conference. By this 
means they hoped to use their numbers to fill the 15 places with AWU 
and Miner nominees, leaving out in the cold the 'red hot industrialists 
who always got in on the back of the AWU and big union vote'. [1]
Rosa and his supporters would then have to take their chances with the 
unattached candidates like Arthur Rae in open conference in a brawl for
[1] Material concerning the Industrial Section, op. cit. 
pp. 19-21.
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the remaining 15 places, which could be reduced even further if the 
parliamentarians could be reserved some of those ex officio. Radical 
president O.C. Johnson declared this also a contravention of Council 
orders and the gambit failed but even so, despite John Power topping 
the poll of the 62 nominees, Rosa himself only achieved twenty-ninth spot, 
scraping in by three votes only in a decisive defeat for the radicals.
[1] Most importantly the IVC resolved at the Sunday meeting to leave 
composition of the federal delegation an open question rather than pre­
determine it by a ticket-Moved by Power himself in the face of these 
reverses through fear that an AWU-Miner vote here would also wipe out the 
radicals’ strength, his opponents also seemed content to leave it to 
conference. [2]
Because of these manoeuvres there was no ticket for the six 
federal delegation positions when its composition arose after conference 
had terminated discussion of the war policy. The radicals urged that 
the 1917 selection be confirmed, if only because of the inconvenience cau­
sed by any such late changes, but Catts and others persuaded conference 
to hold a fresh ballot as a result of which the two IVC supporters Graves 
and Mathews were supplanted by the parliamentarians Catts and T.D.
Mutch, MLA. [3] Although it was argued in justification of the 
change that more experienced men should be sent to such an important 
federal meeting, the opposition of both Catts and Mutch to the radical 
attitudes represented by such as May Mathews was quite clear to the 
participants. [4] In the light of this revised delegation Rosa 
moved that conference bind the six representatives in support of the 
agreed policy: this was carried but Rae immediately rose and insisted
[1] Next week, at the annual meeting of the IVC, the 
AWU succeeded narrowly in placing its own man George 
Buckland in the presidency, Tom Bartle in the 
secretaryship and three sympathisers on the IVC 
executive, giving it 5 of the 9 elected IVC positions. 
The ticket was successful at conference in the 
intervening week but many members broke it, no doubt 
as a result of this bewildering struggle. Ibid. p.22.
[2] Ibid, p .21.
[3] The order of election was Rae, Willis, Catts, Power, 
Mutch and Sutherland. P.C. Evans, state secretary, 
came within 30 votes of the last elected, Sutherland, 
while Mathews and Graves polled even lower down.
Ibid, p.32.
[4] Ibid, pp.8-9 for contrasting views by Mutch and 
Mathews. For Catts' attitude see above.
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that, while loyally supporting the decisions, delegates would ’of 
course, have to compromise where they could not get their objective 
absolutely'. [1] With this last equivocation, the moderates could look 
with some satisfaction upon their efforts at state conference in toning 
down the radical policy and undermining the chances of its adoption 
at federal level. Molesworth met Ryan at the latter’s hotel on 11 June 
after the NSW delegation had already left and briefed the Premier on 
the latest events, concluding that at least three of the NSW group would 
break ranks if given the opportunity by a vote on the NSW policy in 
secret ballot, [2] providing Ryan also with detailed information to use 
against the radicals. [3] Almost as a corollary of the Japanese fear, 
the IVC had also endorsed compulsory military training and made separate 
recommendations to the conference in a circular, signed by Arthur Rae 
as secretary of the initiating committee, [3] containing a straight 
summary of the White Australia vs. Asian hordes scenario; Australia 
was prey to the crushing numbers of certain alien Races menacing her 
and her standards. 'The only reliable defence of Australia must be local 
defence': nine recommendations being made to achieve this end, ranging
from compulsory training and independence in munitions production to 
submarine and aerial defence of Australian shores. These proposals, 
in contrast to those on participation in the war raised nothing objection­
able to the moderates and an amendment to their adoption in favor of 
abolition of compulsory clauses in the Defence Act was beaten 168 - 38,
[A] although it was decided to support democratisation of the Act and 
raising of the age qualification for initial training to 18 years. [5] 
Thus instructed the NSW delegates departed for the federal arena.
[1] Ibid, p .32.
[2] Ibid. p. 2A.
[3] Memo to Mr. Ryan n.d. ibid. pp.37-A0.
[A] Ibid. p. 3A. See appendix.
[5] Gavan Sutherland's figures. Report ALP Federal
Conference. 21 June, 1918 p .35.
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The 1918 federal ALP conference
At no time is the formal structure of a party subjected to 
greater strain than over an extended crisis period. The Labor special 
federal conference in 1916 was called expressly to deal with the conscrip­
tion issue and was anticipated by the FPLP split, caused by disintegration 
of that party and the intransigent stands of the eastern state parties. 
Federal conference formalised the situation and caused the South 
Australian and West Australian Labor parties to conform, the problem being 
essentially reassertion of authority by the federal ALP structure. In 
1918 the formal structural processes were recognised by participants 
and the chief question was their adequacy for the formulation of a single, 
acceptable policy for the ALP which was also politically apt in the 
broader Australian community. Nowhere was the complex, multi-centric 
process of policy making better demonstrated than in the deliberations 
upon participation in the war, the voluntary recruiting scheme and the 
federal defence plank, upon which subjects no fewer than 43 separate 
resolutions had been included in the 54 page agenda distributed to the 
parties in the prece ding weeks. Too late for inclusion were the 
proposals on conditional further participation in the conflict adopted by 
the NSW party on the eve of the departure of its delegation and deliber­
ately withheld from general publication. In aggregate, the items 
submitted covered every point in the spectrum of opinion within the ALP, 
from the mildly reformist to the uncompromisingly radical. While, 
ostensibly, most delegations had been bound to support specified positions 
on these issues, such was the divergence between recommendations that 
compromise was inevitable and in its pursuit the initiative of delegates 
on the floor of conference and in committee and accepted party working 
principles, such as respect for majority decision and the need for 
solidarity, would be at a premium.
From NSW the six representatives were pledged to the 
unpublicised proposals in favor of withdrawal from the war, although Rae 
had stipulated that concessions to the overall mood would be necessary.
J. H. Catts supported the voluntary war effort subject to suitable and 
rational control; T. D. Mutch was of similar views and both were marked 
contrasts to the figures they had replaced at the last moment. A. C. 
Willis was a radical but strong on home defence by compulsory training.
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Arthur Rae possessed complex views; of AWU background and then NSW 
party organiser, Rae had been press secretary of the No-Conscription 
Council and his vociferous radicalism had earned him support from the 
socialist left in the Sydney Labor Council. Described by Molesworth 
as drafter of the NSW conference proposals and 'a whole-hogger for the 
lot', he also favored compulsory training. Of the two hard-liners John 
Power was the most competent, a calm and effective speaker with strong 
pacifist and socialist convictions who also belonged to the Anti- 
Imperial Federation League. The other, Gavan Sutherland, was less 
formidable being younger and less experienced than Power, whose views 
he shared.
Leading the Queensland delegation and enjoying the prestige 
of both his return to government with an increased majority at the 
elections of 16 March and a recent appearance at the Governor-General's 
conference was the Premier, T. J. Ryan, a supporter of the voluntary 
campaign but having serious doubts about the prolonged nature of the 
war. [1] Pressure upon the Queensland delegation had been applied 
by the AWU in that state in favor of an early conclusion to the war 
and striking out of all compulsory clauses in the Defence Act, [2] 
and from the radical BIC which, under influence from the local Peace 
Alliance, had declared in May unabashedly against any further reinforce­
ments being sent to Europe. [3] Furthermore, Queensland Labor-in- 
Politics Convention had declared against further forms of compulsory 
training upon the urgings of radical unionists [4] and instructed 
its federal representatives accordingly. [5] Later, the state executive 
on a division of 8-7 declined to issue an instruction for
[1] D. J. Murphy, T. J. Ryan: A Political Biography Ph.D. 
University of Queensland, 1972. Ryan's personal under­
taking on support for recruiting given to Donald 
Mackinnon Daily Standard 6 June, 1918 must be balanced 
against his doubts at the recent recruiting conference. 
Proceedings loc.cit. p. 136.
[2] Report of Delegates' Meeting, Queensland Branch, AWU, 
Brisbane. Daily Standard. 25 January, 1918.
[3] Ibid. 12 April, 20 May, 1918.
[4] E. H. Lane, Dawn to Dusk, pp. 211-214.
[5] By 38-20. Convention Minutes 2 February, 1918.
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delegates to support withdrawal from further recruiting efforts and 
adopted a fairly flexible definition of the force of party directives,
[1] which in practice led to variegated voting responses from the 
delegates. Apart from Ryan four other delegates were state parliament­
arians and the other, Senator Myles Ferricks, was an FPLP member - all 
belonged to state executive. W. McCormack was the moderate Legislative 
Assembly speaker, Lewis McDonald the state secretary; J. A. Fihelly, 
Minister for Railways whose radical Irish sympathies had previously 
caused controversy, was subdued at Perth; C. Collins had a son at the 
front but favored the BIC policy. Ryan's assurance to Molesworth that 
he could depend upon five, possibly six votes was a little over­
confident. [2]
Victoria's delegation had been, unusually, selected by a 
plebiscite of party members and affiliated unionists and comprised the 
opinion leaders in that state - Senator John Barnes, AWU, M. M. Black­
burn, the idiosyncratic socialist lawyer and senior party vice-president, 
J. H. Scullin, party president for 1918, E. J. Holloway and C. J. Bennett 
from the THC and Victorian and federal ALP Secretary Arch. Stewart. [3] 
State conference had overwhelmingly carried opposition to compulsory 
training in 1917, [4] and endorsed the NSW peace policy of the same 
year, both decisions reaffirmed at the March, 1918 state conference, but 
increased fears of Japan had produced there also an isolationist declara­
tion which was adopted with little debate.
That this conference enthusiastically reaffirms its 
resolutions of 1917 upon Peace and War; approves what 
has already been done in the work of propagating these 
ideas, instructs the incoming Executive to continue to
[1] Minutes Special Meeting State executive 31 May, 1918.
[2] Statement to Molesworth, Sydney 11 June 1918. Material 
on the Industrial Section p. 24.
[3] Review of delegates Labor Call 11 April, 1918.
[4] Official Report p p . 13-15.
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extend that work and to secure the discussion of peace 
in the Federal Parliament. Further this Conference 
recommends the Federal Conference to make it a plank 
of the Federal Platform that Australia shall engage in 
no more overseas wars. [l]
Metropolitan members of state executive had later attempted to formulate 
a position on recruiting but the full executive voted to leave the 
matter in abeyance; both Scullin and Blackburn were free then to 
express their strong beliefs in retention of compulsory training for 
defence against an eastern enemy.
Of the South Australian delegates only three - Tom 
Grealy, Norman Makin and Stan Whitford - were able to attend at Perth, 
state executive in Adelaide finding the cost of sending a full delegation 
excessive at over 200, [2] so that the state disposed only of the 
three votes, all of which were pledged to support the 1917 NSW peace 
policy and deletion of compulsory provisions in the defence plank. [3] 
This delegation was lightweight however, representing the young lower- 
rank replacements for the lost conscriptionist leadership. Tasmania also 
could only afford half a delegation of Senators Long and O'Keefe with 
W.E. Shoobridge MHA, but had taken the precaution of appointing two 
Western Australians as proxies: John Curtin, editor of the Westralian
Worker and ALF state secretary Alex McCallum. Tasmanian state conference 
decisions had supported an amended defence scheme with compulsory 
training and recommended adoption of the principle that no further 
military expeditions should be despatched overseas unless approved by 
referendum of the people. [4] The three native Tasmanians were
[1] Ibid. pp. 4-5.
[2] U.L.P. Council Minutes 14 March, 1918.
[3] Minutes state conference 11 September, 1917.
[4] Daily Post 10-11 May, 1917.
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inoffensive moderates while the two proxies, formally bound by the 
Tasmanian party policies, were independent personalities of practical 
frame of mind unlikely to succumb to radical appeals. State 
executive of the host state had approved NSW 1917 peace proposals, [l] 
favored mild Peace Alliance appeals for a negotiated peace, [2] 
and was prepared to leave the recruiting question to federal conference. 
[3] Control of W.A. votes in terms of a bloc was precluded in any 
case because of the autonomous basis of delegate selection by the 
District Councils. Given such disparity of views then, the room for 
manoeuvre had perforce to be extensive.
[1] Minutes ALF state executive 6 August, 1917.
[2] Ibid. 7 January, 1918.
[3] Ibid. 8 January, 1918.
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The War and recruiting plank .
From the first day of conference at the Savoy Hotel, Perth,war 
and recruiting issues predominated. As a basis for debate the agenda 
committee presented resolution 383 from South Australia, the 1917 N.S.W. 
policy,which Power objected was dated and desired a broader basis.
When the South Australians formally moved adoption of 383 Power accord­
ingly moved that the 1918 N.S.W. policy be added as an addendum and was 
supported by colleagues Willis and Rae. On a point of order raised by 
Catts, the issues of participation in the war and peace proposals were 
declared separate and outmanoeuvred, Power agreed to let a committee 
draft a statement on conditions of peace. Ryan was appointed chairman 
and, following the convention of federal representation, the remainder 
were Rae (N.S.W.), Blackburn (Victoria), Cameron (W.A.), Makin (S.A.) 
and Long (Tasmania). After overnight deliberation the committee reported 
back on the second day, 18 June, [1] Ryan disclosing selection of the 
1917 peace policy as the basis of discussion. Willis, Power and 
Ferricks attempted to have this 'endorsed* rather than 'adopted' so as to 
be free later to introduce the 1918 N.S.W. policy but, after an 
adjournment, accepted assurances that they would be able to subsequently 
raise the matter and the report was endorsed unanimously. [2] A gesture 
to international labor solidarity in the form of a resolution that the 
party be represented on an international conference of the working class 
to discuss peace and war-related issues was also made. [3]
Later that day the real battle was joined when the debate on 
Labor's attitude to the war and recruiting was initiated. N.S.W. members 
distributed copies of their state conference policy and survived an attempt 
to have it excluded on procedural grounds, only to have conference adopt 
the agenda committee report specifically eliminating their proposal : it 
proved impossible however to ignore the radical plank in debate.
[1] Report 1918 ALP federal conference p.p. 9-10.
[2]
[3]
Ibid, p.13. See appendix. 
Ibid, p.14.
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Extraordinary precautions were specified, conference going into committee, 
permitting only delegate® Tudor from the FPLP and Collier, the W.A. 
par liamentary leader, as non-voting guests and visitors vouched for by 
three delegates to be present. Such reticence was prompted both by 
electoral considerations and fear of official prosecutions for statements 
made in open debate, as had already been encountered by Sydney Labor 
Council and Melbourne THC speakers.[1] These reasons induced the 
Victorian Labor party, whose responsibility publication of the official 
record became, to bowdlerise the Official Report with omission of the 
whole day and evening debate on the war which took place on 19 June and 
heavy censorship of the defence plank debate on 20-21 June. Fortunately, 
the proofs of the later Report, comprising actual conference minutes, have 
survived in at least one known copy [2], and disclose the care with which 
the fact was carefully concealed that the federal ALP came within only 
two votes of declaring opposition to the war.
At the opening of debate on Wednesday 19 June the moderate 
position was moved by W. Roche (W.A.) comprising item 312 from the W.A. 
state executive:
That while participation of Australia in the war was justifiable, 
for the reason that it was Australia's duty to assist the 
Motherland, this Conference is of opinion that the war policy 
up to the present has been one of war frenzied jingoism which 
has bled Australia white and demands that any future action 
shall have proper regard to the peculiar conditions of 
Australia, as a thinly populated and debtor country. [3]
[1] A.W. 30 August ,1917.
[2] Proof.Private and Confidential and not for publication.
Only for exclusive perusal of delegates of ALP conference, 
Perth, June 1918 p.p.12 in the Catts papers NLA^658/1/3. 
Foldernentitled Correspondence 1903-1921, article 96. To 
differ^iiate hereafter this will be referred to as Minutes 
and the pamphlet published as the Official Report as Report. 
Previous accounts of this episode have only used the Report.
[3] Minutes, p. 4.
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Rae and Sutherland immediately countered with an amendment based upon the 
final conclusions of the N.S.W. state conference and representing the 
radical, anti-war school within the party. Rae argued that as the Allies 
were no longer fighting for their originally stated aims the Australian 
Labor party should take a principled stand as against one of mere electoral 
expediency - 'Conference should not consider how the political fortunes of 
the Labor Party were affected by any decision arrived at, but come to a 
decision on the position as it now presented itself'. He asked that:
We affirm that the forces making for a coiyLiuance of this war 
are financial and commercial greed, land hunger, militaristic 
ambition and a spurious public opinion manufactured and sustained 
by an unscrupulous press and that the serious depletion of 
Australia's most virile manhood through her share of the war, 
the neglect of her manufacturing industries and the enormous 
increase in her financial obligations renders any further drain 
upon her resources a menace to her economic and national safety; 
and we therefore declare 'That the policy of the Australian Labor 
party is opposed to any men in future leaving Australia for 
military service abroad/
While this proposal did not go as far as the original IVC/NSW state 
executive call for withdrawal of Australian troops should offers for peace 
negotiations on certain specified terms by the Allies fail to eventuate, 
its implications were nevertheless crucial and the motion was subsequently 
ignored.
A further amendment was immediately foreshadowed as a compromise 
and succeeded in drawing the support of several delegates while others 
strenuously opposed both motion and amendment. Amongst the latter was 
Frank Tudor who protested that adoption of the N.S.W. plank would mean 
imposition of conscription 'in a couple of months' ,and argued that the 
party had broad responsibilities - 'When one spoke of the rank and file, it 
was in reference to those whom Labor represented'. As FPLP leader he 
warned that by espousing such a policy Labor would be reduced to 'about 
five seats in the House of Representatives ... Let them face the question 
fairly and squarely and set to work on a platform upon which the next 
federal elections should be fought'. [1] Apart from the four N.S.W. 
radicals the Rae amendment won the support of delegates such as Collins
[1] Ibid p. 6.
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and Ferricks^ueensland) and Cameron and Callanan (W.A.) in a wide-ranging 
debate lasting until late afternoon when a straight vote on the amendment 
was finally defeated 15-13. An exact breakdown of this
result is impossible, conference reaffirming at this stage an earlier 
decision not to record divisions, but the narrow margin of only two votes 
is remarkable. After allowing for P. O'Loghlan (W.A.) in the chair,it 
appears that three other delegates abstained out of the total 32 accredited 
representatives, some because they desired to await one of the several 
amendments foreshadowed. Nearly all state delegations appeared split on 
the matter but it is clear that the critical factor in tipping the balance 
had been the success of the moderates at N.S.W. state conference in 
substituting Catts and Mutch for two of the original radical delegation.
The stage of disillusionment with the war and continued Australian 
participation in it revealed by the closeness of this vote was clearly 
more advanced than has previously been recognised.[1]
After the dinner adjournment W.D. Johnson moved his foreshadowed 
compromise proposal which had already impressed some delegates. Johnson 
had argued cunningly;
He was in favor of no more men leaving Australia, but he wanted 
to have the position clear on that point. What was in his mind 
was that there should be no further participation in the war or 
recruiting except upon an authoritative statement from the Allies 
asserting readiness to enter upon peace negotiations on a no 
annexations and no penal indemnities basis; that Australia's 
requirements in man-power be ascertained with respect to home 
defence and essential industries (including shipbuilding), after 
an enquiry upon which the Australian Labor Party would be 
adequately and officially represented. With a determination of 
that sort arrived at he would submit for a referendum of brauche 
and affiliated unions, and it should become null and void unless 
a majority of the membership voting declared in the affirmative. 
His aim and object was to prevent differences of opinion in the 
future.[2]
[1] Cf. Scott,Australia During the War, pp. 465-9; Turner, 
Industrial Labour and Politics pp. 176-8; Robson,The 
First AIF, p.179.
[2] Minutes, p. 4.
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This was a radical enough departure from the jingoistic approach of the 
’bald-headed bitter-enders' to undercut the appeal of the extremists to 
those more moderate elements while also being acceptable to the federal 
political leaders with an anxious eye upon Labor’s electoral appeal. 
Furthermore the unprecedented device of an intra-party plebiscite upon 
a recommendation of federal policy presented a mechanism for reconciling 
the widely differing approaches of the state parties which, in view of the 
traditional respect for rank and file determinations in Labor party 
thinking, would be hard for partisans on either end of the spectrum to 
reject. Blackburn (Victoria),0'Keefe (Tasmania) and Baglin (W.A.) had 
pronounced themselves in favor of such compromise before the vote on the 
N.S.W. proposal, at least one of whom was regarded by the radicals hope­
fully as sympathetic,[1] and another indicated a switch of support from 
his first preference - the N.S.W. proposal - to the compromise suggested.[2]
Authorship of this compromise and responsibility for its shrewed 
insertion must be attributed to J.H. Catts. Johnson was by no means an 
inconsequential figure in the Western Australian party, [3] but was plainly 
an unlikely leading operator at federal level. His amendment followed 
almost exactly Catts'policy successfully urged upon the federal caucus 
early in 1918, the only new feature being the call for a plebiscite. Both 
Catts and Johnson were members of the agenda committee and use of an 
amenable figure-head by the former obviated the danger of too obviously 
flouting the expressed will of N.S.W. state conference - it had all the
[1] Maurice Blackburn. D. Cameron - R.S. Ross 24 June, 1918. 
Ross papers NLA JAF 56/1/40.
[2] F.A. Baglin .Minutes, p. 6.
[3] A prominent eastern goldfields unionist, he had been a 
senior minister in Daglish and Scaddan Labor governments, 
led the PLP briefly in 1905 and again from September- 
October 1916. Having narrowly lost his seat of Guildford 
to National Labor in the post-split elections of September , 
1917, Johnson remained on the state executive in 1918 and 
was appointed full time organiser in the rehabilitation of 
the party. G.C. Bolton and A. Mozley , The Western 
Australian Legislature 1870-1930. Canberra, 1961, pp.96-7.
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hallmarks of Catts' modus operandi.[l] In seconding Johnson’s motion 
on these lines, Catts now commended it as 'enunciating general principles’ 
and supported the call for reference of the issue to another committee 
for drafting of a recommendation. Accordingly twelve members were 
elected with Ryan again the chairman and of whom only Ferricks, Rae and 
Cameron could be characterised as radicals.[2] The next day, 20 June, 
after working all morning the committee brought down a report setting 
out Labor's 'Attitude to the War and Recruiting'. Once again it was quite 
obvious who had been the principle framer of the report : the attitude on 
the war was a near exact transcription of Catts' statement of Labor 
policy made on his own initiative in the House of Representatives during 
January [3] while the attitude on recruiting followed his suggestions to 
caucus preceding that parliamentary speech,[4] once again the only 
addition being the proposal for a party plebiscite of approval. Catts 
himself undoubtedly needed the assistance of Ryan, whose prestige in the 
movement generally and ability at manipulating the pressures for 
concensus anddeference tc^ederal political authority were invaluable, but 
acceptance of these principles was a particular personal triumph for the 
FPLP secretary.
Radical dissent was immediately voiced, Power criticising the 
commmittee for lack of backbone in not formulating a more positive policy, 
and Ferricks the weakness and indefiniteness of the proposals. During 
consideration of the report seriatim, the N.S.W. radicals moved several 
amendments aimed at strengthening the attitude on the war but met little 
success. On the recruiting plank a short struggle led to deletion of 
reference to 'official' participation as being dependent upon fulfillment
[1] His facility at presenting just the right compromise 
is apparent from FPLP minutes of this period and 
distinguished Catts to his colleagues. Interview by 
the author with N.J.O. Makin, Adelaide 27 November, 
1973.
[2] Bennett and Blackburn - (Victoria), Catts and Rae - 
(N.S.W.), Ryan and Ferricks - (Queensland), Grealy 
and Makin - (S.A.), Johnson and Cameron - (W.A.), 
O'Keefe and Shoobridge - (Tasmania). Minutes p. 6.
[3] CPD LXXXVIII 15 January, p.2957, See above.
[4] Ibid ; FPLP 3 January 1918.
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of certain conditions so as to make the proposal binding upon all members 
of the party in their private and public capacities. The last rally of 
the radicals however took place during the overnight adjournment ; ac 
the start of proceedings on Friday 21 June, Ferricks and Cameron made an 
effort to retrieve the hard line position on further participation in the 
war effort, moving adoption of the following clause as principal component 
of the attitude to recruiting.
That a clear and authoritative statement be made on behalf of 
the Allies asserting thei^readiness to enter into peace 
negotiations by an immediate armistice for the purpose of 
discussion and negotiation with the aim of ending the war upon 
the basis of no annexations and no penal indemnities, and 
failing such armistice proposal by the Allies, no more men 
should leave Australia for military service overseas. [1]
This was obviously the crux of the issue, the committee having avoided 
binding' support for the war effort by Labor to such extreme stipulations. 
Ryan countered, defending the original recommendation as being the 
consensus viewpoint of the contrasting attitudes in the committee and 
invoked the principle of solidarity, two others supporting him and 
Holloway raising the threat of Japan as reason for supporting the amendment. 
Ferrick's amendment was defeated and the clause adopted with minor 
amendations.
After conceding so much ground the radicals*last chance lay in 
gaining deletion of the provision for appeal by plebiscite to the rank and 
file, granted as a concession to Western Australian, South Australian and 
Tasmanian doubts. [2] In this also they were unsuccessful and an attempt 
by Power to have the N.S.W. proposals submitted at the same time for ran 
and file consideration was firmly ruled out by the chairman. It was obvious 
that some hard line delegates were still unhappy at this compromise - Power 
protested 'I would sooner have nothing than this', but Willis put the view 
of several other militants by warning that unless the conference produced 
some policy the N.S.W. branch could split up.
[1] Ibid, p. 7. Emphasis added to the additions by Ferricks to 
the committee recommendation.
J.H. Catts, The Standpoint of Australian Labor on the War and 
Recruiting, Catts papers NLA 658/1/D.
[2]
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Mr. Willis recognised that it camouflaged the whole position 
in a way, but he considered it of paramount importance to keep 
the Movement intact, and whilst disatisfied with the result, he 
was prepared to accept it in the spirit of solidarity for 
Labor . [ 1]
The policy, as amended, was then adopted by 30-2. [2]
Attitude to the War
1. The attitude of Labor towards the publicity declared objects
of the War is what it was at the outbreak of the War :
(a) For Liberty and Democracy and the Independence of Small 
Nations.
(b) For the Honoring of Publicly Made Treaties.
(c) For the Maintenance of Public International Law.
2. The aims of Labor in participating in the War purposed:
(a) Assistance to Great Britain under the voluntary system, in 
maintaining the publicly declared objects for which she 
entered the War (as described in the first paragraphs, and 
those only) to the best of our capability, consistent with 
Australia's paramount and essential needs.
(b) Bringing about an enduring World Peace, on terms of equity 
and justice to all mankind.
Attitude to Recruiting
Further participation in recruiting shall be subject to the 
following conditions:
(a) That a clear and authoritative statement be made on behalf
of the Allies, asserting their readiness to enter into Peace 
negotiations, upon the basis of no annexations and no penal 
indemnities.
[1 ] Minutes p.7 Sutherland, Callanan and Cameron also indicated 
that they would bow to the inevitable pp. 7-8.
[2] Catts, The Standpoint of Australian Labor p.6. The two 
dissenters were probably Power and Collins.
216
(b) That Australia's requirements in manpower be ascertained 
and met with respect to -
(1) Home Defence.
(2) Industrial Requirements.
An Immediate enquiry, upon which the Australian Labor Party 
shall be adequately and officially represented, shall be 
held, and its decisions immediately given effect to.
Provided that this determination shall be immediately submitted 
by each State Executive - with recommendation from this Conference 
for its adoption - to a referendum of members of all branches and 
affiliated organisations, and shall become operative upon a 
majority of the votes of those voting being cast in the 
affirmative. The ballot to close not later than November 1, 1918. 
Should the Commonwealth Government interfere with the taking of 
the ballot on the proposals re the War and Recruiting, the whole 
scheme shall become operative immediately.[1]
The defence plank.
With this disposed of the one outstanding issue for resolution was 
the Labor defence plank, upon which instructions from state party organisat­
ions were once again varied : Queensland, Victoria and South Australia were 
opposed to retention of compulsory military training altogether, N.S.W. and 
Tasmania favoured an amended scheme whilst Western Australia did not have a 
collective preference. Once again the necessity for accommodation of 
differences would be essential and this explained the complicated set of 
alternative proposals culled by the agenda committee from the business paper 
to permit the full play of views. Once again the bete jaune of Japan 
loomed large over the conference and this time exercised its most profound 
influence. Catts had been greatly concerned that the opposition to 
conscription would spill over into hostility towards compulsory military 
training itself as established in the platform in 1908 and that ALP defence 
policy would thereupon become inadequate in view of the Japanese threat.
His own convictions persuaded him that if the public was apprised of the 
strategic situation, a more responsible attitude would result.
[1] Minutes, p. 8.
217
The Government absolutely refuses to give the public any 
information - I am not allowed to give it even to Parliament, 
or outside this House. Under the circumstances, the Government 
may find great Labor conferences meeting presently because of 
administration of defence matters recently, and doing things which 
should not be done at this time above all others ... If the 
public were allowed to know the facts they would adopt no such 
attitude, but because they are not, and because those of us who 
have made a study of the question are not allowed to put the 
facts before them, men, in their ignorance, may do something 
which will be very much to the detriment of this country, if it 
does not lead to disaster.[1]
As can now be established the highest levels in the government and services 
were in fact in accord with Catts’ sense of great and imminent danger, 
being currently preoccupied by a scare over Japan. The Chief Justice, Sir 
Samuel Griffith, made an official report on manpower requirements for the 
AIF upon the basis of government files and senior military advice in March, 
and adverted to the supplementary needs of home defence as 'a matter of 
grave urgency'.[2] Munro-Ferguson had referred to this report in his 
opening speech at the recruiting conference and speculated on the need for 
better home forces; [3] soon after Senator Pearce announced that instead of 
abandoning the compulsory military training system which had been suspended 
since 1914, the government intended to reactivate it 'because we cannot see 
what is going to come out of this war. There is the possibility that we 
may yet have to fight in this country, and we ought to have a force here 
able to deal with all contingencies ! (4] Amalgamation of skeleton units 
and a call of men from 21-50 years unfit for overseas service to take part 
in resumed training followed,[5] as part of what the Adjutant-General 
Brigadier-General Sellheim explained as an effort to bring home-defence 
units up to war strength .[6] Simultaneously a recommendation was accepted 
from Chief of the General Staff, Major-General J.G. Legge,to raise 
immediately an air service for the defence of Australia as the most 
appropriate and inexpensive means of blunting an enemy attack, creation of which
[1] CPD LXXXIV 25 April, 1918 p.4194.
[2] Report of Sir Samuel Griffith CPP Session 1917-18-19 Vol.
4 .p.4.
[3] Proceedings of Governor-General's conference on recruiting, 
loc.cit.
[4] CPD LXXXIV 18 April, 1918 p.4061.
[5] Age 20, 23, 30 April ,1918.
[6] Ibid 1 May ,1918.
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'should not be delayed a day when we realise that they may be needed 
tomorrow'.[1] Steadfast refusal by the government to provide a more 
detailed rationale for the drastic steps regarding the militia did little 
to allay the fears of Labor parliamentarians. [2]
Frustrated in public exposition of the danger, Catts was 
determined to dispel this ignorance within the confines of the federal 
conference as had been done in the councils of the N.S.W. Party, unofficially 
circulating material compiled on the Japanese threat suppressed by the 
Australian censor, including extracts from writings by the Japanese 
imperialist Kayahara Kwazan concerning Australia. [3] A Labor delegate, 
Norman Makin, who was particularly impressed by such information referred 
particularly to Catts as its originator,[4] but the latter was supported no 
less emphatically by certain state colleagues. Another delegate reported
that during the discussion on the question of Defence, the 
attitude of Japan towards Australia was strongly emphasised 
by several of the Eastern States delegates, who detailed many 
instances of how Japan had repeatedly demanded for her subjects 
free entry into Australia. So impressed were many of the 
delegates with the statements which were made in connection with 
this matter that they freely expressed the opinion that not 
another man could leave Australia's shore and that immediate and 
effective steps should be taken for a more adequate defence of 
Australia against a probable invasion by Japan. [5]
[1] Memorandum dated 29 April 1918 quoted by D. Gillison, Royal 
Australian Air Force 1939-1942« Canberra 1962 pp. 1-5;
Sissons' invaluable study Australia's Attitudes to Japan 
and Defence loc cit clearly charts this trend.
[2] CPD LXXXIV 19 April, p.4095; 20 April p.4129; 1 May
pp. 4249-50; 4300-1.
[3] Sissons records the use of this writer shortly after by a
Labor speaker in the South Australian parliament, S.A.P.D. 
(Assembly) 31 July,1918 pp, 51-2, and also the references
to use of such material by then Director of Military 
Intelligence E.L. Piesse in talks with Japanese diplomats. 
Alton-Curzon 23 January £920 No. 33 (F67/67/23). Enclosure 
2 in no. 695. Documents in British Foreign Policy, 1917—
1939. First Series Vol. 6 pp. 953-66.
[4] Report of federal conference delegates, Minutes adjourned 
ULP Council 18 July 1918. W,W. 28 June, 1918.
[5J Don Cameron. Report to officers and delegates, Metropolitan
District Council, ALF 31 June, 1918 adopted Minutes Metropolitan 
D.C. 23 Julyl918. The same report, enclosed in a letter to Lob 
Ross in Melbourne was intercepted by military intelligence. 
Pearce papers NLA B8 MS 213, Series 10.
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C o n t in u in g  s t r a i g h t  on from  th e  d e b a te  on th e  war and r e c r u i t i n g ,  
t h e  V i c t o r i a n  d e l e g a t e s  moved a c c o r d in g  to  t h e i r  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  th e  
p a r t y  a d o p t  as  i t s  d e fe n c e  p la n k  rem ova l  o f  com pulsory  m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  
from  th e  D efence  A c t .  I n  an i n t e r e s t i n g  j u x t a p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  N.S.W. 
r a d i c a l s  Power and S u th e r l a n d  came o u t  a g a i n s t  t h i s  im m e d ia te ly ,  b u t  
Q ueens land  and South  A u s t r a l i a n  spokesm en com plied  w i th  t h e i r  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
by s u p p o r t i n g  i t .  The f i r s t  b r e a k  came when M aurice  B la c k b u rn ,  a d m i t t i n g  
t h a t  he would v o t e  as  d i r e c t e d ,  r e s u r r e c t e d  th e  o ld  a rg u m e n ts ;  a f f i r m i n g  
' t h a t  t h e r e  would be an army i n  A u s t r a l i a  w h e th e r  Labor w an ted  i t  o r  n o t ' ,  
and t h a t  i t  would be  b e t t e r  and more d e m o c r a t i c  t h e r e f o r e  t o  r e t a i n  a 
c i t i z e n s '  army of  com pulsory  t r a i n e e s  s u b j e c t  to  c e r t a i n  s a f e g u a r d s  to  t h e i r  
and th e  n a t i o n ' s  c i v i l  r i g h t s .  C a t t s  to o k  a more p ro m in e n t  p a r t  i n  t h i s  
d e b a te :
T here  was ev e ry  r e a s o n  why A u s t r a l i a  s h o u ld  be  p r e p a r e d  to  
d e fe n d  h e r s e l f ,  and f o r  t h e  C o n fe re n c e  to  a f f i r m  t h a t  
com pulsory  t r a i n i n g  s h o u ld  be  a b o l i s h e d  a l t o g e t h e r  would 
mean t h a t  Labor would have  no r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  
a t  a l l  . . .  I n  1908, a t  t h e  B r i s b a n e  C o n fe re n c e ,  he  had 
been  a g a i n s t  t r a i n i n g  by c o m p u ls io n ,  b u t  s i n c e  th e n  th e  
i r r e s i s t a b l e  l o g i c  of  f a c t s  had com pelled  him to  a d v o c a te  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  home d e f e n c e .  [1]
Tudor a l s o  c la im ed  to  have  changed h i s  v iew s  s i n c e  h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  to  
a d o p t io n  o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  Labor d e fe n c e  p la n k  : ' h e  had to  c o n f e s s  t h a t  h i s  
e x p e r i e n c e  d u r in g  th e  l a s t  t e n  y e a r s  was such  as  t o  a l t e r  h i s  v iew s  on i t . '  
S i x t e e n  s p e a k e r s  opposed a b o l i t i o n  of  com pulso ry  t r a i n i n g ,  i n c l u d i n g  
t h e  w hole  N.S.W. and Tasm ania  d e l e g a t i o n s .  Only t h e  V i c t o r i a n s  
rem a in ed  s o l i d  i n  f a v o r  of t h e i r  m o t io n ,  and of t h e i r  number no l e s s  th a n  
f o u r  s t a t e d  t h a t  th e y  d id  so  o u t  of  p a r t y  l o y a l t y  b u t  would h a v e  p r e f e r r e d  
t o  have  v o te d  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  [2]
[1] M inu te s  p .  8 . C a t t s ,  O 'K eefe  and S h o o b r id g e  l e f t  c o n fe r e n c e  
t h a t  a f t e r n o o n  f o r  t h e  e a s t  b u t  w ere  p e r m i t t e d  t o  r e c o r d  
v o t e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  V i c t o r i a n  p r o p o s a l .
[2] H ollow ay and A rch . S te w a r t  rem ained  l o y a l  ; B e n n e t t ,  
B la c k b u rn ,  B a rnes  and S c u l l i n  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  
v iew s  f a v o r e d  r e t e n t i o n  o f  c o m p u ls io n .  I b i d  p p .  8 -9 .  
B la c k b u rn  and S c u l l i n  w ere  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s a p p o in tm e n t s  to  
t h e  r a d i c a l s  d u r in g  th e  c o n f e r e n c e  g e n e r a l l y .  Cameron-Ross 
24 J u n e ,  1918. R.S .  Ross p a p e r s  NLA JAF 5 6 / 1 / 4 0 .  See 
B l a c k b u r n 's  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  h i s  own a t t i t u d e ,  Labor C a l l
8 May 1919. The w hole  i s s u e  b lew  up a g a in  a t  t h e  
V i c t o r i a n  s t a t e  c o n f e r e n c e ,  1919. I b i d . 22 ,  29 May, 1919.
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All the other delegations split over the proposal in following 
debate in which 10 of 28 speakers referred directly or indirectly to the 
Japanese threat. Victorians Scullin and Barnes and Queenslanders McCormack 
and Fihelly in particular alluded to Japan in justifying their decisions 
to break with instructions and the effect of that issue can be gauged when 
the seconder of the motion, Bennett, admitted that,’had the 1917 Victorian 
State Conference been in possession of what Conference had learned, different 
instructions would have been given regarding the compulsory clauses of the 
Defence Act'. McCormack was satisfied on his part that 'had information 
which had been put before them that day been available at the last Labor- 
in-Politics Convention of Queensland Labor Party ... a different direction 
would have been given to Queensland delegates on this question'.[1J 
References to Japan were far more explicit than the publicly released 
Report discloses, particularly the speeches by Scullin, Barnes, Mutch and 
Fihelly which combined in varying degrees fears of commercial penetration 
by Japan, a challenge to the White Australia policy or outright invasion.
Scullin. Delegates knew what had been happening since the war 
broke out in relation to a nation which had been garrisoning 
ports, controlling dockyards and arsenals, acquiring mines and 
building ships - emerging practically from bankruptcy, now to 
national opulence and able to lend both munitions and money to 
the Allies ... Australians should know that this menace was 
there. The statements which Mr. Hughes had made, as to pressure 
being put on Australia, were correct; but, knowing that, the 
Prime Minister should have assisted to keep men in Australia, 
instead of leading a conscription campaign to force citizens of 
the Commonwealth to fight far from home overseas.[2]
Mutch ...believed that a White Australia was definitely threatened 
now. If there were going to be trouble with Japan, that trouble 
would arise by reason of her planting her commerce here .., Japan 
was seeking a commercial conquest of Australia, and was not likely 
to give up that without something being done to satisfy her 
either in that or other directions.[3]
Fihelly. Australia's battlefront was not in the North Sea, or in 
Flanders : it was here ... Australia was far from Europe and the 
white races and had to be prepared to do her best,[4]
[1] Minutes, p.9.
[2] Ib id, p. 8.
[3] Ibid, p. 9.
[4] Ibid.
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Unsurprisingly then, the Victorian proposal was knocked down 
by 13-9, at least several of the initial supporters crossing sides for 
the vote.[l] Instead it was decided to retain compulsory training in 
the revised defence plank, modifying its application to only those between 
21-25 years and also keeping the provision for mass mobilisation within 
Australia in time of war. Having made this fundamental choice the rest 
came easier, conference deciding next day, Saturday 22 June, to refer the 
matter of detail reforms to yet another committee, comprising Ryan 
(Queensland), Rae (N.S.W.), Blackburn (Victoria), Grealy (S.A.), Cameron 
(W.A.) and Barnes (Victoria), ’to make the recommendations it may deem 
necessary to democratise the Defence Act to safeguard civil liberty, 
rights of conscience and of industrial organisation[2] On Sunday 
afternoon this committee reported back with a long list of matters 
representing advanced party thinking on the administration of defence, 
which were adopted with minor changes. Most notable deletion was of a 
clause proclaiming ’No man to be compelled to serve outside the Australian 
Commonwealth', objected to by Collins, Holloway and Curtin, despite 
Blackburn’s assurance that it included Australian territories within the 
Commonwealth, and the clause failed to gain a two-thirds majority for 
inclusion. Labor’s defence plank now became a massive component of the 
federal platform, replacing the brief two lines aproved almost exactly one 
decade ago.
A.L.P. Defence plank, June, 1918
Amendment of the Defence Act to secure:
(a) No military training for persons not entitled to vote.
(b) Compulsory training between earliest voting age and four ye rs 
afterwards. Employees to be trained in employers' time, and 
without deduction of wages; payment of standard wages for 
time spent in camp.
(c) Obligation of training to be enforced in civil courts only.
[1] Inexplicably Ryan himself was not present during the debate, 
saving him embarrassment later when McCormack and Fihelly 
narrowly escaped censure for disregard of instructions. 
Queensland state executive minutes 12 October,1918.
[2] Minutes, p.9.
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(d) P ro ceed in g s of c o u r ts - m a r t ia l  to  be p u b l i c ,  w ith  
r ig h t  o f ap p ea l to  c i v i l  c o u r t .
(e ) No p e n a l t i e s  to  be im posed ex ce p t in  p u rsu an ce  of 
e x p l i c i t  enac tm en ts of Commonwealth P a r lia m e n t.
( f )  In ten d e d  r e g u la t io n s  to  be p u b lic ly  a d v e r t i s e d ,  and 
r e g u la t io n s  to  have no e f f e c t  a t  a l l  t i l l  b e fo re  b o th  
H ouses, e i t h e r  o f w hich may v e to .
(g) L im ita t io n  o f p r o f e s s io n a l  s o ld ie r s  to  n e c e ssa ry  
i n s t r u c t io n  and a d m in is t r a t iv e  and w orking s t a f f .
(h) A b o li t io n  of m i l i t a r y  o a th s .
( i )  A b o li t io n  o f d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een com m issioned and 
non-com m issioned o f f i c e r s .
( j )  R eco g n itio n  of p r in c ip le  o f e l e c t io n  o f q u a l i f i e d  
c a n d id a te s  as o f f i c e r s .
(k) S a lu te  and o th e r  u s e le s s  d i s c i p l in e  to  be a b o lis h e d .
( l )  No employment of o r  in te r f e r e n c e  by s o ld ie r s  in  
i n d u s t r i a l  d is p u te s .  Punishm ent o f M in is te r s  and 
o th e r  p e rso n s  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  b reac h  o f t h i s  p ro v is io n .
(m) C i t iz e n s ,  on com ple tion  o f t r a i n in g ,  to  r e t a i n  arms 
d e l iv e r e d  to  them d u rin g  t r a i n in g .
(n) P erso n s under v o tin g  age n o t to  be c a l le d  up in  
tim e o f w ar.
(o) P ro c lam a tio n  of com pulsory s e rv ic e  to  c o n ta in  an 
e x p re ss  d e c la r a t io n  o f th e  im m ediate p e r i l  o f A u s t r a l i a ,  
and to  be l a i d  w ith in  14 days b e fo re  b o th  H ouses, e i t h e r  
o f w hich may d is a llo w  th e  c a l l in g  up.
(p) D efence A cts to  r e q u ir e  annual ren ew a l, as in  
E ngland.
(q) No r a i s i n g  o f fo rc e s  fo r  s e rv ic e  o u ts id e  th e  Common­
w e a lth ,  o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  o r p rom ise  o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  
in  any fu tu r e  o v e rsea s  w ar, ex ce p t by d e c is io n  o f
th e  p eo p le  by I n i t i a t i v e  and Referendum.
( r )  No c o n s c ie n tio u s  o b je c to r s  to  be p u t to  any k in d  of 
com batant t r a in in g  o r  s e r v ic e .
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One o t h e r  m a t t e r  c o n c e rn in g  th e  war was s e t t l e d  on t h e  l a s t  
day j Monday 2 4 th  J u n e ,  w i th  c o n fe r e n c e  e x p r e s s in g  Ti t s  e a r n e s t  hope 
t h a t ,  i n  n e g o t i a t i n g  f o r  p e a c e ,  B r i t a i n  w i l l  n o t  be  d e la y e d  o r  
e m b a r ra s s e d  by th e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  i n s i s t s  on th e  r e t e n t i o n  
o f  th e  c a p tu r e d  P a c i f i c  p o s s e s s i o n s ’ . [1] P r im a f a c i e  p r a i s e w o r th y  i n  
i t s  s e l f l e s s n e s s ,  t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n  was approved  a f t e r  d e l e t i o n  o f  an 
accom panying c l a u s e  s u p p ly in g  th e  r a t i o n a l e :  'On grounds  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
m o r a l i t y  and n a t i o n a l  n e c e s s i t y  th e  p e o p le  o f  t h i s  v a s t  Commonwealth 
ca n n o t  s u b s c r i b e  to  t h e  d o c t r i n e  t h a t  c o n q u e s t  c r e a t e s  r i g h t s  o f  
a n n e x a t i o n ' .  B la c k b u r n 's  ' v i t a l  n a t i o n a l  r e a s o n s '  why A u s t r a l i a  c o u ld  
n o t  ad m it  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  amounted i n  e f f e c t  t o  t h e  hope t h a t  J a p a n ' s  
t e r r i t o r i a l  advance  m ig h t  n o t  even  now be  l e g i t i m i s e d .  [2] I t  was 
an a p p r o p r i a t e  f i n a l  r e m in d e r  o f  t h e  p r e s e n c e  w hich  had f e a r f u l l y  overhung  
each  o f  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e b a te s  a t  P e r t h .
'L a b o r  u n i t e d  means L abor  t r i u m p h a n t ' : t h e  b i d  f o r  p a r t y  u n i t y ,  1918.
As a g re e d  on by f e d e r a l  c o n fe r e n c e  i t  th e n  became n e c e s s a r y  
to  s e l l  t h e  r e c r u i t i n g  r e s o l u t i o n  to  an e s t i m a t e d  t h r e e - q u a r t e r  m i l l i o n  
p a r t y  and a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n  members th ro u g h o u t  A u s t r a l i a .  [3 ]  N e i t h e r  war 
n o r  r e c r u i t i n g  p r o p o s a l s  w ere  d iv u lg e d  u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  c l o s e  o f  
c o n fe r e n c e  on 24 J u n e ,  when th e y  e l i c i t e d  p r e d i c t a b l y  mixed r e a c t i o n s  i n
[1] I b i d , p . l l .
[2]  A l lu d in g  to  t h e  G overnm en t 's  w ar aims l a t e r ,  C a t t s  
a l s o  employed s i m i l a r  a rg u m e n ts ; ' I f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  
f o r c e  i s  t o  be  e n th r o n e d ,  w here  does  A u s t r a l i a  come i i  . 
For  i f  we d e c l a r e  t h a t  t h e  s t r e n g t h  t o  annex  t e r r i t o r y  
s h a l l  form  th e  t i t l e  to  t e r r i t o r y ,  th e n  Heaven s a v e  us^ 
f o r  o u r  own t i t l e  deeds  may b e  c h a l l e n g e d  on t h e  same 
p r i n c i p l e  much e a r l i e r  th a n  i s  good f o r  o u r  h e a l t h ' .
J . H . C a t t s ,  The S ta n d p o in t  o f  A u s t r a l i a n  L abo r  on th e  
War and R e c r u i t i n g . J u ly  ? 1918. C a t t s  p a p e r s  NLA 6 5 8 /1 /  
Typ.D. 1918. p . 5 .
P r e s s  r e l e a s e  n . d .  ALF s t a t e  e x e c u t iv e  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . 
F i l e  69, I n t e r s t a t e  C ongress  P e r t h  1918.
[ 3 ]
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the labor press, some feeling that conference had gone too far [1] and 
others that it had not gone far enough. [2] The ballot was drafted 
by a committee appointed by conference [3] and sought to elicit a Yes/No 
response to the conditions laid down for further participation in the 
recruiting campaign. After one false start, in which both the attitudes 
on the war and recruiting were included for verification upon the 
paper, necessitating publication of a new ballot, [4] the question was 
submitted together with conference's recommendation for an affirmative 
answer and the reply of the movement in the six states was awaited.
Chief architect of the policy, Jimmy Catts, lost little time 
in defending it in a manifesto explaining the Perth decisions, widely 
reproduced in the Labor press. 'Since we entered the bloody scrimmage 
under the captaincy of our senior partner in the British Empire Unlimited, 
have the rules and regulations beeen changed, and that without consulting 
us? ... We are in honest doubt?’ Hughes' bellicose utterances concerning 
economic and territorial war aims, Catts said, Labor found both unworthy 
and dangerous, demanding to know how much Britain concurred in them and 
reserving Australia's right to base its estimate of the level of her 
contribution upon industrial needs and domestic defence criteria.
That policy places Australia first ... Unfortunately the 
War Precautions Act prohibits plain speaking or the public- 
cation of facts of urgent importance to the public inter­
est. Labor demands to know all and to then test the 
knowledge by untramelled investigation ... Let us 
unite to accept en masse the determination of the Perth 
Conference. It had facts before it which we are not 
allowed to repeat to the public ... Labor united means 
Labor triumphant. [5]
[1] Daily Post 26 June, 1918.
[2] Daily Standard 26 June, 1918.
[3] Report 1918 federal conference p. 50. It comprised 
P. O'Loghlen (W.A.), Arthur Rae (NSW) and the 
Victorians Arch Stewart and M. Blackburn but in prac­
tice O'Loghlen was ignored and it appears that respon­
sibility was taken by Victoria, Stewart being the federal 
secretary. Minutes ALF state executive 28 October, 1918.
[4] Ibid. 5 August, 1918; Queensland Central Political 
Executive Minutes 1 August, 1918.
[5] The Standpoint of Australian Labor on the War and 
Recruiting, pp. 6-7.
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Some state Labor parties responded readily: in Brisbane the state
executive resolved to ask the Labor newspapers for support, strongly 
urged as high an affirmative vote as possible and accepted the assistance 
of the local Peace Alliance to secure that result. [1] The Tasmanian 
party organisation began conducting its poll with the support of the 
Labor newspaper, [ 2 ] and likewise in the west the ALF fell in with the 
scheme [3] In Melbourne the Victorian executive endorsed the policy 
on 6 September and commended it to the members, [4] followed by the 
Trades Hall Council. [5]
Within a short time the sheer effort involved in such an 
unprecedented enterprise had become apparent, with complaints that 
the task of conducting a vote necessitated full-time organisation 
arising from some quarters, [6] and the fear was also expressed of 
provoking a backlash within the party. Eventually the Western Australians 
began to wire other parties requesting convening of the federal 
executive immediately to decide on future action. [7] The South 
Australian party was able to consider the Perth proposals at its state 
conference in early September and endorsed the attitude on recruiting; 
however on the advice of its PLP leaders and over federal delegate 
Makin’s protest it decided not to implement the ballot and simply 
reaffirm its 1917 decision to leave recruiting up to the individual.
[1] Queensland CPE Minutes 1 August, 1918.
[2] Minutes Tasmanian state executive 14 August,
1918. World 21 September, 1918.
[3] Minutes ALF state executive 5 August, 2 September, 1918.
[4] Argus 7 September, 1918.
[5] Minutes Melbourne THC 26 September, 1918.
[6] Secretary, Metropolitan District Council, ALF 
General Secretary, state executive 27 August, 1918.
ALF state executive correspondence, 1918.
[7] Minutes ALF state executive 7 October, 1918.
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AWU boss Frank Lundie objected to the very form of the ballot and 
feared that the rank and file would reject it, while conference 
chairman Lionel Hill MLA assured delegates that compliance with the 
direction was not mandatory and received almost unanimous endorsement. Ilj
However greatest adverse reaction arose in New South Wales, 
source of the most radical initiatives on the war of all the Labor 
parties, stemming from state and federal parliamentarians opposed to 
the federal conference recommendations. Senator Gardiner had agreed 
there to cooperate in a renewed volunteer recruiting campaign with state 
authorities and began low-key platform appearances urging eligibles to 
search their consciences. [2] He was emulated by PLP leader and 
deputy-leader John Storey and James Dooley, [3] while Con Wallace, 
federal member for Hughes’ vacated seat of West Sydney, suited the 
action to the word by himself enlisting at the end of the month. [4]
Other NSW federal parliamentarians were prepared to go even further, 
despite a request by state executive for all members of parliament to 
refrain from further recruiting activity until the plebiscite had been 
taken .[5] On 2 September a confidential manifesto was circulated 
within the NSW party signed by a majority of federal members opposing 
the state executive’s advocacy of a Yes vote. These parliamentarians 
argued that at every election and referendum campaign since 1914 they 
had firmly supported the voluntary system, individually and as a body. 
They claimed approval of "the Perth policy would tempt introduction of 
conscription by legislation and would be tantamount to abandonment 
of the men in the trenches:
[1] Minutes ULP state conference 13 September, 1918.
[2] Daily/Telegraph,1 August, 1918.
[3] Sun, 7 August, 1918.
[4] Daily Telegraph, 28 August, 1918.
[5] Ibid. 4 September, 1918; Jaunc.ey, Conscription in 
Australia, p.336.
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a distinct breach of faith with the electors and a base 
desertion of our soldiers. Such a step would be disastrous 
to the movement at a time when all should aim at solidarity 
and closing up our ranks to make a united effort to secure 
the reins of government in the Federal and State Parlia­
ments, in order to protect the interests of the people in 
the very serious industrial and financial problems which will 
arise out of the war. [1]
Basically the disagreement came down to a question of authority in the 
ALP, federal members refusing to be bound by recommendation of the 
federal conference or state executive and positing a higher 
responsibility to the electorate at large.
The policy of the movement is that the platform and 
pledges given to electors shall be adhered to at this 
critical juncture in order to protect the best 
interests of Labor, and we earnestly ask you to vote 
No.
This appeal was signed by the three Senators and six 
members: Senators Gardiner, McDougall and Grant; Messrs. M. Charlton,
S.R. Nicholls, Edward Riley, Con. Wallace, Dave Watkins and J.E. West.
Only three NSW FPLP members abstained - Catts, who repudiated it, [2]/' 
Arthur Blakeley and Mick Considine. W.G. Mahony was out of town at 
the time but was also reported to have been active advising league 
branches against endorsement of the plank, so can be counted amongst the 
dissidents. [3] Given the denial in 1916 by federal executive of any 
state party's ability to direct FPLP members and Tudor's insistence in 
Perth on a free vote on the matter there was little the NSW executive 
could do when caucus members remained adamant,except to issue a 
statement through P.C. Evans acknowledging the right of those individuals 
to state their views but regretting publication of the manifesto 
because of the difficulties of reply by the other side imposed by a strict
[1] Age 3 September, 1918.
[2] Daily Telegraph 4 September, 1918.
[3] Argus 30 September, 1918.
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c e n so rsh ip . W ell m ight C a tts  lam ent i n a b i l i t y  to  use  h is  b e s t  
a rg u m en ts :
. . .  n e i th e r  o r a l l y  nor in  w r i t in g ,  p u b l ic ly  n o r p r iv a t e ly ,  
may one f r e e ly  d is c u s s  th e  main b a s ic  f a c t s  upon w hich th e  
P e r th  co n fe ren c e  adop ted  th e  war and r e c r u i t i n g  r e s o lu t io n s  
w ith  on ly  two d i s s e n t i e n t s .  And th o se  d i s s e n t i e n t s  
o b je c te d  on ly  to  th e  m o d era tio n  of th e  P e r th  co n fe re n c e  
r e s o lu t io n s .  [1]
The NSW group s t ru c k  re sp o n s iv e  chords in  o th e r  FPLP 
members. F in la y so n , MHR f o r  B risb a n e , su p p o rted  th e  c la im  o f f i d e l t y  to  th e  
ALP 1917 f e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n  p la tfo rm  p rom ising  su p p o rt f o r  th e  w ar and 
v o lu n ta ry  re in fo rc e m e n ts , [2] and c laim ed  th a t  s e v e r a l  V ic to r ia n  
c o lle a g u e s  w ere p re p a re d  to  su p p o rt r e c r u i t in g  r e g a rd le s s  o f th e  b a l l o t  
r e s u l t .  [3 ] F u rtherm ore  he was quo ted  to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  NSW
a t t i t u d e  re p re s e n te d  ’90%' of th e  members of f e d e r a l  caucus and th a t  even 
f e d e r a l  c o n fe ren c e  d e c is io n s  cou ld  n o t a b ro g a te  e l e c t i o n  p rom ises under 
any c irc u m sta n c e s . [4] F in la y so n  was su p p o rted  by S en a to r  Long and 
V ic to r ia n s  Fenton and McGrath, [5] th u s  making a t  l e a s t  14 d e c la re d  
opponents o f f e d e r a l  p o l ic y  ou t of 34 FPLP members. T u d o r 's  p o s i t i o n  as 
caucus le a d e r  was d i f f i c u l t ;  hav ing  opposed r a d ic a l  su g g e s tio n s  in  P e r th  
and lo o k in g  w ith  d is f a v o r  even upon th e  f i n a l  com prom ise, he was now 
faced  w ith  w hat was b e in g  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  h e ra ld e d  as an im pending s p l i t  
by th e  non-L abor p re s s  and was reduced  to  making so o th in g  s ta te m e n ts .  [6] 
When caucus met in  M elbourne on 17 -  18 Septem ber i t  uph e ld  th e  
r ig h t  of members to  s ta n d  by t h e i r  e l e c to r a l  u n d e rta k in g s  and vouchsafed  
them a f r e e  hand . [7] F in la y s o n 's  c la im  would seem to  be b o rne  o u t
[1] D aily  T e leg rap h  4 Septem ber, 1918; CPD LXXXV 25 
Septem ber, 1918. p . 6378.
[2] Q ueensland W orker 5 , 19, 26 Septem ber, 1918.
[3] World 4 Septem ber, 1918.
[4] A rgus, 4 Septem ber, 1918.
[5] W orld, 4 Septem ber; Argus 7 Septem ber, 1918.
[6] I b i d . 5 Septem ber, 1 9 1 8 .[7 ] . I b i d . 19 Septem ber, 1918;
FPLP.17-18 Septem ber, 1918.
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concerning the majority view by Senator O'Loghlin's report to his
own state that ...'after he had explained to the Federal Caucus the attitude 
of the (S.A.) annual conference on the recruiting ballot nearly all the 
members agreed that a commonsense step had been taken', [l]
In Sydney the manifesto encouraged those otherwise vulnerable to 
state executive suasion to adopt a correspondingly bold attitude. While 
the PLP took no action as a group it was reported that all but a half 
dozen or so members exploited the terms of the plebiscite allowing 
campaigning on both sides to actively urge their respective branches to 
reject the recruiting policy, following the example of Storey himself in 
his Balmain electorate . [2] State executive countered with another 
circular not challenging the constitutional rights of FPLP members to 
differ but arguing that pledges made on the hustings four years previously 
were irrelevant to the current situation. It rather ingenously maintained 
that the Labor policy did not imply hostility to voluntarism - which was 
regarded as moribund in any case, having been largely replaced with 
economic conscription of employees - and defended the strength of objections 
to a continued maximum effort : the need for ascertainment of manpower 
required to defend against 'any stray international burglar who might visit 
out shores if every able-bodied man was sent abroad', and to keep the wheels 
of industrial production turning for domestic demand ,'with a little bit 
over for the soldiers belonging to the Motherland and her friends in 
Europe'. [3]. Executive also publicised an undertaking extracted from several 
N.S.W. dissidents to abide by whatever result emerged from the plebiscite .[4]
[1] Minutes ULP Council 10 October,1918.
[2] Sun 19, 25 September,1918.
[3] The Labor Referendum on Recruiting n.d. Typescript insert, 
Material concerning the Industrial Section, Molesworth 
papers ML. 243/3/J.
[4] Minutes ALF state executive 28 October,1918.
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It was obvious that the plebiscite, after serving as an 
inducement to compromise in Perth, had become an acute embarrassment 
to the ALP, to be down-played as much as possible. On 2 September 
the Director of War Propaganda weighed in with an ’Open Letter to the 
Voters in the Recruiting Referendum of the ALP’, questioning the 
assumptions behind the Perth policy. D.K. Picken, the Director, 
claimed this as a purely personal gesture devoid of any Government 
instigation but utilised the extensive facilities at his disposal to 
achieve widespread mailing and press coverage.[1] Whether affected 
by this or not, sufficient N.S.W. union executives returned plebiscite 
material unopened to Labor head office to alarm state executive into 
warning that non-cooperation was both unconstitutional and reducing 
the plebiscite to a farce.[2] Partly due to this abstention by 
opponents and to a decision by the Sydney Labor Council to urge an 
affirmative vote,after favoring abandonment under the excuse of 
Pincken’s interference constituting Government intervention in the 
ballot, and an automatic implementation of the policy [3], the return 
of papers filled out revealed an easy majority for Yes.[4] Supporters 
like Catts were also able to mobilise support from several electorate 
councils,[5] but feelings within the party remained agitated.[6]
Interstate the same experience resulted, with the Tasmanians 
suspending their ballot after seven weeks due to what it called 'changed 
circumstances’,[7] thereby joining South Australia in refusal to comply 
with the federal request. Even the authors of the Perth compromise 
attempted, not altogether satisfactorily, to minimise its implication,
[1] Sun, 26 September,1918.
[2] Daily Telegraph, 4 October^1918.
[3] Minutes Executive meeting Sydney Labor Council,
17 September; General meetings 19 September,
3 and 15 October,1918.
[4] Daily Telegraph 20, 26 Septemberj1918.
[5] Ibid 12 October,1918.
[6] Even on formal occasions such as the Lithgow Eight Hours 
Day banquet, where public disagreement errupted. Ibid 
14 October,1918.
[7] Minutes Tasmanian state executive, 9 October,1918.
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Ryan explaining that it sought only to emphasise a basis for negotiations, 
and if carried would merely restrict official Labor participation in 
raising troops but not the right of any member of the movement to enlist.[1] 
Catts made the same distinction and stressed that no unilateral pull-out 
was contemplated, nor an opposition to financing and resupply of the AIF. [2] 
The situation had so deteriorated that the federal executive meeting 
urged by W.A. since early October was finally set for 6 November,with 
the alternatives being adherence to the plebiscite result, declaration of 
its adoption regardless or abandonment altogether. Providentially, in 
view of the apparent collapse of the Central Powers in Europe and 
optimistic reports of an early armistice, the executive was enabled to 
hail the approaching peace, congratulate itself upon the similarities 
between Labor’s peace plank and President Wilson's 14 Points and grate­
fully declare that, in view of the situation, perseverance with the 
ballot was unnecessary, although a manpower investigation in anticipation 
of demobilisation problems remained desirable.[3] As a matter of 
principle however the two defaulting parties were castigated.
It was pointed out very forcibly to the representatives of 
these states that such action would mean the overthrow of 
federal authority, and if each state was to decide for itself 
questions of Commonwealth policy, the Party could not exist 
as a national organisation; eventually it was resolved that 
both states be informed that their action was a breach of 
authority of the interstate conference, and they be called 
upon to submit a full explanation of their action to the 
interstate conference in June next. [4]
[1] QPD CXX 4 September, 1918 pp. 2011-2014.
[2] CPD LXXXV 25 September, 1918, pp. 6374-6384.
[3] Labor News 16 November ,1918.
Report federal executive delegates 16 December, 1918. 
ALP state executive correspondence, file 85. Reports : 
General.
[4]
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Such a directive was perfectly reasonable given Labor structure and 
traditions but was rather irrelevant where federal conference itself 
had been too timid to make a firm decision and had excused itself by 
reference to the susceptibilities of the smaller states.[1]
While events had thus rescued the ALP from its dilemma, 
significant returns from the plebiscite were already at hand and known 
to be in the affirmative. Federal returning officer, E.J. Holloway, 
was able to report later that of the four branches participating, all 
had given a gratifying approval of federal recruiting policy ; Queensland 
by the widest margin of 3:1, Victoria and N.S.W. by 2:1 majorities each 
and Western Australia by 'an affirmative majority'.[2] While these 
proportions should be treated with suspicion, for the reasons suggested 
in connection with N.S.W. above, and because exact figures cannot be 
found to give an indication of the representativeness of this result, 
there can be no doubting the prevalence of a genuine rank and file 
antipathy to further recruitment in 1918, stemming from causes ranging 
from simple war-weariness through disaffection with the aims of 
participation, to practical demands for conservation of forces to face a 
more immediately threatening potential enemy. All these underlay the 
powerful call at Perth for Australian withdrawal from support for the war, 
which the radicals merely served to focus. The plebiscite episode in the 
ALP comprised a bizarre finale to the world war, being singular indeed 
for even a party in politica^pposition to poll its members on participation 
in a current conflict and a unique tactic in Labor politics difficult to 
envisage under any other circumstances. Had the war continued, develop-* 
ments can only be speculated upon but as the conditions stipulated for 
continued support of recruiting were unlikely to be met by the Government, 
the radicals would undoubtedly have pressed for a rigorous attitude.
[1] Nevertheless the federal executive did later rule 'That 
all Congress (i.e. federal conference) decisions are 
binding on all States under all circumstances'. Report 
federal executive delegates Minutes ALF state executive, 
2 July,1919.
Federal executive report, Report ALP federal conference, 
1919, p.13.
[2]
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Expectations of a split over this at the time were unwarranted but an 
aggressive policy against the war is conceivable given the perceptible 
shift in attitudes stemming from left-wing minority discontent in 1914 
to the massive uneasiness evident by 1918. Equally, while the policy 
adopted was an unsatisfactory compromise in the interests of party unity, 
revealing in the manner of its devising and submission to the movement at 
large the significant desire for consensus, the loss of confidence and 
authority of the federal leadership in the fields of defence and foreign 
policy was clearly apparent. In effect, the first serious reconsideration 
by conference of these policies since 1908 saw the threatened eclipse of 
FPLP perogatives in essentially federal parliamentary issues,by the same 
independent state initiatives which compelled the FPLP to split in 1916, 
barely prevented by an ambitious federal caucus member and a strong, 
capable Labor Premier. Considering the narrowness of the radical defeat 
one of the intractable figures at Perth, Don Cameron, wrote confidently
I am satisfied that Tudor, Ryan and others who helped to 
defeat us are very much impressed with the fight we put 
up - although we had not crystallised our ideas in the 
shape of decisions as they have done - we are that close 
on their heels that I will be very much surprised if they 
don’t shift some.[l]
How far this pattern marked an aberration from the long established norm 
was a central problem for the post-war ALP.
[1] Cameron-Ross 24 June,1918. R.S. Ross papers NLA JAF 
56/1/40.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ALP defence and foreign policies - 1919-1930
The state of the parties post-1918
During the 1914 - 18 war the ALP policy making process 
had been tested to the limits and the established superiority over 
defence and foreign relations of the FPLP leaders barely maintained 
during the last year of the conflict, at the cost of moving a 
considerable distance towards the radical position on Australia’s 
part in the war. The challenge had developed out of the conscription 
crisis which split the FPLP, New South Wales, South Australian and 
Western Australian parties and deeply impressed the other three 
state parties. However the structure for decision making remained sub­
stantially unchanged with the only new factor being the federal 
executive of the ALP, an initial failure whose effectiveness changed 
only slowly after the war.
The reason for this is that the executive does little or 
nothing in between meetings. It is often on the wrong 
side of the ledger and its secretary (Mr. Stewart) has 
his own work to attend to ... Lacking persistence and 
continuity the executive is largely a futility; it 
’recommends’, and ’proposes’ and ’suggests’ but to a 
large extent relies upon the state executives to mutually 
consent to and finalise its work; if they fail to agree to 
a given proposition, then the prospects are that the 
proposition will die still-born. [1]
A real role for this organisation was only established by attempts to 
restore order within the NSW Labor party in the interwar period and 
its influence either in policy formation or interpretation was minimal.
FPLP leadership during the twenties was at best indifferent, 
depending upon the vagaries of the availability of talent. Tudor 
remained leader until his death in 1922, having always been overshadowed 
on issues by people such as Catts, whose unwise embroilment in NSW
[1] Report of W.A. federal executive delegates A. Clementson 
and T.J. Lutey. Minutes W.A. state executive 2 
July, 1919.
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faction fighting brought about his eclipse in caucus, where he was 
succeeded as secretary by AWU man Arthur Blakely, then expulsion in 
1922. The intended successor to Tudor, T.J. Ryan, had a tragically 
brief presence before his untimely death in 1921 and leader from 
1 9 2 2 .  was NSW member Mathew Charlton whose admirable personal charm 
was not matched by the drive or intellect for successful tenure of 
high office. Only after the accession to the leadership of J.H. Scullin 
and E.G. Theodore's delayed entry into federal parliament in 1927 
did this situation improve. The others - men such as Brennan, Anstey 
and Fenton - were unsuited to the highest office and the dearth 
of talent was accentuated by lack of experience in the FPLP once for­
mer ministers such as Higgs, Mahon and Gardiner made their several 
exits from federal politics in the early twenties.
Despite the importance of pressure groups and factions 
during 1916-18, the end of the war inaugurated a period of structural 
stability in most Labor parties offering little opportunity for 
radical successes. In Victoria a long era of rule by a stable elite 
began, even the VSP surviving the difficult parturition of a Communist 
faction only to encounter an ever decreasing influence in the Labor 
party. Most consistent pressure for change came from the Victorian 
ARU but the few brief and unsatisfactory Labor governments in that 
state during the twenties caused little by way of change. [1]
Queensland unions began to run into difficulties and disillusionment 
with the Labor regimes running uninterruptedly there from 1915l-1929 
from the very end of the war [2]and a series of bitter clashes 
developed. Divisions between the principle unions separated the 
AWU, usually supporting the governments, from the ARU branch whose 
radical leaders were ruthlessly driven out of the party. Efforts 
at organisation of an industrial section by the Ironworkers in late 
1926 and the Brisbane TLC in 1927 — 28 to compel a more responsive
[1] D. Rawson The Organisation of the ALP, 1954; L.J.
Louis Trade Onions and the Depression, Canberra, 1968.
[2] T. Cutler Sunday, Bloody Sunday. The Townsville 
Meatworkers' Strike of 1918-19'. in J. Iremonger and 
others, Strikes . Sydney, 1973.
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attitude in the party were abortive . [1] AWU conservatism was a 
great influence also in South Australia, where that union maintained 
a dominant role in the party and radical influence was so negligible 
as to barely affect party aims and methods . [2 Western Australian 
Labor had realigned itself with the rest of the ALP in the last 
years of the war and with the departure of radicals such as Cameron 
to work in more rewarding fields in the eastern states the way was 
left clear for consolidation of moderate-parliamentary leadership 
and the problems of smallness and communications altered only 
gradually. [3] With J.A. Lyons as PLP leader Tasmanian Labor had 
a brief flirtation with the OBU and the socialisation objective in 
the early post-war years,due as much to the enthusiasm of Lyons 
himself as to the insistence of militant unions, but once Lyons had 
a real prospect of office these radical aims were disregarded, 
along with principle sections of the party platform, in the interests 
of the electoral victory enjoyed from 1923 - 8. [4]
Most action occurred in the NSW branch ,where the factiona­
lism engendered during the war, far from abating, continued with 
redoubled fury producing a length period of high instability and 
culminating in the dictatorship of J.T. Lang and his group at the end
[1] A.A. Morrison /Militant Labour in Queensland, 1912-1927.' 
RAHS. 38,5 1952 pp.209--234;E.M.Higgins, ’Queensland 
Labor: Trade Unionists versus Premiers’,H.S. 9,34 May,
1960.pp.140-155; E.H. Lane Dawn to Dusk Brisbane, 193$
H.McQueen,’Labor versus the* Unions’. Arena 20,1969 .pp.23-34.
[2] D. Hop good ,' The View from Head Office: The S.A. Labor 
Political Machine, 1917-30'.Politics 6, 1 May, 1971 
pp.70-8; J. Playford A History of the Left Wing of the 
S.A. Labor Movement, 1908-1938. B.A. honors, Adelaide 1958.
[3] D. Black #’The Collier Government, 1924-1930*.University 
Studies in Western Australian History 3, 3 October, 1959 
pp.58-70.
[4] M. McRae ,'The Tasmanian Labour Party and Trade Unions, 
1903-1923*. Tasmanian Historical Research Association 5,
1955 pp.4-13; P.R. Hart,’J.A. Lyons, Tasmanian Labour 
Leader*. Labour History 9, November 1965 pp.33-42.
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of the decade. [i] The NSW story during the twenties was important 
not only in itself but for the effect upon federal Labor politics. One 
of the first developments in NSW after the war was the determination 
of the AWU and parliamentarians to destroy the Industrial Vigilance Council
[1] This fascinating period has been extensively
researched, major sources being Rawson op.cit.:
. IE. Young, Conflict within the NSW Labour Party,
1919-34. M.A. Sydney, .1961 and The Impact of J.T. Lang 
on the NSW Labor Party 1929-43’.M.A. University NSW 
1963; 'Catholics and the NSW Labor Party, 1919 - 39’.
APSA News 6, 4 November 1961 pp.19-30; ’Changes within 
the NSW Branch of the Australian Workers' Union in 
1919-24.'Journal of Industrial Relations 6, 1 March,
1964 pp.51-60; 'A.C. Willis: Welsh Nonconformist and 
the Labor Party in New South Wales, 1911-33’. Journal 
of Religious History 2, 1962-3 pp.303-13. Also 
M. Dixson Reformists and Revolutionaries: an interpre­
tation of the relations between the socialists and 
mass Labor organisations in N.S.W. 1919—27. Ph.D.
INÜ 1965”; ’Reformists and Revolutionaries in 
NSW, 1920-22'. Politics, 1, 2 November, 1966 pp.
135-151; ’The First Communist "United Front" in Australia’. 
Labour History 10, May 1966 pp.20-31; 'The Role of 
Ideology: Lang and Labor's Faction War, 1920-27’.
APSA papers August, 1969; 'Ideology, the Trades Hall 
Reds and J.T. Lang'. Politics, 6, 1 May,1971 pp.53- 
65; R. Cooksey New South Wales Politics 1925-32 
with special reference to J.T. Lang, B.A. 
honors,Sydney, I960.
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which had proved so successful as a faction and by the end of 
1917 had taken up the issues of the OBU and socialisation. With this 
step the AWU/militanfe--union alliance finally collapsed and 
after the NSW party split at state conference in June, 1919 with 
Willis leading radicals out of the party to form an industrial-based 
socialist Labor party the AWU-packed IV.C was disbanded in August. [1]
It had served its purpose as a catalyst of anti-parliamentary opposition 
and provided the ladder to success for the new leadership in state 
executive but its very success under the remaining group of radicals 
from 1917-19 threatened the executive. The greatest success of the 
IVC after the victory over Holman had been its near triumph in 1918 
in influencing the federal conference on the issue of war policy, 
enabled by the unique role created in the power struggle in 1916 
for it which had survived upon the institutionalised suspicion of 
political leaders created in the NSW party during the Holman reign.
As the most influential Labor pressure group at state and federal 
level5success had led to the destruction of the IVC but pressures 
from radical sections of the Labor parties remained and were in 
fact strongly fuelled during the 1919-21 period by the rising 
industrial militancy within the union movement which characterised 
those years as some of the most turbulent ever experienced. [2] 
Stimulated by the reaction to the war, the Russian revolution and 
a proliferation of left wing groups and parties competing for worker 
support there was no lack of radical demands in general currency and 
it only remained to be seen what new channels of influence upon the 
ALP could be devised and how effective they would be.
[1] V. Molesworth,'The Labor Party Crisis of 1919'.
Molesworth papers MS 243/1/13 Vol.C; Third and Last 
Annual Report of the IVC, 1919.
[2] Turner Industrial Labour and Politics pp.194-202.
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Defence, 1919-21
One issue at least was settled as far as the vast majority 
of the entire Labor movement was concerned - support for abolition 
of the provisions in the Defence Act for compulsory training and the 
call-up of trained manpower in time of war and continued antipathy to 
compulsory overseas service. /After the 1918 federal conference 
Labor; policy was for restriction of training to the 21-25 years age 
group under reformed conditions of service, use of which force could 
only be sanctioned for home defence by explicit decision of parliament. 
Furthermore, no voluntary force for overseas service was to be raised 
or commit ad to a foreign conflict without the approval of the people 
'by initiative and referendum'. Invocation of the Japanese threat had 
been instrumental in the approval of this scheme but following the Armis­
tice an emotional repugnance against standing armies, citizen armies 
and militarism of all sorts rose to a climax and proved irresistible, 
despite the continuing importance of Japan, both for Labor and the 
government. This was demonstrated most strongly in organs such as the 
Labor Call in Victoria, which warned
Whatever may be the result of the war it seems certain the 
Pacific will be the scene of future conflict... Be not 
deceived - you are up against it. Australia is an 
appendage of Asia. The external problems of the Commonwealth 
arise out of Asia, not out of Europe. [1] Two rules must 
govern Australian foreign policy. The one is that the 
greatest possible number of powerful nations should have 
material interests in the Pacific Ocean and the neighbouring 
parts of the Indian Ocean. The other is that Australia should 
avoid any extension of her frontiers by the acquisition of 
island dependencies ... (Australia) must insist that the 
League of Nations shall become something more than the mere 
shadow of Dr. Wilson's mind ... Australia should see that 
the League has plenty of work in Oceania. [2] It should 
be Australia's policy to surround her coast with submarine 
bases and no stone should be left unturned to perfect her 
aircraft. [3]
[1] Labor Call 18 July,1918
[2] Ibid. 13 February, 1919
[3] Ibid. 3 April, 1919 Similar views were expressed by 
Labor papers in other states with the exception of Henry 
Boote in the Australian Worker who vaccilated on the 
Japan threat and currently was rejecting it as a capita­
list bogy used to sustain militarism. Boote's views cannot 
be taken as expressive of official AWU policy.
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Labor men such as Catts and Ryan were outraged at the disclosure in 
1919 of the spheres of influence deal concluded between Japan and 
Britain [1] and when the Versailles Treaty was announced Catts 
launched a bitter attack upon the government.
... the man, or men, who agreed to that compact committed 
the most traitorous act that ever occurred in the history 
of Australia. ... The effect of the settlement is that 
Australia has taken its frontiers northward to Rabaul 
but the frontiers of Japan have been brought southward 
3,000 miles to the equator until their front door and 
our back door almost adjoin.
With great deliberation I say that Germany ... would be a 
preferable neighbour to Japan. I would rather have 
a white race as a buffer between this country and the 
hordes of Asia than set up an aggressive colored race 
in the islands, than I would open the gates to practically 
400,000,000 of the Asiatic agony (sic) to come to 
our very gates .[2],
Catts desired the question to be thrown open to debate in parliament, 
but in the turmoil of postwar problems could not inspire the 
support of his FPLP colleagues, [3] who were on the whole merely 
thankful that the conflict had ceased.
Fear of Japan remained the chief concern of service 
advisers in postwar defence planning , [4] and this did not go unnot­
iced by the more concerned members of the Labor parties. [5]
[1] Speech by T.J. Ryan in Perth 9 June, 1919.
Westralian Worker 13 June, 1919.
[2] Speech in House of Representatives reported Labor News 
27 September, 1919.
[3] FPLP 14 August, 10, 11, 18, 25 September, 1919.
[4] See Jellicoe Report on Naval Mission to the Commonwealth. 
of Australia May - August 1919. CPP 4. 21 October, 1919. 
pp.471-566.
[5] e.g.Curtin, Westralian Worker, 3 October, 1919.
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Despite this the majority of the movement was unimpressed: it would
be hard to over-emphasize the immense feeling of relief which accom­
panied cessation of hostilities and the last thing many Laborites felt 
was concern with defence and foreign relations in the first flush 
of the establishment of peace.
When the ALP federal conference convened at Sydney in June , 
1919 for preparation of peacetime policies the numbers were already 
firm for abolition of the old defence plank. S.A. state conference 
had approved an AWU motion for abolition of all compulsory clauses 
in the Defence Act [1] and after Queensland AWU delegates had resol­
ved on an identical motion , Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention 
also endorsed it once the urgings of Ernie Lane overcame opponents 
who raised the white Australia issue . [2] This became the QCE 
recommendation to federal conference. [3] Victoria’s Labor party met 
in conference from 18-21 • April, 1919, and Ben Mulvogue led with 
an attack against four Victorian representatives at the 1918 federal 
conference for disregarding their instructions to vote against any 
compulsory training scheme. Scullin and others objected to 
changing the defence plank on the grounds of the danger to white 
Australia but went down by 101 - 33 votes. He, Blackburn and McNeill 
thereupon withdrew their candidacy for the 1919 federal delegation in 
protest against the Victorian decision . [4] A similar climate 
prevailed in the NSW party, where factional antagonisms were temporarily 
forgotten to ’enthusiastically carry a resolution against all compulsory
[1] Minutes S.A. Labor conference 13 September, 1918
[2] The vote was 38-20. Minutes Labor-in-Politics Conven­
tion 2 February, 1919-; E.H. Lane, Dawn to Dusk p .214
[3] QCE Minutes, 11 February, 1919
[4] Labor Call 22 May, 1919.
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c la u se s  by 110 -  18, over th e  o b je c tio n s  o f S e n a to rs  G rant and G ard in er 
who fe a re d  J a p a n , [ l ]  Only th e  Tasm anians rem ained com m itted to  th e  
compulsory t r a in e d  defence fo rc e  a f t e r  a m otion fo r  a b o l i t i o n  was 
w ithdraw n a t  i t s  s t a t e  c o n fe re n c e , Japan  ag a in  b e in g  th e  c h ie f  
cou n ter-arg u m en t r a i s e d .  [2] M i l i ta n t s  in  a l l  th e  s t a t e  p a r t i e s  
r e s o r te d  to  s ig n i f i c a n t l y  s im i la r  a rgum ents , co n firm in g  th a t  t h i s  com­
p le te  r e v e r s a l  of p a r ty  p o l ic y  on d efen ce  was p o p u la r ly  su p p o rte d  by 
th e  g re a t  m a jo r ity  who w ere p re p a re d  to  a c c e p t th e  c o r o l la r y  to  t h e i r  
a t t i t u d e  t h a t ,  as S c u l l in  and o th e rs  p o in te d  o u t ,  im p lied  f u tu r e
su p p o rt fo r  p r o f e s s io n a l ,  r e g u la r  armed s e r v ic e s .  T h e irs  was a
,a g a in s t
deep ly  f e l t  r e a c t io n '/  ov er fo u r  y e a rs  o f w ar.
The e x p e rie n c e s  o f th e  w orkers  o f A u s t r a l ia  d u rin g  th e  
l a s t  fo u r  and a h a l f  y e a rs  a re  such as to  have e m b itte re d  
them a g a in s t  m i l i t a r i s m  in  a l l  i t s  v a r ie d  forms o f 
i n i q u i ty .  I t  i s  t r u e  th a t  th e re  a re  e v i l s  a t ta c h e d  to  a 
v o lu n te e r  fo rc e  and th a t  u n t i l  th e  w orld  becomes s a f e  enough 
fo r  t o t a l  a b o l i t i o n  A u s t r a l ia  w i l l  p ro b ab ly  c o n tin u e  to  
r e t a in  some form o f d e fe n c e , b u t w ith  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f 
c o n s c r ip t io n  and com pulsory t r a i n in g  th e  growth of n i l i t a r i s m  
can be h e ld  in  check and e x p e n d itu re  c o n s id e ra b ly  c u r t a i l e d .  [3]
When G ard iner defended  th e  1918 d efen ce  p la n k  on th e  b a s is  o f th e  
Japanese  th r e a t  a t  f e d e r a l  co n fe ren ce  in  Sydney d e s p i te  th e  NSW d e c i s i o n , 
he was rem inded o f  h i s  i n s t r u c t io n  amid a chorus of r e v u ls io n  from 
d e le g a te s  a t  w hat had been endured  s in c e  1914. Upon a v o te  o f 22-1 
th e  f i r s t  c la u se  in  L a b o r 's  d efen ce  p la n k  became ’D e le tio n  o f a l l  
c la u se s  r e l a t i n g  to  com pulsory t r a in in g  and s e r v i c e » . [4] A ll 
o th e r  s e c tio n s  as d ec ided  th e  p re v io u s  y e a r  rem a in ed yex cep t f o r  s l i g h t  
a l t e r a t i o n  o f th e  f i n a l  p ro v is io n  a t  a Tasm anian su g g e s tio n  to  become 
th e  more f l e x i b l e
[1] Labor News 21 Ju n e , 1919.
[2] World 6 May, 1919. A c i t i z e n  fo rc e  o f com pulsory t r a in e e s  
over 18 y e a rs  o f age was su b m itte d  as T asm ania’ s recom­
m endation  to  f e d e r a l  c o n fe re n c e . Agenda 1919 f e d e r a l  
co n fe ren c e  i te m s , 79, 81.
[3] Labor News 28 Ju n e , 1919.
[4] The lo n e  d i s s e n te r  was M rs. S e e ry , a NSW d e le g a te  
w an tin g  a f l a t  d e c la r a t io n  a g a in s t  a l l  m i l i t a r i s m .
243
No raising of forces for service outside the Commonwealth, 
or participation or promise of participation in any future 
overseas war, except by a decision of the people. [l]
Meanwhile, faced with complex problems of postwar reconstruction the 
party felt that defence spending could well be downgraded, arguing that 
there were sufficient trained men for reactivation in an emergency and 
chat in the light of the experience of late 1914 it would not take 
long to build a worthwhile force upon a small foundation of regulars. [2] 
Arthur Blakeley cited FPLP success in checking profligate defence 
expenditure as a major accomplishment in the FPLP report for 1921. [3]
Pressures for retention of the old defence scheme remained 
after the June conference, indicating that support for the ten-year-old 
policy died hard. It was particularly apparent in the Victorian 
Labor leadership and within weeks of the Sydney meeting state executive 
registered dissatisfaction at decisions made there, particularly the 
party's land tax policy, circulating other states with a suggestion 
for a special federal conference to be convened as soon as possible to 
reconsider both.this, the defence and war-related issues. NSW state 
executive was then dominated by the AWU group and people such as Catts 
kept the altered strategic situation before party audiences: on 10
July executive agreed to the Victorian request. [4] Tasmania found 
the notice too short to overcome transport and financial difficulties
[5] and South Australia also declined federal executive's invitation
to a special conference 'to reconsider defence and land tax resolutions'.
[6] The two other states agreed to support the request but were divi­
ded over the agenda: in Brisbane the state secretary addressed the QCE
[1] Replacing the phrase 'except by initiative and referen­
dum'. Presumably the 'decision of the people' was 
something to be interpreted by a future federal Labor 
government: this point was never elaborated. Report ALP 
federal conference June 1919. pp.74-77.
[2] See debates on the 1920 defence estimates CPD XCIII 
23 September,1920.Tudor pp.4244-5; Anstey pp.4918-20* 
McGrath pp.4922-3;Fenton p.4926.
[3] Contained in Report of NSW state executive 1921. p.6
[4] Labor News 19 July, 1919.
[5] Minutes Tasmanian state executive 22 July, 1919.
[6] S.A. ALP. Council Minutes 15 August, 1919.
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'and stated that the opinion was held by many that in view of last 
conference's decision in favor of deletion of the compulsory clauses 
of the Act it was necessary for conference to more clearly define 
Labor's policy in regard to defence'. However a proposal for a more 
positive declaration of the new policy lapsed [l] while in Perth 
the Western Australian executive relied upon the advice of returning 
federal delegate J.J. Kenneally that any backtracking would be 
electorally disadvantageous and resolved to protest against any attempt 
to alter the new plank. [2] On 2 October special conference duly 
convened, again in Sydney, and after a strenuous battle led by Catts 
and fellow NSW delegates ,agreed to consider other business not on the 
agenda. Enough trouble was encountered in raising and obtaining 
approval for T.J. Ryan to be invited to enter federal politics and 
to lead the election campaign to discourage going beyond consideration 
of Labor banking and finance proposals and the opportunity to 
reconsider defence did not arise . [3]
An additional and essential dimension of the ALP federal 
platform was its explanation and elaboration by the FPLP, particularly 
at election times. For the December, 1919 federal elections caucus 
elected Tudor, Gardiner and Higgs to form a manifesto committee with 
federal executive officers and campaign director T.J. Ryan to draft 
Labor's appeal to the electorate. [4], In their ordering of priorities 
the resultant document reflected the severe downgrading by Labor leaders 
of defence, concentrating upon the rural policy in a bid to capture 
a proportion of the emerging country vote and featuring defence policy 
in eighth position only. The appeal was confined to a promise to 
repeal the compulsory clauses of the Defenct Act and to 'provide for 
the effective defence of the Commonwealth on the most modern and 
efficient lines .'[5] Catts' own policy speech, also given prominence *[]
[1] QCE Minutes 1 August, 1919.
[2] W.A. state executive Minutes, 15 September, 1919.
[3] Labor News 11 October, 1919; Report ALP special federal con­
ference October 1919.
[*] tPLP 2 October, 1919.
[5] ALP Official Manifesto. Labor News 8 November 1919.
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in the Labor press was more explicit, stating reliance upon submarin# 
and aircraft to keep potential invaders at arm’s length and an army 
to be composed of voluntary enrolled veterans and citizens.
Submarine and aircraft defence of continental Australia was a persistent 
theme in ALP defence policies elaborated by new federal leader 
Charlton in a major statement in 1923, [1] after support for the
doctrine had been indicated by Victorian leaders and Curtin since at 
least 1918. The latter influenced A.E. ’Texas’ Green, Labor shadow 
defence minister during the twenties, who along with Charlton quoted 
extensively from current exponents of airpower and submarine forces in 
support of the policy. In fact these arguments were flawed and were 
not applied by the party in office, [2] but owed their popularity mainly 
to political attractiveness. These technically complicated weapons 
depended upon regular, volunteer forces, were (mistakenly) considered 
relatively cheap and highly effective as a method of fending off 
raids or thrusts against Australia. Above all they did not compel 
maintenance of a large military establishment at home nor did they depend 
upon continuing association and training with British forces to preserve 
efficiency,as did the RAN.
Foreign policy, 1919 - 1921
Labor’s foreign policy provisions did not preclude future 
overseas military involvement but contained what was seen as a built- 
in check against too ready acceptance of the role of unquestioning 
sutrimperialist power and proclaimed in advance that an immediate 
threat to Australia would have to be discernible before participation 
in further conflicts was sanctioned. The ease with which Australia had 
found herself at war had made a profound impression and laid the 
basis for a durable suspicion of too close a connection with British 
imperial diplomacy in the interwar era. [3] For a number of influen­
tial leaders the disadvantages of the British connection resulted in
[1] CPD 104 27 July, 1923 pp .1729-41.
[2] J.M. McCarthy ,’The ALP and the Armed Services: Theory 
and Practice, 1919-1949.'Labour History 25 November5 
1973 pp. 58-67.
[3] Labor became the exemplar of one side in the division
between Australian and Austral-British nationalism explo­
red for example by Russell Ward ,'Two Kinds of Australian 
Patriotism’. Victorian Historical Magazine 41, 1. February 
1970 pp £25-2*3:---------------- ---------
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the hope of engaging American involvement in the Pacific, Ryan and 
others being concerned not to risk angatonising that country and this 
concern was evident in Labor opposition to renewal of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance- [1] Another alternative to reliance upon Great 
Britain lay in the newly formed League of Nations, a body never enthu­
siastically regarded by Australian Labor from the start. For some such 
a3 Frank Anstey the League was a sham, a 'League of Victors' 
unworthy of serious support however admirable its original animating 
spirit. [2] When in Europe on Queensland government business T.J. 
Ryan had been appointed ALP delegate to the Second (Amsterdam) 
International conference meeting simultaneously with that at 
Versailles and after the International gave approval of the League 
concept as a guarantor of the peace settlement Ryan had felt obliged to 
enter a serious reservation on the part of his party to membership of 
the League.
I found it necessary to record my objection to the League 
of Nations resolution which would enable a super-national 
authority to interfere with the domestic policy of 
imposing tariffs or, for example, with the policy of a 
White Australia -[3]
Federal conference endorsed his stand and contented itself with 
passing another in what was becoming a long string of decisions commen­
ding the concept of international linkages but which led to little in 
practical developments.
Few reposed much hope in the League after its first few 
years of existence; by 1923 Charlton regretted that it had never 
been given a chance, [4] an opinion reinforced by experience when as 
ALP leader of the opposition he was part of the Australian delegation 
to the fifth assembly of the League at Geneva 1 September - 2 October 
1924. In this international forum Charlton stated his belief that 
the purposes for which the League had been formed remained of critical 
importance but unless its performance could be improved beyond its
[1] FPLP 14 April, 1921. Also C.A. Hicks,The Impossible 
Alliance. Australia, the U.S. and the Postwar Settle­
ment of 1919. M.A. ANU, 1970.
[2] Labor Call 13 March, 1919.
[3] Report of T.J. Ryan on the Berne/Amsterdam Socialist 
Conference 1919. Report ALP federal conference, June 1919. 
pp.56-9. Also speech given by Ryan upon return to
Australia before W.A.-Labor Conference.W.W.13 June, I9]g
[4] CPD 104. 27 July, 1923 p.1733.
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present accomplishments
the public confidence in the utility of the League of 
Nations to secure peace will be dissipated and the energy 
and good work accomplished ... will be of no avail 
We (the ALP) are in favor of the League of Nations and want 
to see it make good. But we do say that if there is to be 
delay year after year, disaster will overtake the League, [l]
This attitude of pessimistic support persisted amongst parliamentary
Labor representatives for the remainder of the decade.
In the extra-parliamentary wing the left disparaged the 
League mercilessly,* even the enthusiasts such as E.R. Voigt, 
director and secretary of the Labor Research and Information Bureau 
established in Sydney in the early twenties, condemned both the 
League and its offshoot the International Labor Office »which
has no more effective power to interfere with industrial 
organisation than the League of Nations has to interfere 
with national government. Neither organisation will accom­
plish the emancipation or even materially advance the 
interests of the working class as a whole.
Despite this ineffectuality and the left wing prejudice Voigt believed 
that the statistical and information services provided by the ILO 
were useful and urged that they be taken advantage of in Australia* [2]
A successsion of Australian delegates nominated by the state capital 
TLCs in turn were accordingly sent to ILO sessions: E.J. Holloway 
in 1923, John Curtin in 1924, George Lawson from Brisbane in 1925, but 
they were hampered by the lack of adequate remuneration for the prolonged 
absences from jobs involved and the general tokenism of the Australian 
government’s participation in League activities. [3] Unions fought a
[1] Copy of Charlton's speech reprinted Westralian Worker 
12 December, 1924.
[2] Circular from Labor Research and Information Bureau 
n.d. - (possibly November 1922) - W.A. state executive 
correspondence, folder 234, International.
[3] Curtin in Westralian Worker 5 September, 1924; Lawson - 
Secretary W.A. state executive, state executive corres­
pondence op.cit. Report of International Labor 
Delegate 24 September, 1925.
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v ain  b a t t l e  w ith  th e  B race-Page governm ent to  o b ta in  c o n t ro l  over 
nom ination  and s e le c t io n  o f th e  Labor d e le g a te  f o r  A u s t r a l i a  and in  
a b id  to  upgrade th e  a s s i s ta n c e  a v a i la b le  to  such  d e l e g a te s .  [1]
Trade Union d e le g a te s  r e g u la r ly  p re s e n te d  fa v o ra b le  r e p o r ts  
o f t h e i r  ex p e rien ces  in  G eneva, [2] b u t cou ld  c i t e  l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  
advantage beyond m oral in v ig o r a t io n  as  th e  government n e g le c te d  to  
r a t i f y  key agreem ents reach ed  by th e  ILO. In  view o f such 
d is a d v a n ta g e s , f in a n c ia l  l i m i t a t i o n s  and th e  p r e v a i l in g  c l im a te  o f u n in ­
t e r e s t ,  th e re  was l i t t l e  fo llo w -u p  by th e  un ion  movement o r ALP to  
th i s  co n n ec tio n  o r any o f  a number o f o th e r  in t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n ta c ts  
a t  co n feren ces  d u rin g  th e  tw e n t i e s . [ 3] M ajor o u t l e t  f o r  th e  
in te r n a t io n a l i s m  o f pow erfu l l e f t  wing a c t i v i s t s  in  th e  un ions la y  in  
r a th e r  d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t io n s .
[1] H ollow ay, S e c re ta ry  M elbourne THC -  S.M. B race ,
11 F eb ru a ry , 1926. UTLC M inutes 12 M arch, 1926; P. Deane, 
S e c re ta ry  o f  Prim e M in is te r ’ s D epartm ent/D epartm ent of 
E x te rn a l A f f a i r s  -  C. C r o f ts ,  S e c re ta ry  Commonwealth C ouncil 
o f F e d e ra te d  U nions, M elbourne 18 F e b ru a ry , 1926 i b i d .
26 F eb ru a ry , 1926; C r o f ts ,  S e c re ta ry  ACTU -  T .P . Howard, 
S e c re ta ry  UTLC 15 F eb ru a ry , 1929 e n c lo s in g  co rrespondence  
w ith  th e  governm ent i b i d . 8 M arch, 1929.
[2] J .  C u r tin  -  S.M. Bruce 5 Septem ber, 1924 quo ted  in  A. 
C h e s te r .John C u r t in ,Sydney, 1943 p .3 8 .
[3] B a s ic a l ly  th e  o b s ta c le s  rem ained c o n s ta n t :  W.H. K itso n  
MLC and H.v . E v a tt MLA (W estern A u s t r a l ia  and NSW 
re s p e c t iv e ly )  r e p re s e n te d  th e  ALP a t  a World M ig ra tio n  
C onference , London in  1926,w here ’Dr. E v a tt  had a most 
s tre n u o u s  tim e com bating e f f o r t s  to  m odify th e  a t t i t u d e  
tak en  up by A u s t r a l ia  r e  W hite A u s t r a l i a  and (im m ig ra tio n ) 
r e s t r i c t i o n .  In  f a c t ,  on s e v e r a l  o c c a s io n s  th e r e  was a l ­
m ost a com plete  b reak d o w n '. R eport o f d e le g a te s  Labor C a ll 
28 O c to b e r, 1926J W.H. K itso n  -  E.H. B arker 22 Ju n e , 1926, 
W.A. s t a t e  e x e c u tiv e  co rresp o n d en ce  f i l e  237, M isce llan eo u s  
K; R eport by M u rie l A. Heagttey f i r s t  B r i t i s h  Commonwealth 
Labor C onference , London 27 Ju ly  -  1 A ugust, 1925 i b i d , 
f i l e  217, F e d e ra l e x e c u tiv e ; R eport by A. W alker, second 
B r i t i s h  Commonwealth Labor C o nference , London Ju ly , 1928; 
Appended to  R eport ALP f e d e r a l  c o n fe re n c e , 1930 p p .9 2 -3 ;
L . F .  C r i s p ,  The A u s t r a l ia n  f e d e r a l  Labour r a r r y . "pp.
104, 107.
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I n te r n a t io n a l i s m  and i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  1921-1924-
D uring  th e  w ar t h e r e  had been  e s t a b l i s h e d  a p a t t e r n  
w hereby th e  p o l i c i e s  o f  un ion , m i l i t a n t s  w ere  s u c c e s s f u l l y  u rg e d  and  even 
t h e i r  c o n t r o l  e s t a b l i s h e d  o v e r  some s t a t e  L abor p a r t i e s  due to  s t r u c t u r a l  
c o n f l i c t  b re d  o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  p a r l ia m e n ta r y  l e a d e r s h ip  o f 
th o s e  p a r t i e s .  As th e  u n i o n i s t s  d e v e lo p e d  v iew s upon th e  w ar t h e s e  
w ere im posed in  i d e n t i c a l  f a s h io n  to  p u r e ly  i n d u s t r i a l  dem ands, w i th  
th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  i n  1918 ALP w ar p o l ic y  was v e ry  n e a r ly  d e te rm in e d  
by th e  r a d i c a l s  i n  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  V ig i la n c e  C o u n c il  i n  NSW? 
w ith  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  a  few r a d i c a l  d e le g a te s  from  each  o f th e  s t a t e  d e le ­
g a t io n s .  Once f i r m ,  s t a b l e  p a r ty  l e a d e r s h ip  had been  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  in  
a l l  s t a t e s  e x c e p t NSW, w here th e  f a c t i o n s  w ere  a lm o s t w h o lly  o c c u p ie d  
i n  th e  s h e e r  b a t t l e  f o r  s u r v i v a l ,  t h i s  mode o f  in f lu e n c e  was s e v e r e ly  
c i r c u m s c r ib e d , h a v in g  b een  d e v e lo p e d  d u r in g  c o n d i t io n s  o f  e x c e p t io n a l  
i n s t a b i l i t y .  T h is  d id  n o t  le a v e  th e  FPLP l e a d e r s h ip  f r e e  how ever to  
r e - e s t a b l i s h  i t s  p rew a r dom inance in  f e d e r a l  p o l ic y  m ak ing , f o r  
o p p o s i t io n  to  c o n s c r ip t i o n  o v e rs e a s  and com pulso ry  m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  a t  
home was e le v a te d  to  th e  l e v e l  o f  fu n d a m e n ta l p a r ty  dogma and a  check  
had been  p la c e d  on f u r t h e r  m i l i t a r y  in v o lv e m e n t a b ro a d  i n  a l l i a n c e  
w ith  B r i t a i n ,  o r  any o th e r  pow er, by e x p l i c i t  p la t f o rm  p r o v i s i o n .  
P ro s p e c ts  f o r  a  c o n t in u in g  d i r e c t  i n f lu e n c e  upon ALP p o l ic y  a f t e r  th e  
w ar w ere n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y  e n c o u ra g in g  a s  i n d iv i d u a l  TLCs w ere  l im i t e d  
v i s  a v i s  s t a t e  p a r t i e s  and d e s p i t e  ru d im e n ta ry  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  , 
p o s s e s s e d  no com bined f e d e r a l  v o ic e .  L a r g e s t  s i n g l e  u n io n , th e  n a t i o n a l  
AWU, had e n tre n c h e d  i t s e l f  i n  some o f  th e  s t a t e  p a r t i e s  and had  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  th e  FPLP, b u t  was c o n s i s t e n t l y  m o d era te  and c o n s e rv a ­
t i v e  i n  t a c t i c s  and p o l i c i e s  a f t e r  c o n s o l id a t io n  i n  th e  p o s tw a r  
y e a r s .  A ll  o th e r s  la c k e d  th e  s i z e  and s t r e n g th  to  a t t a i n  a  s i m i l a r  
p o s i t i o n  a lo n e  b u t  e v e n ts  w ere  soon  to  p ro v id e  th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  a 
tem p o ra ry  u n i ty  w ith  c o n se q u e n t r e s u l t s  upon th e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  th e  
r a d i c a l  u n io n s  i n  f e d e r a l  L abor c o u n c i l s .
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S t im u la te d  by th e  e x p e r ie n c e s  d u r in g  th e  w a r , th e  R u ss ia n  
r e v o lu t io n  in  1917 and c o n tin u in g  econom ic d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s * l e f t  
w ing r a d i c a l i s m  becam e th e  p r e v a i l i n g  c l im a te  i n  th e  u n io n  movement [1 ] 
T h is  found  em bodim ent i n  demands f o r  new o b je c t iv e s  and new o r g a n i s a t i o n  
s o c ia l i s m  and th e  One B ig  U nion -  and f o r  a  tim e  i t  a p p e a re d  a s  i f  
th e  ALP w ould  lo s e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  o f i t s  s u p p o r te r s  to  an 
i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i a l i s t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y .  T h is  t h r e a t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im p re s ­
sed  th e  ALP f e d e r a l  e x e c u t iv e  which, a t  ia m ee tin g  i n  M elbourne on 
14 O c to b e r , 1920,
s e r i o u s ly  to o k  s to c k  o f  th e  movement and i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
to  th e  changed  o u tlo o k  o f  o u r m em bers, and u n an im o u sly  
a g re e d  t h a t  owing to  th e  ch an g in g  p sy c h o lo g y  o f  th e  
g r e a t  mass o f  th e  p e o p le  i n  t h i s  c o u n tr y ,  and a l l  o th e r  
c o u n t r i e s ,  th e  tim e  h as  a r r i v e d  when i t  was n e c e s s a ry  to  
g e t  a  c l e a i l y  d e f in e d  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l ic y  w hich  w ould  be  
a b r e a s t  o f  th e  tim e s  and b e  a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  m a jo r i ty  
o f  o u r  members i n  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  a s  w e l l  as th e  p o l i t i c a l  
w ings o f  th e  movement. W ith  t h i s  o b je c t  i n  v iew  i t  was 
d e c id e d  to  convene th ro u g h  th e  v a r io u s  s t a t e  b ra n c h e s  an 
A l l - A u s t r a l i a n  I n d u s t r i a l  C o n fe re n c e , and im m e d ia te ly  
a f t e r  t h a t  an i n t e r s t a t e  ALP c o n fe re n c e ,  to  r a t i f y  o r  
r e j e c t  th e  d e c is io n s  a r r i v e d  a t .  [2 ]
I t  was c o n c e iv e d  o f  as  an o p p o r tu n i ty  to  e f f e c t  a  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
betw een  th e  p r o g r e s s iv e ly  d iv e r g in g  i n d u s t r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  w ings 
o f th e  L abor movement to  th e  m u tu a l b e n e f i t  o f e a c h . [3 ]
S e v e ra l  h u n d red  d e le g a te s  r e p r e s e n t in g  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f a  v e ry  
h ig h  p r o p o r t io n  o f  th e  e n t i r e  un ion ,m ovem ent convened  i n  M elbourne 
betw een 20 -  25 J u n e , 1921, c e r t a i n l y  th e  b ig g e s t  and m ost r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e  su ch  g a th e r in g  y e t  h e ld  i n  A u s t r a l i a .  C h ie f  i s s u e  a t  s ta k e  
was a d o p tio n  o f  th e  s o c i a l i s t  o b j e c t iv e  a n d , a f t e r  i t s  a d o p t io n ,  th e  
l ik e l ih o o d  o f  i t s  im p le m e n ta tio n  by th e  ALP. T r u s t  was e v e n tu a l ly  
re p o se d  i n  th e  l a t t e r  p a r ty  b u t  a  C o u n c il o f A c tio n  was e l e c t e d  from
[1 ] L. R oss, ’From Lane to  Lang: th e  e v o lu t io n  o f  L abor 
th e o ry  . *A.Q. 6 , 4 D ecem ber, 1934 p p .4 9 -6 2 ; P . J .
O’ F a r r e l l  'T h e  R u ss ia n  R e v o lu tio n  and th e  L abour 
Movements o f  A u s t r a l i a  and New Z e a la n d , 1 9 1 7 -2 2 '.  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Review o f  S o c ia l  H is to r y  8 , 1963 p p . 177-97 ; 
T u rn e r, I n d u s t r i a l  L abour and P o l i t i c s .c h a p te r s  8 -1 0 .
[2 ] F e d e ra l  e x e c u t iv e  r e p o r t ,  R ep o rt ALP f e d e r a l  c o n fe re n c e  
1921 p . 3 .
[3 ] J .H . C a t ts  L abor News 23 O c to b e r , 1920; E .J .  H ollow ay, 
p r e s i d e n t i a l  a d d re s s  a t  A l l - A u s t r a l i a n  T rade  Union 
C ongress W e s t r a l ia n  W orker 24 J u n e , 1921.
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conference to press the matter, [l] Included also on the agenda 
were several defence and foreign policy items reflecting the newly 
emerged radical consensus: both AWU head office and the Rockhampton
branch, Waterside Workers’ Federation submitted essentially similar 
items calling for the Australian Labor movement to associate with 
movements of other lands to prevent future outbreaks of war. [2] 
Holloway’s opening address referred to the same matter:
Militarism had to go and it was necessary to see that they 
were not drawn into any secret peace or war treaties, and 
no alliance made outside Australia should be obeyed by 
the people of Australia.
The prevailing climate was isolationist only in respect of the dis­
credited Empire connection*, Australian unionists looked to international 
contacts at the working class level. After a preliminary discussion 
on war in which Sydney Labor Council leader J.S. Garden advocated 
an outright pacifist stand,» sub-committee was appointed for the 
drafting of proposals, consisting of Ernie Lane from Queensland, Don 
Cameron, now a VSP official, E.A. Painter of Melbourne THC, Roy 
Beardsworth, Peter Rasmussen, W. Carey, T.J. Smith and several other 
unionists. On the final day of Congress the committee reported back 
with a proposal that delegates pledge 'individually and collectively 
to participate in any war outside the Commonwealth of Australia’ and 
to cooperate with the working classes of all countries ,’with a view of 
preventing war'. Only one member, Painter, dissented and in a minority 
report recommended endorsement of the ALP platform advocating arbitra­
tion of international disputes and no Australian involvement in war 
'except by a decision of the people’. Painter further spoke in favor 
of affirmation of Labor's defence plank, urging that Congress
.... realising the dangers of being unarmed in an armed 
world, recognises the necessity of making adequate 
provision for national defence. Such provision to consist 
of citizen defence force, Australian owned and controlled 
navy and air force.
[1] Turner, Industrial Labor and Politics pp.217-22
[2] The AWU item specifically referred to a ’Labor League 
of Nations'. See items 6 and 13 Agenda, Official 
Report All-Australian Trade Union Congress, 1921
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A ll members however w ere unanimous in  condemning th e  governm ent’ s 
c o n t in u a tio n  o f com pulsory m i l i t a r y  t r a in in g  as ’unduly  h a rsh  and 
m o ra lly  d e g ra d in g '- ,  [1] and th i s  l a s t  recom m endation was r e a d i ly  
adop ted  by C ongress. D ebate th en  c e n te re d  upon th e  a t t i t u d e  tow ards 
fu tu r e  w ars and was re so lv e d  by a r e s o lu t io n  comprom ising betw een th e  
i s o l a t i o n i s t  p o s i t io n  and th a t  o f su p p o rt fo r  th e  e x i s t in g  Labor 
p la tfo rm  by ta k in g  up th e  m a tte r  r a i s e d  in  agenda item s -  u rg in g
th e  w orkers in  a l l  c o u n tr ie s  to  form c o u n c ils  o f a c t io n ,  
and as th e  P a c i f i c  i s  l i k e l y  to  be th e  c o c k p it o f  th e  n e x t 
g r e a t  w ar, th e  c o u n c il o f a c t io n  e le c te d  by co n g ress  
be i n s t r u c te d  to  g e t in to  com m unication w ith  Labor o rg a n i­
s a t io n s  g e n e ra l ly  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  w ith  th o se  c o u n t r ie s  
b o rd e r in g  on th e  P a c i f i c ,  f o r  th e  pu rpose  o f p re v e n tin g  
f u tu r e  w a rs ’ . [2]
Any r e a l  danger o f m i l i t a r y  th r e a t  was th u s  n o t d isc o u n te d  in  an 
excess of p a c i f i s t  op tim ism , r a th e r  A u s t r a l ia n  u n io n is t s  sou g h t an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  re sp o n se  in  r e v iv a l  of th e  i l l  f a te d  p re-1914  Second 
I n te r n a t io n a l  p o l ic y ,  t h i s  tim e s p e c i f i c a l l y  ad d ressed  to  th e  P a c i f i c .  
S h o r tly  a f t e r  Congress b roke  up th e  c o u n c il  of a c t io n ,  e le c te d  by 
i t  and c o n ta in in g  le a d in g  r a d ic a l s  Baddeley and W il l i s  o f th e  M in ers ' 
F e d e ra t io n , H arry  H o llan d , Jack  G arden, R .S. Ross, and a ls o  more 
m oderate f ig u r e s  l i k e  S c u l l in ,  B i r r e l l ,  B la k e le y , B arnes and C u r tin ,  
im m ediately  endeavoured  th rough  Holloway to  e s t a b l i s h  o v e rsea s  
c o n ta c ts .  Having fo rm u la ted  t h e i r  p o s i t io n s  th e  un ions looked  to  th e  
ALP f o r  endorsem ent and im p lem en ta tio n  o f them.
As th e  ALP had prom ised a f e d e r a l  co n fe ren c e  was convened 
in  B risb an e  d u rin g  O cto b er, 1921 to  d e te rm in e  th e  p ay o ff  f o r  
co n tin u ed  r e c o g n i t io n  by th e  un ions o f p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  th ro u g h  th e  
Labor p a r t i e s .  E s s e n t i a l ly  , i t  had to  b a la n c e  th e  new un ion  demands 
a g a in s t  th e  need f o r  b road  e l e c t o r a l  s u p p o r t ,  a c o n s id e ra t io n  p o s se s s in g  
n o t j u s t  th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  b u t many un ion  f ig u re s  th e m se lv es» a lth o u g h  
f e l t  most a c u te ly  by d e le g a te s  such as E.G. T heodore, now Q ueensland
[1] M il i ta r y  Committee R eport o f A l l -A u s tr a l ia n  TUC, 1921.
[2] W e s tra lia n  W orker, 22 J u ly ,  1921
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P re m ie r . Lengthy and a t  tim es v i tu p e r a t i v e  d eb a te  o v e r th e  s o c i a l i ­
s a t io n  o b je c t iv e  cu lm in a ted  in  i t s  ad o p tio n  as a t h e o r e t i c a l  
a s p i r a t io n  b u t w ith  escape  c la u se s  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r s ;  in  T u rn e r 's  
p h ra s e , f e d e r a l  co n fe ren c e  'b y  a n e a t p ie c e  o f c o n ju r in g , changed 
t h e i r  s o c i a l i s t  t i g e r  in to  a sa c re d  c o t t . ' [ l ]  At th e  end o f th e  
s e s s io n  on th e  fo u r th  day , 13 O c to b er, B lackburn  moved item  6 , th e  
Trade Union C ongress r e s o lu t io n  fo r  c o n c e rte d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c t io n .  I t  
was co u n te re d  however by a NSW amendment from Power and O'Dea 
s u g g e s tin g  ad o p tio n  o f a s t r a i g h t  i s o l a t i o n i s t  r e f u s a l  to  f i g h t  o u ts id e  
A u s t r a l ia  . [ 2 ]  Next day le a d in g  opponent o f th e  s o c i a l i s t  o b je c t iv e ,  
T heodore, ag reed  th a t  as th e  TUC r e s o lu t io n  d id  n o t p re c lu d e  r e t e n t io n  
o f a re a so n a b le  d efence  schem e, as o th e rs  such as C a tts  f e a r e d ,  and 
a lth o u g h  s c e p t i c a l  as to  th e  r e s u l t s  in d ic a te d  h is  g e n e ra l agreem ent 
w ith  i t .  D esp ite  s u b s t a n t i a l  su p p o rt f o r  th e  amendment i t  was 
d e fe a te d  13 -  12 and th e  TUC m otion  approved* [3] A lthough com pulsory 
m i l i t a r y  t r a i n in g  was co n dem ned ,a ll o th e r  m i l i t a r y  item s in c lu d in g  
c a l l s  f o r  disarm am ent w ere s t ru c k  o f f ,d e s p i t e  B la c k b u rn 's  c a l l i n g  o f 
a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  im p lie d  by th a t  d e c is io n  -  su p p o rt fo r  
a r e g u la r  m i l i t a r y  e s ta b l is h m e n t o r  no defence  fo rc e s  a t  a l l .  C onference 
in s te a d  to o k  S c u l l i n 's  ad v ice  n o t to  s p e c ify  f u tu r e  d efence  
p o lic y  d u rin g  th e  c u r re n t  s t a t e  of f lu x  ( th e  W ashington co n fe re n c e  
c u r r e n t ly  underway) b u t aw a it developm ents, as 'The movement a t  
p re s e n t  was d iv id e d  on th e  m a tte r '*  [4] C onference th u s  h e ld  th e  
l i n e  on b o th  d efen ce  and fo re ig n  p o lic y  as l a id  down in  th e  1918-19 
p la tfo rm  [ 5 ] a p p r o v a l  o f th e  t r a d e  un ion  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  s ta n c e  
im ply ing  no more th a n  com m itta l to  th e  g e n e ra l S o tio n  r a th e r  th an  
c o n c re te  m easu res.
[1] I n d u s t r i a l  Labour and P o l i t i c s , p .226
[2] As c a r r i e d  by th e  NSW s t a t e  co n fe ren ce  in  1921. Labor 
News 2 A p r i l ,  1921. Power, a p a r ty  v ic e - p r e s id e n t ,  had
s u c c e s s f u l ly  opposed th e re  a c a l l  f o r  u n i l a t e r a l  d isa rm a­
ment a lth o u g h  i t  was ag reed  to  campaign in  fa v o r  o f 
m u l t i l a t e r a l  m easures to  th a t  e n d . I b id .9 A p r i l ,  1921
[3] R eport ALP f e d e r a l  co n feren ce^  1921. p p .28-31.
[4] I b i d , p .3 7 .
[5 ] Only o th e r  f o r e ig n  p o l ic y  r e s o lu t io n s  b e in g  a r e j e c t i o n  
of A u s t r a l ia n  im p lic a t io n  in  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e s ,  i b id .  
p p .3 4 ,4 1 , and endorsem ent of th e  p r in c i p le  o f s e l f -  
d e te rm in a tio n  f o r  I r e la n d  i b i d , p .34
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As an exercise in retaining the support of the trade unions, 
1921 federal conference was an admirable success, the TUC council 
declaring at the end of the year that ’On principle all that was 
asked for has been adopted' , [1] but between principle and performance 
lay a gulf most tellingly revealed by the subsequent fate of socialism 
in the ALP. Gaining acceptance on the coat-tails of the principle 
issue, the proposal for an international working class organisation 
to frustrate the militarism of capitalist governments fared equally 
badly. Both socialisation and the internationalist proposition had 
only been successfully urged upon the ALP because of special circumstan­
ces in the immediate postwar years which induced it to pay special 
heed to union demands in an attempt to placate working class dissatis­
factions - indeed to actively solicit the views of the unions. Once 
the wave of militant discontent began to abate the radical program had 
little prospect of fruition. Another All-Australian Trade Union Congress 
was held in Melbourne in June, 1922 in an attempt to sustain the initia­
tive and after considering more immediate organisational problems 
resolved further ;
Whereas we believe another war to be in the nature of 
things capitalistic, and whereas we view with suspicion 
the conferences of Washington and Genoa (A conference 
for the stabilisation of international trade) as respon­
sible for merely a re-alignment of warlike alliances; and 
whereas, despite all the disarmament measures, increased 
preparations for war are being made in the world’s 
laboratories and factories; and whereas we fear that another 
war to end war will end civilisation, culture and progress; 
and whereas international working class action is essential 
for the preservation of permanent peace, this congress 
declares its uncompromising hostility to all forms of 
militarism and war, and urgently calls upon the workers to 
at once organise to prevent war by linking up with each 
other in order to oppose the designs, methods and machina­
tions of capitalistic governments; and, as a step in this 
direction, this congress instructs the Council of Action 
to convene a Pan-Pacific Congress of working class organisa­
tions, to meet next year in Australia, simultaneously 
with the Pan-Pacific Science Congress • [2]
[1] World 21 November, 1921
[2] Adopted on a motion by E.H. Lane and H. Kneebone.
Labor Call, 6 July, 1922.
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The TUC and its executive shortly lapsed and no follow-up action 
resulted.
Nothing was done either by the ALP, if only because of the 
immobilism of the federal executive which prevented the federal party 
attaining anything more than spasmodic concerted action. After the 
April-May, 1922 federal executive meeting Alex McCallum morosely told 
W.A. state executive of
the absolutely hopeless position of the federal executive 
in carrying out functions which its position should warrant 
it performing ... The money provided is altogether 
totally inadequate and so long as the executive is without 
a fully paid official and without ordinary exedutive autho­
rity, so long will the movement be a disjointed six state 
movement and not an Atistralian one. [l]
Nor had the situation improved twelve months later when Arch. Stewart 
confessed ’that I am fed right up with the secretaryship of the 
federal executive. We are always behind, and have never hp to date been 
able to place it on a satisfactory basis . [2] . Due to official 
uninterest and the parlous condition of the only Labor body competent 
to implement the commitment, the 1921 international initiative 
remained in abeyance.
Subject to the 1919 federal platform» .the FPLP leadership 
remained free in expressing ALP policy from the opposition benches and 
to confirm fairly early its hostility to the Nationalist government’s 
close adherence to British leadership in foreign relations, the 
dangers inherent in which were emphasised for the Labor party by the 
Chanak crisis in 1922. This involved Hughes having to agree to a 
publicised request from London for full support in a possible conflict
[1] W.A. state executive cogfespondence file 176 
Federal executive, ALP.
[2] Stewart - H. Millington 21 June, 1923 Ibid.file 
217, Victoria.
256
in  th e  D a rd a n e lle s  to  th e  e x te n t  o f  c o n t r ib u t in g  tro o p s  i f  r e q u ir e d * [ l ]  
With v o lu n te e rs  g a th e r in g  a t  V ic to r ia  B arracks in  th e  war 
atm osphere i t  provoked, Chanak had a p rofound  e f f e c t  upon th e  ALP as 
an example o f th e  ea se  w ith  w hich u n q u e s tio n in g  com pliance w ith  
B r i t i s h  p o l ic y  could  le a d  to  invo lvem ent in  h ig h ly  dubious ad v en tu re s  
a t  any tim e and su p p lie d  a n ic e  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f a b a s ic  c o n f l i c t  
betw een Labor and i t s  opp o n en ts . Mathew C h a rlto n  p l a i n t i v e l y  asked 
th e  House ' I s  o u rs  b u t to  do o r d ie ,  and n o t to  know th e  re a so n  why?'
to  w hich a governm ent backbencher r e p l i e d  ' I ,  p e r s o n a l ly ,  go so 
f a r  as to  say  "My co u n try  r i g h t  o r wrong" ' .  [2] The c r i s i s
removed any rem ain ing  b e l i e f s  th a t  A ugust, 1914 was an u n fo r tu n a te  
a c c id e n t (which o f co u rse  th e  s o c i a l i s t s  had c o n s i s te n t ly  d en ied ) and 
r a is e d  th e  a p p a l l in g  p ro s p e c t  th a t  th e  w hole h o r ro r  cou ld  be ag a in  
re p e a te d  w ith o u t w arn ing  o r  o p tio n s  to  c o n s id e r .  H e re a f te r  th e  
Im p e ria l co n n ec tio n  p e r  se  became an o b je c t  o f s u s p ic io n  and s tim u la te d  
a wave o f i s o l a t i o n i s t  s e n tim e n t a t  a l l  l e v e ls  of th e  Labor movement -  
AWU N a tio n a l C onvention in  e a r ly  1923 re so lv e d  th a t  as th e  w orking 
c la s s e s  had no s ta k e  in  any o v e rsea s  c o n flic ts ,m e m b e rs  sh o u ld  develop  
'e f f e c t i v e  r e s i s t a n c e  to  our c o u n t ry 's  a n t i c ip a t io n  in  any war 
o u ts id e  th e  Commonwealth' [ 3 ] ;  NSW p a r ty  organ Labor News in c o r r e c t ly  
s t a t e d  Labor p o l ic y  as o p p o s itio n  to  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  any e x te rn a l  
c o n f l i c t  and d e c la re d  th a t  A u s t r a l i a  cou ld  defend  h e r s e l f  by w ithdraw ing  
to  defend  h e r  s ta n d a rd s  and l i v in g  c o n d itio n s  'a g a i n s t  a l l  com ers' [3 ] ;  
Q ueensland TLC endo rsed  a c l a s s i c  i s o l a t i o n i s t  s ta te m e n t 'a g a i n s t  any 
p ro p o sa l to  send A u s t r a l ia n  s o ld ie r s  a c ro s s  to  E urope, o r e lse w h e re , 
to  ta k e  p a r t  in  any war in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f I m p e r i a l i s t  C a p ita lism  
n o tw ith s ta n d in g  th e  r e s u l t  o f any referendum  th a t  may be tak en  on th e  
m a t t e r ' . ^ ]  T h is a f f e c te d  th e  FPLP, [5] S en a to r  G ard in e r even
[1] For th e  b road  view se e  G.M. G athorne-H ardy, A S h o rt 
H is to ry  of I n te r n a t io n a l  A f f a i r s  1920-1939. F ou rth  
e d i t io n  O x fo rd ,1950 p p .120-122; fo r  more d e ta i le d  
tre a tm e n t M. A rn o ld -F o s te r , 'Chanak Rocks th e  E m p ire '.
Round T able 230 A p r il  1968 p .169—177; P.M. S a le s ,
'W.M.Hughes and th e  Chanak C r is i s  o f 1922'» AJPH
17, 3 December 1971 pp . 392-405.
[2] CPD 100 19 Septem ber, 1922. pp.2354 and 2357-8.
The p a t r i o t  was S ir  R obert B e s t. See a ls o  th e  S en a te  
d eb a te  on th e  Near E a s t C r is i s  f o r  f u r th e r  exam ples o f 
th e  ALP a t t i t u d e .
[3] R eport AWU C onvention  3 February , 1923. p p .4 3 -4 .
[4] Labor News 17 November, 1923.
[5] TLC M inutes 27 S ep te m b er,1922; two days l a t e r  s t a t e  execu­
t i v e  p assed  a s im i la r  m otion  QCE M inutes S e p t .1922
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temporarily entertaining a suggestion that Australia become a 
republic if the cost of Imperial membership was involvement ' any 
and every skirmish or war fought by Britain. [1] In the cio»elv 
following federal election Charlton promised to reduce defence expendi­
ture to prewar levels, declared the hopelessness of securing an 
effective Dominion voice in Imperial foreign policy and stated that Labor 
would reserve its judgement upon any foreign commitments.
It is prepared to defend Australian life, liberty and 
property, but it claims the right of parliament to decide 
when such issues are at stake. Our policy is knowledge 
and responsibility in foreign affairs where they concern 
us, and capacity to mind our own business where they 
do not concern us . [2]
This period marked the height of isolationism in the Labor 
movement during the twenties, when serious consideration was given to 
changing ALP policy to absolute refusal to countenance foreign involve­
ments. FPLP executive in early July, 1923 gave consideration to the 
defence plank as part of a general review of its policies and reported 
to full caucus its unanimous approval of Tno participation in overseas 
wars1 23, noting the greater importance of submarines and aircraft as 
effective means of domestic defence but concluding that circumstances 
did not warrant any urgent necessity for laying down detailed proposals. 
[3] Almost immediately however the new Prime Minister, S.M. Bruce, 
initiated a debate on the forthcoming Imperial Conference which
[1] CPD 100 20 September, 1922 pp.2400-2403.
[2] ALP election manifesto 22 October, 1922.
[3] FPLP, 12, 19 July, 1923. As of 27 February, 1923 
executive comprised Charlton, Gardiner as Deputy-
leader, Frank Ansety assistant-leader in the House, Arthur 
Blakeley secretary, J.E. Fenton party whip with N.J.0. 
Makin, P.J. Moloney, J. Barnes and J.H. Scullin. It is 
significant that caucus defence committee: W.G. Mahoney,
J. Mathews, D.C. McGrath, E. Needham and C.S. McHugh, 
together with such officers as cared to attend, was dis­
regarded on the issue. Although a defence committee was 
usually appointed with other such bodies in the allocation 
of responsibilities at the first caucus meetings in a new 
parliament, the same pattern prevailed throughout the 
twenties at least: when an important statement had to 
be drafted or review made the caucus executive was 
invariably delegated to the task.
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necessitated a statement of policy. Frank Brennan, a self-styled 
pacifist Victorian member, urged caucus to agree to proclaim Labor’s 
’unwillingness to participate in warlike operations beyond the
•
Commonwealth’. Correctly the chairman, Gardiner, pointed out that this 
was an expansion of the federal platform and it was subsequently deter­
mined that Charlton's reply in parliament reiterate that Australian 
involvement in future overseas wars should be dependent upon 'a 
decision of the people’. [l].
Feax of automatic involvement in British quarrels and imperial 
clashes as an inescapable obligation of Dominion status extended to the 
party's reaction to the 1923 Imperial Conference decisions effectively 
establishing Imperial strategy for the remainder of the interwar era 
and involving Australia deeply in the Singapore scheme, which the ALP 
strongly resisted from the start. [2] Labor's 'Chanak syndrome’ 
was given periodic reinforcement during the remainder of the decade, thus 
stimulating the isolationist element. In 1925 civil disturbances in 
China and British involvement in defence of her concessions caused 
Charlton to protest:
If the British Empire became embroiled in any trouble we 
have the right to say whether we will go to her assistance 
or not; we should not be drawn into every war that occurs, 
irrespective of whether Australia is concerned in the 
dispute and even when the British Empire is concerned only
[1] Ibid.28 July, 1923; CPD 104 27 July, 1923. pp.1729-41 
for Charlton’s speech.
[2] FPLP 25, 27 March, 1924; FPLP Report for 1924 reprinted 
in Report ALP federal conference, 1927; See 'Summary of 
Proceedings, Commonwealth of Nations Conference 1923’.
CPP Session 1926-7. Vol.5 pp.1049 ff; also D.C. Watt, 
'Imperial Defence and Foreign Policy, 1911-39.A Neglected 
Paradox?' JCPS 1, 3 May, 1963 pp. 266-81; for the strategy 
adopted J.M. McCarthy, ’Singapore and Australian Defence, 
1921-42'. A.0 .25, 2 August, 1971 pp.165-80 and W.D. 
McIntyre, 'The Strategic Significance of Singapore 1917-42: 
the Naval Base and the Commonwealth’.Journal of Southeast 
Asian History 10, 1 March, 1969 pp. 77-89.
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to a limited degree. [1]
News that the Australian cruiser HMAS Brisbane, on attachment to the 
R.N. China station under a training exchange scheme, was actually invol­
ved in British pacification action during the Shanghai Incident doubled 
the alarm, for Labor felt that this was an interference in the 
justifiable Chinese struggle for self-determination. [2] Two years 
later another clash occurred at Hankow and Kiukiang, exciting renewed 
fears of Australian involvementt [3] and again that same year 
Brennan raised a protest against despatch of HMAS Adelaide at British 
request to the Solomon Islands to support subjugation of rebellious 
natives. [3] Labor’s embarrassment over foreign policy arose from this 
ambiguous attitude to association with Britain, exemplified by 
comparison of Charlton's emotional reaction to Chanak with his 
speech at the reception for a visiting R.N. squadron in Sydney^ at which 
he stated that Labor stood for Australian defence *
and if the people of Australia were in favor of defending 
the Empire abroad, the Labor party would not hesitate to 
give them the opportunity of doing so ... He was not 
unmindful of what the Mother Country had done in the past, 
and he was amongst those who thought that it was necessary 
to stand shoulder to shoulder in regard to the Empire's 
defence in the future. [4]
In contrast, non-Labor enjoyed the electoral advantages of its generally
[1] CPD 110 25 June, 1925. p.465 passim.
[2] Charlton moved an urgency motion to discuss the matter 
ibid.3 July, 1925 pp.703-6; Anstey p.710; W.M. Hughes 
in support pp.711-12; supplementary inquiries ibid. 8,9 
July; also Charlton's final appeal,1925 federal election. 
Labor Call 12 November, 1925.
[3] Charlton SMH 25 February, 1927; CPD 115.2 March, 1927 
p,21 and ibid.8, 10, 11 March; FPLP 3 March, 1927; A.E. 
Green Labor Call 14 April, 1927.
[4] CPD 116.14 October, 1927 p.568; 2 November p .871; 3 
November p.937; 15 November, p.1361.
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uncritical support for Britain and Empire. [1]
Defence and Foreign policy, 1924 - 1930
Despite the low priority initially accorded to defence and 
foreign policy in the ALP after the war, these issues refused to 
conveniently disappear and in fact at every federal conference between 
1919 and 1930 (excluding special conference in October, 1919) there were 
significant additions or alterations to the relevant platform sections. 
Two stages can be distinguished here: one from 1919 - early 1924 in
which the postwar defence plank was established, the conditions imposed 
on Australian participation overseas under any Labor government formu­
lated and both subjected to test by the course of events at home and 
abroad. By the end of this first period the major themes were present 
and the second, 1924 - 30, essentially comprised a working out of the 
themes established in earlier years. Following the challenge by radical 
unions in the early twenties and temporary toying with isolationism in 
foreign policy the dominance by the middle of the decade of the FPLP 
in federal policy making is the most significant feature in future 
party operation.
Acceptance of an imperial strategy laid down in 1923 involved 
the Bruce-Page government engaging forthwith in re-equipping of the 
navy as the principle defensive arm by an initial decision to replace 
a pair of cruisers. In parliament Anstey took advantage of his role 
as acting-leader in Charlton’s absence on his trip to Geneva to move 
deferral of their construction pending the results of projected inter­
national disarmament talks, [2] an indulgence of a popular Labor 
aspiration which left to W.G. Mahoney the task of introducing the inten­
ded amendment asking that the cruisers be built in Australia, ’thus
[1] Now recognised as subject to genuine qualifications after 
Chanak, Arnold-Forster op.cit.and Sales op.cit. Never­
theless the response by Bruce was typically an attempt
to remedy the difficulties by dloser communication with 
London. C. Edwards. Bruce of Melbourne Melbourne, 1965 
quoting Bruce pp.85-7; W.J. Hudson, Australian Diplomacy 
Melbourne, 1970 pp.20-1.
[2] FPLP 2, 10, 16, 17 July, 1924; CPD 107. 16 July, 1924 
pp. 2115-20.
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relieving the distress caused by unemployment and helping to 
develop Australian industries, [1] With another federal conference 
scheduled for October, 1924 and Charlton still overseas, federal caucus 
then bent to the preparation of its own recommendations. Anstey, seconded 
by Arthur Blakeley, proposed that the defence plank be updated by 
addition of the following principles
Abolition of compulsory training; convertible factories, 
munitions, small arms; aeroplanes, air forces, depots; 
land forces, fortifications; mines, submarines; utilisation 
of science and industry for standardisation of rolling stock 
and materials, roads and railways. [2]
J.M. Gabb, a South Australian MHR who had resisted the opposition to 
cruiser construction, sought to add 'That the first item be 
"replacement of above water craft for purposes of protection of trade 
routes against invaders," ' but withdrew it in preference to acceptance 
of the phrase 'submarines and above water craft'. [3]
Others also were considering the platform and in Brisbane the 
QCE under Theodore/AWU control made a considered withdrawal from 
the isolationist position adopted in reaction to Chanak cleverly 
wording a resolution designed if accepted to permit even greater dis­
cretion over foreign relations for the FPLP leadership by a declaration 
that 'Australia is not to be committed to military action in any 
circumstances by any authority whatsoever without the express approval 
of parliament and, except in cases of emergency and where time 
permits, by a referendum of the people'. [4] This was placed on the 
agenda paper, together with requests from Victoria for a review of defence 
policy and a South Australian call for 'cultivation of an international 
sentiment and the linking up industrially and politically with the 
working class of other countries'. Resurrection of the 1921
[1] Ibid.23 July, 1924, p.2368; also FPLP Report 1925 
session, Report ALP Federal conference 1927 p.35; 
this was consistent with the prewar attitude to naval 
building. R. Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics 
Melbourne 1960, p.201.
[2 ] FPLP 17 July, 1924.
[3] Ibid. 31 July, 1924.
[4] QCE Minutes 18 July, 1924.
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TUC scheme had also found favor with the Western Australian state 
executive, it submitted a proposal that the ALP ’convene a Pan- 
Pacific Congress in Japan to promote a closer understanding of the 
Labor movements concerned.f[1] There had been some encouragement
of the Pan-Pacific idea in the Labor movement by radicals, [2] but 
insufficient to compel the several state executives to sponsor the 
item against their own volition - by way of contrast the NSW party, 
where Sydney Labor Council's affiliation to the Moscow-based Red Inter­
national of Labor Unions since 1922 had afforded the Australian union 
movement its closest formal links with the international working class 
movement, submitted no defence or foreign policy items for conference 
and was currently preoccupied with the conduct of internecine 
warfare. Specific proposals for changes in the defence plank and 
ALP foreign policy were deriving wholly from the FPLP and state execu­
tives on their own initiative, in distinction to the attempts 
at exerting radical influence upon the party through several separate 
avenues employed during the 1916 - 21 years of militancy.
Federal conference met at Melbourne in late October, 1924 
and on the third day Theodore introduced the Queensland resolution, 
explaining that it was a carefully considered one designed not to 
cramp the party, acting as a check upon participation in capitalist 
* wars but leaving the way open for defence of vital issues such as 
white Australia. Against him were arrayed the isolationists led by 
Blackburn in support of an amendment,'That Australia shall not, under 
any circumstances, be committed to military action, except for the 
defence of Australian soil or Australian territory’. Blackburn 
argued that even the check of public opinion was of no value if war 
hysteria prevailed; he wished to prevent anyone being empowered to 
commit Australia to overseas wars and debate turned on whether or not 
Japan was seen as a threat or bogy, whether Australia could be 
defended from her beaches or if it was necessary to fight beyond them. 
Blackburn’s amendment was easily defeated by 22-14, but the best 
Theodore's motion could achieve was an even split 18 - 18. Queensland 
and Tasmanian delegates voted solidly for it as instructed. W.A. had 
been instructed to support 'disarmament and the abolition of war’ and
[1] W.A. state executive correspondence file 172, 
Agenda - Federal, 1924.
[2] Such as R.S. Ross, Labor Call, 17 April, 1924.
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voted against while the other states split, four of Blackburn's 
fellow Victorians deserting him but only one each from S.A. and 
NSW supporting to produce the tie. It was an issue which went to 
the heart of Labor beliefs, politicians being as divided as unionists; 
seven FPLP members were delegates, of whom four supported the Queensland 
motion and three opposed. [1] Nevertheless the strict isolationist 
approach had been comfortably defeated and ALP policy on future 
overseas involvements remained what it had been since 1919, subject to 
satisfaction of the ambiguous requirement for a 'decision of the 
people'.
In opposing conscription the conference remained as solid a 
as ever, agreeing to a Victorian suggestion that Labor seek a con­
stitutional prohibition of compulsory service overseas, but went on 
to greatly strengthen the defence plank after a full afternoon's 
discussion in committee so as to avoid exploitation by a hostile press 
of party disagreements on the subject. No record of the deliberations 
remains and when normal session was resumed any conflict had been sub­
merged. Blackburn and Blakeley, who had voted against the Theodore 
motion, moved adoption of the report giving the FPLP all it had asked 
for:
(1) Adequate home defence against possible foreign aggression.
(2) Convertible factories for small arms, munitions, aeroplanes.
(3) Air forces, depots, etc.
(4) Land forces, fortifications, etc.
(5) Submarines and adequate above-water craft, and mines.
(6) Utilisation of Bureau of Science and Industry for the 
purpose of standardisation of railway and motor rolling 
stock, and materials.
(7) Roads and railways. [2]
[1] In favor - Senator Hannan VIC., Senator O'Keefe TAS. 
J.M. Gabb S.A. and J.McNeill VIC.Against - A. Blakeley 
NSW, G.E. Yates S.A. and Senator Needham W.A. Report 
ALP federal conference 1924, p.41.
[2] Ibid. p.42.
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The r e p o r t  was adop ted  and added to  th e  ALP d efence  p la n k , making th i s  
a now e x t ra o rd in a ry  item  c o n ta in in g  no few er th an  n in e  c la u se s  and 
th i r t e e n  s u b - s e c tio n s  w hich to g e th e r  would p e rm it th e  f e d e r a l  
caucus to  su p p o r t v i r t u a l l y  any m ix tu re  o f armed fo rc e s  i t  f e l t  
n e c e s s a ry , w ith  s tro n g  em phasis on dom estic  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  in  d efen ce  
p ro d u c tio n . Once ag a in  th e  FPLP co u ld  be seen  to  be w r i t in g  i t s  
own p o lic y  f o r  co n fe ren c e  endorsem ent and was r e s t r i c t e d  by th e  p la tfo rm  
only  in  th e  use o f such f o r c e s ,  n o t a t  th e  d i c t a t i o n  o f th e  e x t r a -  
p a r lia m e n ta ry  wing b u t because  f e d e r a l  caucus i t s e l f  rem ained d iv id e d  
on th e  c irc u m stan c es  under w hich an ALP governm ent cou ld  a c t .  Such c i r ­
cum stances cou ld  on ly  be e x p re sse d  in  term s o f h y p o th e t ic a l  s i t u a t i o n s ,  
so Labor rem ained hampered by th e  am b igu ity  in h e re n t  in  i t s  p o s i t i o n ;
By re v iv in g  th e  TUC p la n  o f 1921 to  o rg a n is e  in t e r n a t i o n a l  
l in k s  w ith  w orking c la s s  movements in  P a c i f i c  c o u n tr ie s ,  f e d e r a l  
co n fe ren c e  reopened  th e  way f o r  f u r th e r  p u r s u i t  o f th e  t r a d e  un ion  
id e a l  o f  a g u a ra n te e  a g a in s t  w ar b ased  n e i th e r  upon a l l i a n c e  w ith  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  co u n try  no r t r u s t  in  th e  League o f N a tio n s . As a f i r s t  s t e p ,  
an a n t i-w a r  d e c la r a t io n  was adop ted  u rg in g  th e  A u s t r a l ia n  movement 
to  ' j o i n  w ith  th e  w orkers o f a l l  c o u n tr ie s  in  s t r i v i n g  w h o le -h e a r te d ly  
fo r  peace  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c t io n ,  [1 ] and was fo llo w ed  up by th e  
W estern A u s tr a l ia n s  w ith  t h e i r  own item  fo r  a P a n -P a c if ic  C onference , 
w hich was c a r r i e d  unanim ously . [2] In  c o n t r a s t  to  th e  th r e e  y e a rs  
of d is r e g a rd  s in c e  1921 a genu ine  e f f o r t  was made by a more v ig o ro u s  
f e d e r a l  e x e c u tiv e  on t h i s  o c c a s io n  to  im plem ent th e  scheme. S ix  months 
a f t e r  f e d e r a l  c o n fe ren c e  e n th u s ia s t s  in  th e  V ic to r ia n  p a r ty  p re s se d  
th e  i s s u e  a t  s t a t e  co n fe re n c e . E .J .  Holloway warned th a t ,  a f t e r  
m eeting  Jap an ese  un ion  d e le g a te s  a t  th e  ILO m eeting  a t  Geneva, he had 
been made aware o f th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in v o lv e d  b u t f e l t  t h a t  th e  id e a
[1] I b i d , p .5 8 . T his was an a d a p ta t io n  w ith  s e v e ra l  
d e le t io n s  of a M elbourne THC r e s o lu t io n  fram ed f o r  
su b m issio n  to  f e d e r a l  co n fe ren c e  and c i r c u la t e d  to  
o th e r  un ion  o r g a n is a t io n s .  M elbourne THC M inutes 
10, 24, 31 J u ly ,  16 A ugust, 1924. E .J .  H ollow ay, 
S e c re ta ry  THC, to  Labor O rg a n is a tio n s  UTLC M inutes 
29 A ugust, 1924.
[2] R eport ALP f e d e r a l  co n fe ren c e  1924 p . 69.
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was worth a try and federal executive was duly requested to initiate 
action. [1] At an interstate meeting of major TLCs in Adelaide on 
8 June further strength was added by an endorsement of the Victorian 
resolution, [2] and in Sydney on 3 September, 1925 federal executive 
agreed to issue invitations to a Pan-Pacific Conference in Honolulu 
in November, 1926. After reports that earlier enquiries abroad had 
been discouraging it was resolved to accept Institute of Pacific 
Relations assistance in soliciting participation by peace and other 
interested bodies. [3] Once actual organisation had been taken in 
hand Labor bodies in Australia favorably responded early in the new 
year despite the estimated 100 expense for each state representa­
tive. However the overseas response was disappointing again and by 
1 July, 1926 federal executive informed Labor organisations of the 
postponement of the event by eight months, [4] but there was no 
subsequent improvement. McNamara’s own statement to Victorian 
state conference was described as
a story of endeavour and energy frustrated by misunder­
standing or indifference. Tremendous efforts had been 
made to secure co-operation in all countries whose shores 
touch the Pacific Ocean but for one reason or another 
communication in cases had not been established, while 
in other cases non-participation had been ordained. [5]
At federal conference in 1927 this complete failure was 
raised by Western Australia; Victoria requested that efforts be 
pursued for a new date in 1929 but the chairman defended what had 
been done by McNamara’s diligence and after the latter explained the
[1] Labor Call 23 April, 1925.
[2] Report A.H. Panton MLA, W.A. state executive corres­
pondence file 268, Reports - state executive.
[3] Minutes ALP federal executive 2 - 3  September, 1925.
Ibid, file 217, Federal executive.
[4] E.H. Barker W.A. state secretary - D.L. McNamara, 
federal secretary 2 February, 1926. ibid; Queensland 
TLC Minutes 24 February, 19 March, 1926; Minutes UTLC 
11 February, 9 April, 1926. Minutes Melbourne THC
25 March, 1926. Minutes Tasmanian state executive 19 
November, 1926; Queensland state executive remained unen- 
thusiastic Minutes QCE 17 September, 1926.
Circular re proposed Pan-Pacific Conference 1 July 
1926 W.A. state executive correspondence, file 217, 
Federal executive; Report federal executive 1925-6-7, 
Report ALP federal conference 1927 pp.32-4.
[5]
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paucity of interest the whole question was referred back to the 
executive. [1] As far as the ALP was concerned it was content to 
let the matter rest, only to see it resurrected yet again by enthus­
iastic trade unions through the new channel of the long-awaited 
federal industrial organisation - the ACTU, [2] whose executive 
affiliated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat at the 
urging largely of Garden. [3] The Secretariat had been established 
in China initially by the Red International of Labor Unions and the 
communist association coupled with its multi-racial nature and stated 
objective of breaking down racial prejudice^ augured poorly for support 
from Australian unions and Labor parties. From the start the AWU 
refused to associate with it out of antagonism to the ACTU itself and 
also the 'pernicious doctrines and piebald principles' of the Secreta­
riat. [4] Scullin immediately disowned the connection on behalf of 
the ALP, [5] but it was still exploited by the government at the 1928 
federal election. [6] State parties and other unions joined the chorus 
and after concerted moves by federal and state Labor parliamentarians, 
[7] the ACTU split hopelessly over continuation of its affiliation at 
its 1930 congress, almost wholly upon white Australia grounds.
[1] Report ALP federal conference, 1927, p.27
[2] Official Report of All-Australian Trade Union 
Congress 3-9 May, 1927. Barker papers Box 31, 
items 1-2^ Trade union papers.
[3] Minutes executive meeting ACTU. Melbourne 8-13 
August, 1927. W.A. state executive correspondence, 
file 290 ACTU
[4] E. Grayndler, General secretary, AWU executive 
council - C. Crofts, secretary ACTU 29 June, 1928 
and Henry Boote A.W.4 July, 1928. Reprinted with 
mass distribution as a dodger ibid, file 293 Miscel 
laneous A. See also What is the PPTUS?Sydney, 1928.
[5] SMH 27 July, 192&
[6] Nationalist party pamphlets, Ross papers NLA MS 3222 
JAF 56/2 Commonwealth Elections, 1928; disclaimers by 
ALP federal campaign, director E.G. Theodore Westra- 
lian Worker 31 August, 1928.
[7] SMH 3 January,1930.
267
For the ALP the Pan-Pacific Conference episode had always 
been a secondary matter after initial approval of the principle in
1921 as a harmless concession to union susceptibilities. Even though 
an honest attempt to convene such a body had been made by the 
federal executive on behalf of the ALP, only after persistent urging, 
the objects to be realised were always vague though directed single- 
mindedly at preventing war in the Pacific. Had more favorable responses 
been elicited there seems to be little doubt that the racial issue 
would have inhibited much more than the most cautious of links being 
established. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the ALP leaders 
tolerated the scheme and formal party commitment to it only so long
as it remained a relatively harmless diversion and repudiated it 
with alacrity once the unions concerned attempted themselves to bring 
it to fruition along undesirable lines. Nevertheless, the Pan- 
Pacific Conference attained significant support not only from unions 
and TLCs but state parties as well throughout the twenties. [1]
This longevity testifies to the deep-seated response to the concept in 
the Labor movement, stemming from the pre-war Second International 
example and persisting for many years before given its most substantial 
incarnation by radical supporters of the RILU. Although an application 
of a European idea to the Pacific region, which proved completely abor­
tive in a practice, the Pan-Pacific concept in Australia during 
the twenties must be considered before any easy dismissal of Australian 
unions as isolationist: for a large, indeed considerable number, working 
class internationalism formed but the obverse to Anglo-Australian 
imperialism.
Although decidedly unsuccessful either in urging inter­
nationalism or encouraging the embedded isolationism in the party,as 
an alternative to the ALP foreign policy given birth in 1918,and 
nurtured by the foreign crises threatening Australian tranquillity from
1922 - 1927, the disparate elements in the industrial wing were 
powerful enough nevertheless to check FPLP liberty exemplified in the 
1924 defence plank. The scope permitted federal caucus by this part 
of the platform grated on many in the movement as inconsistent with
[1] It was raised yet again at ALP federal conference 
in 1930, on this occasion to be firmly turned 
down. Report ALP federal conference, 1930 pp. 53-6.
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Labor*8 professed anti-militarism and support for disarmament, leading 
to immediate protests in every state. R.S. Ross bitterly denounced 
the new plank as ’window-dressing for the elections ... permitting 
almost anything in the way of preparedness for war*, [l]
and similar protests were reflected by items appearing on Victorian state 
conference agenda. [2] Melbourne THC resolved to urge state execu­
tive to call a special federal conference to reconsider the defence 
plank [3], supported by the UTLC in Adelaide [4], Brisbane TLC [5] 
and Hobart, [63 Federal executive turned down the Victorian applica­
tion, [7] but opinion in this state was so strong that after a 
defence policy committee at state conference in 1926 failed to reach 
a conclusion, it was instructed to prepare a report for the next year.
[8] Consisting of J.H. Scullin, Jean Daley, R.S. Ross, R.A. Crouch 
and three others,the committee came to accord in the intervening 
twelve months on a recommendation for deletion of clauses 2 - 7 ,
(the FPLP additions of 1924) and other minor alterations, but reported 
disagreement over knocking out clause 1: 'Adequate home defence against 
possible foreign aggression*. Scullin, McNeill and even Brennan 
spoke for retention of this last provision at 1927 state conference, 
claiming that it was an inoffensive and justifiable declaration, and 
succeeded in carrying delegates with them by 111 - 52. Several amendments
[1] Westralian Worker 28 November, 1924; also
Jean Daley, 'Labor's Defence Policy* Labor Call 2 
April, 1925; • R.A. Crouch, Victorian state president, 
ibid.22 January, 1925 and succeeding issues.
[2] Ibid. 19 March, 1925.
[3] Minutes 23, 30 April, 7 May, 1925.
[4] Minutes UTLC 12 May, 1925.
[5] Minutes TLC executive 29 May; ibid.Council 3 
June, 1925.
[6] But rejected by Tasmanian state executive, Minutes 
10 July, 1925 and Western Australian state executive 
in May-June, upheld by state congress Report W.A. 
Labor congress pp. 120-22.
Minutes ALP federal executive 3 September, 1925.
W.A. state executive correspondence, file 217, federal 
executive.
[7]
2 t) 9
suggesting an isolationist resolution for the platform were defeated 
before conference ran out of time but the Call interpreted the result 
as indicating substantial support for the existing plank. [1]
1927 federal conference was held at Canberra during May, 
to coincide with the royal opening of the new federal capital, an 
arrangement criticised by W.A. because of the short notice afforded 
and inevitable distractions. John Curtin, particularly, had taken 
conference seriously and circulated a memo to other states criticising 
lacunae in the ALP platform; as a result of his influence the W.A. 
party sent requests, inter alia,
1. That the federal Labor conference declares the foreign 
policy of the ALP in respect to international relations 
as a whole; the League of Nations, the Washington 
Naval Pact, peace in the Pacific Ocean; Japan and China.
2. That the conference declares the policy respecting the 
relations of the Commonwealth to the British Empire, 
Imperial Conferences, fiscal relations within the 
Empire, relationship of Australia to Imperial defence, 
migration and Australian mandates. [2]
However Curtin was to be disappointed by the work of conference, which 
was bogged down for the first few days over yet another manifestation 
of disunity in NSW. On 14 May conference selected FPLP members 
Scullin, Brennan and Needham to form a foreign policy committee with 
J. J. Kenneally, H. Kneebone and J. S. Collings and when it reported 
back Scullin himself successfully moved a recommendation that the first 
W.A. item be discharged, 'as it is impossible with limited time to go 
into the many and far-reaching questions raised.1 23[3] Instead, the 
delegates contented themselves with a reaffirmation of the existing
[1] Ibid. 28 April, 5 May, 1927.
[2] Memo to state executive 19 March, 1926 W.A. state 
executive correspondence file 268, Reports - state 
executive; Minutes W.A. state executive 21 February 
1927.
[3] Report ALP federal conference, 1927 p. 27.
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specification of 'Complete self-government for Australia as a member 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations1 2[1] and opted for the status 
quo by even-handedly making an indirect attack upon Britain, 
condemning 'the aggressive naval and military intervention in China 
of powers foreign to that country'.
A similar method of handling the defence plank was employed, 
with establishment of a committee of moderate composition: Brennan
and Senator Graham, with Blackburn, J.S. Collings, ex-Senator Gardiner 
and Kneebone. Their report was adopted without opposition from con­
ference and, in deference to the persistent union discontent, resulted in 
a dramatic pruning of the overloaded plank inherited from 1918 and 
1924 conferences. Most of the superfluous detail and explicit commit­
ments approved in 1924 were removed and the plank reduced to general 
principles and a minimum of particulars:
Defence plank, 1927
1. Adequate home defence against possible foreign aggression.
2. That the Commonwealth Constitution be amended to include a 
condition that no Australian can be conscripted for military 
service.
3. Amendment of Defence Act to secure -
(a) Deletion of all clauses relating to compulsory 
training and service.
(b) Any sentence imposed by court martial to be subject 
to review by a civil court.
(c) No offence to be created by regulation; no penalty 
to be imposed by regulation.
(d) No employment of or interference by soldiers in 
industrial disputes.
(e) No raising of forces for service outside the Common­
wealth, or participation or promise of participation 
in any future overseas war, except by decision of the 
people. [2]
[1] Clause 2(a), Fighting Platform, ibid.
[2] Ibid, pp. 26-7.
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By and large the 1927 federal conference marked the return 
to an uneasy balance in the Labor party; the explicit clauses of the 
defence plank adopted as direct inputs from the FPLP had been struck 
out and the plank greatly simplified: at the same time the internatio­
nalist proposal had been given a run before abandonment by the ALP, and 
isolationism rejected in favor of retention of the qualification upon 
future involvements overseas in force since 1918. Having entertained, 
then rejected the separate notions of isolationism and internationalism 
as federal policy the British connection was accepted if only by 
default and with caution bred of the knowledge that no platform 
clause or conference declaration could be made ’villain-proof’ [1] 
amidst the unpredictabilities of the real world. It was not a case 
of politicians subverting the idealism or inherent isolationism of 
the party rank and file, but acceptance for better or worse of 
a great and powerful protector as the only guarantee of security, intro­
ducing problems of alliance management which were genuinely intractable 
and capable of even temporary resolution only as changing time and 
circumstance permitted. As John Curtin pointed out to state executive 
of the Western Australian party, failure to make precise declarations 
of policy vis a vis the League, China, Japan and other issues 
and the reposing of guarded confidence in the British Commonwealth, left 
future Labor attitudes imprecise and open ended. [2] W.A. moved 
at the next federal executive meeting that another federal conference 
be held especially to revise the federal platform further, but failed 
to obtain support. [3] This sort of precision in defining complex 
relationships in a document such as the federal platform, even if 
reasonable agreement could be obtained, was inherently unlikely and 
Curtin probably failed then to appreciate the benefits of calculated 
ambiguity in such matters to the federal leaders.
This circumspection and the holding of the line against both 
isolationist and working class-international pressures gave the Scullin 
government freedom of manoeuvre upon taking office in October, 1929 
the first federal Labor government since the conscription split thirteen
[1] J.M. Gabb MHR used the term in the foreign policy 
debate in 1924. Report ALP federal conference, 1924.p.40
[2] W.A. state executive Minutes 18 July, 1927; editorial 
Westralian Worker 17 June, 1927.
W.A. state executive correspondence file 321, Federal 
executive.
[3]
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y e a rs  p re v io u s ly .  Almost im m ediate ly  a lo n g -s ta n d in g  Labor o b je c t iv e  
was r e a l i s e d  by th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f th e  com pulsory m i l i t a r y  t r a i n in g  
scheme w hich had fu n c tio n e d  in  a much reduced  and i n e f f i c i e n t  manner 
th ro u g h o u t th e  tw e n t ie s .  I t  was accom plished  by a d m in is t r a t iv e  
r e g u la t io n  w ith in  days o f ta k in g  o f f i c e  and w ith o u t c o n s u l t in g  th e  
D efence D epartm ent, [1] b u t l e f t  th e  com pulsory c la u se s  o f  th e  D efence 
Act un touched . I f  any m ajor d e p a r tu re s  w ere ex p ec ted  on th e  b a s i s  of 
L ab o r’s p la tfo rm  o r s ta te m e n ts  when in  o p p o s itio n , such f e a r s  w ere 
removed by L a b o r 's  re c o rd  in  o f f i c e .  W ith in  months o f re a c h in g  th e  
T reasu ry  benches i t  f e l l  to  a s e n io r  Labor m in is te r  J .E .  F enton  to  
r e p re s e n t  A u s t r a l i a  a t  th e  London C onference on N aval D isarmam ent in  
Jan u ary  1930. At th o se  p ro cee d in g s  A u s t r a l i a  c o o p e ra ted  c lo s e ly  w ith  
th e  o th e r  members o f th e  Commonwealth in  fo rm u la tin g  a common B r i t i s h  
view p r io r  to  th e  p le n a ry  s e s s io n s ,  a t  w hich th e  Commonwealth n a v a l 
fo rc e s  w ere ta k e n  as a s in g le  u n i t  f o r  th e  p u rp o ses  o f n e g o t ia t io n .  
Fenton spoke up f o r c e f u l ly  on A u s t r a l i a 's  b e h a lf  in  su p p o rt o f th e  b lu e  
w a te r  s t r a t e g y ,  a d m ittin g  t h a t  he was seen  by th e  p re s s  a t  th e  
co n fe ren c e  'a s  one of th e  e x c e p t io n a l ly  b ig  navy men' and a c c e p tin g  
th e  e v e n tu a l outcome on th e  b a s is  o f  B r i t i s h  A dm iralty  ad v ic e  as to  
i t s  adequacy f o r  A u s t r a l ia n  n eed s . [2] C ontinued  a c c e p ta n c e  o f 
A u s t r a l ia n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w ith  th e  R.N. in  defen ce  p la n n in g , endorsed  
by le a d e r  o f th e  o p p o s itio n  J .G . Latham , was s u b je c t  on ly  to  L a b o r 's  
in s i s t e n c e  on m a in ta in in g  independence o f  judgem ent on f u tu r e  
invo lvem en ts:
I  s t a t e d  t h a t  we w ere n o t p re p a re d  to  g iv e  g u a ra n te e s  
in v o lv in g  us in  p o s s ib le  European e n ta n g le m e n ts . T hat was 
th e  a t t i t u d e  I  to o k  up d u rin g  th e  com m ittee d is c u s s io n s  and 
I  w ould have ta k e n  th e  same s ta n d  in  open co n fe ren c e  i f  
n e c e s s a ry . [3]
[1] CPD 122.6 December, 1929 pp . 844-6.
[2] CPD 126.30 J u ly ,  pp . 4935-40.
[3] I b i d . p . 4939
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Labor did little more than exploit the definition of Commonwealth 
membership provided in the Balfour Declaration in 1924 as ’autonomous 
communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way 
subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external 
affairs, though freely united in common allegiance to the Crown as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’ [1]
Labor’s federal conference in May, 1930 declined the opportunity 
to consider 'defence, war and peace' in depth and easily headed off 
the Pan-Pacific conference enthusiasts with an innocuous resolution 
in favor of world disarmament. [2] To deprive the RILU and the 
Communist Pan-Pacific Secretariat of their appeal to internationalist 
sentiment it was decided to investigate affiliation with the Amsterdam 
Second International, [3] but, as with all previous such initiatives, 
nothing practical eventuated. This left Scullin and Brennan free of 
constraints when both attended the Imperial Conference in September 
that year, addressing the disarmament committee of the League of Nations 
at Geneva en route where Brennan especially gave full play to his 
pacifist enthusiasm. More to the point, however, was the outcome 
of the Imperial Conference. No plenary session was held on defence 
and foreign affairs (the only such conference thus affected) though a 
special sub-committee was convened on Singapore. Despite Labor 
opposition to the plan since the mid-twenties it was decided that the 
ultimate completion of the defended naval base at Singapore would be 
pursued, Scullin being quite cheerful in endorsing a five year 
moratorium on new works to permit stabilisation of the international 
situation. [4] It was clear from these decisions, made when the 
full force of the Depression had yet to break upon the Labor government, 
that the ALP in office was little inclined to diverge to any significant 
extent from the policy of its opponents.
[1] R. York Hedges, 'Australia and the Imperial Conference*. 
A.Q. 9, 1 March, 1937 pp. 80-82.
[2] Report ALP federal conference 1930, pp. 53-6.
[3] Ibid, p. 78.
[4] Round Table 21 December, 1930 pp. 252-3; J.M. McCarthy, 
'Singapore and Australian Defence 1921-1942'. A.Q.
25, 2 August, 1971 pp. 165-80 and 'The ALP and the Armed 
Services: Theory and Practice'. L.H. 25 November, 1973 
pp. 58-67.
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Conclusions
ALP defence and foreign policies prior to the First World War 
were formed by the federal leadership of the party on the basis of the 
perceived political needs of the day. The party's federal consultative 
structure was used virtually to ratify the policies so formed on 
military and naval defence, within an implicitly accepted framework 
of Imperial co-operation with Great Britain. The Labor movement 
appeared happy with the procedure thus established and the policies 
devised. Little by way of protest was encountered as successive prewar 
Labor governments implemented the party platform clauses, which were of 
necessity highly generalised and greatest opposition to them came in 
fact from the ranks of the FPLP itself. By the outbreak of the war, 
resentments at certain aspects of Defence Act administration had given 
rise to party agitation, bearing fruit at federal level in demands for 
reform of some military practices and clarification of the implications 
of the universal trainee-based army for home defence. There was no 
discernible challenge to the unstated position of Australia vis a vis 
Great Britain. On the first matter, such opposition as did exist took 
the form chiefly of popular resistance to the onerous demands upon 
eligible youths and found organised shape in the creation of quite small 
groups of pacifist or Marxist persuasion without much direct influence 
on the Labor parties. This period marked the peak of an FPLP ascendancy 
that was not to survive the middle years of the war.
Initiatives for alternative policies came from left-wing parties 
and sects and other attitude groups on the fringes of political Labor, 
most seeking influence on trade unions and, through the trade union 
movement, upon the Labor parties themselves. Organisational connections 
between unions and parties varied in range from the TLCs, with their 
relatively strict industrial focus, to the vast, oligarchic AWU 
dissatisfied with Labor governments' performances and structural 
considerations, together with other, smaller unions with radical leader­
ships. Under normal circumstances the only direct trade union access to 
Labor party decision-making lay through affiliation strength. To be 
effective, this had to be closely organised and deployed in support of 
highly specific objectives, as was best illustrated at the time of the 
conscription crisis. Nearly all Labor political leaders favored 
conscription to some extent, making it very much an industrialist vs.
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politicians dispute. At the federal level, Hughes’ determination and his 
advantages as FPLP leader and Prime Minister were sufficient to cowe the 
membership into acceptance of a formula that effectively transferred the 
responsibility for the decision to the general public but seemed to 
offer the highest liklihood of successfully imposing compulsory military 
service. Holman in New South Wales, Vaughan in South Australia and 
Scaddan in Western Australia left their parties after defeat on 
conscription, taking substantial numbers of their parliamentary colleagues 
and varying proportions of the movement with them. In Tasmania Earle 
left after the great majority of the PLP rallied behind the anti- 
conscriptionist challenger, Lyons. Victorian leader Elmslie supported 
conscription, but was permitted to remain on the condition that he 
maintain a neutral stance throughout the campaign, while the new Ryan 
government in Queensland was unwilling to sacrifice the hard-won 
advantages of office to support what seemed increasingly to be a perverse, 
incorrectly-based policy. Ryan emerged as the main challenger to 
conscription purely on the grounds of the faulty reasoning of its 
proponents.
Expulsion of the conscriptionists was a development independent 
of struggles for control in most of the parties involved. Structural 
conflict in Victoria, the first state to declare its intention of 
enforcing its policy, was noticeably weak and in NSW the industrial 
section/politicians clash had already been substantially settled, if 
not finally resolved, earlier in the year. In Queensland and Tasmania, 
where there were no organised challenges (as distinct from minority 
discontent) to the established power balances from below, expulsions 
were enforced with alacrity. Only in South Australia was the issue of 
support for conscription actually used as a weapon by one faction 
against the dominant one to upset the leadership. Every effort was made 
in Western Australia to conciliate the conscriptionists up until the 
last: the split in that state was forced by federal events.
Structural conflict in NSW and South Australia preceded the 
outbreak of war in origin, being induced by the disappointments of Labor 
in office and exacerbated by wartime conditions and by under-representation 
of important elements in the parties. Only in the former case did these 
conditions lead to a long-term effect, for in South Australia the issue 
was resolved once the challenging group attained its objectives. The
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NSW result differed because of fundamental disparities between the 
respective states, affecting the nature and style of factional 
behaviour. in every state, except Tasmania and Western Australia, 
there were organised left-wing groups and party factions within the 
Labor movement, persistently advancing radical policy alternatives on 
conscription, recruiting and support for the war itself. These were 
limited in their effectiveness by several factors, including the size 
and diversity of the workforce sustaining the local Labor movement, 
the tactical approach of the groups as measured by readiness to agitate 
directly within the movement to gain influence in the party, or to 
eschew party involvement altogether in favor of other forms of political 
activity. Chances for success of these groups rested additionally upon 
the attitude of the Labor leadership to group activity and that leader­
ship’s determination and capacity to prevent such activity.
More specifically, at one extreme can be identified such 
examples as the IWW, unconcerned with political success in the 
established system and related thereby to those other parties who saw 
their role as being to compete against the Labor party directly - the 
Australian Socialist and Socialist Labor parties for example. Being 
opposed by the Labor party leaderships for obvious reasons and unable 
to secure mass adherance, these bodies nevertheless contributed 
indirectly by helping to set the terms of debate and outline the 
alternatives to accepted or unchallenged policies. Next can be placed 
those groups and parties concerned to exert direct influence as 
sympathetic but conscious vanguard elements in the parties, leading but 
not outpacing them. The Australian Freedom League, Australian Peace 
Alliance, Victorian Socialist party and their imitators, or ad hoc 
groups such as the Wage Earners in the Victorian Labor party can be 
cited here. This role was particularly subject to the sensitivities of 
Labor leaderships to any threat agai nst their positions and most often 
raised antagonisms in direct proportion to their initial successes. The 
third category comprised such factions as the NSW industrial section, 
later Industrial Vigilance Council, its South Australian counterpart and 
the Militant Propagandists and Catholic Workers' Association in Victoria. 
In the first two cases, success was achieved in actually taking over the 
party in the face of spirited resistance by the parliamentary leadership;
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in Victoria an attempt to supplant at least a portion of the leadership 
by means of a conference ticket selected by the Militants failed because 
the ruling group was sufficiently broadly based to retain the confidence 
of the majority. The Catholic workers strictly limited themselves in 
scope of action and did not sustain as an organised faction. Tasmania 
experienced conditions apparently ideally suited to inciting a threat 
to the leadership, but the opportunity was not exploited, due largely to 
the underdeveloped state of unionism and its incapacity to maintain such 
an effort. Western Australia shared the same historical and socio­
economic disabilities as Tasmania, although the latter was doubly 
inhibited in regard to conditions for an insurrection by the presence 
of a radical-sounding and apparently sympathetic leader who took over 
the party without need of prompting. Despite the familiarity of the 
NSW experience then, it should be emphasised just how exceptional this 
particular case proved to be.
Success by the industrialists in South Australia resulted in the 
accession to power of a moderate union elite, principally led by the AWU 
branch; hereafter the S.A. party remained relatively untouched by radical 
policies on the war and was the most conservative Labor party at the end 
of 1918. By contrast, there existed in NSW a diversity of elements 
involved in the insurrection, running from the AWU and the more radically 
inclined Miners’ Federation to the left-wing branches and unions, who 
all found common cause against Holman. Once the victory was won two 
critically important developments occurred: the decision, firstly, to
maintain the industrial section after the split in late 1916, due to an 
institutionalised suspicion of politicians as a class rather than merely 
one particular group of them. At the 1917 state conference the 
unsuccessful proposals for card vote representation and exclusion of 
politicians from state executive in the previous year were at last carriea 
and the continuance of a special organisation of industrialists affirmed. 
Secondly, there was a transfer of leading unionists from the original 
section to places on the state executive and, later, to state and federal 
seats made available by the conscription purge. Quite accidentally, 
important leaders like Sam Rosa and John Power missed out in the scramble 
for office and were left in control of the Industrial Vigilance Council, 
making the most of their opportunities to maximise this position of 
irresponsible power - that is, without the constraints imposed on the new
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Ifcfldirrn attempting to run the party and to increase its parliamentary 
representation, aims which naturally conduced to adoption of more 
moderate attitudes and policies. By the time the implications of this 
situation had been realised, the radical war and recruiting policies 
contrived by the IVC were unstoppable.
Victory by the socialist left in the Sydney Labor Council at 
the same time demonstrated the rank and file support for this radical 
shift, but the organised unions there were not well placed to readily 
urge their similar attitudes upon the party: in any case the ideological
disposition of key leaders like Judd prejudiced many of them against 
Labor political activity. Even the Brisbane Industrial Council and 
Melbourne THC, also quite radical at the ti me, were unable to 
significantly affect their respective state parties to anything approaching 
a similar extent, as unions in those states were relatively well integrated 
and without an independent channel into the party. Even so, it must be 
stressed that the radicals in the IVC and their counterparts elsewhere 
were restricted to those issues upon which they could summon mass support 
through their genuine popularity and were not capable of imposing policies 
at will upon political Labor.
Once the NSW war and recruiting policies reached the federal 
level the major difficulties involved in inducing change within a 
confederal party were encountered. Despite wide rank and file Labor 
disillusionment with the war effort to date, exemplified by reactions to 
the Governor-General’s recruiting conference, and a distinct lack of 
leadership from the federal leaders, amongst whom FPLP secretary Catts 
was responsible for the most positive declarations, the proposals were 
defeated in outright form even after their moderation at NSW state 
conference. Reception of the policies turned upon the responses of 
individual delegates and the need for solidarity perceived by all, 
producing the extremely narrow result in favor of a compromise. The 
diplomacy of T.J. Ryan, secure in his record as Labor premier and the 
ability to match Hughes in public debate, and the well defined policies 
of Catts saved the day for the federal leadership. Only two votes 
prevented adoption of the radical position of opposing further 
participation in the war; by contrast, ALP endorsement of the generalised 
and largely impracticable Peace Alliance-influenced plank with little
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controversy indicated the extent to which that organisation had been 
forced to attenuate the substance of its objectives in return for 
gaining support through the indirect method.
As with the rest of the nation, the Labor movement estimated 
Australian national requirements in terms of its own domestically defined 
interests and acted during the war accordingly. In addition to purely 
material concerns, such as the personal cost of conscription and 
economic unrest bred by inflation, there was the opinion that the reasons 
for the war were less idealistic than had been proclaimed, reinforced by 
British treatment of Ireland, and that the results of overseas service 
would be the erosion of domestic standards and introduction of cheap 
colored labor. This last fear combined with misgivings over the 
intentions of Japan from 1916, culminating in a state approaching panic 
two years later. Because of the suppression of public debate upon this 
subject it is difficult to trace it accurately, but fears were strongest 
at high levels in the FPLP, which alone had access to relevant information, 
and were transmitted to union leaders and into the mass audiences, where 
a responsive chord was struck; it was a case of federal party concern 
meeting popular misgivings. Without this apprehension towards Japan 
within the FPLP and its strong influence on the rest of the Labor movement 
by the end of the war, opposition to the continued participation in the 
conflict in Europe and to abandonment of compulsory military training in 
the Labor defence plank would have been far less determined and successful 
than was the case. While the rank and file had trenchant reasons for 
discontent with the war it was not solely a one-way process of this 
feeding into federal policy-making considerations. Fear of Japan at the 
highest parliamentary and trade union levels augmented and shaped ALP 
disagreement with Australia's continued, single-minded concentration upon 
sustaining the AIF in Europe.
From the first year of peace the basic divisions and trends of 
Labor thinking in the nineteen-twenties were apparent and found concise 
expression as early as the 1919 federal conference. Labor defence policy, 
established for a decade as reliance upon a compulsorily-trained citizen 
army and a navy closely locked into the British naval strategy, was 
reversed with the decision to dispute the compulsory clauses of the 
Defence Act and emergence of the submarines and aircraft argument as a 
substitute for closer Imperial partnership. Isolationist and working
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class international enthusiasm was also in evidence from this time.
With the end of the war came changes in the channels of influence in 
the ALP as well, during the years of continuing militancy from 1919-21. 
Breakup of the IVC in NSW removed a potent source of radical inputs and 
henceforth the factions in that state were principally occupied fighting 
each other. When rank and file discontent attained a postwar peak, it 
was the ALP federal leadership itself which actively solicited 
industrialist opinion, and gave the opportunity for all unions to meet 
on a national basis with guaranteed access to the highest federal party 
councils. Accepted by these unions as a minor corollary to socialisation 
and the OBU was the proposal for the Pan-Pacific Conference, adopted at 
the 1921 ALP federal conference with much the same reservations as 
accompanied qualified approval of the socialisation plank - and with as 
much effect. No follow-up could be carried out at that stage because of 
consistent failure to establish a permanent national union structure of 
the type which was only tentatively and unsatisfactorily achieved by 1927.
Once the stimulus provided by the war had been removed there was 
an unmistakeable reassertion of FPLP dominance in ALP defence and foreign 
policy formulation. The Pan-Pacific Conference initiative was strongly 
supported from below, being raised at every federal conference from 1921 
to 1930, winning its most favorable reception during 1924-6. When it 
broke down in execution and left-wing unions began promotion of it 
through the newly formed ACTU in the shape of the Communist Pan-Pacific 
Trade Union Secretariat, ALP leaders were quick to disown it altogether. 
After temporarily toying with isolationism in the aftermath of Chanak 
and its minor sequels during the rest of the decade, the FPLP leaders 
were forced to attempt to come to terms with the British Commonwealth 
connection, and it was eventually substantially accepted subject to a 
necessarily vaguely-worded but deeply felt reservation on too close and 
uncritical a relationship with Great Britain. That the party leadership 
never seriously contemplated going beyond this was born out by its essay 
at national government from 1929: assessment of Labor policy based upon
statements while in opposition is risky, due to the over-emphasis of 
their reactive nature; certainly there was nothing in the ALP platform 
suggesting any dramatic departures once the Pan-Pacific idea was firmly 
given its quietus. FPLP dominance on defence was underlined by the 
acceptance of its recommendations by federal delegates in 1924, although
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rejection of these highly explicit but extremely broad-ranging 
provisions three years later served as a reminder of how deeply anti­
militarist and pacifist principles had been accepted in the Labor 
movement. Caucus discretion in the practical application of platform 
principles remained unchanged, enabling Labor to make little real 
deviation from established defence planning giving primacy to naval 
co-operation with Great Britain once the party had regained office.
Even abolition of compulsory military training, such as it was by the 
end of the twenties, marked a disagreement over fundamentals between 
Labor and its opponents which was more apparent than real.
Throughout this study policy has been defined as the federal 
platform provisions on defence and foreign relations, together with what 
federal Labor leaders enlarged on or attempted to implement from this 
basis. Main conflict was fought out between forces in the state parties 
attempting to obtain revisions of policy, and the FPLP leadership, 
charged with the responsibility for presenting it to the electors, seeking 
to minimise radical departures. No simple trade union vs. parliamentary 
party dichotomy is apparent in this process, but there was no doubt that 
the predominant voice belonged initially to the latter. Three particular 
challenges to FPLP independence were thrown out concerning these areas 
of traditionally federal concern during this era; over conscription in 
1916 when the party held office; the war and recruiting in 1918; and the 
internationalist/isolationist dispute, during 1924-27 particularly. Each 
was sustained by conditions of mass support within substantial portions 
of the principle state parties for the changes being advocated by 
influential elites, in direct opposition to the moderation and electorally- 
conscious policies of the ALP leaders. Under exceptional circumstances, 
involving a grave challenge to deeply assimilated attitudes in the Labor 
movement, the ALP leaders were repudiated in 1916, then sorely tried in 
1918, but within a decade of the disastrous split the autonomy of the 
FPLP was in a large measure restored.
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APPENDIX I.
Resolution on Recruiting, adopted by Sydney Labor Council,
30 May 1918.
’That this council, after careful consideration of the 
war and the issues involved, and being fully zeized with the 
momentous nature of such issues, declares
[1] That careful consideration should be given to the 
question pressed by Lords Morley, Brassey, Loreburn (ex-Chancellor 
of England), Farrer, Beauchamp and Lansdowne, namely, "Is it worth 
while indefinitely to prolong the awful struggle with its 
lamentable sacrifice of life and the waste of resources not easily to 
be replaced?"
[2] That we deeply regret that the Federal Government ignored 
the peace proposals of the P.L.L. Conference last June, and this 
Council’s endoresement in January last of the preamble of those 
proposals and demand therefore that the Allied Governments immediately 
initiate negotiations for peace.
[3] That the secret treaties of the Allied Governments, as 
published in the press disclosing designs of territorial 
aggrandisement; the placing of an army of approximately 80,000 armed 
men in Ireland; the Allied Governments’ attitude towards the working 
class Government in Russia; Mr Hughes’ speech before the Manufacturers 
of this city, in which he thanked God that Germany had plunged the 
world into this war; and the fact that all anti-Labor forces are in 
favor of the war and its continuance, justify grave doubts regarding 
the contention that the Allied Governments are fighting solely for 
liberty, justice and democracy.
[4] That the Allied Statemen's rejection of Chancellor von 
Hollweg’s peace offer (December 12, 1916), President Wilson’s 'Appeal
to Belligerents’ (December 22, 1916), the Pope’s appeal (August 2, 1917), 
Germany's peace offer (December 25, 1917) and the Allied Government’s
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refusal of passports to the Labor leaders to attend the Stockholm 
peace conference (August, 1917), and the failure of the Allied 
statesmen to initiate peace negotiations enable the German militarists 
to persuade the German workers that the Allied Governments are more 
concerned about rendering Germany impotent as a competitor in the 
world markets than in securing an early and just peace.
[5] That the economic resolutions of the Paris conference, the 
demand for the annexation of German colonies, the declaration in favor 
of 'crushing Germany' and other imperialistic utterances of bellicose 
statesmen and publicists have strengthened and are still strengthening, 
the German ruling class, and have prolonged and are still prolonging 
the war.
[6] That as all modern wars are caused by the conflicting interests 
of different sections of the capitalist class, a 'conclusive' or 
'permanent peace' is not possible under capitalism.
[7] That the secret conference of English, French and German 
financiers in Switzerland last September for the purpose of devising 
means to control Labor after the war, proves that they place their class 
interests and the safeguarding of Capitalism above the welfare of 
suffering humanity.
[8] That the Federal Government's further attempt to introduce 
conscription and its refusal to grant Mr Foster's passport to Russia 
have an evil significance-especially when combined with the wholesale 
suppression of Labor-Socialist literature and free speech, and the 
censorship, which is far worse than the English censorship.
[9] That the promises of the Nationalist Government at the 
Recruiting Conference should be carried out as acts of justice: we 
refuse to accept them as bribes for lives.
[10] That the bleeding of the manhood of the white races to death, 
thereby forcing many millions of women to endure a life of celibacy 
and hard and uncongenial work, is a crime against civilization.
[11] That the peoples of the belligerent nations are war-weary 
and long for peace.
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[12] That the greatest service we can render the men at the 
Front, their loved ones at home, and humanity in ge neral is to do all 
in our power to stop the war. Therefore, whilst fully expecting 
anti-Labor forces to misrepresent and calumniate our action, we refuse 
to take part in any recruiting campaign and call upon the workers of 
this and all other belligerent countries to urge their respective 
Governments to immediately secure an armistice on all Fronts and 
initiate negotiations for peace.1
Moved at Special Meeting Sydney Labor Council 2 May, 1918 by 
E.E. Judd, and carried after protracted debate.)
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APPENDIX I I
Peace p ropogal»  of N.S.W. I n d u s t r i a l  S e c t io n , 1918. 
C i r c u l a r  S ta te  of N.S.W. A nnual c o n fe re n c e , 1 9 1 8 /
The D efence of A u s t r a l i a .
[1) A u s t r a l ia  from h e r  i s o la te d  p o s i t io n  and th e  im m ensity of h e r 
a re a  compared to  p o p u la tio n  i s  u n iq u e  among th e  c i v i l i s e d  com m unities 
of th e  w o rld . As th e  one o u tp o s t of W hite C iv i l i s a t i o n  whose n e a r e s t  
n e ig h b o u rs  in  enormous numbers a re  anx ious to  f in d  more elbow room, we 
a re  in  g rave  danger of b e in g  swamped o u t o f e x is te n c e  by th e  mere w eigh t 
of t h e i r  num bers, shou ld  we a llo w  them f r e e  in g r e s s .  These A lie n  Races 
occupy a much low er s ta g e  o f economic developm ent th an  we have a t t a in e d ,  
and even in  sm a ll num bers, a re  a menace to  our S tan d ard  of L iv in g .
[2] To r e s t r i c t  th e  in f lu x  o f th e s e  ra c e s  i s  v i t a l  to  A u s t r a l i a ’s 
e x is te n c e  as a f r e e  community. To m a in ta in  th e se  r e s t r i c t i o n s  we m ust be 
a b le  to  defend  o u rs e lv e s  a g a in s t  th e  a g g re s s io n  o f th o se  whose i n t e r e s t s  
a re  opposed to  t h a t  p o l ic y .
The on ly  r e l i a b l e  d e fen ce  o f A u s t r a l i a  m ust be a lo c a l  d e fe n c e . 
The c o n te n tio n  th a t  A u s t r a l ia n  freedom  m ust f o r  a l l  tim e depend upon th e  
co n tin u ed  n av a l suprem acy of G rea t B r i t a in  i s  as f a l s e  as i t  i s  
m isch ievous and cow ard ly . Our d is ta n c e  from o th e r  la n d s  re n d e rs  th e  
d e fen ce  of A u s t r a l ia  from fo re ig n  a g g re s s io n  q u i te  p r a c t i c a b l e ,  b u t  none 
th e  l e s s ,  an im m ediate n e c e s s i ty .
For th e  ad eq u a te  d e fen c e  o f A u s t r a l i a  we recommend
(a) The e s ta b l is h m e n t of an a r s e n a l  f u l l y  equipped fo r  th e  
m an u fac tu re  of a r t i l l e r y  and a l l  th e  m u n itio n s  of War.
(b) The f o r t i f i c a t i o n  of our C o a s ta l towns and c i t i e s .
(c) The c o n s tru c t io n  of a f l e e t  o f su bm arines.
(d) The e r e c t io n  of Aerodromes a t  s u i t a b le  p o in ts  around th e  
C oast l i n e  of A u s t r a l i a .
(e) The e s ta b lis h m e n t in  A u s t r a l i a  of works f o r  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  
of a i r c r a f t  in  la rg e  numbers and t h e i r  u t i l i s a t i o n  in  peace  tim e fo r  th e  
c a r r ia g e  of m a ils  and o th e r  u s e f u l  p u rp o se s .
( f )  The encouragem ent of R i f l e  C lubs.
(g) The m i l i t a r y  t r a in in g  of ou r a b le  manhood.
(h) The e s ta b l is h m e n t of a l l  e s s e n t i a l  in d u s t r i e s  in  A u s t r a l ia
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so that in the event of invasion the Commonwealth may be self- 
contained .
(i) The establishment of such economic and political conditions 
as will enable the Commonwealth to attract and maintain a large 
population of free and prosperous White Citizens.
Proposals for discussion re the attitude of the Labor Movement 
on War and recruiting.
[1] That a year ago the Labor Party of N.S.W., recognising the 
appalling loss of life, the destruction of wealth and other evils arising 
from the present war, adopted proposals which sought to secure peace by 
negotiations. These proposals, which were endorsed by the Labor 
movement in every State, were forwarded to Great Britain, America and 
other English speaking communities and have been generally approved.
[2] Whereas the Government of the Commonwealth has taken no steps 
to bring these or any other peace proposals before the Imperial 
Government but, on the contrary, has manifested open hostility to all 
suggestions for attaining peace and has endeavored to suppress them.
[3] Whereas the Governments of Great Britain, her Allies and the 
Central Powers seem equally determined to continue this colossal and 
inhuman conflict as long as the supplies of men are available for 
further butchery; and as this insane slaughter policy threatens to destroy 
the roots of our white civilisation which have been slowly garnered 
during three thousand years of human effort and suffering, we advise
the workers here and in other lands to unite for its immediate 
suppression.
[4] Realising that, whatever the immediate causes of the war have 
been, that its fundamental origin is economic, and that racial 
animosities are subsidiary causes fostered and exploited by the military 
and ruling classes, we are less concerned with apportioning the blame 
for the outbreak of the conflagration than with the need for its 
immediate suppression.
[5] The press censorship and general application of despotic powers 
by the Government have entirely prevented the free discussion of the war 
and many vital problems therefrom, and no public reply has been possible
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to the most outrageous falsehoods or the most mischievous arguments.
It therefore becomes then a duty which can be no longer honourably evaded 
for this party, representing the sentiments of the Australian nation to 
disregard these unjust and tyrannical restrictions and proclaim its 
message to the people elsewhere. The present conditions of Russia, 
Finland and the Ukraine Republic are held up to Australia as shocking 
examples of what would happen to the whole world if Britain and her 
Allies consented to peace by negotiation before inflicting a knockout 
blow upon Germany. Such a contention is absurd. Even assuming the 
worst stories of German greed and treachery to be true, between the 
present belligerent powers no such inequality exists as between them and 
Russia. Our armies remain strong and intact, our munitions and equipment 
undiminished. If an honourable and equitable peace were agreed on in 
conference the armies of all the Powers concerned would be gradually and 
simultaneously demolished, and no nation would be able to dominate or 
terrorise another. Failing agreement by conference hostilities could be 
resumed, although such a calamitous contingency would be unlikely.
[6] We contend that the forces making for militaristic continuance 
of this war are financial and commercial greed, land hunger, ambition and 
a spurious public opinion, deliberately manufactured and sustained by an 
unscrupulous press.
[7] It behoves us, therefore, to spare no effort and shirk no risk 
in order to spread the truth as we know it among those who suffer and 
perish for lack of knowledge.
[8] Australia occupies a unique position among the communities of
the earth today-the largest remaining territory suitable by climatic
conditions to sustain the white race and possessing abundant space for
»
its growth.Australia s development is restricted by lack of people to 
settle and develop her enormous waste spaces. As the lone outpost of 
white civilisation, Australia is at once the most easily defended great 
country in the world, and at the same time the one most in need of 
defence, and the land in which defence has been most scandalously 
neglected. The danger grows greater day by day, and yet the conspiracy of 
silence among our rulers and their Press mouthpieces grows more 
persistent and more ominous,and already any preparations we make will 
only be just in time to avert disaster.
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[9] N early  400,00 men have l e f t  our sh o re s  to  ta k e  p a r t  in  th e  
in te rm in a b le  c o n f l i c t  ra g in g  in  Europe and seem ingly  no n e a re r  
f i n a l i t y  now th a n  in  1914. Our governm ent, w hich m easures a l l  
A u s t r a l ia n  i n t e r e s t s  w ith  th e  y a r d s t ic k  of th e  B r i t i s h  m e rc h an t, 
con tends t h a t  A u s t r a l i a 's  b e s t  d e fen c e  i s  on th e  f i e l d s  o f F rance 
and F la n d e rs  and a re  f r a n t i c a l l y  u rg in g  every  a b le  bod ied  c i t i z e n  to  
le a v e  h is  co u n try  fo r  h i s  c o u n t ry 's  good,and have i t  made a p e n a l 
o ffe n c e  fo r  anyone to  a d v ise  s to p p in g  th e  mad stam pede.
[10] We contend  th a t  th e  lo c a l  d e fen c e  of A u s t r a l i a  i s  n o t on ly  
p r a c t ic a b le  b u t i s  an im m ediate and im p e ra tiv e  d u ty , th e  f u l f i lm e n t  
of w hich i s  of v i t a l  concern  to  our co n tin u ed  freedom . The mean and 
cow ardly c o n te n tio n  th a t  A u s t r a l ia n  freedom  i s  now and ev er m ust be 
c o n tin g e n t upon th e  n av a l supremecy of G rea t B r i t a in  in  th e  N orth  Sea 
i s  as f a l s e  as  i t  i s  m isc h iev o u s . At th e  o u tb re a k  of war our own sm all 
navy , d e r id e d  a t  i t s  in c e p t io n  by every  j in g o  p a t r i o t  in  th e  Common­
w e a lth ,  a lo n e  saved our c o a s ta l  c i t i e s  from d e s t r u c t iv e  enemy r a i d s ,  
w h ile  our seab o rn e  commence and m i l i t a r y  t r a n s p o r t s  have been  p ro te c te d  
by th e  navy of a fo re ig n  a l l y .
[11] A u s t r a l i a 's  s p a rs e  p o p u la tio n  has been  so g r e a t ly  d e p le te d  
by h e r  sh a re  in  th e  w ar, h e r  m an u fac tu res  n e g le c te d  and h e r  f in a n c ia l  
o b l ig a t io n s  so h e a v ily  in c re a se d  th a t  our v e ry  e x is te n c e  i s  in  
je o p a rd y . Taking th e se  f a c t s  in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  our G overnm ent's 
r e f u s a l  to  n e g o t ia te  fo r  p e a c e , t h i s  co n fe ren c e  th e r e f o r e  d e c la re s
[a] T hat th e  p o lic y  of th e  ALP i s  opposed to  any men in  
f u tu r e  le a v in g  A u s t r a l ia  fo r  m i l i t a r y  s e rv ic e  ab ro ad .
[b] T h a t, f a i l i n g  th e  co n sen t of th e  Im p e r ia l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
to  a t  once open up n e g o t ia t io n s  fo r  p e a c e , th e  A u s t r a l ia n  d iv i s io n s  
on s e rv ic e  abroad  be b rough t back to  A u s t r a l i a .
[c] T hat we c a l l  upon th e  o rg a n ise d  w orkers  o f every  co u n try  
engaged in  th e  war to  ta k e  s im i la r  a c t io n .
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APPENDIX III
AUSTRALIAN PEACE ALLIANCE 
OBJECTS AND PLATFORM, 1916.
Objects.
[1] To bind together all the forces in Australia that are 
sympathetic to the establishment and maintenance of peace by means of 
international organisation, arbitration and other such methods as may 
be favored.
[2] To create where practicable State Councils in sympathy 
with the objects of the Alliance.
[3] To cooperate wherever possible with, similar organisations 
in other parts of the world.
[A] To advocate the abolition of all forms of conscription.
[5] To uphold the principle of freedom of speech, and to 
cooperate with all organisations fighting for liberty of expression.
[6] To advocate the following platform:-
Platform
[a] The establishment of an effective and permanent 
international arbitration court elected on a democratic basis, in­
cluding women's delegates.
[b] The setting up of adequate machinery (including enfranch­
isement of women) for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy.
[c] The general reduction of armaments and the national­
isation of their manufacture.
[d] The organisation of the trade unions and workers 
associations, with a definite view of ending the war.
[e] The education of children in the principles of peace 
and arbitration.
[f] The appointment of a Minister for Peace and the 
appropriation of a considerable sum of public money for the 
dissemination of peace ideas.
[g] The termination of the present war at the earliest 
possible moment, and the following principles to govern the terms of 
peace:-
ti] No province or territory in any part of the world shall 
be transferred from one Government to another without the consent by 
plebisite of the population of such province.
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[ii] No treaty, arrangement or undertaking involving the 
nations in armed support of any Powers shall be entered upon in the 
name Great Britain without the confirmation of a national referendum. 
Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy 
shall be created.
[iii] The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be 
aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the Balance 
of Power but shall be directed to the establishment of a concert of 
Europe and the setting up of an international council, whose deliber­
ations and decisions shall be public.
[iv] Great Britain shall propose as part of the peace 
settlement a plan for the drastic reduction of armaments by the consent 
of all the belligerent powers, and to facilitate that policy shall 
attempt to secure the general nationalisation of the manufacture of 
armaments and the prohibition of the export of armaments by one 
country to another.
[v] The universal abolition of Continental Conscription 
and compulsory military training.
[vi] No war shall be declared without a national referendum.
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APPENDIX IV
Australian Union of Democratic Control. Platform, 1916-17«
Note:
(A branch of the Australian Peace Alliance was founded in Sydney 
on 30 November 1915. Following disagreements at the federal APA 
conference in Melbourne at Easter, 1916 the NSW branch broke away to 
become the Australian Union of Democratic Control (for the Avoidance 
of War.) on 21 June, 1916. The platform adopted was as set out below. 
Another change of attitude took place in late 1917 with the result 
that the AUDC renamed itself Australian Peace Alliance, NSW Council 
following another interstate conference at Easter, 1918. The AUDC 
platform’s modest scope compared to that of the original Australian 
Peace Alliance will be apparant, as also will the lack of an explicit 
commitment to organising in the Labor movement in pursuit of its 
aims in plank [d] of the APA document.)
AUDC Platform.
A.
B.
D.
C.
The creation of adequate machinery to ensure democratic 
control of foreign policy and that each British Dominion 
shall have a voice in the foreign policy of the Empire.
The establishment or development on a proper basis of a 
Parliament or Council of the Empire which shall have charge 
or the foreign affairs of the Empire.
That the foreign policy of the British Empire shall be directed 
to the establishment of a concert of Europe, and the setting 
up of an International Council or Parliament worldwide in 
scope whose decisions shall be public.
That until such an International Council or Parliament has 
been created Britain shall urge upon the powers a resort 
to the existing Court of Arbitration, or to a Commission of 
Enquiry or to other means provided by Hague Conventions for 
the avoidance of war.
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E. T hat G rea t B r i t a in  s h a l l  p ropose  as p a r t  o f th e  s e t t le m e n t 
of th e  p re s e n t  war a p la n  fo r  th e  d r a s t i c  re d u c t io n  of arm­
aments by th e  co n sen t of a l l  th e  b e l l i g e r e n t  powers and
th e  a b o l i t i o n  of p r iv a t e  m an u fac tu re  and t r a d e  in  arm am ents.
F . T hat no t e r r i t o r y  in  any p a r t  o f th e  w orld  s h a l l  be  t r a n s ­
f e r r e d  from one governm ent to  a n o th e r  w ith o u t th e  co n sen t 
of th e  p o p u la tio n  of such t e r r i t o r y .
G. The u n iv e r s a l  a b o l i t i o n  of c o n s c r ip t io n  and com pulsory 
m i l i t a r y  t r a i n in g .
L.C . Jau n cey , The S to ry  of C o n sc r ip tio n  in  A u s t r a l i a . L ondon,1935 p .1 3 6 .
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APPENDIX V
ALP peace plank 1918 federal conference, 
based upon NSW state conference proposals, 1917.
PEACE PROPOSALS
That as theGovernments of Europe, founded on class rule and adopting 
the methods of secret diplomacy, have failed utterly to preserve 
peace, or to bring the present war within measurable distance of a 
conclusion, and whereas the existing capitalistic system of production 
for profit compels every nation constantly to seek new markets to 
exploit, inevitably leading to a periodic clash of rival interests, we 
contend that only by an organised system of production for use, under 
democratic control, can a recurrence of such calamities be permanently 
avoided. The present system, by fostering commercial rivalry, territorial 
greed and dynastic ambitions, has created an atmosphere of mutual fear 
and distrust among the great powers, which was the immediate cause of the 
present colossal struggle.
While the people suffer and die in millions, thousands of the ruling 
and privileged classes are amassing huge fortunes out of war profits.
We are, therefore, convinced that peace can only be accomplished by 
the united efforts of the workers of all the countries involved.
We, therefore, to quote the "Sydney Morning Herald" of April 18, 1917, 
"Rejoice over the revolution in Russia" and congratulate the people 
of that country upon their efforts to abolish despotic power and 
class privileges.
We are of opinion that a complete military victory by the Allies over 
the Central European Powers, can only be accomplished by the further 
sacrifice of human lives, and the creation of an intolerable burden 
of debt, to the further impoverishment of the workers, who must bear 
such burdens.
We,therefore, urge that immediate negotiations be initiated for an 
International Conference, for the purpose of arranging equitable terms 
of peace, on which conference the working-class organisations shall 
have adequate representation, and the inclusion of womem delegates, 
and we further urge that the British self-governing Dominions and 
Ireland shall be granted seperate representation thereon.
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We subm it t h a t ,  in  fram ing  th e  term s of* a l a s t i n g  p e a c e , th e  fo llo w in g  
p r in c ip le s  shou ld  be o b se rv e d : -
1 . The r i g h t  of sm a ll n a t io n s  ( in c lu d in g  I r e la n d )  to  p o l i t i c a l  
in d ep en d en ce .
2. T hat th e  European c o u n tr ie s  occupied  by in v a d in g  arm ies d u rin g  
th e  p re s e n t  war be im m ediately  e v ac u a ted .
3 . T hat d is p u te d  p ro v in c e s  or t e r r i t o r i e s  s h a l l  choose t h e i r  own 
form s of governm ent, o r s h a l l  be a t ta c h e d  to  such  a d ja c e n t c o u n tr ie s  
as th e  m a jo r i ty  of t h e i r  in h a b i ta n ts  may by p l e b i s c i t e  d e c id e , on th e  
d em o cra tic  p r in c ip le  t h a t  a l l  j u s t  government m ust r e s t  on th e  co n sen t 
o f th e  governed . The f r e e  e x e rc is e  of such c h o ic e , under c o n d itio n s
of p o l i t i c a l  e q u a l i ty ,  to  be secu red  by th e  appo in tm en t of an i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  com mission o f c o n t r o l .
NOTE:- T his co u rse  ( w ith  such sa fe g u a rd s  f o r  th e  r i g h t s  of 
m in o r i t i e s  in  com m unities of mixed ra c e s  as th e  C onference m ight 
d e v ise )  would se c u re  a f i n a l  s e t t le m e n t o f th e  r i v a l  c la im s fo r  
A ls a c e -L o rra in e , P o lan d » T ran sy lv an ia  and o th e r  t e r r i t o r i e s  
s im i la r ly  c irc u m sta n c e d .
4 . T h a t, p r io r  to  th e  d isbandm ent of th e  com batent a rm ies and th e  
m erchan t n a v ie s  employed in  th e  w ar, th ey  s h a l l  be u t i l i s e d  by an 
o rg a n ise d  system  o f v o lu n te e r  s e rv ic e  fo r  r e s to r in g  th e  d e v a s ta te d  
t e r r i t o r i e s  a t  th e  expense o f th e  in v ad in g  pow ers, w hich s h a l l  a ls o  
com pensate th e  widows and dependan ts of a l l  n o n -co m b a tan ts , in c lu d in g  
seam en, who have l o s t  t h e i r  l i v e s  as a r e s u l t  of h o s t i l i t i e s .
5 . T h a t, w here an am icab le  arrangem ent canno t be reach ed  by th e  
Peace C onference in  re g a rd  to  cap tu red  c o lo n ie s  and d e p e n d e n c ie s , such 
t e r r i t o r i e s  s h a l l  be p la ced  p ro v is io n a l ly  under in t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .
6 . T hat th e  freedom  of th e  se a s  be secu red  on th e  l i n e s  l a id  down by 
P r e s id e n t  W ilson , of A m erica, in  h i s  speech  a t  W ashington , in  May 
1916, w here he ad v o ca ted -
"A u n iv e r s a l  a s s o c ia t io n  of th e  n a t io n s  to  m a in ta in  th e  
i n v i o l a t e  s e c u r i t y  o f th e  highway of th e  s e a s  f o r  th e  
common and u n h in d ered  u se  of a l l  th e  n a t io n s  of th e  w orld .* '
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7. The abolition of trading in armaments and the prohibition of the 
private manufacture thereof.
8. The abolition of conscription in all countries simult^ously.
9. The control of foreign relations under a democratic system, based 
upon publicity in lieu of the present methods of secret diplomacy.
10. That the existing machinery for International arbitration be 
expanded to embrace a concert of Europe, ultimately merging into a 
world-wide Parliament, as advocated by President Wilson in a recent 
message to the American Congress.
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